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This thesis is a qualitative study of firefighters, and focuses on how firefighters, a predominantly 
male, white and able-bodied group with popular public support, form tight knit teams on and off the 
fireground, and their motivations for so doing.  It is also a study of gender, which aims to describe 
and deconstruct masculinity.  In part the thesis was undertaken with a view to assisting the fire 
service (specifically the few women who are firefighters) with its difficulties in relation to equal 
opportunities.   
 
  One understanding the thesis provides is that firefighters bond around a common professional 
ethos: to provide an efficient service to help the public.  To achieve this, firefighters form informal 
hierarchies through which they create protocols for firefighting, thus setting the standards for what 
comprises a ‘good firefighter’: a label firefighters test themselves against when they ‘get in’ to fight 
a fire.  However, before firefighters can achieve this they must first access the skills of firefighting 
(which experienced firefighters are pleased to hand on), but only after a newcomer ‘fits in’ with the 
agendas of the informal hierarchy, some of which have little to do with firefighting.   
 
  However, there is a second view, and this suggests that ‘fitting in’ and ‘getting in’ to pass the test 
of being seen as a ‘good firefighter’ also coincides with the way firefighters form their masculinity.  
This then provides a second common cause amongst firefighters, and so might explain why 
firefighters gather so successfully under the umbrella of their union to resist their officers’ attempts 
to deskill and cut the fire service.  Cuts would limit firefighters’ ability both to fight fires as they 
currently do and to pass the test of being a ‘good firefighter’.  Thus blocking a third central but 
unacknowledged element: that of masculinity.  This analysis involves a discussion of class, and 
recognition that antagonistic relations between officers and firefighters are not only economic, but 
are also about petty dividends involving power, status and gender construction.   
 
  The conclusion provides a comprehensive overview to suggest that firefighters form their 
masculinity by acting at work in the way they subjectively judge that they are seen, by themselves, 
their peer group and the public.  In so doing, they set themselves apart from the ‘others’ who cannot 
meet their expectations.  It is these ‘special people’, as identified by both firefighters and others that 
this thesis has studied, a group of ‘special’ men and women.  
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Firefighters and sociologists are alike, they have to learn how to do their work and at each stage they have to pass 
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1. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION  
These are also powerful arguments against any naive, fixed 
or essentialist concept of masculinity: masculinities are 
recognised as diverse, socially constructed and structured in 
terms of their own hierarchies, notably between hegemonic 
masculinity/ies and subordinated masculinity/ies (Carrigan, 
Connell and Lee 1985; Connell 1987) 
Hearn 1994: 53. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This is a thesis about firefighters, a group comprising mostly white males who so organise their work 
as to be able to construct what I identify as firefighters’ masculinity: a subject this first chapter 
introduces.  Second, I will introduce the questions that I have asked to interrogate firefighters’ 
masculinity.  Third, I will introduce my methodology and, in so doing, I explain that I intend to give a 
very hands-on account of the fire service by using, as part of the research, my own experiential
1
 
knowledge of being a firefighter for over thirty years.  Fourth, I shall introduce the history and 
organisation of the fire service; whilst some parts of this are inevitably analytical, this is not an 
attempt to pre-empt the findings of the whole thesis, but an attempt to use my experiential knowledge 
to set the scene for those readers whose knowledge on the fire service is limited.  This section puts 
into context the next section, an overview of relevant gender and class debates.  Finally, I shall 
introduce the remainder of the thesis.   
 
1.1.1 Firefighters’ masculinity 
This thesis will suggest that most firefighters develop skills/qualities/attributes in common, that 
generally these associate with their main job, firefighting, and that this occurs because as a mostly 
male group firefighters form an informal hierarchy, through which older firefighters pass down their 
knowledge about the skills/qualities/attributes necessary for firefighting to younger firefighters.  
However, the fire service is predominantly a white, male, working class, heterosexual, able-bodied 
and pseudo/para-military organisation that is institutionally sexist (see Baigent 1996; HMCIFS 1999), 
and alongside the skills/qualities/attributes that firefighters might have to learn in order to become 
efficient firefighters, they are also offered and frequently accept other forms of behaviour.  Much of 
this behaviour will be familiar to them and likely represents their chosen preference as boys, youths 
and now as firefighters, to achieve the “false monolith of what men are supposed to be” (Hearn 1996: 
211).  In this respect, this thesis will suggest that firefighters’ ‘false monolith’ is one that they develop 
both individually and as group through their informal hierarchy.      
 
It is possible to write this thesis using and extending the list of social characteristics that 
describe firefighters’ behaviour, but it is not practical.  I have therefore chosen a term that might 
describe this collective behaviour for firefighters.  Whilst I accept that this is not everybody’s 
preferred option, not the least mine (because I accept that the term is so ubiquitous as to have no fixed 
meaning), I am going to call this behaviour firefighters’ masculinity.  This I am going to do because 
without a label for firefighters’ behaviour this thesis will fail in one of its key aims, which is to 
encourage male firefighters to look again at how they act at work (which they would call their 
masculinity).  In particular I would note that whilst firefighters might talk about masculinity in a 
generic sense as if all men had it, they would, when pushed, identify their masculinity as 
characterising something different, even something special that ‘other’ men could not achieve. 
 
                                                 
1 When I use the term ‘experiential’ I am talking of hands-on experience of having done something, in this case my 
experience of having been a firefighter, in particular about firefighting and firefighters’ hierarchies (see Willis-Lee 
1993b).  At no time do I consider experiential knowledge is innate knowledge.    
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It is true I could spend a considerable part of this thesis discussing what would, or would not, 
be a possible label for firefighters’ behaviour, and this would include an extensive theoretical debate 
about identity.  I will say it once (to make it clear where I stand), I have no notion that masculinity is 
‘pre-given’ in any biological or psychological sense, nor that it can actually be defined in any fixed 
way.  However, this is not how most firefighters see it.  Many believe that their masculinity is pre-
given and they might currently find it difficult to understand a life without such a word.  It may even 
be that male firefighters (like Calvinists) set out to ‘prove’ their ‘calling’ (see Weber 1971).  As an 
example of why I say this, as some proof of why I believe firefighters’ masculinity is social and not 
given, this thesis will suggest that it is a pattern of firefighters’ behaviour that they not only seem to 
believe they must ‘prove’ to themselves that they can achieve the ‘false monolith,’ (possibly even 
their ‘special’ status above ‘other’ men), but also to their watch and the community they serve.  
Arguments about social construction become even more persuasive when held against evidence 
suggesting that firefighters use a Foucaultian gaze (and harassment when necessary) to help them and 
their colleagues achieve their masculinity.  Crucial in this process is the way firefighters perform their 
operational duties, which can involve firefighters working in a dangerous and a risk-laden 
environment (see Chapter 3).  Moreover, their gender construction also continues at the station, where 
working environments are more relaxed and firefighters temporarily live together: a place where the 
gaze is no less stringent (see Chapter 4).   
 
Paradoxically, firefighters’ informal hierarchy also develops as a resistance to what Weber 
(1971) might call an ‘iron cage’: the formal, bureaucratic and authoritarian hierarchy, which officers 
would appear to have you believe controls the fire service (see Chapter 5).  This may appear as a 
classic case of revolutionary consciousness to protest against their economic disadvantage (see 
Giddens 1982: 163-164), but, firefighters’ resistance may be more to do with the action of a group of 
workers who are aware that they need to act conservatively against officers to protect their 
masculinity: a situation which improves firefighters ability to resist their officers because firefighters 
believe they are only proving what is given; part of their uniform so to speak: a belief that becomes 
real in its consequences (see Thomas 1909; Janowitz 1966: 301).  However, firefighters’ masculinity 
and the metaphorical uniform they wear to ‘prove’ it, is similar to the Emperor’s new suit, it is an 
illusion.   
 
1.1.2 Research questions 
I became interested in the construction of gender during my first degree, which focuses on equality 
issues.  My final dissertation (Baigent 1996), which focuses on equality issues, indicates that majority 
white male workforce
2
 were harassing female firefighters
3
.  I resolved to continue my research at PhD 
level to see if I could help the fire service with the ongoing difficulties they are having with equal 
opportunities.  Initially I started my doctoral research with two questions in mind.  First, how did my 
30-year close association with firefighters influence my gender construction (masculinity) at that 
time?  Second, can a study of firefighters throw any light on the argument that gender labels as 
masculine/feminine are social applications and not determined by biological/physiological sex 
(MacKinnon 1979: 154-155)?  However, during the course of this research it became clear to me that 
I might best answer these two questions and help the fire service with its difficulties over equal 
opportunities, by focusing on how firefighters construct their masculinity.  As a result of these 
thoughts, the two questions were replaced by ‘new’ questions, about four specific areas.  These are: 
  
                                                 
2  99.2% are men, 98.4% are white (HMCIFS 1999; FBU 2000; see Appendix 1). 
3 The formal structures of the fire service and the FBU have adopted a generic term of firefighters, to replace what was the 
single sex term fireman.  When it is necessary for me to differentiate between women firefighters and men firefighters, I 
shall refer to them as male firefighters and female firefighters.  I shall do this to avoid the terms firewoman and fireman, 
which I consider have become political terms that frequently default to the term firemen.  The media in particular are 
prone to do this and this not only reduces the visibility of women in the fire service, but provides succour for those 
misogynist firefighters who still resist the term firefighter.     
  
3 
Firefighting:  how do firefighters develop the protocols and skills necessary for 
firefighting?  
what does ‘getting in’ 4 mean to firefighters? 
why, given the apparent danger involved, do firefighters ‘get in’ at a 
fire? 
Relations at the station: how do firefighters organise their social relations at the station? 
Class: can the dynamic between class, hierarchies and resistance help explain 
how firefighters construct their masculinity? 
Gender: how do firefighters construct their masculinity and what does this tell us 
about gender debates? 
 
 
In the event, all these areas are interrelated, but to make some sense of what I have found I provide a 
chapter for each of the first three.  The fourth area, gender construction, is a consideration throughout 
the thesis and in particular I produce a reflexive view of firefighters’ actions looking for the 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of these actions (see Giddens 1979: 56)
 5
.  
All areas will be re-considered in the conclusion. 
 
1.2. METHODOLOGY  
Before coming to academia, I was a firefighter for over 30 years and as my research is about 
firefighters’ masculinity, I wanted to develop a methodology that would make best use of my 
experiences (see Appendix 2).  I also had to consider that my PhD had a political aim, which was to 
help the fire service with its difficulties over equal opportunities and therefore should be available to 
firefighters themselves.  Consequently, my methodology had to be flexible enough to enable me to 
respond to any leads, use my experiential knowledge of the fire service with academic rigour and 
provide a thesis firefighters could understand
6
.   
 
Chapter 2 will describe in detail the development of my methodology, but for now let it be 
understood that I collected the bulk of my data using qualitative methods of interview, observation 
and auto-critique, and that some data was collected through quantitative/qualitative questionnaires.  
Collation and analysis of this data took place using grounded theory(Glaser and Strauss 1967) to 
provide a considerable ethnography of the fire service, which became especially revealing because the 
actual analysis (my epistemology) took place using Hearn’s (1994) notion of pro-feminist auto-
critique
7
.     
 
My use of pro-feminist auto-critique allows me to reveal much about the fire service from my 
own experiences, including some of the previously hidden joint understandings that firefighters use to 
                                                 
4 One particular way that I shall use my experiential knowledge will be to use firefighters’ in-house language.  When this 
occurs the text will be placed within quotation marks in the recognised way that metaphors or other collegial language is 
used, for example ‘getting in’.  Some words such as ‘getting in’, ‘fitting in’, and ‘The Job’ are so important to this thesis I 
shall also italicise them thus ‘getting in’, ‘fitting in’ and ‘The Job’.  However, once the term has become recognisable, 
normally after its second use, I shall drop the ‘ … ’.    
5 Whilst it was Collinson (1992) that sent me back to reread Giddens (1979), there is some strange sense of deja vu in how 
Giddens uses a hands-on approach to explain the notions of ‘unintended consequences'.  His use of the example of how 
hydrogen and oxygen combine to produce (an unintended consequence) water provides exactly the same sort of grounding 
to knowledge as I hope to provide for firefighters.  It is almost ironic that firefighters’ main medium for firefighting is 
water; in fact the whole scenario I explain here is a further example of an unintended consequence.   
6 There are a number of books which help researchers to find a method and I consulted many of these before I chose my 
particular mix of pro-feminist auto-critique and grounded theory (Bell and Roberts 1984; Bell 1987; May 1993; Jones 
1993; 
7 I shall return to Hearn’s (1994) notion of pro-feminist auto-critique in Chapter 2.  However, it needs to be understood 
that pro-feminism is a politically charged approach to sociology that attempts to enlighten men about how their behaviour 
is damaging: to society, women and themselves.  Pro-feminist auto-critique is an attempt to do this by men searching back 
into their past to reveal some previously hidden processes by which men perpetuate their power.   
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perpetuate their power
8
 (see Chapters 2-6).  Section 3 is an example of how I use pro-feminist auto-
critique and involves an experiential view of the fire service that my fieldwork influences.  As I have 
already explained this is produced at this time to provide some context for those whose knowledge of 
the fire service is limited, and to separate it from the remainder of the thesis, which is fieldwork led 
and influenced by my experiential knowledge.  As a warning, it may appear that the thesis moves 
away from debates about gender.  However, I am trying to develop a more complex understanding of 
gender by listening to how firefighters actually explain firefighting and their social arrangements on 
the station, in the belief that working arrangements for firefighters are influential in how firefighters 
construct their masculinity.  Chapters 3-5 are the outcome of this practice.  In Chapter 6 I shall 
conclude the whole thesis in a critique of the social/political construction of gender amongst 
firefighters and move this discussion to wider debates about gender.  However, gender is about power 
and any understanding of how firefighters construct their masculinity first needs a prior explanation 
of some important structures/traditions in the fire service, how the fire service works and some other 
important features concerning firefighting
9
.  This explanation follows and I recognise right from the 
onset that this explanation is a partial view.  It is done with academic rigour, but cannot be divorced 
from my subjective way of seeing the world. 
 
1.3. THE FIRE SERVICE  
1.3.1. History 
The Great Fire of London (1666) was the dynamic for establishing the fire service, but the fire-
insurance brigades that sprung up after the fire were part of the wealth creation process and not a 
humanitarian response
10
.  In origin each brigade had a distinctive uniform, mainly as an advertisement 
for their insurance company (see Appendix 3
11
) and firefighters only fought fires in the property 
insured by their company—they had no life saving role.  As cities expanded, fire-insurance 
companies (and brigades) increased.  In London, the first economic rationalisations occurred in the 
fire service (1827) as fire-insurance companies started to amalgamate their brigades to eventually 
pool their resources in forming the ‘General Fire Engine Establishment’ (1833).  In 1866, the 
responsibility for providing a fire service in London passed to local government who formed the 
London Fire Engine Establishment.  This forerunner of the London Fire Brigade (LFB), under the 
command of Massey Shaw, experienced immediate financial restrictions.  The budget was less than 
Shaw wanted
12
: a problem that still exists today (see Chapter 5).  
 
                                                 
8 During my education as a working class man, I learnt that there were understandings and forms of behaviour that men 
support and test themselves against, what I will later generalise as ‘masculine standards’.  The fact that these standards had 
to be achieved, rather than that they were natural, is something that men do not publicise, nor particularly discuss, but 
nonetheless the groups they form do police these standards.  As an example when I joined the fire service I was expected 
to conform to the way the experienced firefighters operated (what I later explain as conforming to firefighters’ hierarchy), 
this was in effect a very similar situation to that I had accepted as a working class boy, but these standards were rarely if 
ever formally discussed, they were just policed.  Keeping to these standards and yet not publicising them is what Goffman 
(1959: 216) identifies as dramaturgical loyalty.   
9 Later in this chapter and in Chapter 2 I will explain that this thesis will not be another ritual discovery of harassment in 
the fire service that produces simple to find examples of how firefighters harass women (see Howell 1994; Baigent 1996; 
Lee 1996; Richards 1996; Archer 1998; HMI 1999).   
10 Segars (1989) argues that the financial revolution saw the provision of fire-insurance companies as a response to a need 
by merchants to protect their properties from fire (particularly in the aftermath of the Great Fire of London).  Having 
provided the insurance, it then made economic sense for the fire-insurance companies to protect the risk by establishing 
their own individual fire brigades. 
11 On the day that fire-insurance premiums were due there was a parade of firefighters in the City of London.  The 
distinctive uniform, more there to advertise individual companies, was totally inappropriate for firefighting (see Segars 
1989).  Dixon (1994) would understand about inappropriate uniforms that were designed more to flatter the organisations 
and to create an image, than to be practical (see Strangleman 1997). 
12 The insurance companies contributed 30% of the cost, which represents a saving to them of about 50%, but this did not 
prevent them complaining about having to contribute towards the fire service’s ‘new’ role of saving life from fire (see 
Segars 1989).   
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Large cities followed London’s lead, but parish arrangements remained haphazard.  Not until 
the country prepared for war (1938), did the government require local authorities to organise a fire 
service.  The fire service was nationalised during the war (1941): a situation dominated by London, 
which had the largest number of professional
13
 firefighters
14
 and was able to dispatch them as officers 
and trainers to areas with little or no provision for firefighting.  After the war, The Fire Services Act 
(1947) returned the fire service to local authorities, but it appears that the whole tradition of the 
modern fire service had its foundations in a model established in London (see Blackstone 1957; 
Holloway 1973; Segars 1989). 
 
 
1.3.2. Fire Services Act (1947) 
The Fire service Act (1947) established that in England and Wales local government is responsible for 
appointing a Fire Committee to provide an efficient fire service that will protect life and property 
from fire, and render humanitarian services.  To comply with this requirement local government in 
England and Wales provides for 50 brigades with 589 wholetime stations and 139 day crewed stations 
(Audit Commission 1995).  Staffing these stations are 33,656 wholetime firefighters of which only 
258 are women, 315 are black and 74 Asian (see Appendix 1).  There are also 868 retained stations 
staffed by 14,665 retained firefighters: 14,421 are men, 244 are women, 24 are black, 16 are Asian 
and 13 others
15
.  The total annual cost is £1.474 billion—56.87% of which represents professional 
firefighters’ wages  (see HMCIFS 1999;)16.  Government also accepted in 1947 that there would be 
national pay and conditions of service for firefighters negotiated between the employers and the Fire 
                                                 
13 The more usual use of the term professional might follow Hall, (1968; see also Wright 1982; Lucio and MacKenzie 
1999; Devine et al 2000) and relate to the work of recognised professionals, such as doctors, accountants and lawyers.  
These have a professional body that is: self-regulating and controls entrance to the organisation and ethical considerations; 
acts almost as a public trustee, to be relied on to ensure that a profession will retain the highest standards.  Most 
professionals can be elitist, having undergone a period of higher education, followed by further qualification in work-
based examination/s and time served.  Professionals also consider there is status to their work and incumbents attempt to 
control the work-process, mainly on the basis that professionals know best how their work should be done.  Professional 
work in the UK can also be identified as predominantly white male work (Grint 1998: 209-214, 254-256) and in the same 
sexist terms male managers are increasingly terming themselves as professionals (Kanter 1977; Collinson et al 1990; 
Collinson and Hearn 1996).   
The fire service is somewhat different having little in the way of educational standards for entry to define it as 
professional, yet is selective in its recruitment policy by choosing mostly working class, white, heterosexual males who 
are able-bodied, physically fit and have to reach high medical standards.  Firefighters are also chosen for a predisposition 
to learning experientially, suited for team working activities and are expected to follow masculine standards (see Burke 
1997; Chapters 3 and 5;).  Firefighters’ use of the term professional has two interpretations.  First, the term is self-labelling 
by firefighters who see their work as professional in that: firefighters have their own work ethos related to helping the 
public; firefighters consider their job has status and characteristics that are not simply rewarded by pay alone; becoming a 
‘good firefighter’ involves a great deal of experiential learning of professional skills learnt on the job (see Chapters 3, 5 
and 6; see also Willis-Lee 1993a, 1993b; Manuel 1999; Smith 1999; O’Brien 2000).  In a similar way the army advertise 
themselves as ‘The Professionals’ and the police take a similar view (see Campbell 1999).  Second, firefighters use the 
term to differentiate between those firefighters who are employed wholetime (on exacting standards regarding suitability 
for the job), as opposed to the retained firefighters, who more often have full-time jobs in other occupations and do not 
have to fulfil such exacting recruitment standards.  In many areas where retained pumps provide the fire cover there are 
difficulties in getting enough retained firefighters to staff the appliance, even on the lower standards applied.  As might be 
expected, wholetime firefighters have a considerable animosity for the retained service, because if it did not exist there 
would be more jobs for fulltime firefighters, and the lower standards applying to recruitment might denigrate the status of 
wholetime firefighters.   
14 Out of the 4272 professional firefighters in the country nearly half of them were LFB (Segars 1992: 139). 
15 The retained section of the fire service contains a higher percentage of female and non-white firefighters than the 
fulltime one.  I suggest this occurs because, unlike the fulltime service, the retained service has difficulty in recruiting 
sufficient firefighters.  Therefore, ‘starved of choice’, prejudice cannot operate so freely and it may be that female and 
non-white firefighters are a reserve army of labour, which fills the gap left when white-men are not available, or prepared, 
to undertake such work (see Gamarnikow et al 1983: 3).        
16 Under the Standing Spending Assessment for 1997/8 the fire service in London costs £34.42 per head, West Midlands 
costs £27.42, Essex £22.26, Surrey £22.34 (FBU 1998). 
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Brigades Union’s (FBU), and that the FBU also had authority on technical questions within the fire 
service: a situation that still remains today (Segars 1989: 342).   
 
The Government maintains control over the fire service through Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Fire service (HMIFS), which reports to the Home Secretary on fire service efficiency.  Historically 
HMIFS have concentrated their efficiency inspections on the firefighters’ product: the saving of life, 
property and the rendering of humanitarian services.  However, as in all government organisations 
over the past 20 years there has been an expansion of the terms of reference for efficiency (see 
Maidment and Thompson 1993; Corby and White 1999).  Now HMIFS inspect to identify areas 
where financial savings can be made, Health and Safety, Best Value, Fire Prevention and even more 
recently equality provisions (Fire 1998: 10-11; HMCIFS 1999).  The move by the HMIFS to inspect 
for wider efficiencies, rather than at point of delivery, represents what I suggest is part of an 
increasing divide in the fire service between officers and firefighters.  This divide, I will now discuss.   
 
 
1.3.3. Fire service ethos: to provide an efficient service to help the public 
Up until the 1960’s, ‘all’ firefighters had undertaken military service.  Tradition and honour (Dixon 
1994) passed from the military to the fire service, despite long hours and often-harsh discipline 
(Segars 1989) the fire service appeared to have one view about service delivery.  Officers and 
firefighters bridged any gap between them by their shared understandings about what I call a 
professional ethos: ‘to provide an efficient service to help the public’.  This ethos closely links to 
another shared understanding, the fire service’s raison d’etre: the saving of life; the suppression of 
fire and the rendering of humanitarian services (what in the military might be seen as a sense of 
honour, see Dixon 1994).  Then in the 1970’s politicians increasingly looked for budget savings in the 
fire service.  At first, almost all uniformed staff resisted these economies; another shared 
understanding, which appears as a tradition ever since Massey Shaw.  Now, on the one hand, you 
have those who still want to retain a fire service based on a traditional model of efficiency, which 
equates to the fastest and best service delivery: the Massey Shaw model, which the public appear to 
support
17
.  On the other hand, you have those officers who would increasingly prioritise other agendas 
and willingly cut back the fire service to meet economic boundaries.  This division divides the 
workforce almost horizontally, between those firefighters at the station who actually do the 
firefighting (who my study focuses on) and senior officers and politicians
18
.  In particular, this 
division and the dynamics around it may have a direct impact on firefighters’, ‘forcing’ solidarity 
amongst them (and separation from their officers) to resist cuts (see Chapter 5).  I do not see 
firefighters’ resistance in straightforward class terms, or as solely in defence of their ethos.  It may 
also be that firefighters’ solidarity and resistance is in defence of the means they have to construct 
their masculinity (see Chapter 3-6).        
 
1.3.4. Stations 
Generally, firestations are purpose built and strategically placed so that fire engines 
(appliances/pumps) can attend fires in accordance to standards laid down by the Home Office (see 
Fire Services Act 1947).  These standards vary, but in most cities/large towns there is a requirement 
that two fire engines (‘pumps’/‘appliances’) should arrive at a fire within 8 minutes (‘the attendance’).  
In high-risk areas, the first pump must arrive within 5 minutes and the requirement in rural areas is 
                                                 
17 The notion this thesis has of the public is a generalised view of the community that firefighters seek to protect.  In return 
the public respect and support firefighters (see Compton 1994; Audit Commission 1995; Hetherington 1998; HMIFS 
1999), and this thesis will argue that this often leads to firefighters seeing the public they protect as an ‘other’ (who cannot 
do their job).   
18 This division is a generalised view, some senior officers and politicians retain ‘old fashioned’ values as opposed to neo-
liberal ones and some firefighters can be surprisingly neo-liberal.  However senior officers do not come out in public and 
argue against the cuts as firefighters (and police chiefs) do. 
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that one pump arrives within 20 minutes
19
 (see Appendix 4).  The fabric of firestations can range 
from grand Victorian buildings, designed for horse drawn appliances, to the most up-to-date modern 
designs
20
.  Central is the appliance bay (the garage for the appliances), the tower/yard (used for 
training), the watchroom (the communications and central reporting area), office, lecture room and 
breathing apparatus servicing area.  However, there are other necessary requirements in a building 
where workers must be self-sufficient 365 days a year, 24 hours a day: a kitchen, mess, 
dormitory/locker room and shower/toilet area
21
.   
 
1.3.5. Watches 
Wholetime firestations provide continuous and equal staffing levels over the whole year.  This is 
achieved by a nationally agreed rolling shift pattern and personnel (riders) are permanently attached 
to one of four watches (Red, White, Blue and Green)
22
.  An eight-day tour of duty averaging 42 hours 
per week consists of two 9-hour day shifts (0900-1800), two 15-hour night shifts (1800-0900)
23
 and 
four days off (Appendix 5).  The top  
rate of pay for a firefighter is £20,021 per year (see Appendix 6).  Whilst only wholetime firefighters 
feature in this thesis, there are other shift systems.  These operate at stations covering lower-risk rural 
communities: day-crewing (professional firefighters who go to the station during the day and are 
called from home at night and weekends) and retained firefighters (part-timers, who are called from 
their main occupation or home by pagers).   
 
 
Each watch operates as a self-sufficient integral unit and all firefighters train in the use of 
breathing apparatus (BA).  Firefighters are very flexible workers who can interchange their role 
according to the task they are allocated at role-call.  Firefighters do not get any extra pay for 
qualifications (including driving) and are therefore not in competition with each other over pay
24
.  The 
watch strength (riders) is dependent on the appliances at the station.  National standards require that 
every pump should have a minimum crew of five riders and one of these must be a crew-commander 
                                                 
19 However, most brigades will send two appliances to a house fire. 
20 It may be that firestations, as prominent buildings, present a lasting reflection of the architectural style of the day. 
21 Any visitor to a firestation may be surprised at the facilities provided, which appear to enhance the living arrangements 
for firefighters.  Much of this is traditional: a result of the long hours of continuous duty firefighters worked up until the 
1960’s.  Firefighters still cannot leave the station to have a meal, and the long night and day shift means that firefighters 
must arrange to supply their own food in-house.  Some brigades do provide a cook, but the watch have to purchase their 
own food.  To organise their eating arrangements most watches appoint a mess manager, who is paid £23.52 a month.  The 
mess manager can be a sought after job, especially by older firefighters, because it can afford some status and an 
opportunity to avoid some of the more arduous work at a fire station.  On some watches, the job mess manager has no 
status and some watches individually bring in their own food, but this arrangement is more often temporary until a watch 
can sort out a method of appointing a mess manager, sometimes by each watch member undertaking the job in turn on a 
rolling rota.  The mess manager is always operational and available for fire calls, just like any other watch member.  
However, if the station has a special appliance, that is to say a hose layer or turntable ladder, it is possible the mess 
manager will ride that.     
22 Firefighters do not often transfer, perhaps in their first few years they may move once to get closer to home or move to 
watch on which they feel more comfortable, but it would not be unusual for a firefighter to serve their whole 30 years 
service on a single watch. 
23 The European Working Time Directive (Hegewisch 1999: 126), which requires that there is an 11 hour break from work 
each day and that night shifts should not exceed 8 hours duration, would make firefighters’ 15 hour night shift illegal if the 
FBU were to challenge it: firefighters fully support the FBU stance not to do so.   
24 The UK fire service is not like the US big city model, which breaks down firefighting into task-orientated groups such 
as hose crews, search/rescue crews and ladder crews.  Firefighters in the UK undertake all firefighting duties and a long 
established tradition of the FBU require all firefighters to be able to carry out all functions.  This stance avoids the elitism 
that occurs in the US and reduces the likelihood that one job can become more important than another.  There is no extra 
pay for day-to-day qualifications, for example for driving or BA, and increments in pay are time served.  This reduces the 
possibility that firefighters might argue about getting a qualification because of the extra pay involved, what Marxists 
might call a contradiction that can divide the proletariat by putting them in competition with each other, rather than 
recognising their real ‘enemy’ is capital:  a false consciousness which divides the proletariat and prevents their solidarity 
and cohesiveness (see Burawoy 1979: 67; Collinson 1992, 1998).  
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25
.  To allow for leave and sickness each watch on: a one-pump station requires 5 firefighters and 2 
officers; a two-pump station requires 10 firefighters and 3 officers.  There are local agreements about 
staffing for special appliances such as Turntable Ladders, Hydraulic Platform and Emergency 
Tenders.  Each watch has an officer-in-charge: a watch-commander who rides to all incidents on the 
appliance and is responsible for their watch’s day-to-day administration, discipline, training and 
welfare (see Chapters 3-5)
26
.   
 
 
1.3.6. Formal hierarchies 
The term officer can have a wide ranging meaning in the fire service, in this thesis I try to 
differentiate between the always operational watch-officers, and senior officers who are not attached 
to a watch and only have a limited operational involvement
27
.   Promotion in the fire service is by 
single tier entry promotion (STEP), a system by which every officer must have first served as a 
firefighter and the hierarchy is so arranged as to ensure promotion is achieved step-by-step: there is no 
leapfrogging of ranks and in achieving promotion officers must serve in each rank before applying for 
the next
28
.  Overall responsibility for the four watches at a firestation, or a group of firestations, falls 
on the Station-commander.  This can rank can vary in some brigades it will be a Station Officer and in 
others an Assistant Divisional Officer [ADO].  ADO’s are the first senior officer rank, addressed as 
‘Sir’ and saluted when met.  Station Commanders do not have ‘hands-on’ responsibility for the watch 
or firefighting, but they are responsible for ensuring that each watch organises according to the rules 
and regulations.  Groups of stations might also be organised as Divisions, then Divisional Officers 
coordinate the ADO’s29.  The upward hierarchy continues to principal rank with Deputy Assistant 
Chief Officers, Assistant Chief Officers and a Chief Officer (Appendix 6).  Officers’ working week 
averages 72 hours, divides between day desk-hours and hours on call from home.  All officers can be 
called from their desk, or home, to a fire at a moments notice.   
 
Coordinating four watches that operate around the 24 hours is not easy.  To facilitate the 
operational and administrative organisation of the fire service, especially during the absence of senior 
officers, written Brigade Orders (BO’s) provide the complete wisdom on how to run a fire service.  
BO’s cover every conceivable administrative concern, and a written procedure for almost every type 
of emergency incident (despite firefighting being hands-on see Chapter 3)
30
.  In an organisation where 
rank is supposed to provide unquestionable authority, rank also implies a greater ability and there is 
little room for entrepreneurial questioning during or after the rule making process (see Dixon 1994
31
).  
                                                 
25 Without the required riders the appliance is not available (‘off the run’) until a firefighter, or officer, from another 
station is drafted in as a ‘standby’  
26 The term watch-commander is new to the fire service (used in some brigades and not others) and in some brigades the 
rank of this officer will be a station officer and in others a sub officer (Sub O).  Firefighters might have a variety of names 
for this position such as ‘Guv’, ‘Guvnor’, ‘Boss’, ‘officer-in-charge’ and ‘OIC’, and this term can replace a formal 
salutation of ‘Sir’.  On watches with good relations with their watch-commander, there is an increasing tendency for the 
watch to use first names and only use a more formal term when senior officers are present.  Whilst the watch-commander 
will also be a crew-commander, stations with more than one appliance will need additional crew-commanders.  These are 
a subordinate rank to the watch-commander, either a Sub O or a Leading firefighter (Lf.) and both these ranks are called 
junior officers (JO’s). 
27 Chapters 3-6 differentiate between watch-commanders who are operational and senior officers who are deskbound.   
28 STEP is my abbreviation, chosen because it aptly reflects that promotion is only achieved step-by-step.  The lack of 
accelerated promotion and outside entry at senior level may cause the fire service considerable difficulties regarding 
expertise, restrict the ability for entrepreneurial decision making and contravene equal opportunities legislation (see 
Chapter 5). 
29 Each brigade may organise their own structure and re-organisations occur on a regular basis. 
30 Sometimes situations occur for which there are no written procedures.  Then, principal officers write an Order to cover 
the situation as soon as possible afterwards, even though they may have little understanding of current situations on the 
fireground  (see this Chapter, Chapters 3 and 5).   
31 Dixon (1994) provides a very clear explanation of how military officers have been historically ‘given’ the right to lead.  
As his account of the countless blunders in the many battles that the UK has been involved in indicates, this actually 
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The expectation is that firefighters accept officers given right to lead and will comply with BO’s, but 
this thesis will suggest that firefighters often make entrepreneurial interpretations to avoid officers’ 
‘iron cage’ (see Chapters 3-5).  It may be that senior officers are aware of this breakdown in 
discipline, but few recognise it publicly: content almost that they have written the orders in such a 
way as to protect themselves and unconcerned that the bureaucracy is failing (see Chapters 3 and 5).     
 
1.3.7. The link to the military 
The formal structure of the fire service may be organised along military lines, but despite the 
regimentation, the traditional attachment is to the, “highly disciplined and immensely strong sailors of 
the Royal Navy” (Lloyd-Elliott 1992: 24; see Segars 1989; Bailey 1992: 4; Divine 1993).  It is easy to 
see how the link with the navy served the fire service, because firefighters have historically worked 
extremely long hours, in groups isolated at a station and in dangerous and confined situations (see 
Segars 1989).  The link with the navy is mostly only one of tradition now: firestations can still be 
referred to as ships and shifts are called watches; the fire service often acts as a senior rescue service.   
 
As in the military, officers report to the officer above (see Dixon 1994).  Chief Officers report to 
the Fire Committee and write the impersonal Brigade Orders (BO’s) to cover ‘every’ contingency 
with the belief that they are dictating how their brigade will organise.  Weber (1971) could identify 
BO’s as creating an iron cage of rationality, especially as the fire service makes convincing claims to 
be a uniformed disciplined service, where the rule is “salute and execute” (CCC 2000: 21; see Archer 
1999: 94).  Whilst it would be easy for a researcher to accept this view, it is a view I query.  Much of 
my evidence collected from politicians, at The Fire Service College, on stations and from the FBU, 
challenges the whole concept of the fire service as disciplined in any military sense (see Chapters 3-
5).  Analysis suggests there is a concerted attempt throughout the fire service to pretend that the 
disciplinary model still exists (see Chapters 3-5).  Each level of the hierarchy might have different 
reasons for maintaining this image, but I choose to take the view that firefighters take when they 
suggest that every officer appears to justify their rank as if they were the centre-pin of the fire service.  
Therefore, if any officer admits they were not in control, they would destroy their own justification (if 
firefighters were to publicly admit officers were not in control, they might draw unnecessary attention 
on themselves and lay down a challenge to officers).  Chapters 3-5 will expand this theme, but it 
needs to be understood that there are times when firefighters are prepared to put on a show for their 
senior officers and make-believe officers are in charge, and times when senior officers are in charge 
(see Chapters 3-5).  However, with the exception of recruit training, no officer would, or perhaps 
could, expect firefighters on a watch to follow orders blindly.  Firefighters’ resistance is so organised 
that perhaps it is best to consider the fire service as having three structures, each of which can apply at 
different times: 
   
A formal authoritarian hierarchy (disciplined in a military sense): this will normally apply when 
firefighters and senior officers are in close proximity. 
 
A formal bureaucracy (rule book led/BO's cover ‘every’ exigency): again this will apply when 
firefighters and senior officers are in close proximity, but for the majority of the time the watch-
commander and firefighters informally negotiate how BO’s will apply. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
means that ‘right is might’.  The senior rank is not only in charge, but identified by their subordinates as having absolute 
power and there is little room for negotiation of this right.  Not forgetting the ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’, one recent 
examples of this behaviour is the Commons Public Accounts Committee’s criticism of the Ministry of Defence handling 
of the enquiry into the Chinook helicopter crash that claimed 29 lives in 1994.  They suggested that the ruling by two Air 
Marshals who blamed the pilots for the crash was unsustainable.  Yet, Sir William Wratten, one of the Air Marshals on the 
original RAF board of inquiry, dismissed the charges of arrogance.  “As far as I am concerned there is no doubt 
whatsoever.  There wasn’t  then, there isn’t now,” he told Newsnight (BBC, 30-11-00; see Norton-Taylor 2000a 2000b).    
To a lesser degree, this thesis will indicate that fire service officers might have a similar belief in their own infallibility.    
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An informal hierarchy (charismatic): this is the way the watch organise and length of service is a 
considerable indicator of place in the hierarchy, but some younger leaders might emerge. 
 
1.3.8. Respect 
The system may give officers respect, but firefighters themselves have always expected their officers 
to earn their respect.  In the past officers used to do this by ordering and leading firefighters into a 
building to fight a fire.  Then the use of breathing apparatus (BA), which provides a firefighter with a 
supply of fresh air, was frowned on as sissy.  Good firefighters (Chapter 3) were acknowledged 
‘smoke-eaters’, who competed with each other to get the furthest into a fire without having to find 
fresh air
32.  Some ‘smoke-eating’ (autocratic) officers were legends in their own right, leading crews 
into the fire, ensuring they were ‘safe’ and then leaving to take control from outside.  Most officers 
were then chosen for their firefighting abilities, experiential skills and ability to lead firefighters 
above other considerations.  Firefighters ‘had’ to respect them, because it was the officers who taught 
them their job and officers quite literally held firefighters’ lives in their hands.  Now however, fumes 
from the petro-carbons in a fire make smoke-eating almost impossible, Health and Safety legislation 
is rigidly enforced by the FBU to ensure that BA has to be worn at even the smallest fire
33
.  The 
minimum size BA crew is two and this is an important safety factor, which allows for the second 
crewmember to rescue an injured partner in the case of accident
34
.  Safety procedures also prevent 
crews from splitting up once they have entered a fire, and therefore an officer whose primary roll is to 
organise firefighting from outside, can no longer lead a crew into the fire, then return outside and take 
command.  Officers now have to wait outside, dependent on the firefighters inside to fight the fire.  
This reduces officers’ ability to be seen as good firefighters and as a consequence the 
authority/respect that their firefighting abilities gave them.  Now those experiential skills are in the 
hands of firefighters, who without their officers to teach them have established their own protocols for 
firefighting (see Chapters 3 and 5).  Technology, in the shape of BA, has effectively required 
firefighters to reskill and in firefighters’ eyes, officers are increasingly deskilled; little more than 
managers who stay outside of the fire, away from the risk, to provide a series of safety checks, ensure 
that nothing has been forgotten and do the paperwork
35
.  
 
1.3.9. The gap between firefighters and senior officers 
While senior officers may have lost respect as their earlier firefighting role became impossible, they 
have not given up their notion that they are still firefighters (see Chapter 3 and 5).  Deprived of the 
ability to get into the fire, officers now elevate their command and control responsibility outside the 
                                                 
32 This situation still apparently happens with ‘Rescue One’, the famous New York fire team (see Chapter 3).   
33 Improving workers’ safety became a major issue in the 1960’s and the Health and Safety Act was a result of increasing 
agitation by trade union leaders (often almost against their members wishes).  One prominent member of the TUC General 
Council who campaigned for health and safety legislation was the then general secretary of the FBU, Terry Parry, who 
went on to become a Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Commissioner.  In what might be seen as a typical example of 
the concerns the fire service had for the health and safety of firefighters, the fire service applied for exemption from this 
act, but was refused and from personal experience at the time I am convinced that had Terry Parry not been influential in 
governmental circles that the fire service might have found itself outside of the act.  Officers to an extent lost control of 
some of their authority because of this act, because it gave firefighters a first ‘legal’ right to question their officers’ 
judgements.  Officers’ resistance to the inclusion in the act may have been on the basis that their given right to be in 
charge at a fire was first answerable to the Health and Safety Act and subsequently to firefighters who might challenge the 
legitimacy of an order which they saw as dangerous.  Chapter 5 argues that this situation has been somewhat turned upside 
down, with firefighters ignoring (when they consider it appropriate) the HSE and in particular ‘dynamic risk assessment’ 
and their officers enforcing it: a cynic may see officers as using the HSE as a weapon to hit firefighters with in an attempt 
to regain control of the fire service.        
34 This may account for why firefighters place such a high priority on physical strength and being able to trust your BA 
partner (see Chapter 3).   
35 Watch commanders can avoid this gap by retaining the title good firefighter and the respect this gives them; see Chapter 
3).   
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building on fire as if that were firefighting
36.  Examples of this appear within the firefighters’ 
journals, where the description of major incidents often inflates officers’ role to a point where 
firefighters’ attendance at the incident almost appears coincidental: an unskilled job that anyone can 
do
37
.  This has increased the gap between firefighters and officers and the way officers marginalise 
firefighters’ skills, appears to support firefighters’ view (above) that officers always see their own 
position as key in the organisation.  It is also very noticeable that when research takes place by the 
members of the Divisional and Brigade Command courses at The Fire service College (FSC)
38
, it is 
predominantly about command and control (how officers control firefighters, manage fire brigades 
and technical developments): a view that invariably looks down on firefighters and does little to take 
their views into account
39
.  Further examples of how officers marginalise firefighters’ skills (a point 
that particularly angers firefighters), is that at an important incident, it is always senior officers who 
appear on the television, as if to steal firefighters’ glory.  As one watch-commander pointedly said 
during a lecture on command and control at FSC, “as soon as the cameras are around the command 
structures collapse – the white hats are there40.”     
 
1.3.10. Senior officers’ firefighting experience 
All senior officers have to take their turn at being the ‘duty officer’ whose responsibility it is to take 
charge of ‘makeups’41 within their area.  However, following the 1977/78 firefighter’s strike, there 
was an increase in the numbers of senior officers (probably to improve managerial control).  This 
speeded up promotion, thus reducing the experience an officer got before their promotion.  It must 
also be considered that the increase in officers, without an additional increase in makeups meant that 
there were fewer fires for officers to attend.  As an example, after the strike (1977/78) each of the 12 
LFB divisions of 11 stations had an increase in senior officers from 5 to 16.  Recently, senior officer 
numbers are reducing, but there are currently 264 senior officers in the LFB.  These officers have to 
share the experience to be gained from the 581 makeup incidents that the 112 LFB stations attended 
                                                 
36 This thesis is not particularly interested in officers except where they impact on firefighters, and therefore I am not 
going to comment in detail on the rights and wrongs of single tier entry promotion.  However, in Chapter 5 I do suggest 
the difficulties of such a system, and here I suggest that the fire service might be better managed if officers concentrated 
on managing and forgot the notion of being operational.  Officers though are unlikely to propose this because once they 
were ‘reduced’ to being managers, then managers from outside the fire service could apply for their job.  The single tier 
entry system would then no longer support their sole right to be officers and the employment of professional managers 
would reduce if not stop completely the right of firefighters to rise through the ranks.  The way that officers resist the 
employment of professional managers may be partly responsible for why the fire service finds it so difficult to change its 
approaches, especially to equal opportunities.  Strangleman (1998) identifies that railway culture only really changed 
when managers from the private sector were brought in.   
37 Segars (1989: 5) raises exactly the same point when he argues that “most fire service histories … concentrate 
excessively on chief fire officers and their role in technical innovation as leaders of men. … The part played by the 
ordinary rank and file fireman and his importance is totally ignored.”   
38 Each student on these two high profile courses has to complete a dissertation from their own research.  In the case of the 
Brigade Command Course, the research involves an international project funded by the Home Office.  All these 
dissertations are available in The Fire Service College Library.  They are clearly in-house, written for the examiner and 
therefore unlikely to challenge current wisdom, but they do provide an understanding of the view of future officers and 
those who train them.  It is my judgement that in academic terms they range between A level standard and Masters.    
39 Most of this research is quantitative and little of it involves interviewing anyone, least of all firefighters and those 
interviews that are done appear not to have been transcribed.  One senior officer at FSC told me about his research and his 
metaphors were interesting in that they portray a common view amongst senior officers that running the fire service would 
be easier without firefighters.  He spoke of station-commanders as “sleeping with the enemy” and about the “pathological 
behaviour of the watch.”  However, aware as they are of firefighters’ ability to resist their actions, apart from innocent 
asides, officers do not publicise this knowledge.  Nor do they use their research opportunities to look at why the problem 
exists, but just seek to find better ways of managing firefighters without identifying the dynamics behind the actors they 
are trying to manage. 
40 Senior officers wear white helmets at fires and the point being made is that whilst officers were supposed to be in 
control, once the media arrived, especially television cameras, officers left that duty to be seen, as it were, in the spotlight. 
41 This term relates to fires where the officer in charge decides the initial attendance of two appliances is insufficient to 
deal with the incident and radio for more pumps to control the fire (see Chapter 3).  
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in 1998/9.  Although a crude example
42
 this suggests that each senior officer might attend 2 
incidents in a year, and because only 19 of these makeups involved more than 8 pumps, this supports 
a view that not only is senior officers experience of attending fires limited, but that only rarely and by 
chance do senior officers actually attend large fires.   
 
One example of the gap developing between officer and firefighters is when firefighters 
complain that officers have ‘lost’43 substantial buildings by withdrawing firefighters from the fire too 
early (see Chapters 3 and 5).  This argument stems from the fact that if a fire is spreading inside a 
building, it can only be stopped by firefighters ‘getting in’ to extinguish it (see Chapter 3).  If officers 
withdraw firefighters from a fire too early, there may be some truth in firefighters’ argument, because 
as the explanation above suggests, officers are now clearly less experienced at actually firefighting 
and might err too far on the side of safety.  However, firefighters’ arguments might not be altogether 
fair when they accuse senior officers of ‘losing’ a building.  It should be understood that once a fire 
has reached a certain size and intensity, then it is very dangerous for firefighters to remain inside the 
building.  Therefore, it is possible that some of firefighters’ argument will be just anti-officer.  Skilled 
firefighters should also recognise the danger on such occasions and would ‘withdraw’.  However, if 
an officer instructs firefighters to leave, instead of the firefighters shouldering the responsibility for 
‘pulling out’, they can blame the officers: it is the officers, not them that have ‘bottled out’ and ‘lost 
the building’. 
 
1.4. FIREFIGHTERS’ INDUSTRIALISATION AND ORGANISATION 
1.4.1. Left wing union 
Fire service naval origins do not sit well with independent trade union activities.  However, 
firefighters almost continuous duty and harsh discipline
44
 finally forced firefighters to organise.  It 
was not until 1920 that their continuous duty system was amended to achieve a second watch and the 
72-hour week: a situation that lasted until the 60-hour week saw the introduction of a third watch in 
1946 and a 56-hour week in 1956 (see Segars 1989 for a full explanation).  During this 
industrialisation, the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) leadership became very leftwing (see Segars 1989
45
; 
Bailey 1992; Darlington 1996, 1998; Chapter 5).  
 
1.4.2. Undermanning 
The fire service’s history of working long hours for low pay (Segars 1989), became even more of a 
problem when, in the late 1960’s, a buoyant economy reduced fire service recruitment46.  The 
                                                 
42 There is a considerable amount of data produced in Appendix 10 and this particular use of the data hopes to provide an 
overview and uses averages.  Some senior officers will attend more fires, but that inevitably means others will attend less.  
The statistics may also be skewed, because at large fires several senior officers will attend, although only one will be in 
charge.  However, most makeups are not generally large fires: the majority will involve 4 pumps at a single house fire and 
most of the work will be done before the senior officer arrives.  The senior officer might have a considerable distance to 
travel to the fire and does not get the call until the makeup is sent (by the watch-commander who has arrived at the fire).        
43 The term lost means that the fire has ‘won’, firefighters have had to withdraw and have in affect given in (see Chapter 
3).   
44 Prior to 1920, firefighters worked continuously for 13 days before getting 1 day off.  Accommodation was provided at 
the station, thus bringing families within the discipline of the fire service as well. 
45 Up until 1956, almost the whole leadership of the FBU were members of the Communist Party.  After the Hungarian 
revolution was crushed by USSR (1956) many resigned their communist card in protest.  However, Militant, Socialist 
Workers Party and other far-left groups, still have direct links into the fire service.  Terry Fields, the MP who was 
removed from the official labour list because he was a Militant member, was previously an Executive Council member of 
the FBU.  Derek Hatton was also a firefighter, before becoming leader of Liverpool Council.  
46 Women were prevented from being firefighters at that time and it took until 1982 for the first female wholetime 
firefighter to be employed.  However, if the current rate of women’s employment in the fire service were anything to go 
by, women would not have made any difference to the understaffing in the 1960’s.  Of interest the FBU allowed sexist 
cartoons in their Firefighter journal at the time (see Compton 1976) and in so doing supported a view that trade unions 
would resist women coming into men’s jobs (see Stockard and Johnson 1992: 42). 
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shortage of firefighters became so acute that pumps often rode with a driver, a firefighter and an 
officer (as opposed to today’s minimum standard of 5).  This increased the risk to firefighters, 
particularly regarding the support available outside the fire for those who ‘got in’ (see Chapters 3 and 
5).  Shortage of riders also severely restricted leave
47
.  The shortages also meant that long hours could 
not be reduced (from 56) and this further deterred recruitment.  As a result, the workforce (which 
more and more included people like myself with no military experience) became angry and the FBU 
increasingly focussed firefighters’ anger on industrialising the fire service (see Segars 1989 for a full 
report of this).  The employers’ response was to first resist, then reduce hours and increase pay.  
However, once firefighters’ militancy had been aroused, the FBU were able to ratchet up their 
bargaining power, which then trapped the employers in a vicious circle: as fast as the working week 
reduced to appease the existing workforce, more recruits were needed to fill the vacancies that the 
reduction in the working week created
48.  The massive influx of ‘new’ firefighters at this time may 
also have been important in building a gap between firefighters and officers.   
 
It may also be that the authority of the FBU increased in part because rationalisations were 
occurring in the fire service to reduce the number of brigades.  For example the new LFB (1965) was 
the result of amalgamating eight Brigades and firefighters moaned about lost conditions and 
undermanning.  This gave the FBU an opportunity to provide leadership and a sense of belonging 
before firefighters focused their loyalty on the new brigade.  I was very much a part of this process of 
industrialisation, being, at the time, a prominent member of the London Negotiating Committee.  I 
remember that the LFB, with vacancies for 1000 firefighters out of an establishment of 6000, 
continually faced spit and polish/emergency calls only disputes involving firefighters refusing to drill 
and maintain the cleanliness of the station to military standards.  Firefighters’ denial of their officers 
‘right’ to maintain the previous military levels of cleanliness, ‘proved’ just how unimportant that 
bullshit was (see Dixon 1994) and this alone had a marked effect on discipline.  Firefighters’ 
resistance to officers also became clearer and more pronounced, with the result that firefighters 
refused to accept any order from officers unless they were attending an emergency call.  The ability to 
refuse orders and get away with it also demystified officers’ autocratic authority and at the end of 
each dispute, the gap between firefighters and officers increased as officers lost more respect, while 
firefighters’ industrial strength and confidence in the presence of their officers increased49.     
 
1.4.3. Service for the sixties 
Alongside the disputes over hours, the FBU campaigned for a more professional fire service by trying 
to involve firefighters in Fire Prevention (FP) (see FBU 1960; Holroyd 1970).  This eventually 
culminated in a discreet FP branch in the fire service, which consists mainly of officers who have 
moved permanently sideways away from line management and some officers who intend to move 
back after getting their FP experience
50
.  This branch carries out inspections to ensure properties 
comply with a variety of legislation intended to prevent/control fire and to save life.  It was also 
anticipated that firefighters would carry out inspections after their ‘Service for the Sixties’ campaign, 
                                                 
47 In an organisation operating round the clock for 365 days a year, it is more important to be able to take leave when 
reasonably requested than in traditional 9-5 working. 
48 The hours reduced from 56 to a 48-hour week in 1965, but this often involved firefighters working compulsory overtime 
to cover shortages and the hours effectively returned to 56 in 1967.  It was not until after their national strike that 
firefighters finally achieved their current 42-hour week duty system.  Even then, after the agreement was made as part of 
the return to work deal, the employers tried not to implement this reduction and firefighters had to threaten a further strike 
to get the 42-hour week. 
49 This was also a time when the Health and Safety at work act came into use in the fire service (see Chapter 5) and 
firefighters were increasingly able to challenge their officers’ right to be in charge on the grounds that their orders were a 
breach of safety regulations. 
50 The senior officers in FP, who have little to do with the operational firefighters in a day-to-day command sense, but they 
do have an operational roll, take their turn as ‘duty officer’ when they will turn up, ‘out of the blue’, and are expected not 
only to be in charge, but also to control firefighters.  Some brigades unable to staff their FP vacancies have offered 
inducements in the form of temporary promotions to those who ‘choose’ to go into FP and other brigades require, as a 
condition of promotion, that officers serve in FP. 
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but this has not really occurred.  Firefighters and FP are not a ‘natural’ mix and after an initial 
surge of interest, firefighters quickly became unhappy with FP.  They particularly disliked the 
paperwork, which firefighters feminise as office work and not compatible with their status as 
firefighters (see Chapters 3 and 5).  To marginalise FP, firefighters carry out their own form of 
soldiering (see Taylor 1947): a process made easy because firefighters who carry out FP remain ‘on 
the run’51.  The inevitable result, even for quiet stations, is that an emergency can disrupt the 
inspection.  After the call, the firefighters return to the station to clean up and this frequently leaves no 
time to return to the inspection
52
.   
 
Currently in some brigades, FP is an important part of firefighters’ duties and in others only 
token inspections occur.  This might suggest that some Brigades are keener to accept FP than others 
are, but what is more likely is that they are in a different point in a cycle.  This cycle starts with a new 
initiative such as visiting schools (see Sacre 2000)
53
, but might also involve some ‘follow-up 
inspections’ after the fulltime FP department have visited a premises.  However, the brigade has to 
train and involve all firefighters in FP
54
 before this can be done.  After a time each initiative gradually 
loses momentum and grinds to a halt.  Then a few years later the FP initiative starts again and the 
same cycle repeat itself; each time firefighters have to retrain to incorporate changes in FP legislation.  
Recently a new FP initiative is starting, called Community Fire Safety (CFS) this is more orientated 
towards firefighters getting involved with the public and could be instrumental in changing the way 
the fire service operates.   
 
1.4.4. Cleaning 
Once the FBU won the argument and as FP started (as a condition of it starting in LFB), the FBU 
insisted that now that firefighters were professionals, it was no longer befitting for firefighters to do 
their own domestic cleaning and after a further spate of industrial disputes ‘civilians’ took over station 
cleaning.  These disputes completed a new phase of industrial relations in the fire service and 
heralded the end of discipline in any military sense.  Gone were the military standards of cleaning: 
scrubbing and polishing floors, cleaning windows, toilets and polishing brass—bullshit (see Dixon 
1994).  Gone too was officers right to ‘prove’ their authority and reinforce firefighters place at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, by ordering higher standards of cleaning as a local punishment for deviant 
firefighters
55
.   
 
 
 
1.4.5. Discipline code 
                                                 
51 ‘On the run’ means the appliance is available for emergency calls.  In this case, the driver remains on the appliance (in 
touch by radio with control) and can summon the crew who have left the appliance to carry out the inspection.    
52 Firefighters have to wear their best uniform for the FP inspection, but if they receive a call to a fire they discard their 
best uniform and rig in their firegear on route to the incident.  Firegear is inevitably dirty and even when they have nothing 
to do at the incident their hands will be dirty, they then need to return to the station to wash and straighten out their best 
uniform.  The trip back to the station is never as fast as the trip to the fire.  Factory managers, who have to set aside time 
to show firefighters around on the inspections, are often angry at how their time is wasted under such circumstances.   
53 Currently the term Community Fire Safety is being used to describe what earlier may have been called FP.  Community 
Fire Safety is a re-branding and a new attempt to involve firefighters in carrying out what effectively is FP but on a more 
local and interactive approach.  In this thesis the terms CFS and FP are almost mutually interchangeable and I predict that 
unless this re-branding is well handled firefighters will soon recognise this form of work in the same way they do other FP 
work (see Chapters 5 and 6).  It also has to be noted that those stations with the most time to carry out CFS are the stations 
which receive less calls and that the busier stations (which probably have more need for CFS involvement) have less time 
to help prevent fires through CFS.  
54 In line with the FBU’s fundamental policy that all operational firefighters carry out the same work, when operational 
firefighters carry out FP inspections, everyone at the station must be trained and do their fair share.  This avoids a situation 
whereby only ‘interested’ firefighters are trained, and the competition over who does and does not do FP inspections.   
55 This might be seen as similar to the informal methods of discipline in the military where officers given right to lead is 
supported by officers’ administering summary punishments for minor misdemeanours.   
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The fire service has a discipline code (laid down by Act of Parliament) and ‘Charges’ can be served 
on firefighters to be answered at what best resembles a court marshal.  However, the fire service 
rarely use its disciplinary procedures and, nationally, only 168 firefighters (almost ½ of those 
investigated) were found guilty during 1998/9 (see Baigent 1996; Appendix 7).  This lack of use 
occurs mainly because the discipline code is so cumbersome, but there are other reasons.  First, 
firefighters are skilful in avoiding direct confrontation that might produce the type of evidence 
required to support a ‘Charge’.  Second, the FBU is very effective in avoiding and winning initial 
cases and the system of appeals that can go up to the Home Secretary.  Third, if an officer has to 
resort to discipline they are almost admitting that they cannot control firefighters.  Officers have also 
lost the opportunity to gain respect from being good leaders/firefighters and now firefighters have less 
need of officers’ skills at a fire.  Officers who lack the respect of their firefighters are therefore 
trapped in a system where they are expected to lead, almost in military fashion, without the ability to 
impose punishments summarily (as in the military) and are not expected to bring formal charges.       
 
1.4.6. Cutting the fire service  
In recent times, attempts to cut the fire service have almost forced firefighters to act in self-defence 
again (see Segars 1989; Bailey 19992; Darlington 1996, 1998; Chapter 5).  However, only a few 
firefighters show the revolutionary consciousness
56
 that might be expected in such an apparently 
successful working class organisation.  Their view is close to printers (see Cockburn’s 1983, 1991a): 
individual firefighters’ trade unionism can be seen as left wing, and self-centred and conservative57.  
Lashing out to defend their service ethos may be an equally rational explanation of firefighters’ 
behaviour, alongside or instead of the class action and solidarity that Segars (1989) recognises.  A 
further explanation that I explore in this thesis is the possible link between firefighting and 
masculinity, which firefighters might be conservatively defending (see Chapters 3 and 6).  Whatever 
the reason the FBU mixes a powerful cocktail for resistance that makes them a substantial union the 
employers have to reckon with.  Despite the general view that they were forced back to work in 1978, 
it might be argued instead that firefighters actually won their national strike, because they returned to 
work with a pay agreement that locked their wage to a point on the industrial wage scale for skilled 
labour (see Segars 1989; Bailey 1992).   
 
1.4.7. Shared understandings 
Importantly the strike made obvious to firefighters that the so-called ‘shared understandings’ between 
firefighters and senior officers (in general) were little more than a sham.  Senior officers, who might 
until the strike have been seen by firefighters to have joint understandings and therefore held 
firefighters’ esteem, now sided with the government58.  These officer ‘scabs’ not only helped to train 
the troops brought in to break the strike, but led them at fires.  Senior officers at the time made the 
argument they were defending the public.  However, in the light of this thesis, it is possible to see 
senior officers as accepting, if not supporting, the earlier understaffing and bad conditions that 
firefighters endured.  It also appears that post 1965, when firefighters started to fight back, officers 
have increasingly sided with the employers, who were first keen to run the fire service as cheaply as 
                                                 
56 Giddens (1982: 163-164) argues that many groups have ‘class awareness’, which involves an understanding that groups 
form around norms.  He does not consider that so many have ‘class consciousness’, which he describes as, “conscious of 
the other classes and relationships and antagonisms between them.”  Giddens goes on to break these into three categories: 
1. Aware of other classes and class differentiation; 
2. Aware classes are in conflict, with oppositional interests; 
3. Revolutionary consciousness. 
I will for the purposes of this thesis use the term conservative to describe those firefighters who I consider are ‘aware 
classes are in conflict, with oppositional interests’.   
57 It is interesting to note how Cockburn (1991a) is an update on Cockburn (1983) by including the redundancies caused 
by the move from Fleet Street to Docklands. 
58 Segars (1989: 315-316) argues, “It was not until 1977 that firefighters eventually came to terms with both the special 
nature of their job in an emergency service and their best interests as working people.” 
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possible and, after firefighters’ gains of the last three decades, are now intent on cutting the 
cost/size of the fire service.  Despite the increase in emergency calls and attempts to increase the 
FP/CFS duties of firefighters, officers have not stood up (in the way that senior police and military 
officers have) for their service.  Officers’ position may be less to do with protecting the public from 
fire and more to do with officers trying to ‘prove’ or reclaim their authority in an environment where 
firefighters have become increasingly resistant (see Chapter 5)
59
.   
 
However, attempts to cut the fire service remain unsuccessful and no firefighter has ever been 
made redundant.  In comparison with other groups of unionised labour, firefighters do not experience 
job insecurity.  The fire service remains one of the few havens where men can celebrate their physical 
strength
60
 and embodied skills in permanent employment with a pension after 25/30 years
61
, which in 
turn allows firefighters, collectively and individually, to reflexively view themselves in a positive 
light and not in competition with each other (see Burawoy 1979: 67; Collinson 1992: 24, 1998).  Of 
particular interest, the authority of the FBU, gained during 1960’s, when firefighters were in short 
supply, has not been eroded as problems over a labour shortage turn into problems of how employers 
process 80,000 applications for 120 jobs (see Webb 1998: 26-27)
 62
.  In part, this may occur because 
the FBU have added public support to their cocktail of resistance by successfully manipulating the 
concept of Total Quality Management.  Rather than allowing politicians and officers to use public 
interest as a reason for introducing economies, which in the NHS involves an emphasis on cost, rates 
of delivery and not ‘customer’ satisfaction (see Lucio and MacKenzie 1999: 168-169), the FBU have 
turned the tables and formed an alliance with the public and public bodies (who are the real 
stakeholders in the fire service) to challenge politicians by an innovative use of performance 
measurement and consumers rights (to have ‘Best Value’ from an efficient fire service in delivery 
terms rather than economic) to maintain their service at 1980 levels.     
 
1.4.8. Secondary work: fiddle jobs 
Most firefighters have secondary employment (‘fiddle jobs’), through which firefighters use their 
entrepreneurial skills away from the station to improve their income.  The shift system is well suited 
to ‘fiddling’ and this second job can boost firefighters’ incomes above that of their officers.  Much of 
this work is casual labour, but many firefighters operate as self-employed builders, window cleaners 
and mechanics.  In fact, firefighters suggest that if you want something done there will be a firefighter 
somewhere who can do it
63.  When such entrepreneurial ‘skills’ are pitted against officers, rather than 
encompassed or harnessed by management, then this adds to officers’ difficulties in controlling the 
workplace.   
 
                                                 
59 This may be a classic case of how firefighters’ consciousness was raised as they recognised that their officers had been 
exploiting them.  However, as to whether officers were acting on behalf of capital, or in defence of a petty dividend that 
gave them prestige over firefighters is left until Chapters 5 and 6 (see Wright 1984). 
60 The notion that firefighters have to be strong, which caused the fire service to look for sailors in the past (above), 
continues today and in research (Richards 1999: 49-50) over 80% of all respondents considered a firefighters’ job was 
physical. 
61 Whilst firefighting is a manual job, it also involves mental skills.  Firefighters should be thought of throughout this 
thesis as a thinking labourer, whose workplace is far from the assembly line and officers’ surveillance.   
62 Outside of the remit of this thesis, but difficult to ignore, this mix of formal and informal structures appears to provide 
an efficient fire service that reflects the wishes of the community and it may be that the fire service provides a good 
example of ‘Best Value’.  If politicians really want to change the fire service and promote an efficiency based on 
economics, then they will probably need to implement a root and branch rethink of the formal system.  However, moving 
towards a cost based criteria for efficiency might work against the secondary stakeholders’ (the public) views on ‘Best 
Value’, as Chapters 3, 5 and 6 will suggest. 
63 In many ways, those firefighters who choose self-employment in their ‘fiddle jobs’ and those who are employed in 
‘fiddle jobs’, but not dependent on the wage this work gives them for survival, might be seen as independent artisans (see 
Wright 1984: 122).  Fiddle jobs, might also develop firefighters’ independence in ways not so available to those workers 
whose ‘normal’ hours at work do not provide the options that firefighters have.  For a few firefighters, ‘fiddling’ becomes 
their main occupation and then the fire service is almost a hobby.   
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1.5. WELFARE AND BENEVOLENT 
Before examining firefighters’ working arrangements, it is important to recognise that the FBU is not 
the only organisation that looks after firefighters’ welfare and to provide a sense of belonging.  There 
is also The Fire Services National Benevolent Fund (FSNBF) and The Fire Service Welfare Fund 
(FSWF), both registered charities that provide services to firefighters.  FSNBF provides rehabilitation, 
therapy, convalescent care, and financial grants, for sick and injured firefighters and their families.  
FSWF provides a more local need and in London it operates three social venues, two large sports 
facilities as a focal point for the many sporting clubs that firefighters organise, and provides sporting 
equipment to stations (LFBWFM 2000).  There are numerous other fire service societies and a 
National Retired Members Association.  Firefighters are good fundraisers and apart from supporting 
their own organisations, they are prominent campaigners for national charities and one-off issues, 
especially those associated with children.           
  
1.6. WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR FIREFIGHTERS   
Firefighters are involved in three forms of working arrangement: one predominantly takes place in the 
public arena, the other two, mainly in the private.  My description of these types of work, in the next 
three sections, recognises the colloquial terminology of the fire service, which uses military terms to 
explain firefighters’ work as a duty: first, there are firefighters’ operational duties; second, 
firefighters’ standing-by duties; third, firefighters’ standing-down duties64.    
 
1.7. OPERATIONAL DUTIES  
Operational duties are the fire service’s raison d’etre: the saving of life; the suppression of fire and 
the rendering of humanitarian services.  This is the public face of the fire service, recognisable as a 
mixed bag of emergency calls/’shouts’65, many of which do not involve fire  (Burns 1995: 28; Archer 
1999: 98; see Appendix 8).  ‘Shouts’ can and often do involve periods of intense activity in an 
uncomfortable and hazardous work environment.  At these times, firefighters, “can act with 
conspicuous courage and devotion to duty” (Fennell 1988: 83).  My understanding has led me to 
suggest that firefighters have a professional ethos: ‘to provide an efficient service to help the public’ 
and this might apply to anytime the public ask for help.  However, firefighters indicate that they 
believe firefighting is the single most important, even defining, feature of their work.  Therefore, 
firefighting is treated as central to firefighters’ gender construction and a focus of my thesis.  It is 
important to note that if any risk is associated with firefighters’ work, then it is normally to be found 
at a fire.  Whilst there will always be exceptions to the rule, it is possible to identify that the other 
‘emergency’ incidents firefighters attend do not involve so many unknowns and consequently the 
danger element of that work is largely reduced.   
 
1.7.1. Attending emergencies 
Each firebrigade has a central control to receive, evaluate and determine the attendance to 999 calls.  
The control then ‘put the bells down’ at the station, a ‘call-slip66’ prints out in the watchroom 
‘ordering’ the appliances to ‘turn-out’ and the whole watch will run to the appliances.  The 
commander of each appliance collects a call slip and route-card
67
 from the watchroom, before 
continuing to the appliance where the crew will already be ‘mounted’ with engine revving ready to 
                                                 
64 The terms ‘stand-by’ and ‘stand-down’ are of Naval origin.   
65 The term ‘shout’ is understood to have risen from the way that, before bells and sirens, firefighters used to shout to the 
pubic to get out of their way (Lloyd Elliot 1992: 25-26).  There is even an argument that the Prince of Wales in Victorian 
times, who is known to have attended fires with the London Fire Brigade, may have been instrumental in using this 
method of getting people to move out of the way.   
66 The call slip provides the address, type of incident, the appliances to attend and the route card number.   
67 Each brigade will have its own type of route-card, but typically there will be one card for each road on the station’s 
ground and these will comprise of a small map of the area and have a written instruction of how to get from the station to 
the road concerned.   
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go.  The officer jumps onto the appliance and it will leave, often within 40 seconds of the ‘bells 
going down’.   
 
In most areas, the appliance will arrive at the fire within 5-10 minutes.  The watch-commander 
then has to make immediate decisions on how to fight the fire, as there is no time to prepare a plan 
because this might allow a fire to spread further.  The watch-commander is also under pressure to 
radio a message back to control indicating how the incident is progressing (see Appendix 9)
68
: a 
‘stop’ message, indicates no more assistance will be required; an ‘assistance message/makeup’, 
indicates that the initial attendance is insufficient to contain the fire and asks for extra appliances.  If 
people are trapped in a fire, the watch-commander must send back a ‘persons reported’ message (see 
Chapter 3) and it is almost mandatory to ‘make pumps four’ at persons reported incidents.  Messages 
have the advantage that central control know how to arrange their resources, but the need to comply 
with tight time schedules may also be an example of a Foucaultian gaze over the officer in charge of 
the fire.  On receipt of a makeup, the central control will despatch a senior officers to take control, but 
they will not arrive for a considerable time after the initial attendance.      
 
1.7.2. Always ready 
Firefighters have no warning when a shout will occur and the importance that firefighters place on 
always being ready for action cannot be overemphasised.  The possibility that in 40 seconds they 
could be heading down the road with sirens blaring means firefighters priorities are mostly focussed 
on preparing for this probability.  Even on the quietest of stations, such as Biggin Hill with less than 
200 ‘shouts’ a year, the appliance will always be ready with doors open and ‘firegear’ (protective 
clothing) laid out on the seats to facilitate ‘rigging’ as the pump weaves through the traffic to the 
incident.  There is no room for leaving equipment behind, everything, including the firefighter must 
always be ready for action
69
.  Adrenaline levels are likely to rise, even en route, because the call slip 
will more often only indicate ‘fire’, the rest is left to the imagination.  As one firefighter explained, 
“we only come back from false alarms, we never go to them.”  Driving to a fire is in itself an 
adrenaline-raising experience.  Drivers can take advantage of the knowledge that other traffic will not 
deliberately hinder them and apart from the call to duty, the ability to have an adrenaline-raising 
drive encourages firefighters to treat all calls with equal urgency.  It appears that firefighters spend on 
average 12.5 minutes at each call
70
 and whilst false alarms clearly skew this statistic, it is true that 
many fires do not take very long to extinguish.  Firefighters really enjoy firefighting
71
 and as an 
example of this and their sense of duty, it is true to say that such statistics are only made possible, 
because once they extinguish a fire, firefighters do not then stretch out the job.  They hurry to become 
available (‘on the run’) in case there is another incident72.  However, if firefighters wanted to they 
might extend the time spent at each fire by up to 3 or 4 hours
73
. 
 
                                                 
68 The radio has now replaced the female despatch riders who carried out this service during WW2 air-raids.  Some 
brigades require this message to be sent within ten minutes of the call.  This forces officers into making a decision as to if 
they can control the fire or not, but is a considerable feature of control that enables senior officers who are not at the fire to 
reach out, as it were, to the fireground.  It might be possible to see this as a Foucaultian gaze. 
69 This can make toileting difficult. 
70 A fire service statistician whose name will not be revealed supplied this statistic.   
71 Deakin (1977) explains that firefighters told him “you look forward to going out … I wait for a fire all the time.” 
72 Firefighters, unlike other workers (see Collinson 1992: 14), do not require production bonuses to work harder at what 
they identify as ‘The Job’.  However as Chapters 3-5 will show they resist carrying out ‘other’ work, which they do not 
relate to their operational duties, such as FP, or what they call unnecessary drills; they impose what might be seen as 
unofficial embarkation lines.  Chapters 3 and 4 will explain that firefighters do not only work for wages, they also gain 
other dividends from their employment.   
73 Once a fire is over the speed at which firefighters work does not materially slow down.  They are quick to collect up 
their equipment, tidy up and to then radio control that they are available for other fires.  Firefighters have not yet resorted 
to a form of soldiering that would see them staying at an incident longer than necessary and thus increasing the need for 
extra reserves of firefighters to cover any other incidents that occurred.  It is surprising that firefighters have not yet used 
this form of action as a warning of what might occur if further cuts in the fire service were to take place.   
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1.7.3. How many calls? 
The LFB have provided me with considerable statistical evidence; I have adapted this for my own use 
to indicate how busy firefighters might actually be and the type of emergencies they attend (see 
Appendix 10).  From this Appendix (Figure 1), it is possible to suggest that in the financial year 
1999/00, the 112 LFB stations attended 174,564 emergency calls.  Figure 2 indicates that 77 people 
died in fires and 239 were rescued
74
.  Figure 3 is the result of my using SPSS to manipulate the 
statistics for ‘Total Calls’ to select stations at five percentile points over a period of four financial 
years.  In the year, 1999/2000 it can be ascertained that:  
 the busiest station is Soho (percentile point 100), which attended a total of 3954 emergency 
calls in their area;  
 the quietest station is Biggin Hill (percentile point 1), which attended 166 emergency calls in 
their area. 
 
Figure 3 also provides statistics to generalise how many calls a firefighter on one of the four watches 
at the percentile stations might attend.  Thus, in the year 1999/2000 a firefighter stationed at:  
 Soho attended 988 emergency calls in their stations area; 
 Biggin Hill attended 41 emergency calls in their stations area.  
 
Figure 4 involves a similar use of SPSS for fires in properties (primary fires) and from this it can be 
ascertained that in the year 1999/2000:  
 the busiest station, Tottenham (percentile point 100), attended a total of 431 fires in buildings 
in their station’s area and a firefighter on one of the four watches might attend on average 2 
fires a week;   
 the quietest station, Biggin Hill (percentile point 1), attended 50 fires in buildings in their 
station’s area and a firefighter on one of the four watches might attend on average 12 fires a 
year . 
 
Figure 5 represents a breakdown for the total calls for the percentile stations, including makeups.  
Figure 6 is a total of the makeups
75
 the LFB attended in four financial years.  Figure 7 breaks these 
statistics down station by station for the year 1998/1999 and this indicates that:  
 there were 581 makeups  
 Biggin Hill had no makeups;  
 Soho had 11 four-pump fires;  
 Tottenham had 10 four-pump fires;   
 no makeup resembles the size of the Kings Cross disaster (Fennell 1988).   
 
I provide these statistics to make the point that contrary to popular belief firefighters are not always 
firefighting
76
, indeed and as later evidence will verify firefighters have a considerable time free from 
firefighting to organise their social hierarchies.  
 
1.8. STANDING-BY 
When firefighters are not attending emergency calls, they use the terms standing-by
77
 or standing-
down to describe their working arrangements.  Whilst standing-by firefighters prepare for their 
operational role and this can involve routine (but important) duties, such as testing their equipment
78
, 
                                                 
74 In 31 year’s working as a firefighter in a ‘busy’ area of London, I was present at about 16 rescues.   
75 Fires where the initial attendance of two/three pumps was insufficient to deal with the incident and the officer in charge 
had to ask for the assistance of extra pumps (a makeup). 
76 Cunningham (1971) suggests only 3% of firefighters’ time is spent firefighting.  
77 Firefighters can also use the term ‘standing-by’ or ‘stand-by’ to describe a situation when they go to another station for 
the shift to cover a temporary shortage. 
78 Every piece of operational equipment has a standard test laid down in writing.  This test will indicate how often the 
piece of equipment is tested and how the test is done.  When the test is complete the test card is filled in to substantiate 
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drilling
79
, technical lectures, 11D inspections
80
 and FP.  Normally the amount of time spent on this 
work is prescribed in Brigade Orders (see Appendix 11).  Some firestations will be organised ‘to the 
book’, but this is rarely the case (see Chapters 3-5).  Custom and practice provides that watch-
commanders and firefighters will reach an accommodation at watch level over working arrangements.  
There are at least three reasons for this.  First, officers’ administration duties take up a lot of time.  
Second, firefighters are self-motivated about maintaining operational readiness.  Third, many 
firefighters consider routines for testing equipment, drilling and lectures are over prescribed (see 
Chapter 5).  Were watch-commanders to force issues in these areas, they would have to constantly 
oversee firefighters and their ‘admin’ would not be done.  As an example of the accommodation that 
can be reached on a watch, once important duties are complete a watch-commander may suggest that 
the firefighters should, “check the appliances.”  This simple statement can provide a number of 
messages to firefighters.  On some occasions, the appliances may actually need attention, but equally, 
these duties may hardly be necessary and officers may be inventing work to prevent the devil from 
making work for idle hands.  Control then passes to the peer-group leaders who organise this 
apparently ambiguous situation, spreading the work through the time-lapse between meals or other 
anticipated activities.  The peer-group leaders are normally the senior firefighters (‘hands’81).  
However, leadership at such times is conditional on the acceptance by the watch of the senior hand’s 
status.  Charismatic leadership is important at a firestation, (in both the formal and informal 
hierarchy) personality rather than rank can command respect, and often a younger peer group will 
emerge and be very influential.  This can occur because older hands have chosen to pass on some 
authority to the younger peer group in exchange for an easier life
82
.   
 
Dependent on the view of individual watch-commanders and their ability to implement those 
views, one outcome is that the station work environment can be ‘relaxed’ (see Chapters 4 and 5).  This 
is not to say that watch-commanders are negligent.  They were first employed for their physical skills 
as firefighters, are often burdened by the paperwork and have to spend more time at their desks than 
they might otherwise choose.  This pushes the task of managing firefighters to secondary importance: 
a task made easier  
if a ‘good’ officer can come to an accord with the peer leaders on a firestation83.  Friendship between 
watch-commanders and their firefighters can develop to such an extent that official hierarchies may 
almost be suspended once the operational readiness of the station is ensured.  Watch-commanders 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this.  As an example a wooden ladder is tested by fully extending it against the tower.  Then a firefighter goes to the top 
and jumps on each ‘round’ (rung) of the ladder as they come down.  Then a line is tied halfway down the ladder on the 
‘string’ (side) and the weight of three firefighters is applied.  The ladder is then fully inspected for splinters and damage.  
This test takes place after every operational use of the ladder and weekly.  Testing does not always take place and this will 
result in records being falsified to make it appear the test did take place.   
79 ‘Drilling’ relates to training with the equipment on the appliance and this normally takes place in the station yard.  
Firefighters are in effect rehearsing for a fire. 
80 Section 1.1.D of the Fire Services Act (1947) allows for the fire service to visit industrial premises for the purpose of 
familiarising firefighters with the buildings in case of fire.  These visits will normally be carried out with the watch 
remaining available for calls (on the run) in a similar way to when they carry out FP inspections.  As a generalisation, it is 
possible to suggest that each watch at a station will visit premises with an expected high risk of fire, or where difficult 
circumstances might be expected if the building caught fire.  Hospitals, hotels and factories are particular examples.  It is 
left to the watch-commander to organise these visits and if the area had a docks, ships also would also be visited.  Some 
areas might be visited more often, because of their popularity and will likely involve locations where children (and their 
mothers) might be found or attractive women might be working or at leisure.   
81 The use by the fire service of the word ‘hands’ is taken from the Naval term where sailors are often referred to as 
‘hands’, and it is my view this relates to how the past embodied, experiential nature of the rigging ships for sailing and 
how important hands were in doing this.   
82 Senior ‘hands’ might ‘disappear’ and avoid all the drills by going in the mess to help the cook (see Chapters 3-5). 
83 It might be that this is a case of give and take: a workplace strategy by managers to gain conformity in wider areas (see 
Burawoy 1979; Salaman 1986).  However, I believe Salaman’s analysis is relevant, but does not account for the strong ties 
that exist between watch officers and firefighters.  More likely watch officers legitimise firefighters’ informal working 
arrangements, because officers too have interests at stake.  Clearly officers’ life at work will be easier if they do not upset 
firefighters, but more likely officers share values with firefighters, and until they move from the watch and break the tie 
with those values, they are less likely to see firefighters’ actions, through the eyes of a senior officer whose rules 
firefighters break, as deviant or pathological.   
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may then be explicit and suggest that firefighters, “disappear” (keep out of the way).  Firefighters 
will then take this instruction as a signal to go to more secluded areas of the station and read or chat.  
In the event that a senior officer arrives and disrupts this informal arrangement, then firefighters are 
unlikely to let their officer down; they will ensure they appear to be working.  Watches can then 
become almost little fiefdoms of resistance and it possible that drill records and log books may 
actually be falsified to make a station look like it is organised ‘to the book’84 .  However, it is unlikely 
that senior officers will arrive surreptitiously to check up on firefighters.  In part, this will be because 
most senior officers were party to such practice when they were watch-commanders and partly 
because it is difficult for a senior officer to arrive unannounced at a station.  Tradition requires that on 
arrival at a station a senior officer must go to the watchroom and ring ‘one-bell’ to summon the duty-
firefighter and the watch-commander, which warns firefighters that they must now look busy
85
.   
 
 
 
1.8.1. Conflict 
Occasionally the understanding between the watch-commander and the firefighters can change: a 
disruptive group of firefighters can emerge, or a watch may believe their commander is ‘out of line’.  
This might most commonly occur when a new watch-commander arrives on the watch or if an officer 
tries to enforce a new Brigade Order without negotiating with the watch.  Then a test of strength can 
take place to establish boundaries of control.  These tests will often result in the watch carrying out a 
range of ‘soldiering’ activities, mainly, but not always during less important non-operational duties.  
Disrupting the informal working relationships can be uncomfortable for both officers and firefighters; 
officers must neglect their administrative duties to control firefighters and this disrupts firefighters 
comfortable work arrangements.  If firefighters stick together they can have an advantage, because 
they are aware that officers are unlikely to want to make the dispute public by resorting to discipline 
procedures against the whole watch.  The right to apply for transfer en masse is a further threat 
firefighters have over an officer, because again this makes public the officers’ inability to control their 
watch (see Chapter 4).  If these disputes are not quickly settled they can involve real upset to 
station/family life: a whole series of changes may then result as firefighters take entrenched positions 
or transfer to happier stations.  Experience suggests that the type of officer who ‘takes on the watch’ 
can only be successful for a short time and quickly moves on: moving sideways or getting the 
promotion they have ‘proved’ they are capable of having (see Chapters 3-5).  To prevent disputes 
escalating
86
, wise officers or older hands will often call a ‘hats off meeting’87 to restore the normal 
collaborative way the watch and their officer organise.   
                                                 
84 Most brigades have a ‘drill record book’, which watch-commanders complete, to ensure that each member carries out 
the prescribed amount of drill each week/month/year.  ‘Log books’ are a record of the activities that a station undertakes in 
a day and normally completed by the duty firefighter.  As with ‘test records’ these records can be falsified to make it 
appear the watch have done things they may not have done (run by the book; see Chapters 3-6). 
85 In most brigades one firefighter on each shift is responsible for maintaining the log book, answering the telephone, the 
teleprinter and dealing with visitors (they are though on the run and in the event of a call the station is left empty).  
Traditionally, when senior officers arrive at a station they go to the watch room and ring ‘one bell’ to announce their 
arrival at the station.  The duty-firefighter and the watch officer then go to the watchroom.  The duty-firefighter will ‘book 
the officer in’, in the Log Book and with Brigade Control.  The watch officer has to ‘report to’ the senior officer and 
salute.  The senior officer might then inspect the station and can require the firefighters to drill or line up and answer 
questions.  When the officer leaves, the duty-firefighter will ‘book them out’ in a similar fashion to ‘booking them in’.  It 
is also incumbent on the duty-firefighter to ask “where shall I tell control you are going Sir/Maam.”  The answer is not 
only relayed to control, but to the station they go to visit next.  This warns the next station, giving them time to prepare.  
As traditions decline in the fire service this practice might be getting less formal and it might be tempting for officers to 
sneak up on a firestation.  However, society has almost conspired to help firefighters, vandalism and theft are now so 
common that firestations are now securely locked and senior officers would have great difficulty in gaining entry without 
actually knocking on the door.   
86 Disputes normally remain within the watch: a culture of 'keep it on the island’ (LFCDA 1995: 13).   
87 Officers of a senior rank must be saluted when first met.  However, this recognition of rank only applies if the officer is 
fully dressed i.e. with their hat.  The argument goes that it is the rank that the subordinate acknowledges, not the 
individual.  It might appear strange to those not acquainted with the workings of uniformed services, but when held 
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Watches, especially large ones consisting of up to 30 firefighters, may have more than one peer 
group and sometimes conflicts can occur between these groups.  However, except in extreme cases, 
the watch will not intentionally extend their internal domestic conflicts so that they affect their 
operational effectiveness.  In the ‘public’ operational sphere, the fire service ethos apparently takes 
precedence, and when ‘the bells go down’ the group put aside conflicts until after the incident is over.  
If viewed in context, the refusal to allow private disputes to affect service delivery is a sign of how 
much store firefighters put behind their professional ethos.  Such abilities might also explain how a 
service that is recognised as institutionally racist prevents this from affecting their service delivery to 
non-whites (Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999: 52 and p.80).   
 
1.8.2. Firefighters’ protocols for firefighting and more 
The Audit Commission (1995: 36) recognises that officers allow unofficial relaxation periods.  This 
space might appear similar to that, which engineers, or the mentally ill might make to resist authority 
(see Goffman 1961; Linstead 1985; Collinson 1992
88
).  However, the spaces that firefighters colonise 
are larger, last longer
89
 and are often used to reinforce their hierarchies (by harassment if necessary; 
see LFCDA 1995; Baigent 1996; Chapters 2 and 5).  On a less negative note, firefighters will often 
use these unofficial spaces to share experiential skills, develop trust and understanding between team 
members.  Talking and working are synonymous activities for firefighters, and this thesis will show 
that firefighters’ informal hierarchy unconsciously organises the joint experiences of firefighters to 
add to the drills and lectures through which the watch bond before an emergency.  The outcome is 
that the watch develop tactics for all types of incidents, almost create their own equivalent of Brigade 
Orders, but these are far more flexible than the official structures and despite being only spoken 
understandings, they have the authority of the watch (see Chapters 3-5).  These tactics are part of what 
I call protocols, because they involve more than just tactics, but also unspoken understandings that 
develop amongst men about testing themselves against their own standards (see Connell 1995; Hearn 
1996; Seidler 1997).  
 
The informal hierarchy does not only help to develop firefighters protocols for firefighting, it 
develops coping strategies for dealing with the iron cage of bureaucracy that autocratic officers would 
impose (see Chapter 5).  It also provides the support to debrief the traumas that occur during 
firefighters’ work.  A mature group might sit in silence genuinely grieving at a life lost, then someone 
will break the ice and they will move on.  A probationer who has seen their first dead body will get 
help from those with more experience, and it may be that firefighters can cope with their own trauma 
by helping someone younger.  Death and injury is not the only suffering that visits firefighters, and 
they see human despair in all its worse forms.  People who have their homes destroyed by fire get 
                                                                                                                                                                     
alongside the notion that rank is ‘might’ as it were, the suggestion is that rank is also ‘right’ and cannot be questioned.  
Whilst the outcome is that it is individuals who use this might/right, it is the understanding that the rank, not the person, 
has these attributes.  When an officer visits a station they will keep their hat on, the civilian notion of removing your hat 
on entering a building does not apply, as an officer without a hat loses their rank and the given right their rank holds.  
Therefore, when an officer visits and takes off their hat, they are so to speak reducing the formality of the occasion and 
effectively giving up their rank.  This has led to the expression ‘hats off meeting’, which means that an officer and 
firefighters meet as equals.  This romantic notion though has its caveats and it is unlikely that firefighters will trust a 
senior officer as an equal under any circumstances and such an arrangement might only apply within watches and their 
own officers.  Nor do officers hold true to such an arrangement and I have witnessed them putting their hat back on when 
they are losing an argument (as if they ever really take it off; see example of officers in a university, Chapter 4).  The 
railways had a similar understanding concerning the wearing of hats (see Strangleman 1998).       
88 Goffman (1961) suggests that even in total institutions have their areas of vulnerability, where formal structures are 
resisted.  These are often supply rooms or sick bays and Linstead  (1985 cited in Collinson 1988) suggests there are areas 
or times that the workers colonise, such as meal breaks.  Workers might also make the time to meet in specific areas as a 
resistance to managers (see Collinson 1992).   
89 Collinson (1992: 16) found that workers were uncomfortable and unused to talking about themselves or their 
organisation.  They were also conscious of taking up someone’s time, presumably because this might affect the bonus.  
Firefighters do not have that problem and in some ways talking is also a way of filling in the monotony between calls. 
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comfort from firefighters, who, in turn, cope with their trauma around the mess table by planning 
how they could have done the job better and by making jokes out of the ironies that occur at the job.   
 
However, discussions can also be about politics, nights out, sex, sport, families, cars, do-it-
yourself, fiddle jobs – the list is endless, but even more than that the watch contains a considerable 
experience of life, and firefighters bring their problems to work to get advice.  These problems may 
involve buying or repairing a house/car or the best way to winter geraniums, and there will be little 
the watch does not have an opinion on, nor prepared to share.  This will include giving advice on the 
most intimate situations and now I have left the fire service new work colleagues are often shocked by 
how intimately I am prepared to talk.  Sharing might be paternalistic on a watch, but it is also similar 
to the way that women operate in their networks.  As a place where pride in The Job meets the 
personal, so to speak, the mess table becomes a source through which firefighters develop their 
understanding of the world.  In a simple aside, since my retirement, when I am discussing something 
with my wife, she has frequently said, “don’t you think you should run that past the green watch.”  
Joking apart, I realise what she means
90
.          
 
1.9. STANDING-DOWN 
Standing-down time relates to when firefighters only duty is to attend emergency incidents, or to 
carry out essential-work necessary to maintain the operational efficiency of the station.  Firefighters 
have established national embarkation lines over definitions for essential-work in The National Joint 
Council Conditions of Service (1993, the Grey Book
91
).  At a typical wholetime firestation, standing-
down differs between the day and night duty.  On day duty, firefighters stand-down for two 15-minute 
tea breaks, 1-hour at lunch and 1-hour towards the end of shift.  On night duty there is a 1-hour supper 
and breakfast-break, and 6-hours between 1200 and 0600.  Whilst standing-down firefighters are 
‘free’ to relax and can play cards, darts, table tennis, snooker, pool, sport or watch television; at nights 
they can sleep ‘fully clothed’ in the dormitory92.   
   
1.10. COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR ORGANISATIONS 
In many ways, the fire service stands astride two types of working class employment: it is para-
military and yet industrialised.  When protecting the public from fire, firefighters operate as self-
disciplined military style units and yet, firefighters’ resistance is able to challenge formal discipline at 
these and other times (see Chapters 3-5).  As a group, firefighters are similar to those in many other 
working class or uniformed organisations.  Amongst these are the: 
 military93  
 police94  
                                                 
90 Later in the thesis, I shall indicate that Firefighters might actually use the watch and the understandings they form 
through their informal hierarchy as a way of knowing the world.  The watch can be seen as a primary reference group for 
wider understandings and opinion forming in general.  Within this context I have no difficulty in seeing firefighters 
working within their informal hierarchy as acting to defend an ‘occupational community’ that occurs when “people who 
work together choose to establish a form of relationship amongst themselves” (Salaman 1986: 75; see Hart 1982: 182: 
233). 
91 The term ‘Grey Book’ is a reference to the colour of the cover of the book that records the decisions of the National 
Joint Council (which comprises representatives of National Organisation of Employers Local Authority Fire Brigades and 
Fire Brigade Union) regarding the conditions of service of all firefighters.  
92 Most firefighters will strip to their underwear. 
93 I have during the period of my research spent considerable periods of time with the military.  This has given me an 
insight to how men in the various wings of the military operate (see: Dawson 1991, 1994; Barker 1992, 1994, 1995; Dixon 
1994; Barrett 1996; Owen 1996; Higate 1998; Holden 1998; Karner 1998; Dyer 1999).  However, the uses to which I can 
put this experience are limited, because it was not formally part of the research project  (see Chapter 2 and 6).   
94 As with the military I have spent considerable periods of time during my research in close contact with the police, but 
this took place at times not formally connected with the research.  At first glance, the police force/service might appear the 
closest example to firefighters, but I challenge this view as a commonly held perception based on similarity of uniform 
and that they both provide an emergency service, which confuses the reality.  I do not choose to see the firefighter, whose 
skills manifest themselves in the manual work of firefighting, in the same ‘class’ as a police officer, whose occupation I 
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 railways95  
 engineers, miners, printers, shipbuilders and similar non-uniformed groups of skilled working 
class industrial labour
96
.   
 
Nevertheless, whilst the fire service might appear similar to other occupations, it is not the same
97
.  
This thesis will refer to these organisations to gain some perspective, but social research on the fire 
service is limited and it is my intention to use my exceptional perspective to provide a view of the fire 
service that other researchers might at a later date use to draw out the comparisons and differences 
with other groups of workers. 
 
1.11. THEORETICAL VIEWS ON GENDER  
Most cultures socially construct gender by labelling occupations, activities and goals as either 
masculine or feminine.  These binary gender divisions polarise gender characteristics to advantage 
men and what is seen as appropriate behaviour in one sex, is sanctioned in the other
98
.  In very simple 
generalised terms this can lead to a society that encourages boys/men to:  
 think ‘rationally’ (that is what is socially constructed as ‘rationally’);  
 limit their emotions and caring skills;  
 develop their ability to be physically and mentally aggressive;  
 prove they are not sissy/feminine. 
 
These standards are all characteristics that firefighters would say form a fundamental requirement of 
their job/masculinity.  The polarised opposite happens for girls/women.  They are encouraged to 
‘prove’ their femininity by:  
 connecting with their emotions;  
 being unthreatening, attractive and caring (for men); 
 limit their physical skills and experience within a narrow feminine range; 
 prove their attractiveness by demonstrating dependence on men.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
see as white-collar work and involving constables upholding the Queen’s peace through a range of non-manual duties 
(often, according to Macpherson [1999] in particular and Reiner, [1992] with their own political motivation).  However, 
the class location of the police officer is increasingly becoming ambiguous, as when policing goes from being a service to 
a force.  Policing then becomes manual labour, when the police use their right to legitimate violence to physically control 
a social situation (see Reiner 1985; Smith and Gray 1985; Graef 1989; Dunhill 1989; Jefferson 1990; Fielding 1991 1999; 
Young 1991 and 1995; McConville, and Shepherd 1992; Punch 1993; Northern 1995; Pallister 1998; Campbell 1999; 
Dodd 1999; Mcpherson 1999; Norton-Taylor 1999; Chapters 3-6)..  Currently, on the mainland the extent to which UK 
policing can be seen as manual labour may be increasing, but only in areas of Northern Ireland where policing is para-
military (see Northern 1996) and the police operate as an army of occupation/suppression, when, as with the soldier, their 
work skills are manifested manually, might policing be seen as blue-collar labour.  However, political allegiances apart, 
the police often do not have public support for the way they do their work.  The same cannot be said for firefighters who 
are rarely criticised by the public and in stark contrast to the police are more often seen as the public’s friend.  The fire 
service also differs because it has a TUC affiliated trade union with considerable working class credentials based on a 
democratic (and ‘free’) leadership. 
95 See: Strangleman 1998, 1999). 
96 See: Braverman 1974; Willis 1977; Devaney, 1982; Giddens 1982; Strangleman and Roberts 1999; Cockburn 1991a; 
Collinson 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998; Grint 1998; Blum 2000.  
97 This thesis will argue that firefighters have found a way to keep public support and this is a fundamental to firefighters’ 
resistance and their gender construction in at least two ways.  First, in general terms the public support the commonsense 
notions concerning masculinity, and more specifically that firefighters are masculine and male (see Chapters 1 and 5).  
Second, I take the view that the public are primary stakeholders in ‘Best Value’ terms and as such they provide support to 
firefighters who resist attempts to cut and deskill the fire service (Young 2000, argues that the Strategic Fire Authority is 
the ‘primary stakeholder’ and that the public are the ‘secondary stakeholder’; see also Hutton 1995; Chapters 1 and 5).  
98 This view is supported by a number of writers, although their reasoning may differ they all consider that the social 
environment influences gender (Kanter 1977; Millett 1971; MacKinnon 1979; Hartmann 1981; O’Brien 1981; Hochschild 
1983, 1989; Gerson 1986; Pateman and Gross 1986; Walby 1986, 1990, 1997, 2000; Bradley 1989, 1992, 1994; Segal 
1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Collinson et al 1990; Humm 1992; Morgan, 1992; Hearn 1994 1996; Connell 1989, 1993, 
1995, 1996, 2000; Hollway 1996; Kemp and Squires 1997). 
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In even simpler terms, these social characteristics lead to the belief that ‘boys don’t cry and girls 
do’ (Frieze et al 1978; Toch 1998).  All roads point to men’s superiority and a world led by masculine 
standards makes a self-fulfilling-prophecy out of a gender hierarchy erected on those standards.  The 
outcome is a view in which “[m]ass culture generally assumes there is a fixed, true masculinity … 
inherent in a man’s body” (Connell 1995: 45; see also Kant 1959; Pateman and Gross 1986: 5; 
Cockburn 1991a: 206; Hearn 1994; Seidler 1997; HMCIFS 1998; Kimmel and Messner 1998).  This 
commonsense understanding, in turn, underpins men’s assumptions that they are the dominant sex and 
the patriarchal dividends men get from that assumption (see Connell 1995)
99
.  And one of those 
dividends (for male firefighters at least) is the commonsense belief that only men can be firefighters 
(see HMCIFS 1998
100
).  
 
 
1.11.1. Social embodiment 
It appears that there is a historically constructed, generalised cultural base for masculinity.  This pre-
exists the contextually specific and acts as a commonsense guideline; a standard for men’s behaviour: 
“a false monolith of what men are supposed to be — heterosexual, able-bodied, independent” (Hearn 
1996:  211; see Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985, 1987: 179; Seidler 1997; Connell 1995, 1998)
101
.  
Early in this century, the soldiers, sailors and airmen who defended the Empire, became examples of 
how masculine aggression and embodiment serve the nation (and men as a group).  In more peaceful 
times, sportsmen heroes replace military figures as a cultural base for masculinity
102
.  But, what of 
women?  Their historical embodiment has been as mothers and wives, patriarchally  ‘protected’ by the 
                                                 
99 However, when the combination of these so called and false ‘natural’ advantages fail to subordinate women, men often 
resort to their socially acquired physical and psychological human capital resources to take physical or verbal violence 
against women to remind them of their place (MacKinnon 1979; Collinson and Collinson 1989, 1996; Walby 1990; 
Cockburn 1991a; Hearn 1998; Allison 2000).  Rape is also part of this process and because some men have raped some 
women, it is argued that all men might ‘gain’ from the fear this creates (Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981; Hearn 1998) 
and the same might be said for all acts of male violence.  This is a dividend pro-feminists argue against and Hearn (1992, 
1994, 1998) argues, often men’s behaviour is at a price that damages society, and individual men and families.  In 
particular, a main theme of Seidler (1995, 1997a, b) is a critique of the outcomes for men who celebrate/develop their 
objectivity and oppress themselves by rejecting their own feelings in a constant test to ‘prove’ themselves against the 
dominant (but social) masculine standards: this argument about men testing themselves against a masculine standard is a 
central theme of this thesis.  One way these standards are perpetuated is through the media (see Sobieraj 1998).      
100 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Fire service in Scotland provides a very good example of how he supports the 
commonsense notions about masculinity (see Connell 1995).  I quote extensively from his annual report on equal 
opportunities (HMCIFS 1998: 19):  
It would seem to be unrealistic, therefore, to expect equal numbers of females as males to apply to become firefighters the 
work of which requires, by its nature, the spatial skills of males rather than the verbal skills of females.  Recent wide-
ranging research into the brain differences of females and males emphasises that males, in using their ‘visual right-brain 
skills’, have advantages involving manipulative and mathematical tasks.  This would affect fire service operations such as 
pitching ladders, parking vehicles, sensing directions etc whereas females, using both hemispheres of the brain, are better 
with words and at recalling landmarks to find their way over a journey, using verbal skills to tackle visual tests.  The 
research reveals that the differences in brain structure and organisation between the sexes inevitably lead to differences in 
job choice: for example females choose language based topics while males choose mathematical /engineering topics.    
Whilst it may be argued that this research is not conclusive, there is, at the very least, an obvious need to investigate these 
phenomena further.  It may result therefore, that the Fire Service should try to recruit females not as firefighters per se but 
to recruit them specifically for disciplines that use their brain differences and aptitudes to best advantage.  The choice and 
range of working roles in such a s community education, fire investigation, control room operations and media relations 
are examples where females can undoubtedly be of advantage to themselves, the service and the public alike.  In these 
roles they could use their inherent verbal fluency and communication skills were females are generally though to have 
superiority over their male counterpart. 
The only reference that could account for  “wide-ranging research” in his bibliography is Moir (1998).    
101 It is sometimes difficult to understand that a man might challenge the behaviour of other men.  Four authors that I refer 
to frequently intend their work to be recognised as a critique of masculinity: Hearn, Connell, Collinson and Seidler.    
102 According to Connell (1998: 12) the sportsmen provides an example of hegemonic masculinity, which validates the 
gender hierarchy (see Lipman-Blumen 1976: 23; Parker 1996). 
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military and the male wage
103
.  However, some women are currently resisting this location and are 
avoiding family life to increase their human capital
104
.  In response to this resistance, a backlash by 
men reduces the space these women take up by valorising a ‘new’ slimmer more feminine figure.  The 
super-model provides an example.  She emphasises women’s sexual objectification by idealising 
feminine as the slim, almost pre-pubescent, semi-naked body.  This model reduces women’s physical 
presence and is not so empowering as the male one, because it increases women’s objectivity, reduces 
their physical strength and emphasises their reliance on men (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; Hochschild 
1983; Pateman and Gross 1986; Connell 1987; Segal 1990; Walby 1990, 1997; Lorber 1994).  Sadly, 
when women seek to achieve such feminine standards they appear to be supporting their 
representation as the sexually available weaker sex.
 
 It is also possible to question if super-models and 
those women who follow them, are participating in their own subordination by supporting a 
masculine hegemony
105
.   
 
1.11.2. A picture of masculinity 
Whilst sportsmen might provide an example of the masculine standards of aggressive heterosexuality, 
physical/mental strength and stoic discipline, it might also be that firefighters can have similar 
characteristics.  Firefighters also encompass the status of the paternalistic protector without the 
savagery of the military.  The painting “The Rescue” (Millais, 1855; see Appendix 12) provides an 
example by portraying a Victorian fireman rescuing children from a fire, with their mother at his feet 
thanking him and in so doing glorifies all that is good in proletarian masculinity.  However, Cooper 
(1986) sees two other images in this picture, gender and class: gender, because a man is rescuing 
children and their mother thanks him; class, because the missing father indicates that it would be 
inappropriate for an upper class Victorian man to thank a working class fireman.  However, the 
wife/mother does not have such a place in the hierarchy, and in stark contrast the upper class woman 
is able to thank the working class fireman.  This is important in patriarchal terms, an 
acknowledgement that the Victorian mother’s status is dependent on her husband and in his absence 
she can be subordinate to all men (see Goldthorpe 1983; Lipman-Blumen 1976: 19).  It is also 
possible to suggest that Millais found it difficult to portray a father in the picture at all, because the 
                                                 
103 Walby (1990: 20) argues that there are six structures of patriarchy: the patriarchal mode of production; patriarchal 
relations in paid work; patriarchal relations in the state; male violence; patriarchal relations in sexuality; patriarchal 
relations in cultural institutions.  In so doing Walby crystallises how a gender hierarchy, created and perpetuated by men, 
can restrict women by giving cause and effect to the argument that gender division is a natural order: a situation that is 
hegemonic and which influences mass cultural beliefs about gender.  In particular I would like to suggest that when 
Beverage suggested: “In the next thirty years housewives as mothers have vital work to do in ensuring the adequate 
continuance of the British race and British ideals” (Beveridge Report 1942: 52 cited in Westwood 1996) after WW2 he 
was not only appealing for ‘white supremacy’, he was also pushing the ‘reserve army of women’ back into the home to 
make way for the male workers they had replaced during the war. 
104 Some women are avoiding the difficulties that Wollstonecraft saw when she argues that women who preen themselves, 
birdlike, ‘prove’ the male notion that they are biologically inferior and deflect themselves from their education (see Todd 
1994).  Contextually a similar argument was made by Lipman-Blumen (1976: 21) and now Walby (1997) acknowledges 
that growing numbers of women are resisting the hegemonic understandings that they can fulfil their life by marriage and 
childbirth.  These women do not neglect their education, increase their human capital and consequently improve their 
position in the labour market (but only if they lead similar not complimentary lives see Cockburn 1985: 13-1.   
105 Women who ‘accept’ they are dependent on men and do not learn how to develop their physical or technical skills must 
rely on men to: mend the car; carry heavy loads; do the physical work.  Put another way, if men are encouraged to be 
strong and physical then consequently they can become strong and physical; if men are taught to be technical they 
consequently become technical (see Connell, 1995; Seidler 1997).  Women’s dependency that follows, which women 
participate in (see Connell 1987: 108; Collinson 1992: 91), then supports the commonsense notion of men’s superiority.  
This is a hegemony; “Gramsci wrote of the hegemony, the leadership by force of ideas as much as by force of arms.  Like 
capitalist class hegemony, male hegemony is organised in the main by consent, by identification with the status quo and as 
a belief in common interest or in inevitability” (Cockburn 1991a: 205-206).  One site that reflects this hegemony is the 
gender division of paid-labour; when women increasingly undertook paid work after WW2 in the UK, many forgot the 
‘masculine’ work they did in that war (and which some of them were forced to give up to make way for returning male 
heroes).  They complied with an environment that, again, supported the commonsense belief that women’s work was 
secondary and that women’s natural task was to raise families and care for men: a hegemony, which can still underwrite 
the current gender division of paid labour.   
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father has failed in his duty to protect his children.  Today, such a picture might appear in a 
newspaper as a photograph under a banner headline, “Mother thanks firefighter for saving children in 
Pimlico fire.”  However, although not so artistically contrived, a discerning eye might witness similar 
political messages.  First, the firefighter would more likely be male and would therefore be 
undertaking the patriarchal responsibility of protecting children; second, it is still a mother’s place to 
thank the firefighter (because women still have the responsibility for caring for children). 
 
According to Cooper, “The Rescue” is more about sex differences than sexuality, but she does 
notice that the female child is struggling against the fireman’s hand on her genitals.  Cooper’s gaze 
does little to emphasise the submissive position of the mother, but she is less clear about another 
heroic image “Saved” (Vigor, 1892; Appendix 12).  Here, Cooper sees the rescue of a pre-pubescent 
child almost as if a victim of rape.  Implicit in Cooper’s observation is that proletarian heroism does 
not hide the physical threat embodied masculinity poses to women (see Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 
1981; Hearn 1998).  As if to explain what Cooper might imply, Lorber  (1994: 62; see Lipman-
Blumen 1976; Hochschild 1983; Pateman and Gross 1986; Connell 1987; Segal 1990) argues that the 
threat of sexual desire/possession is one way that men make women dependent on them for protection 
as partners
106
.  Lorber also recognises that firefighters, soldiers and policemen protect women
107
.  
Leaving unchallenged for the moment the commonsense assumption, which Lorber appears to 
support, that all firefighters are men, then “The Hero” is a typical example of how a male artist has 
used a firefighter to portray and support the commonsense belief that men have a fixed masculinity 
“inherent in their body” (Connell 1995: 45; see also Pateman and Gross 1986: 5; Cockburn 1991a: 
206; Hearn 1994; Seidler 1997; Kimmel and Messner 1998).  This artistic impression epitomises a 
historically constructed base for masculinity (see Connell 1995, 1998; Hearn 1996).  There are 
dividends to be gained from such an image and commonsense beliefs, and these are available not only 
to firefighters, but to all men
108
.   
 
Historically, the firefighter has always been identified as male and masculine
109
, but not all 
firefighters’ images are so contrived, or complimentary.  Firefighters are a group of men who will 
adopt extreme physical measures to exclude and harass women (see Hearn and Parkin 1987, 1995: 74; 
Walby 1990: 52)
110
.  My thesis in no way intends to challenge these findings, but it will suggest that 
now female firefighters too are actively defending their rights to be firefighters through their 
networks
111
.  However it will also report that the few trailblazing female firefighters I have spoken to 
are as active as their male counterparts in constructing and testing themselves against the positive 
                                                 
106 MacKinnon (1979), Hadjifoutiou, (1983: 9) and Cockburn (1991b: 142) would all identify that women at work suffer 
harassment from the male gaze, pinching their bottoms, pin-ups and pornography.  It also has to be considered that men 
often use violence directly against women to remind them of their place (Hearn 1998) and that violence/rape are a source 
of power that allows all men, violent or not, to scare women (see Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981). 
107 Interestingly Lorber appears to stereotype these occupations as male. 
108 Connell (1995) calls this dividend a patriarchal dividend, which is available to all men and not because all men have, or 
even support those characteristics, but just because there is a commonsense belief that all men have such characteristics 
(see also Hearn 1994).   
109So much so that the fire service (alongside the police) sought to gain exclusion from equal opportunities legislation 
arguing that, “women could not/should not perform all the duties” (Corby 1999: 99). 
110 The incident referred to is one that occurred at Soho fire station (see Ballantyne 1985).  There are no clear publicly 
available details of this incident, but I understand it involved a considerable physical sexual abuse of a female firefighter.  
However, there are even dividends that men might gain from firefighters’ abuse of their female colleagues.  This 
behaviour seeks to exclude women and, as in all male violence against women, it puts women in fear of men’s physical 
strength and is taken as a false proof that women cannot take the pace in men’s jobs (Brownmiller 1975; Dworkin 1981; 
Hearn 1998; Chapter 1).       
111 These networks are organised by women, but have been mainly sponsored by the FBU.  Recently the government (no 
longer prepared to accept women’s harassment and token presence) and employers are now supporting these female 
firefighters by taking a new proactive approach to women by setting targets for their recruitment (Home Office 1999a, 
2000; see Lovenduski and Randall 1993 for an account of how women can organise their networks and the difficulties 
they might find). 
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characteristics of firefighters’ masculinity, which promote their ability to fight fires (see Chapter 3), 
and even some that promote firefighters’ status (see Chapters 3-5) 112.   
 
1.11.3. Gender and class 
Marxism’s answer to patriarchal inequalities is that they result from the contradictory relations 
between individuals and classes involved in the capitalist system (see Engels 1973: 29-46; Giddens 
and Held 1982).  This understanding is challenged by Hartmann’s (1981) dual systems theory, which 
develops an argument to suggest that patriarchy and capital both subordinate women (and also argues 
that patriarchal hierarchies exist within each sex
113).  Although Hartmann’s theory, similar to much 
class theory, can imply determinism, almost reifying capital and patriarchy, I choose not to interpret 
Marxism this way.  I prefer to use class understandings to develop the debate about firefighters’ 
gender, because I anticipate it might draw out some new arguments (see Chapter 5).   
 
However, I shall not be concentrating on examples of harassment of female firefighters, in what 
might appear as classic exclusionary tactics to protect male wages that evolve out of antagonistic 
contradictory social relations within the working class.  As I have said earlier, this is not to avoid the 
subject.  It is an attempt to concentrate on how class debates might help explain if there are other 
reasons, rather than matters of utility, for why firefighters might wish to exclude women.  As an 
example, in Chapter 5, I suggest that firefighters’ ‘product’ is firefighting and whilst I accept that 
utility is one reason why firefighters work, I also provide evidence that there are more dividends to be 
gained from firefighting than as a way of earning money.   
 
 
 
1.11.4. Firefighters’ masculinity 
To provide some early warning of what these dividends might be, it is important to note that an 
argument will develop that will suggest the way firefighters actually do their firefighting is a test, 
which allows them to construct, reproduce and police their masculinity in the terms of: 
 their own self-esteem;  
 their status in their peer group  
 their status with the public.   
 
However, because firefighters’ status and their masculinity evolves from the particular way that 
firefighters arrange how their work will be done (which might be seen as the skills of being a 
firefighter), firefighters increasingly have to resist officers attempting to take their status away by:  
 deskilling and cutting the fire service;  
 increasing firefighters’ work to include (feminised) Fire Prevention duties;  
 trying to take firefighters status for themselves.  
 
To understand the antagonistic relations that result between officers and firefighters, I equate their 
relations to some traditional class debates.  This can be approached in a variety of ways: 
                                                 
112 My interest to interrogate how male firefighters construct their masculinity did not lead to me seeking out female 
firefighters for interview.  However, when a women was amongst a group of firefighters I was interviewing I interviewed 
her, unaware how significant her words might be.  It is important to look out for these women in the data (see Chapters 3-
5).  They so clearly reiterate what their male colleagues are saying that it is possible not to identify that women are 
speaking.  I nearly made that mistake, not realising until late in the analysis that whilst I was constructing a framework for 
male firefighters’ masculinity, that female firefighters were adopting and defending many of the attributes and 
understandings that the men held.  I will further develop the consequences of this in the conclusion.   
113 “Patriarchy … men's domination of each other ... a set of social relations in which there are hierarchical relations 
between men, and solidarity among them, which enable them to control women” (Hartmann 1981:14 [Key throughout the 
thesis .. pause, … missing words] see also Millett 1971: 25; Lipman-Blumen 1976; Cooper 1986; Cockburn 1991a, 
1991b).  
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1. by locating firefighters as a work category within the general economic class structure; 
2. by discussing if there is a ‘product’ to firefighting; 
3. by discussing the relationship the fire service has with capital;  
o as an unnecessary expense; 
o as a way capital can prevent a loss of profit caused by fire; 
4. by relating officers’ and firefighters’ relations to those between the proletariat and 
bourgeoisie; 
5. by seeing firefighters and officers in a struggle over who has authority in the fire service 
regarding; 
o how firefighting is done; 
o safety procedures, particularly BA; 
o FP; 
o relations on stations; 
o equal opportunities; 
o deskilling and cuts. 
6. as a struggle about the way firefighters (and perhaps officers) construct their masculinity. 
 
All these six examples are considered throughout the thesis and in particular Chapter 5.  However, at 
this stage I would like to briefly discuss how I see the last three.  Regarding example 5, which 
suggests that officers might be acting to help capital almost in false consciousness, this is not a view 
that I particularly take.  I prefer to see the antagonism between firefighters and officers as closely 
related to a power struggle between two groups, which might both be trying to construct their 
masculinity in the same environment.  In particular, points 6 and 7 indicate there are areas that 
officers would control and where firefighters might understand that officers are trying to steal their 
masculinity from them (see Chapters 3-5).   
 
The thesis will also explain that any antagonism firefighters have for their officers is made 
worse and their resistance more vehement, because officers were once working class firefighters who 
have become upwardly mobile
114
.  In so doing officers have left behind their manual skills, blue-
collars and their shared understanding that they supported whilst they were firefighters.  For 
firefighters, this means that officers have lost their status as firefighters and whilst officers might 
dispute this (another cause for antagonism), officers are in the course of establishing a new status by 
proving they can order firefighters about.  One way they might do this is to now interpret efficiency as 
economic rather than in service terms and ‘prove’ their authority by attempting to deskill and cut the 
fire service in what might be seen as a marriage with capital (see Chapters 5 and 6)
115
.   
                                                 
114 The fire service retains single tier entry promotion (STEP), which means that all officers were once working class 
firefighters (see Giddens 1982: 158-61, Hart 1982: 46-48), who achieve promotion after passing examinations and serving 
for the required time in each rank (see Chapters 3-5).  The first promotion, to leading firefighter requires a minimum of 
two years’ service, to sub officer requires a minimum of four years’ service, and to station officer requires five years’ 
service.  Promotion above station officer has no time served requirement, but there is no leapfrogging of ranks and an 
entrepreneurial station officer cannot quickly achieve senior command: each rank must be obtained before being eligible 
to apply for the next rank and whilst it is not the remit of this thesis to particularly discuss how effective STEP is it might 
serve the fire service well to look at least at the possibility of providing accelerated promotion for Station Officers and to 
look at employing officers at various stages of entry.  Flanagan (1998) recognises that it is difficult to achieve principal 
rank in under 26 years (see Currie 1996; Home Office 2000: 16).  Firefighters can retire after 30 years service and whilst 
slightly different arrangements apply to principal officers, firefighters must retire at age 55. 
115 In effect, firefighters see officers as traitors to firefighters’ professional ethos, which firefighters believe was a joint 
understanding.  Similar outcomes occur in engineering when a shop-floor worker moves into management (see Burawoy, 
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There is also a further site for conflict between firefighters and officers and this is recognised in 
Chapter 5.  In more recent years firefighters’, who were almost exclusively a white, working class, 
male, group, have found their masculinity under challenge by officers forcing ‘others’, in particular 
women, on them as firefighters
116
.  This has been a basis of considerable difficulty in the fire service, 
because firefighters’ masculinity has been previously constructed on the premise that it was only 
available to (white) men.  Therefore, their reactions to women might appear as a conservative defence 
of the petty dividend of masculinity and I hope this thesis will have considerable impact in developing 
this area of thinking.  
 
1.11.5. Looking at a way forward 
Despite the increasing weight of debate that continues to make visible the politics of gender division, 
there remains at least one area that may confuse and hinder equality in the fire service.  This relates to 
the commonsense notion that only men can achieve the embodied standards of masculinity required to 
be a firefighter, which in turn perpetuates the hegemonic gender division of labour in the fire service.  
The outcome has been that when women apply to join the fire service, male firefighters have taken the 
view they are unlikely to achieve the masculine standards a firefighter requires, and this has led to the 
marginalisation and harassment of those women.  What then occurs is that male firefighters’ 
behaviour is seen as a challenge, not only to equal opportunities, but also to officers’ authority.  
Officers then, their authority on the line, take an approach that dictates, rather than investigates, how 
to solve the problem.  This has resulted in some heavy-handed solutions, which might miss some of 
the more subtle understandings that sociology has to offer
117
.  Therefore, my intention is to look 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1976: Collinson 1992, 1994, 1996; Chapter 5).  Hollway and Jefferson (2000), illustrates a similar effect in families, 
which in many ways might apply to the fire service.  Their account indicates that one family member, Tommy, believes he 
gains respect on his council estate by holding true to norms, which he values as important.  His sister, Kelly, does not 
respect Tommy’s norms, and has moved away from the family and the council estate.  In doing this, she challenges the 
source of Tommy’s values, values that Tommy believes she held and he sees her as a traitor.  Hearn (1994) too, has a 
similar view, which suggests that men who use pro-feminist auto-critique to ‘make visible the invisible way that men 
subordinate women’, may also be seen as traitors.  
116 Salaman’s, (1986) study of station officers’ (WO’s) resistance to equal opportunities in the fire service, particularly the 
imposition of female firefighters, provides an interesting view of why the fire service resisted female firefighters.  
Amongst the ‘discoveries’ that Salaman made were that station officers (watch-commanders) do not trust their senior 
officers.  This he explains as a form of jealousy, because firefighters (who eventually become officers) start from a similar 
background and qualification to their senior officers.  Therefore, watch-commanders explain their “relative failure” 
(Salaman 1986: 52) at not achieving senior rank by suggesting, not that the successful senior officer is more competent, 
but that they have achieved their senior rank by devious means.  I have difficulty in accepting Salaman’s view as 
representing anything like a full explanation, although I can see why his limited study led to that conclusion.  His 
considerations have some merit, particularly when he argues that firefighters form an occupational community: a view that 
Hart, (1982: 160-182) took (although Salaman does not acknowledge Harts’ work).  However, Salaman writes as if the 
bitter resentment that watch-commanders have for senior officers was new.  There is a considerable history (see FBU 
1960; Hart 1982: 94, 161; Segars 1989; Bailey 1992) of resistance to senior officers by firefighters and their watch-
commanders.  It is also possible to suggest that having ‘discovered’ an occupational community in the fire service, 
Salaman might have noticed (because it is unlikely that anyone in the fire service would have told him) that there is a clear 
separation between what watches and senior officer would understand as their occupational community.  This might have 
a ‘knock on effect’ to prevent many watch-commanders from seeking promotion, because they might not wish to leave 
their watch and their life as firefighters behind.  Rather than hold bitter resentment for officers who had been more 
‘successful’ than them, it might even be that watch-commanders could also consider that by increasing their hours (from 
42 a week to 72 a week) they ‘sell themselves and their family for promotion’ (partly because many of these extra hours 
involve being on call from home).  Salaman’s failure also to acknowledge the importance of senior officers’ ‘scabbing' 
during firefighters’ strike (1977/1978) is almost a careless neglect.  Particularly, when senior officers’ actions at that time 
may have been a direct result of the hostility between them and watches.  On the one hand, there were the striking 
firefighters/watch-commanders and on the other hand, the senior officers who supported the government by training and 
leading the troops brought into fight fires, and as firefighters suggested at that time, ‘senior offices ‘suddenly’ became 
aware of their duty to the public’.   
117 Sociology, in particular feminist sociology, has been important in acknowledging that gender is a political construct to 
favour men.  However, feminists mainly identify the cause and effect of this labelling by pointing to how inequality is 
organised by men and reinforced by harassment/violence (see MacKinnon 1977; Hochschild 1983, 1989; Walby 1988, 
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closely at what male firefighters might call their masculinity.  In so doing I start from a premise 
that firefighters’ masculinity is not natural, but a result of socially learnt behaviour that firefighters 
adapt to enable them to do The Job.  Rather I should say forms of behaviour, because I accept right 
from the onset Connell’s (1995) argument that masculinity is not singular, but plural: there are 
masculinities and there are femininities (see Hochschild 1983; Segal 1990; Cockburn 1991b; Hearn 
1994, 1996).  However, I do not accept that in the fire service The Job makes the man
118
, more that it 
makes the person (Kanter 1977: 3).  There may be some central attributes that firefighters might 
follow and seek to achieve, which they might collectively identify as masculinity at work, but the 
label masculinity does not account for the gender of those female firefighters who also adopt the same 
standards whilst firefighting (see Baigent 2001b).   
 
In part Hearn’s (1996) argument that the concept of masculinity has become so ubiquitous to be 
in need of clear reformulation might provide a way forward.  As an academic, I accept what Hearn 
argues, but I am not convinced that such statements will change firefighters commonsense beliefs that 
sex causes gender.  However, what Hearn does do is to encourage the debate, in particular, for me to 
reflect back and analyse how (before I came to university) I accepted commonsense notions about 
innate binary gender divisions.  I now recognise that I made a choice when I did this, but it needs to 
be better understood that the working class commonsense discourse I grew up in indicated that sex 
causes gender; the outcome was that my beliefs became true in their consequences (see Thomas 
1909).  Contextualising this analysis, I would question if my father and his father before him, the 
teachers at my school, my social group and the people I worked alongside all believed masculine 
attributes are natural, then where was I to get the knowledge that things might be different?  I know 
now that gender is a social construction, but I question, before I came to university, how was I going 
to accept women could be firefighters
119
?  My reflexive view encourages me to suggest that it is time 
for sociology to investigate further the social construction of gender.  The aim to extend the debate 
from a situation whereby sociology provides evidence of how men learn and protect their so called 
‘natural qualities’, to a situation where sociology can ‘prove’ to men just how social these qualities 
are by providing research that suggests women are learning similar attributes.  This new emphasis 
would develop at least three arguments:   
 Connell’s (1995) argument that there are a multiplicity of masculinities;  
                                                                                                                                                                     
1990, 1997; Connell 1987 1995; Collinson and Collinson 1989, 1996; Collinson et al 1990; Segal 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 
1991b; Hearn 1993, 1994, 1998).  
118 Doyle (1996: 13) indicates there is a popular adage in the fire service, “You may take the man out of the Fire Service, 
but you can’t take the Fire Service out of the man,” and this indicates that to male firefighters, like other men, that “gender 
is fundamental to the way work is organised; and work is central in the social construction of gender” (Game and Pringle 
1984: 14). 
119 There are clear arguments to indicate that parenting and role models are important in this process (Heward 1996) and 
although I denied them at the time, this did not stop me from making politically inspired decisions as the following 
example suggests.  When my daughter joined the fire service in 1993, she defied a commonsense notion that firefighters 
were male, but my friends adapted their common sense view to suggest that public service was in her blood to excuse her 
‘transgression’.  From their perspective this was true as her great grandfather served as a railway Station Master for over 
50 years, her grandfather served in the police for 25 years, and I had been a firefighter for 31 years.  Therefore everything 
pointed towards a (different) causal link and at that time I held the same view.  The ambiguity of what I have just argued 
does not escape me, because at that time I appear on the one hand to believe that gender and sex are linked and then on the 
other hand to argue that there can be exceptions, but these must be blood-related.  However, in the commonsense hands-on 
world that I lived in then, my powers of analysis were not as now.  Now I have a different view.  I would argue that my 
daughter’s sense of public service was not genetic, but socially acquired and although I might deny it I must have had 
some sense of this then.  Take the case of my daughter: it may be that then I had already recognised the dividends 
associated with masculine behaviour and I did not allow her sex to ‘restrict’ her social development of human capital.  She 
learnt her view of the world in a house that offered her both masculine and feminine opportunities, and she helped with the 
building work I was doing and she also helped to wash up.  Her determination to succeed was encouraged, her rebellious 
spirit was channelled to provide controlled aggression, she was not taught to be sexually subordinate to men, but 
encouraged to do what she was comfortable with and not to be forced into situations that she did not want.  When she 
wanted to be a firefighter, I encouraged her and passed on my skills to her.  In sociological terms, she lived within the 
influence of social structures that were strongly steeped in public service and her masculine ‘strengths’ were encouraged 
alongside her feminine ones.  In many ways the tools to good employment (human capital), which Walby (1997) advises 
many women are now choosing were offered to my daughter and she took them.     
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 Hearn’s (1996) proposal that there needs to be a clear reformulation of the notion of 
masculinity/masculinities;  
 Walby’s (1997) suggestion that women can, by increasing their human capital and avoiding 
patriarchal structures, gain access to good employment.   
 
From this starting point research might provide arguments to critique the commonsense notions that 
masculine standards are essentially men’s standards, by providing examples to suggest they are 
socially learnt standards that women may also obtain and vice versa.     
 
Challenging such a basic structure in our society as gender might not be easy.  However, many 
women cross the binary gender divisions
120
.  And rather than take a view that these women are being 
defeminised, a reserve army of labour, or being forced to accept men’s standards, perhaps sociology 
should consider if these examples might be analysed to celebrate women’s agency and at the same 
time critique/influence commonsense views about gender.  Fortuitous in the events occurring during 
my research is an intervention by Lorber (2000).  She argues that feminists should now form a 
degendering movement and challenge the whole concept of binary gender divisions
121.  Lorber’s wake 
up call is perhaps a next step for feminist and pro-feminist research to consider and this thesis will 
contribute to her arguments by identifying how male firefighters construct their masculinity and 
consider in the conclusion what gender label do we give the female firefighters who act the same. 
 
1.12. THE THESIS 
The Thesis comprises six chapters, each combining relevant literature, data and analysis.   
 
Chapter 2, Methodology, explains in detail the methodology and methods for the research, my 
own experience of the research process and thesis production.   
 
Chapter 3, Firefighting: Getting In, begins by identifying current thinking on masculinity and 
image presentation before providing a close look at the business of firefighting, the product of 
which (can be seen as economic, but in this chapter) is: saving lives, protecting property; and 
                                                 
120 Gender beliefs that separate male and female work are being broken all around us, but these events have yet to be fully 
recognised in the terms I will suggest.  There is clear evidence that men elevate their position by making women invisible, 
except as wives and mothers (Pateman and Gross 1986; Segal 1990) and this situation is not new.  Feminists argue that in 
early Greek society women’s activities in the Aristotelian polis were hidden by men (see Coole 1993; Tong 1993).  
History also marginalises the women who had toiled alongside men in feudal fields; disguises the turn of the 19th century 
sleight of hand by which men used industrial or political muscle to label work as either unskilled women’s work 
(associated with natural feminine skills used in the ‘private’), or skilled work that only men had the natural resources to 
learn (see Cockburn 1983; Walby 1986, 1990; Hollway 1996: 27).  Also conveniently forgotten by men, though not by 
feminists, were the ways in which women became a reserve army of labour during two world wars (see Gamarnikow 
1983: 3).  An interval when women undertook ‘men’s’ work by replacing the men who had gone to fight the war in: 
commerce; factories and farms; to a limited extent in directly defending the country by staffing anti-aircraft guns 
(although they were not allowed to pull the trigger as the mother of one of my friends told me) and staffing radar stations.  
In the fire service at the time, there is no conclusive evidence that women actually fought fires as regular crewmembers on 
an appliance.  The general view was that women should not, or could not, be subject to the danger of firefighting during 
air raids.  However, in a typical piece of irony, during the research I met a wartime woman control operator and she told 
me that during the war she was trained as a despatch rider (a motorcyclist who took messages from the fire to the control 
and back again during air-raids).  Females are as a rule kept away from the high-risk industries, which empower men (see 
Lipman-Blumen 1976: 23) and this might better explain why women were excluded from firefighting.  Similar views led 
to the way women were deliberately taken out of the mines in a series of trade-union sponsored industrial laws that 
preserved labour (and I suggest proletarian masculinity) for men (see Walby 1990).  Currently, examples of women acting 
in a similar fashion to men can be found in all areas of employment, from managers to road sweepers and in all industries 
and professions, but as I argue earlier, this is not seen as masculine behaviour, but as women acting like men or being 
defeminised (Cockburn 1991b: 69).   
121 This may have been argued earlier by, amongst others, Hearn (1994, 1996).  It is possible to see Wollstonecraft taking 
such a view: “She claimed to be androgynous in her self-presentation, but manly in her force and reason” (Todd 1989: 
xxix-xxx) Wollstonecraft (1994) also suggests that women were ‘human before feminine’ and that ‘the soul was unsexed’ 
(almost an opposite argument to that of Kant 1959 who saw men as naturally rational and women as naturally irrational). 
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rendering humanitarian services.  This data led chapter focuses in particular on the tightly knit 
teams of firefighters (watches), how they fight fires and their motivations for doing so.  Foremost 
from this evidence comes the understanding that to firefighters, firefighting is not just another job, 
but a service that they wish to carry out to the best of their ability; if this involves challenging 
some company rules, then so be it.  However, the analysis places some question marks over if 
firefighters motivations for doing their job and providing their service is only humanitarian (the 
Millais model) and I produce a list of possible motivations that firefighters might have for 
firefighting.  This list develops to suggest that whilst firefighters are ostensibly helping the public 
during firefighting, firefighters might be testing and proving their masculinity at the same time, 
although this is not a judgement that their reactions to any similar situation at another time might 
have the same motivation (see Giddens 1987).   
 
Chapter 4, Relations at the station: Fitting In, moves from the fireground to the firestation and 
provides detailed data from firefighters concerning their working relationships on the watch.  This 
data suggests that despite the fire service having a formal hierarchy, the watch more often form 
around an informal hierarchy; group membership is conditional on firefighters fitting in with peer 
group gatekeepers.  To help explain these relationships including the resistance that firefighters 
might show to the informal hierarchy a list of loose categories or stages, which firefighters might 
pass through or join, is produced.  There is no intention to suggest that firefighters’ behaviour will 
always fit those categories, the list is just a tool to aid understanding.   
 
Chapter 5, Class, Hierarchies, Resistance and Gender Construction, reviews some issues 
surrounding class to indicate the framework of analysis for the data that follows from both officers 
and firefighters.  In particular, I investigate the relations between the formal hierarchy (officers) 
and the informal one (firefighters) in class terms.  The data supports a view in all the previous 
chapters that despite fire service claims to be a disciplined and united service that there is a vast 
disparity between public claims and private outcomes (because of firefighters’ resistance  to 
officers).  The industrialisation of the fire service is seen as a focus for this resistance, but in a 
class orientated analysis about control of the means of production and surplus values it is possible 
to recognise that not all resistance is about economic dividends/surplus values, but that the gap 
between officers and firefighters is also about petty dividends involving power and status.   
 
Chapter 6, Conclusion, will bring the findings of the thesis into a conclusion.  It does this by 
referring back to the four areas, which Chapter 1 provides for investigation.  In particular, it 
analyses how firefighters construct their gender at work, what this analysis adds to the debate on 
gender construction and how this thesis might help the fire service.  There is also a critique of the 
research and thesis, and a discussion of some areas for further research.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO METHODOLOGY 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
It is my view that my experience of having been a firefighter for nearly 31 years will considerably 
influence my PhD research.  I can see no way that I can stop this from happening (even if I wanted 
to), nor can I ‘prove’ how good or selective my memory is.  I am using the eye/I of Kondo (1990: 
8
122
) and acknowledge that my view is subjective (and partial) in a similar way that the term 
‘masculinity’ is subjective (and not positive).  There can be no doubt that I ‘know’ a lot about being a 
firefighter and contextually I share Blum’s (2000: 107) view123 when I argue that the fire service is 
my world and that academia still remains somewhat difficult to me.  Not withstanding this 
‘confession’, my subjectivity is not an excuse to produce a journalistic account of the fire service and 
I have tried to make my research as rigorous as possible (see Morgan 1987).  I am firmly of the view 
that had it not been for Hearn’s (1994) notion of pro-feminist auto-critique, which calls on men to 
make visible the hidden understandings of how they construct their masculinity, that I may well now 
be claiming to have created a similar method, but rather than auto-critique I would be calling it re-
search.  However, Hearn was there before me and this chapter explains how I developed his method 
to both contain and exploit my subjective views as I use my I/eye to research the fire service.   
 
I collected most of my data using qualitative methods of interview, observation and auto-
critique, and some data through quantitative/qualitative questionnaires and statistics.  The data was 
collated and analysed by using my own special mix of grounded theory(Glaser and Strauss 1967) and 
pro-feminist auto-critique.  As much as any man can be, I have been a feminist in this research.  I 
have a political agenda, which is unashamedly to challenge sexism and help the fire service with its 
difficulties over equal opportunities, and the bulk of my data relies on narrative and personal 
reflections.  This chapter will also explain how my feminist-inspired concerns over not exploiting my 
informants are partly eased by putting firefighters’ words at the centre of the thesis.  I hope 
firefighters find this thesis accessible; that they recognise their words and my conclusions and do not 
see them as some far off theoretical blueprint.    
  
2.2. PRO-FEMINIST AUTO-CRITIQUE 
2.2.1. Feminist methods 
The development of contemporary feminist methods takes place as an attempt to raise the profile of 
women subjects and researchers, and as a critique of positivist malestream methodologies (see 
O’Brien 1981; Reinharz 1992; Hammersley 1993; Mies 1993; Wolf 1996).  Feminists suggest that 
malestream claims to objectivity and scientific accreditation, which this thesis will explain as the 
methods the fire service prefers, are a covert attempt to marginalise women: a subjective prejudice in 
research, which is hidden behind an argument of objectivity and underpins the commonsense 
understandings that support the hegemonic gender order of ‘men’s natural superiority’.  Making their 
politics obvious, feminists undertake action research to critique masculinity and consciously favour 
women.  In doing this, they hope to highlight women’s exploitation, consider their subjects’ agendas, 
present narrative as data, place the researcher’s subjectivity within the findings and not exploit them 
by using the research just to gain academic recognition (see Jackson 1987; Hammersley 1993; Wolf 
1996).   
 
2.2.2. Pro-feminist auto-critique 
                                                 
122 “that any account, mine included, is partial and located, screened through the narrator’s eye/I” (Kondo 1990: 8; see also 
Giddens 1979, in particular 43-44). 
123 Blum is a shipyard worker who went to academia and now writes about his work. 
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My research parallels feminism in the critique of masculinity and I shall be following its 
methodological agendas closely.  However, pro-feminist auto-critique is not so much about elevating 
women, its orientation is towards enlightening men about how their actions might be self-harming.  
Therefore, if I am to avoid ‘hit and run’ research that exploits the firefighters who are my informants, 
I must be particularly careful that I prepare this thesis in a way they might want to understand.  I say 
“want” because I am acutely aware that firefighters do not like reading academic literature and in 
general terms they show distaste for anything academic.  I know that firefighters prefer to learn 
experientially, that is to say by actually doing something or at least relating new knowledge to their 
experiences in the past and therefore I have tried to make this thesis as ‘hands-on’ as possible.  One 
way I will do this is by including as much narrative from firefighters as I judge academic limitations 
will allow me.  However, the narrative is not there to ‘prove’ the analysis, it is part of my pro-feminist 
auto-critique; as such it is so arranged to form part of the analysis.  This style has two outcomes for 
firefighters: first, it allows firefighters’ subjectivity to speak for itself by reproducing their own words 
as they occurred; second, it will allow firefighters to hear themselves in the thesis.    
 
There are a relatively small number of men who are sympathetic to feminism and problematise 
current notions of masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995; Morgan 1987; Collinson 1988; Collinson, and 
Collinson 1989; Collinson et al 1990; Jackson 1990; Seidler 1992, 1995, 1997; Hearn 1992, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1998; Collinson and Hearn 1994; Collinson and Collinson 1996; Collinson and Hearn 
1996a, 1996b; Mac an Ghaill 1996; Whitehead 1996; Kimmel and Messner 1998).  Some of these are 
pro-feminists (see Hearn 1992: 29), but the men amongst them are not being patronising.  Sympathy 
with feminism does not mean helping out a subordinate in a patriarchal manner by arriving like the 
cavalry to save women.  Pro-feminists intend to help men become more aware of the negative aspects 
associated with masculinity
124
.  For some this means making visible the invisible myths of male 
power by a reflexive critical study of men: pro-feminist auto-critique (Hearn 1994: 50-60; Hearn 
1998: 3).  What I believe Hearn anticipates (and I support in my thesis) is that if men will critically 
unmask their own understandings, they may rewrite some history.  In my case, this might mean that I 
can add my own reflections to the data I collect and make visible some understandings between 
firefighters through which they replicate their masculinity.  In the wider field, feminism already has a 
project to do this in their search to expose patriarchy, but contextually this is often a case of the ‘have-
nots’ studying the ‘haves’ (see Hearn 1994: 3).  My location is as an insider, both as a man and as an 
ex firefighter, and if it is necessary I am prepared to be a traitor to my sex and possibly accelerate 
understanding by revealing information that might be of direct emancipatory value to other males, 
females and myself. 
 
2.2.3. Some pro-feminist auto-critique 
I arrived at university in 1993 after nearly 31 years proud service as a firefighter (Appendix 2).  My 
aim was to get a degree, but from my arrogant yet naive firefighters’ perspective, this was just a 
means to an end.  It was my belief that a degree was simply a qualification that I could bolt onto my 
existing experience.  Then I would be able to fulfil my main aim, which was to return to the fire 
service and help with the problematic issues of equality surrounding females becoming firefighters
125
.  
                                                 
124 For some very clear examples of men’s negative behaviour in a pro-feminist style see Bowker (1998; see also Huggins 
and Haritos-Fatourors 1998; Karner 1998; Messerschmidt 1998; Sobieraj 1998; Toch 1998; Websdale and Chesney-Lind 
1998).  
125 I had recognised that in our increasingly ‘certificated’ society that bits of paper were important, yet I had no real idea of 
why.  Fire service promotion examinations are called ‘tickets’, presumably because they grant you access to promotion.  
Many of the officers I have interviewed seem to have a similar understanding to the one I had as I joined university.  They 
realise a need to get qualifications, yet have no real belief that the knowledge gained in getting these qualifications will be 
of any practical use.  This understanding is fostered at firefighter level, because firefighters are protective of their belief 
that ‘The Job’ can only be learnt by ‘hands-on’ experience (see Chapter 3).  This attitude serves them well because it helps 
them to retain a large degree of control over their work process (see Chapters 3-5; Willis 1977: 152).  One way that 
firefighters keep the learning process centred on their experiential knowledge is to distance themselves from those officers 
who firefighters identify as incompetent, and to argue that those officers have learnt ‘The Job from a book’.  Firefighters’ 
association between book learning and incompetence also increases their wariness of anyone who does not have hands-on 
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So, I decided to  ‘pop along to university and get a degree’.  Not for one minute did I have any 
understanding how much my views on masculinity, a dynamic I was part of, but relatively unaware 
about, might change during the successful completion of a degree in sociology
126
.  Nor did I think that 
eight years later I would still be at university and using pro-feminist auto-critique to reflect on how 
my previous workplace may identify the social aspects of male power.    
 
Now, I look back and recognise how sociology introduced me to a radical new way of 
understanding: the idea that social life and in particular gender, is a social construction rather than 
natural
127
 (see Chapter 1).  Sociology also provides the knowledge for me to recognise that whilst I 
celebrated my masculinity, this had negative connotations, one of which was that I was a harasser 
women and ‘lesser’ men.  This recognition came as a considerable shock and becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable with this aspect of my behaviour, I began to use my newly gained knowledge about 
gender construction and agency to realise that as my masculinity was not fixed by nature as 
commonsense understandings suggest (see Connell 1995; Chapter 1), I could assess and change my 
behaviour
128.  I recognised that I had ‘chosen’ to be a patriarch, but under circumstances where I did 
not realise that the masculinity offered to me by my class, family and particularly my work was not 
the only option available (see Willis 1977; Walby 1986; Collinson and Collinson 1989: 95; Cockburn 
1991a, 1991b; Connell 1996; Collinson and Hearn 1996b; Seidler 1997)
129
.  However, despite late 
arrival, I was now in a new environment: one that offered me alternative models of masculinity and 
new opportunities to exercise a different kind of agency.  Consequently, given the need and will to 
change I started to develop the tools sociology provided (in particular, Hochschild’s (1983) 
understanding that if an actor plays a part [surface-acts] for any length of time, this behaviour 
develops into deep-acting [a natural to them way of living]), and I ‘chose’ a target identity as a pro-
feminist academic and started a long and complicated journey towards achieving it.    
 
This was not as simple as the words suggest.  I did not just decide to change and ‘hey presto’ it 
happened.  Fifty years of socialisation are not easy to ignore.  Change to me is an ongoing process not 
an outcome and my ‘born again’ attempts to ‘surface-act’ until it becomes ‘deep-acting’ never end.  
The negative influences of masculinity that I once thought ‘natural’ now cause me considerable angst 
as they threaten to (and occasionally do) ‘schizophrenically’ flash me back to patriarchal agendas and 
the mental violence and sexism I have used to achieve them
130
.  I am not a new male divorced from 
the old male.  I still harass those around me, but I increasingly recognise this and apologise in the 
hope I can repair the damage I have done.  Therefore, whilst I am attempting to change, that change is 
slow, nothing is set in concrete and the whole process needs constant vigilance.  Hearn (1998: 106) 
suggests that many of the violent men he interviewed claimed a double self: first, as the man in the 
past who was violent; second, as the non-violent (new) man of the present.  At the start of my 
research, I claimed I had left behind my patriarchal identity and replaced it with my male pro-feminist 
status.  However, I now recognise this was wrong.  There is no ‘old’ man or ‘new’ man, but me.  I am 
                                                                                                                                                                     
skills.  This can then lead to firefighters almost labelling any form of book learning pejoratively as ‘academic’: an inverted 
snobbery (see Chapters 4 and 5).  It is important to recognise throughout this thesis that firefighters’ understandings of the 
term ‘academic’ will not only relate to studying from a book, but also to any form of paperwork or ‘admin’ as they call it.  
In broad terms the outcome of their approach might be summed up to suggest that blue-collar work is real work and 
masculine, and white-collar (office or academic work) is feminine and not real work at all.     
126 I chose sociology just because it had the word harassment in the prospectus. 
127 During my introduction to sociology (Bilton et al 1996) I opened my mind to ‘hear’ what was being said, a skill that 
once developed became a very useful tool for theorising alongside the data: what Orona called “free fall” (1997: 178). 
128 One analysis of this situation could suggest I was again using my agency to my own advantage; I had recognised that 
an identity as a patriarchal male did not have the same advantages when I was at university reading sociology and 
women’s studies, as it did in the fire service.  I do prefer to see myself as being ‘saved’ as it were by sociology, whatever 
the reason this has become a ‘salvation’ (see Walker 1991). 
129 This use of Marxism seems appropriate to the position of firefighters.  They ‘choose’ an identity without the full 
knowledge of hegemonic agendas that they are operating amongst (see Giddens 1982), which harm them, females and the 
world (see Hearn 1994; Seidler 1997).  This might be seen as a false consciousness, but this implies and almost excuses 
completely firefighters’ subjectivity as if it were beyond their control. 
130 The biggest difficulties I have had to confront are my use of mental violence, particularly what I would describe as fire 
service humour (see Chapter 4) and my sexism.   
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a man trying to be less of a patriarch.  New consciousness and location has allowed me a new 
ability to mediate on who I am.  However, as in my past (see Chapter 1), I am constructing myself 
within a bubble of knowledge, but now I am increasing its size by the use of resources that I was 
previously not aware of
131
.  Therefore, this thesis is not just about how firefighters construct their 
masculinity, it is also involves an auto-critique of my involvement in challenging my masculinity and 
my journey towards pro-feminism.  This is a story of men, told through the subjectivity of a man who 
has been one of those men, but who has undertaken PhD research using pro-feminist auto-critique.  In 
its own way this project is ‘unique’ and hopefully therapeutic.   
 
 
2.2.4. Not a traditional academic 
My ‘late arrival’ in academia means I do not have a traditional academic background, but one based 
on commonsense understandings (see Chapter 1).  Traditionally, academics are likely to have been 
within or near academic discourse for most of their life and their understandings, from early education 
to their current location, will involve academic rigour (see Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strathern 1987; 
Wolf 1996; Strauss and Corbin 1997).  My situation was almost the opposite.  As a ‘late arrival’ in 
academia, I lacked academic rigour and my view of the ‘real world’ took place using working class, 
commonsense understandings.  Similar to most firefighters I was close to Willis’s lads132; my learning 
was experiential and I had a general disdain for anything academic (see Willis-Lee 1993a, 1993b).  
However, as an undergraduate, I gradually warmed to book learning and I found that my earlier 
experience and understandings had one advantage.  My earlier lifestyle became a resource, because I 
realised that the type of person that academics were often looking (down) at, were like me.  This was 
particularly so when I read about class, race and sexism and I was able to ground much of the reading 
by looking into my own past.  Of prime importance and the initial motivator for this research was 
how, when I looked back into my past to find an example of Walby’s (1986) theory on patriarchy, I 
saw myself, a ‘perfect’ patriarch133.  It is my ability to re-search from my past that is integral to my 
approach to pro-feminist auto-critique.   
 
2.3. THE RESEARCH 
2.3.1. Using experiential knowledge  
My suggestions so far are not completely new.  Contemporary ideas already suggest that reflexive use 
of one’s experience should be cultivated, rather than suppressed, to provide a base for systematic 
theorising (see Glaser and Strauss 1967: 252; Davis 1959: 158-165; Strauss 1987: 16; Narayan 1989).  
Morgan (1987) used this approach when he carried out a self-interrogation of his experience as a 
                                                 
131 This argument, which again points to my false understanding, is not a defence of my earlier behaviour.  Had such 
knowledge been available and it may have been, I would have undoubtedly marginalised it.   
132 Willis (1977) suggests that boys who become working class males, reject the middle class (precursors to academic) 
standards at school.  They ignore their education for the immediate pleasures of fooling about in class and a quick route to 
work.  Such ideas updated by Canaan’s (1996) study of youth sub-cultures in Wolverhampton.  In particular, the group she 
studied appear to be the type who may turn to become firefighters.  But when they become firefighters they do not suffer 
the entrapment in subordinated employment that Collinson (1992: 52) argues is the outcome when the lads in Willis 
(1977) chose work that they believe will allow them to celebrate their commonsense belief in ‘macho’ masculinity, 
freedom and independence.  In many ways what Willis and Canaan have found amongst boys is repeated for girls.  Walby 
(1997) identifies that many girls affect their life chances by accepting the commonsense notions about being a family-
maker, neglect their education, and choose instead the quick fix gratification of being a wife and mother: a situation they 
often regret when their dreams of homemaking go wrong if they are deserted by their partner and then have to make their 
own way in the world. 
133 This suited my working class hands-on fire service approach, because it made tangible the things I was hearing.  
Further analysis also suggests that my provision of experiential data to ground the theories from the books I was reading 
was a slightly different approach to the process most authors would have used when they wrote a book i.e. author reads 
theory – searches for data to create theory – produces ‘new’ theory – writes books.  At that time I read theory – then to 
understand the theory I sought out data (experiences from my own life) – grounded the theory.  
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national serviceman to ‘start’ the masculinity debate.  However, my insight /experience as a ‘late to 
arrive’ academic, goes far deeper than traditional academics probably envisage.  When, as a retired 
firefighter, I relate to firefighters today, I seem able to reactivate some of my pre-academic 
understandings: to almost return home
134.  To use a simple example, firefighters have a ‘distinctive’ 
way of climbing a ladder and this is something I learnt and cannot consciously or unconsciously 
forget.  Whilst climbing a ladder will be of little use to this thesis, the example may be.  I have learnt 
many ways ‘natural and peculiar’ to firefighters from my 31 years socialisation with them, and this 
increases my sensitivity in the field by helping to explain firefighters’ conversations, their symbolism 
and behaviour.  Similar to the way I discovered my patriarchal identity by searching my pre-academic 
experiences, it may be possible for me to search my memory to such an extent that my earlier insider 
experience as a firefighter may become a resource that helps this research.  Many of the 
understandings I held as a firefighter, although often mediated by academia, are still with me, and I 
expect my insider knowledge to help reveal data, recognise and interpret issues that ‘others’ may 
miss.  Possibly amongst my experiential knowledge are some of the hidden understandings between 
males that underpin male power.  As Hearn suggests, I might make the “invisible visible” (1994: 60) 
135
.   
 
2.3.2. Am I ‘at home’ or not? 
My claim is similar to that of many researchers who consider their insider knowledge makes for better 
research by improving the interpretation of respondent’s views (see Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 
1987; Narayan 1989: 263-264; Jackson 1987; Jackson 1990; Hearn 1993: 7; Hearn 1994: 63; Wolf 
1996: 14).  However, there are two counter arguments: first, that a researcher’s desire to produce 
results can problematise their feminist intention to help their informants (see Warren 1988: 39).  The 
second relates to the possibility that now I am striving to be an academic I might not fully recognise 
that I am more an insider (at home) in the academy than amongst firefighters (see Jackson 1987; 
Strathern 1987: 16).  This possibility can have several consequences and I now intend to look at these.   
 
2.3.3. Marginal natives: auto-anthropologists 
Wolf (1996) is amongst those researchers who have tried to address the problematic notion of being 
‘at home’136.  Similarly, Strathern critiques  "auto-anthropologists” (Strathern 1987: 16), for being ‘at 
home’ in the academy when they think they are ‘at home’ in the field.  There is a view that these 
researchers are neither insider nor outsider, but “marginal natives” (Freilich 1977 cited in Altorki 
1988: 16).  Taking the view that most researchers have their roots firmly in a global academic 
discourse, it is possible to suggest these researchers may not fully appreciate how much their current 
theoretical understanding will influence any previously held common understandings with their 
informants.  Failing to recognise what is in effect ‘looking down’ from an external academic 
theoretical perspective, may result in a researcher filtering out the original meaning behind their 
informants’ words, behaviour and psychology.  This can then result in a thesis that gains academic 
recognition, but, which moreover, the subjects of the research do not recognise: the arrogance of 
looking down, hidden behind a supposedly objective insider view
137
.  If this were to happen to my 
                                                 
134 Jackson (1987) uses the term ‘at home’, to describe research by people with experience of the area they are working in.  
I use this term as well and in this particular context have chosen to widen its use by replacing the common academic and 
now somewhat offensive term of ‘native’.  
135 Corbin (1986a: 92, 1986b), Strauss (1987: 11) and Mascarenhas-Keyes (1987: 187) all suggest that the more the 
researcher understands respondents at these levels the better the theory.  Hearn (1994) more specifically, suggests that the 
possibilities of a ‘critical sociology of men’ is made more credible if pro-feminist men use their experience, 
understandings and insight, not as disinterested observers, but to become active participants in a critique to achieve 
change.  
136 Other writers also claim ‘at home’ status and show an awareness of the problems they encounter in making this claim 
(see Mascarenhas-Keyes 1987; Berik 1996; Matsumo 1996; Ping-Chun Hsiung 1996; Zavella 1996). 
137 Chenitz (1986: 46; also see Corbin 1986:  92; Hann 1987, 143-4; Strauss 1987: 11; Mascarenhas-Keyes 1987: 187) 
explains how ‘filtering’ can damage the research.  I take their critique to suggest that much of this filtering may be to 
produce tidy research, which accords with current understandings.  It may also be that researchers who claim to be insiders 
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research, then the firefighters who have made my research possible may feel exploited, because I 
have not used my knowledge to interpret what they have said in a way they understand.  The outcome 
will then be that I would justify those firefighters who argue ‘that academics do not know anything 
about their real world’.   
 
Of note, when researchers argue they have a common understanding with their informants, it 
reminds me of the difficulties in the fire service regarding the gap between firefighters and officers.  
Chapter 5 will suggest that officers claim a shared understanding with firefighters as a way of 
justifying their single tier entry promotion system.  However, as Chapter 5 indicates, officers may 
anticipate they have shared understandings of having been a firefighter, but this belief is a site of 
considerable conflict with firefighters throughout this thesis (see Collinson 1992, 1994, 1996; 
Hollway and Jefferson 2000; Baigent 2000, 2001a, 2001c).  In fact, the evidence of Chapter 5 puts 
this whole notion into doubt and the misunderstandings that occur between fire service officers and 
firefighters may involve similar dynamics to the misunderstandings between some returning 
researchers and their informants.        
 
The debate so far illuminates how researchers (and fire officers) can believe that they are 
insiders when they no longer are.  In comparison, I intend to support my argument (above) that my 
contextual location is different to traditional academics.  Experience in the field suggests that I have 
not lost touch with the way I used to think when I was a firefighter and I often flashback to my earlier 
understandings when amongst firefighters (see section ‘The boob test’ later).  Sometimes I do this 
unconsciously (as in climbing the ladder), but I am also able to subjectively search my memory to 
‘recreate’ my earlier understandings.  This helps to remove some of the divisions building between 
my commonsense and academic understandings.  Sometimes when I look at incoming data, both as it 
occurs and later in my office, I can almost move back and forwards between my two sources of 
knowledge and recognise I am doing so
138
.  At these times by being both insider and outsider, via my 
own experience and the mechanics of flashbacks, I may be able to interpret what firefighters say in a 
manner that both academics or firefighters can recognise: to make some of the invisible visible.  
 
2.3.4. Self-interrogation: a critique 
Considerable criticism can be made of auto-critique/self-interrogation, for example the issue of 
memory failure, or more specifically that my insight may have already been ‘contaminated’ by my 
new knowledge (see Jackson 1990: 4-9; Young 1991: 392).  Morgan (1987) argues, when carrying 
out a similar process that his was a disciplined attempt to gain knowledge.  Morgan was not claiming 
pure objectivity, but an objective use of his subjective knowledge.  I am aware that I may be working 
on ‘the edge’ of what is acceptable from qualitative evidence (especially as I have political intentions 
to raise male consciousness), which could lead to me being disowned by both academics and 
firefighters alike.  Yet, I am not able to ignore the opportunities that my experience could provide to 
get close to firefighters.  It is my view that this experience is better used in a disciplined way, because, 
whatever, the flashbacks would still occur.  I make no claims other than that my research is a 
subjective yet disciplined attempt to increase understanding without deliberately making selective 
choices
139
.  As with all qualitative research my data is subjective (see Swanson 1986: 66), but I expect 
to sceptically analyse my experiential views in the same way I would any respondent’s answers (see 
Glaser and Strauss 1967: 253; Swanson 1986: 66, 73).   
 
2.3.5. Some more auto-critique 
                                                                                                                                                                     
may start to look down and interpret their respondents’ actions for them because they (the researcher) really understand 
what is going on: the malestream view (see O’Brien 1981). 
138 Strathern (1987: 18) believes the real insider needs to be able to “draw on concepts which also belong to the culture 
under study.”  
139 Morgan (1987; see Jackson 1990) suggests that a tendency to select what you find in your memory to suit your 
argument can be a problem with reflections. 
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In particular, I must not ignore the likelihood that the scientific fire service lobby might claim my 
research is too subjective, reliant on contaminated knowledge or provided through false memory.  The 
fire service has little time for subjectivity, believing in the malestream world of objectivity and 
scientific proof
140
.  To reduce this possibility, test the methodology and keep the research at the 
‘cutting edge’, I shall follow Corbin (1986: 93) who believes credibility improves by verification.  My 
experiential knowledge will therefore be ‘tested’ by the rigour of gounded theory, to ensure it guides, 
not leads the research.  In this way, I hope to remain faithful to feminist methods and my own 
experience, while at the same time strengthening the potential impact of my research on the fire 
service  
 
2.4. ACCESS AND ETHICS 
This section starts by discussing the way firefighters bond and how this may produce some form of 
dividend that an ex-firefighter carrying out research might use to get access, and the ethical concerns 
that arise from doing this.  First, my kinship as an ex-firefighter might lead to firefighters providing 
information that may have the potential to damage them if made public.  Second, and very connected 
to my first concern, I already suspect that firefighters celebrate their masculinity and if they treat me 
as an insider they will do so in the belief that I share their dramaturgical loyalty to not reveal the taken 
for granted understandings between firefighters that some things should not be publicised (see 
Goffman 1959).  This has led to me not being entirely honest with firefighters, especially when their 
gatekeepers set tests that ‘force’ me to uphold their sexist agendas, and I report on one particular 
incident in detail and discuss a problem this caused for my attempts at pro-feminism.  Lastly, I shall 
explain that the fire service at officer level was not entirely welcoming to me and had it not been for 
the firefighters I might not have gained any access at all.   
 
2.4.1. Kinship, closure and dividends 
This thesis indicates that the fire service shares a professional ethos: to provide an efficient service to 
help the public.  To help achieve this it is necessary for firefighters to be able to work together and the 
fire service develops formal and informal methods to ensure this happens.  Training, procedures and 
equipment is standardised, and this helps firefighters from different stations to work together at large 
fires.  Commonly firefighters suggest they ‘work, train, play, eat, sleep and die together’ and although 
this might be a touch overdramatic, firefighters believe their work provides them with a bond in life 
and death
141.  So if a firefighter’s car breaks down in Birmingham, whether in England, Alabama or 
                                                 
140 During my time spent at the FSC it was clear that research in the fire service follows scientific lines.  Mostly based in 
the hard sciences, research rarely strays into the humanities.  Those few research projects into human behaviour generally 
were around management techniques, which had a strong element of psychology.  The lecturers, although jokingly, 
spurned my sociological background and it is easy to see why the limited attempts to understand human behaviour that 
stray into the social sciences, stay firmly planted in the statistics that questionnaires provide.  This is particularly true of 
the research done on the BCC.  During my time spent with this high profile course, on which each student is given funding 
for international research, those students I spoke with indicated that they were ‘persuaded’ by the markers of their 
assignments to follow number crunching methods.   
My attendance at three research conferences at the FSC indicates that despite officers arguing they are becoming research 
conscious this belief in any true sense is embryonic.  In particular, the conference runs alongside the courses and the 
students are not encouraged to attend.  The fire service is not an organisation that takes critique lightly and careers are 
made, or at least enhanced, by sponsorship (Flanagan 1998).  Most presenters follow the corporate image that all is well in 
the fire service.  This of course was in the interest of those presenting the papers (see Dixon 1994), who were in effect 
trying to promote themselves. The format was for many of the presenters to leave soon after their paper.  This is not a 
sound basis for research and progress.  Two students on the BCC were actually carrying out international research into 
promotion in the fire service and I spoke with them after their presentations to indicate my desire to share knowledge.  
Neither attended my paper delivery, nor contacted me and during my presentation I did attempt some action research by 
critiquing the single tier entry system so loved by officers.  There was no response.           
141 It may even be that fire service structures have an international perspective, which makes for an international family 
with similar understandings.  There is a considerable support for this view from respondents to this research who have 
associated with firefighters from Arabia, Africa, Australia and Asia, and authors and authors (see Hart 1982; Laughlin 
1986; Hall 1991; Howell 1994, 1996; Delson 1996; Richards 1996; Wilson 1997).  
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South Africa, they can go to the local firestation and they will receive help: a form of dividend for 
being a firefighter
142
.    
 
2.4.2. Access bordering on trespass 
This ‘dividend’ therefore is a real asset for the researcher who is an ex-firefighter.  Firefighters whom 
I interviewed, and had never met before, revealed intimate details about their lives, because they 
expect me as an ex-firefighter to share understandings about dramaturgical loyalty
143
.  Access not 
only improved because I am an ex-firefighter, but also because of the topic of my thesis: masculinity.  
Male firefighters celebrate their masculinity in commonsense terms as their ‘natural’ skills and 
abilities.  I remain convinced that even though they test themselves to ‘prove’ their ‘calling’, and 
exclude those ‘other’ they believe cannot do so, most firefighters do not consciously consider that 
their masculinity is a social phenomenon that is handed down amongst men (see Lipman-Blumen 
1976; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Barrett 1996: 136).  If they did, then firefighters are far too 
sophisticated a group to reveal to others (HMIFS 1999) or me, about their prejudices and the 
harassment they use to enforce their masculinity
144
.   
 
2.4.3. What can I expect?  
Young (1991), a policeman, who similar to me took a degree and then returned
145
, provides some 
insight as to how he hid his ‘new’ critical understandings and colluded with police culture to maintain 
access
146.  I now recognise Young’s dilemma, because I became acutely aware during my research of 
gatekeepers, who not only tested my bona fides to see which side of the equal opportunities debate I 
was on, but also to find out my ‘real’ intentions in the research (see Mies 1993: 80; Williams 1996: 
81).  Therefore, for most of my research I chose to act according to fire service cultural rules and in 
particular not to challenge sexism
147.  Goffman’s work brilliantly portrays how complex social 
interaction can be and how all manner of tests are set as pitfalls to test/destroy an image (see Goffman 
1997a 1997c
148
).  I cannot overemphasise how skilled firefighters are at testing those around them 
                                                 
142 This draws on and extends Connell’s (1995) definition to suggest that not only is patriarchal dividend available to men 
as reflected power, but that individual groups of patriarchs can also provide a dividend to those who are automatically 
accepted as complying with group norms: in this case that firefighters will help other firefighters.   
143 Zavella (1996: 141) suggests that feminists are not unfamiliar with this sharing of information and celebrate the 
reciprocal, sisterly, relations provided.  However, between women this relationship occurs around marginalised rather than 
elite relations, but the outcomes are still the same; conformity to the rituals and tests implicit to the sisterhood/brotherhood 
allows access (see Finch 1993: 172-173). However, not only does access, trust and celebration provide me with rich 
narrative data, the very existence of this trust gives added weight to the concept of a fraternity of firefighters built on 
notions of a shared and celebrated masculinity. 
144 The invisible only remains invisible whilst it is hidden  (see Young 1991: 61).  Masculinity is an example of this dictate 
and if firefighters knew their masculinity is a social phenomenon, they would likely realise that any power masculinity 
provides can only remain whilst the social phenomenon remains invisible. 
145 Young was a serving police officer who following a three-year degree scholarship returned to the police to carry out 
PhD research and then produced his book An inside job.  However, Young remained a police officer whilst he did his 
research and I did not.  
146 Young was a serving police officer, who following a three-year degree scholarship returned to the police to carry out 
PhD research.  However, Young remained a police officer whilst he did his research and his recognition of police 
behaviour was problematic for him.  For me the problem was not so great, because I had ‘suffered’ the disturbance of 
recognising the shortfalls associated with my ‘life’ in the fire service during my first degree.  I was also outside of the 
culture and (apart from when I was researching) developing the skills to marginalise problematic areas from my old 
lifestyle.   
147 Late in the research I did challenge a senior academic at the Fire Service College about sexism and his sexist attitude is 
reported in the conclusion. 
148 Goffman (1997c) argues that image management is so practised that it appears as a ‘natural’ form of behaviour, 
especially when operating in known environments.  However, behaviour is not natural and this becomes clearer when 
operating in an unfamiliar territory, especially when there is a need to be accepted/respected.  We then take part in a 
complex process in which we ‘feel’ for the proper way to act.  One way we do this is to watch our audience and use their 
reactions, almost as a mirror, to identify if we are presenting the correct image.  Giddens (1979) suggest that as skilled, 
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(see all Chapters).  Each time I met with firefighters they tested me and I realised that my response 
would influence my access, or even if I got access at all.  On one visit to a firestation, I was subject to 
what I have labelled the boob test.  This is a near perfect example of firefighters sexism, how they test 
each other and how they tested me.   
 
2.4.4. The boob test 
At one station a peer group leader passed round a picture of a topless woman for all to ‘admire’.  
Experiential knowledge alerted me that this was a test, to see if the insider status I claimed extended 
to supporting firefighters’ heterosexist and sexist agendas (see Chapter 5).  Firefighters’ apparent 
innocent passing round of a picture was a test of where my loyalties lay in regard to equal 
opportunities.  This should not have been unexpected, because I was making a claim to access on the 
basis of a shared dividend of having been a firefighter and they needed to know what shared 
understandings we had before deciding how much access I was to be given.  In similar situations, 
many pro-feminists may react with disdain and fly feminist colours, but that would have risked 
exclusion (see Hsiung 1996: 132).  My aim in doing my research was to be seen as an insider, so I 
used my experiential knowledge, indicated “dramaturgical loyalty” (Goffman 1959: 212149), smiled 
and then handed on the picture.  Like others (see Lal 1996: 196; Higate 1998), I suspended my 
‘feminist’ approach and participated in a charade to keep insider access (see Hearn 1993: 45-47).  
Through this one act I recognised why so many researchers consider it necessary to carry out their 
own particular form of covert research.  I am not comfortable with deceiving my subjects, but I am 
not naïve either.   
 
2.4.5. Risking my new identity 
However, there was a second crucial lesson I learned from the boob test, and this concerns my 
attempts to change my masculinity.  When I chose not to confront the gawking eyes of the 
firefighters’ sexist test and looked at the picture of the women with the 52” bust, I recollected the 
‘pleasure’ of sexism.  Resembling a reformed smoker who accepts just one cigarette, that one incident 
could have damaged the tender shoots of my pro-feminist ambitions; for me an emptying thought.  As 
I have already suggested I am much impressed with Hochschild’s notion, that “surface-acting” can 
develop into “deep-acting”  (Hochschild 1983: 54) if an actor immerses in a role (see Goffman 1959: 
252-253).  In particular, I argue throughout this thesis this was how the fire service initially reinforced 
my childhood socialisation and completed my education as a patriarchal male.  As an 18 year old I 
had first ‘surface-acted’ to conform to social pressures to be like other males around me (see Seidler 
1977).  Before that, I followed the boys reported in Prendergast and Forrest (1998) and went from 
shortie to ’ardnut in the school playground.  Then, when I joined the fire service, I willingly accepted 
and immersed myself into a role that then became a ‘natural to me’ way of life.  As I gained status, 
my behaviour turned to ‘deep acting’ and when my turn came, I ‘persuaded’ probationers to join 
firefighters’ patriarchal hegemony.  Currently in a reversal of the earlier process, I am consciously 
acting out a part with the intention of socialising myself towards pro-feminism.  However, I have to 
be careful; nothing is set in concrete and I remain acutely aware of this.  
 
2.4.6. Do the ends justify the means? 
                                                                                                                                                                     
knowledgeable agents capable of reflexivity we can think for ourselves and reflect on the effects of our conversations (see 
Hochschild 1983). 
149 The notion of ‘dramaturgical loyalty’ involves members of a group staying loyal to their group understandings, by 
acting in a certain way to perpetuate them and not revealing to ‘others’ the extent of this act.  Today and in context to this 
thesis, this is understood as the taken for granted understandings that exist between men on how they subordinate women 
(that pro-feminist auto-critique hopes to make visible).  This behaviour closely relates to the ‘dramaturgical 
discipline/circumspection’ (Goffman 1959: 216-218) of following expected behaviour that is almost scripted of how a 
group portrays itself publicly.  An example of this will be found in Chapter 3, where it will be explained how firefighters 
might provide a ‘heroic’ image to the public and portray humility to enhance their status.  
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I take no pride in the hypocrisy/acting when I put the research before my pro-feminist stance.  I am 
also disturbed by the temptation sexism still appears to hold for me.  However, I am convinced that if 
my research is going to achieve any of its pro-feminist aims, I must provide examples of firefighters’ 
day-to-day actions, and hope they will follow my analysis and make a choice to change some of their 
negative behaviour
150
.  To do this I have to maintain access, and I realise that any attempt to challenge 
firefighters’ views during the research could result in immediate exclusion by gatekeepers defending 
their hegemonic masculinity or provide less valid data.  The fire service has all but avoided scrutiny 
to date, and I found access very difficult (see next section).  The possibility of raising the 
consciousness of firefighters in a macro sense after this research is more important than an attempt to 
help the few I met within the research
151
.  The need is to finish this thesis and work towards a 
publication.  Then hopefully I can intervene more actively.  It is clear I am not alone in this dilemma, 
because feminists have also collected data using some form of cover.  Lal (1996) and Katz  (1996) 
indicate that without a  “willingness to be untruthful for strategic reasons” (Katz 1996: 172), they 
would not have achieved access.  Abu-Lughod (1991: 161, 1993) followed a similar understanding by 
seeing herself as a “halfie” (half Palestinian and half American), who, in order to gain access, rotated 
between being a Palestinian woman in the field and a feminist academic out of it.  Berik also used a 
similar approach when she adopted ‘alien’ gender norms to access a Turkish village (Berik 1996:  61).  
Mascarenhas-Keyes was particularly resourceful when she became a “chameleon, multiple native” 
(1987: 182), who changed her dress and persona according to the religious perspective of her Eastern 
informants.  It appears that without passing, “loyalty tests” (Warren 1988: 37), access will reduce.  I 
have, it appears, done what others have done and participated in a charade by remaining neutral whilst 
listening to sexist comments (see Collinson 1988; Hearn 1993: 45; Lal 1996: 196; Hsiung 1996: 32).   
 
2.4.7. Access  
My ability to gain access has not been the success story I thought it would be.  I now realise that any 
help if my car broke down would come from firefighters not officers (see above).  At the start of the 
research, my supervisor wrote to the Home Office for assistance and the reply refusing assistance took 
over six months.  After the election of the Labour Government, I wrote direct to the Home Secretary 
(30-5-97) in an attempt to gain access to the Equal Opportunities working party of the Central Fire 
Brigades Advisory Council.  The letter was redirected to the same Home Office department that had 
kept me waiting before.  The reply, after three months, suggested my attendance at the meeting was 
“inappropriate” (8-8-97).  I also invested a considerable amount of time developing a relationship 
with two brigades that led me to believe I would gain access, before they withdrew offers of help.  
From one of these brigades I was unofficially informed that my use of the words pro-feminist and 
Marxist in my proposal had set alarm bells ringing and the second brigade suddenly discovered there 
was too much research going on at the time.   
 
My experience with the Fire Service College (FSC) was equally as difficult
152
.  After breaking 
down initial difficulties, my access was still restricted to the library.  The FSC is in Gloucestershire 
and to obtain value from my visits I stayed overnight.  FSC did not discourage this, probably because 
                                                 
150 I am in the sense of Hearn (1994: 48) ‘reaching out’ to men who are hostile, in an attempt to provide them with sound 
reasons for recognising the deficits of patriarchy and the advantages of change 
151 Wolf, (1996: 217) suggests that starting an action part of a project too early may result in the project floundering 
through access being withdrawn. 
152 The FSC provides operational and technical training for ‘all’ officers.  My access was actively discouraged: the Dean 
refused an interview; I was originally denied access to the classrooms, students and staff.  This closure and anti-researcher 
stance is hardly compatible with the fire service claim that the FSC is the fire service’s university.  In fact, the FSC is in 
many ways not at all like a university, but more as I imagine Sandhurst to be.  Uniforms are worn all day and ‘discipline’ 
is maintained during the seminars and at meals.  Even in the evening, the way firefighters dress in the three bars at the 
college has a sense of ‘mufti’.  One further similarity with the military might be in regard to academic understandings.  
Dixon (1994: 157-162) notes that in the past, the military was an intellectual abyss, where intellectual activity was 
suppressed and discouraged and Doyle (1996) might be interpreted to follow Dixon, when he notes there is a preference 
for experiential skills in the fire service, as opposed to academic skills.  Willis-Lee (1993b) also argues that fire service 
officers prefer to learn experientially.  
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the department that deals with accommodation has financial priorities, more interested in the 
revenue from my 12 visits, which ranged between two and four days, than the politics of exclusion.  
In one way the FSC’s financial gain was my loss, because accommodation and travel was expensive 
and I am unfunded (I was at least more comfortable than an undergraduate student who was camping 
in a nearby field and came each day to the library).  However, if FSC resistance to my visits was to 
deny me access, they forgot that by accommodating me in the staff and student blocks, and allowing 
me access to the bars and dining hall I had the opportunity to observe a side of the fire service not 
normally available to researchers.  In particular, the opportunity to speak with officers and civilians 
‘out of hours’, provided a very different view of the fire service than was obtained during the formal 
day.  I exploited this opportunity as probably only someone with my understandings of the fire service 
could have done.  As an ex-firefighter, I knew how to dress, how to talk and how to encourage 
conversations.  However, I was always open about my reason for being at the college and about my 
research.  At the start of every discussion/interview, I informed those I spoke to that the FSC was 
actively discouraging my research.  This statement became almost a catalyst to encourage firefighters 
to speak with me, an anti tactic which suggests that firefighters enjoyed getting one over on their 
managers (see Chapter 5)
153.  I did eventually ‘persuade’ two civilians to support me and then I gained 
the necessary missing element of my research, access to the classroom and to limited extent 
fireground training.  
 
The attempts by the Home Office and fire service officers to limit my access suggests the fire 
service is reluctant to allow ‘independent’ academics to carry out research into the fire service, almost 
as if they are a closed organisation concerned about scrutiny.  It is as if the fire service has something 
to hide and that being an ‘old boy’ made it more likely that I would find and reveal it.  Without the 
support of some ‘friends’ in the fire service and my insider knowledge of how to gain access this 
thesis would have been different.  However, so far all my arguments suggest that my status and 
critical insight as an ex-firefighter will improve the evidence I get from firefighters.  Not withstanding 
this ‘advantage’, I must not forget that firefighters, similar to the official structures in the fire service, 
might also be concerned about scrutiny.  In particular, they may not wish to reveal to an ex-firefighter, 
who is supposed to have shared understandings with them, any concerns they have about those 
understandings.  Sharing will have its limitations and in particular, as an insider, firefighters are 
unlikely to show me any signs of weakness that stranger-researchers might find 
154
.   
  
2.5. INTERVIEWING FIREFIGHTERS  
This section refers to some interview data from the research to suggests that firefighters are capable, 
quick thinkers and skilled in providing politically motivated, or ‘right’ answers/images: a skill they 
develop in the ‘cut and thrust’ of station life.  What this section begins to establish is that whilst 
firefighters may innocently reveal delicate matters, and generally lack academic skills, they do not 
lack intelligence.  To think otherwise is intellectual snobbery, which before writing this chapter could 
have led to me viewing ‘from above’ (see Mies 1993: 68).  Viewing from above might then have led 
to me not recognising the skills firefighters develop to defend themselves from: first, senior officers, 
whom firefighters manipulate by reflecting back an image officers want to see (see Chapters 4 and 5; 
Goffman 1959, 1961, 1997c); second, the gaze of other firefighters policing their masculinity (see 
Chapters 3-5).  Firefighters use these skills to bring their own agendas to interviews and build images 
for a researcher (as well as their senior officers, other firefighters and the public; see Chapters 1, 3, 4 
                                                 
153 More than anything, I consider it was firefighters’ desire to ‘show’ their officers that provided me with the access at 
these times. 
154 Research amongst firefighters regarding post-traumatic-stress-disorder by outside researchers found evidence I was 
unlikely to find.  Firefighters admitted that whilst the fire service “is male orientated and macho.  Firefighters, when 
talking privately, would admit that they would rarely show their feelings to their colleagues” (Elliott and Smith 1993: 40).  
They “never told anybody how they had felt over that incident”  (McLeod and Cooper 1992:  17; see also Durkin 2000).  
Tixier y Vigil and Elsasser (1976) an insider  and outsider respectively, found that Chicano women provided different 
answers to the same questions depending on who was asking the question (see also Hann 1987: 143-4; McKeganey and 
Bloor 1991). 
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and 5).  I consider that whilst some of the data that follows could equally be introduced later in the 
thesis, it is appropriate in the methodology chapter because it gives a good insight into how 
firefighters might try to avoid scrutiny and manipulate what they reveal.  It also contextualises my 
arguments in a ‘hands-on’ way for firefighters.    
 
2.5.1. Firefighter’s ability to talk 
Throughout this thesis firefighters are shown as gregarious talkers, especially about The Job and by 
the conclusion it will be shown that firefighters’ conversations are instrumental in the way they 
develop and police their masculinity.  Chapters 4 and 5 will show that the policing element of this 
process is important to anyone researching in the fire service, because it means that firefighters are 
often cautious about what they say.  In particular, Chapter 4 will suggest that firefighters’ 
conversations take place within an informal hierarchy that the probationer must accept before they are 
taught their occupational skills.  One rite of passage to acceptance in the hierarchy is that probationers 
must spend about six months listening to what peer group leaders say before they are allowed to 
participate in conversations (see Chapters 3 and 4).  However, the probationer and all firefighters, 
soon learn to take care when participating in discussions.  Any slip, particularly any chance revelation 
of weakness, however minor, can become an inroad that the watch may then exploit during a windup: 
a situation colloquially seen as fire service humour and a favourite pastime amongst firefighters (see 
Chapter 4).   
 
Firefighters’ behaviour at these times appears to be far from being humorous.  What they 
identify as a laugh and a testing process, I identify as cultural policing (see Chapter 4; Mac an Ghaill 
1996: 68).  Firefighters work within what might be described as a Foucaultian panoptican (see 
Chapters 3-5; Sheridan 1980; Rabinow 1986).  The watch, watch each other and themselves all the 
time.  Firefighters rationalise their windups as a necessary process, in their life or death occupation, to 
ensure each team member is up to the task (see Chapters 3 and 5).  However, the windup does not 
only enforce dictates necessary for firefighting and safety.  Firefighters also police their masculinity 
in a wider hegemonic sense with their humour.  Innocent conversations supported by the windup are 
the essence of firefighters informal hierarchy.  In particular, conversations are the source of the 
understandings that firefighters will fit in with, and will identify those who might resist and require 
persuasion to conform (and to test researchers, see boob test above).  To avoid the gaze of the watch, 
firefighters remain alert to hidden agendas in any conversation and are careful about what they say
155
.  
‘Informal’ cultural policing apart, firefighters’ adroitness at avoiding/diverting ‘the gaze’ is also 
tested when senior officers visit the station.  Chapter 5 indicates that were it not for firefighters very 
skilful manipulation of their senior officers, the uniformed bureaucracy of the fire service, where rank 
equates to right, might become an iron cage
156
.  However, this does not happen, because firefighters 
practice in providing ‘correct’ answers and mirroring back images is a useful resistance that protects 
them.  This time not from their ‘friends’, but their ‘enemies’ the officers (see Goffman 1997c: 28).  
 
2.5.2. The agency of the respondent: deceit  
Firefighters develop skills to talk in a way that maintains their status, hides the truth and raises 
political agendas.  This can often involve a careful over-emphasis to perpetuate their image of a good 
firefighter (see Chapter 3; Goffman 1959; Baigent 1996: 25), something less wary spectators 
(including researchers) may not expect
157
: a process also recognised within the police (Finch 1993: 
                                                 
155 Chapter 4 will also explain that fire service humour/the windup appears to be practiced to such an extent it almost 
creates a dynamic of its own with unpleasant consequences for most firefighters. 
156 See Baigent 1996: 8, 21-22, which discusses fire service discipline procedures that follow a hierarchal, Weberian, quasi 
military/legal pattern: a sledgehammer to crack a nut, but an unwieldy sledge hammer that often misses its target. 
157Deceit is not the remit of firefighters; their officers (who were also firefighters once) may employ such tactics to avoid 
and challenge the public gaze and to give the impression they are in charge (see Chapter 5; comments on Salaman, 1986).  
It is possible to argue that the whole fire service uses politically motivated answers to provide an image that 
prevents/diverts the public gaze.  The fire service is not the only (closed) group that ‘challenge’ the gaze.  Gypsies are 
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184).  To support this argument I shall now provide some data from a focus group to indicate how 
firefighters can manipulate a conversation to raise a politically motivated sexist point against female 
firefighters.  We were talking at this point about female firefighters:    
 
Ian: One of these women regularly has PMT and we were talking about it the other day, 
and I regularly look at the sick book. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30158).   
 
However, insider knowledge identified what had occurred, leading to rich data of hidden patriarchal 
agendas that provided a ‘chance’ release of information to suggest PMT was a problem159, a debate 
that then came back.  
 
Ian: But the one thing I worry about, when my wife has her period she is a pain in the arse 
and you hear most fellers say ‘it’s this week again’, and some women they reckon can 
like ..
160
 when you read the papers, some people have attacked their husbands with 
knives, but the week after they’re as good as gold .. the scenario I imagine is your 
going into a fire .. if your going in with a female .. I can say bird, because this ain’t 
going nowhere is it?  You are going into a fire with a bird and she’s got PMT or she’s 
got her period and like you .. it’s just in the back of your mind.  
 
This clearly was not an impromptu answer, but one flavoured with a covert hegemonic agenda.  
However, I recognised firefighters not so subtle attack on females
161.  The use of the word “bird” may 
also have been a test to identify where I stood on the equal opportunities front.  Sexist agendas apart, I 
should expect firefighters to construct an image for me, they appear to do it for everyone else.  
Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5 argue that firefighters act a part for their colleagues, officers and the public.  
What I tried to do was to differentiate between when firefighters are ‘surface-acting’ in pursuit of a 
specific agenda and the ‘deep-acting’ that indicates their ‘real’ beliefs (see Hochschild 1983).  
Otherwise, the insider knowledge I claim above would be of little use.   
 
My concern that firefighters would be simple subjects in the research reduced after this debate.  
Firefighters should be seen as more than capable of using their agency for political purposes and not 
as vulnerable as I patronisingly first thought.  It appears that firefighters are well rehearsed in: 
 avoiding  the gaze; 
 being alert to hidden agendas; 
 saying what people want to hear; 
 portraying an image people want to see; 
 bringing their own agendas to any conversation. 
 
My soul searching during this and other sections may be psychologically problematic, but by applying 
the pressure in the right place, on me, there have been positive outcomes.  I now consider that 
firefighters practice what they will make visible and what to hide: from their peers, officers, the public 
and me.  I will not be looking down at firefighters, but at them.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
another group who are adept at diverting questions and providing confusing answers, but their reasons may be more 
understandable (see Oakley 1987: 63; Fonseca 2000; Hardy 2000). 
158 When a respondents name is mentioned this is changed to protect their anonymity. 
159 Howell (1994: 13) indicates that when firefighters were asked “if they felt that performance of a woman colleague 
during periods was a matter of concern 83% said that it was” and this is typical of the way that men use women’s 
procreative physiology to discriminate against them (see Lorber 1994: 46-49). 
160 Key throughout the thesis .. pause, … missing words. 
161 Cheater (1987: 176) warns me of a respondent’s ability to deceive and this ideal example of how pro-feminist auto-
critique may improve the research, because as an ex-firefighter I could recognise the nuances and understandings amongst 
firefighters.   
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2.6. METHODOLOGY: PRODUCING RELEVANT RESEARCH FOR ACADEMICS AND 
FIREFIGHTERS 
The earlier debate provides some insight to the specific character of the fire service as well as 
discussing problems I might experience as a researcher.  Most of the theory so far has been from a 
feminist perspective and it is their methods I preferred for the research.  I will now introduce gounded 
theory, which I used as a basic framework to collect and analyse data to complement my prime aim, a 
pro-feminist auto-critique of the fire service that will be: both, available to firefighters and be true to 
their commonsense understandings as rooted in the context of their daily lives, and be academically 
rigorous. 
 
2.6.1. Grounded Theory 
The work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) (coincidentally paralleling in time the increasing interest in 
feminist methods) was an attempt to develop contextual theory to explain problematic behaviour in a 
way that, “both laymen and sociologists can readily see how its predictions and explanations fit the 
realities of the situation” (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 98).  Glaser and Strauss expect methodological 
development to occur as the research proceeds (see Glaser and Strauss 1967: 237; May 1986: 149; 
Strauss 1987: 8; Strauss and Corbin 1990: 179).  I am sure there would be no surprises for them in the 
way I use their methodology, as a framework for organising and developing data that I collect using 
mainly feminist qualitative methods.  What follows is close to a textbook explanation of grounded 
theory, but this should not suggest that my research, or any other research, is so straightforward or 
unproblematic. 
 
2.6.2. A secret garden: a source of power that avoids the gaze 
Traditionally most research starts with a scrutiny of the academic research that has gone before about 
the subject area.  Of the fire service there is little to report in this regard.  There is no major thesis on 
firefighters in the area in which I am working
162
, but the FSC library does provide an extensive source 
of ‘in-house’ dissertations written by students as a requirement to pass their course.  It is more likely 
therefore, that these papers reflect a subjective view specifically for a tutor/examiner and provide only 
background information for this research.  In academic terms the fire service is a ‘secret garden’ from 
which a powerful and high profile public group emerge in shiny red fire engines race to do their work, 
support their image, then return and shut the doors to retain their privacy: a group pro-feminist auto-
critique might make visible
163
.   
 
At the start of my research, not having a store of literature on the fire service, I read widely 
about masculinity, sexism, racism and homophobia and to ‘kick start’ the research I used my 
experiential knowledge of the fire service to produce a relentless flow of ideas (hardly justifying the 
name hypotheses) about firefighters and their masculinity.  It was not until this process was well 
underway and I was busy generating abstract hypotheses about firefighters that I ventured into the 
field to find any ‘new’ data.  My early fieldwork was to:   
 read whatever was relevant in the FSC library.  
 conduct a series of interviews at the FSC,  
 conduct three focus groups away from the college  
 undertake some observations of firefighters both at the FSC and away from it.  
   
At this time the skills I had developed as a firefighter for ‘thinking on my feet’ were most useful.  I 
balanced all I had learnt from academia and the fire service alongside the data I was collecting in the 
field.  This data was placed into NUD*IST/NVIVO and collated and analysed using grounded 
                                                 
162 This meant I did not have the problem foreseen by May (1986:  149) that researchers are frequently influenced by 
previous research.   
163 May (1986; also see Hearn 1994: 49-60) argues that powerful groups often avoid research and if the fire service is a 
secret garden, then I as a previous gardener may be able to reveal some of the ways firefighters cultivate their masculinity. 
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theory(Glaser and Strauss 1967) and Hearn’s (1994) notion of pro-feminist auto-critique.  This 
process led to me deciding that in the second phase of the research I should focus on:  
 firefighter recruitment and training;  
 firefighting in all its aspects;  
 how the watch incorporate new members;  
 fire service humour;  
 firefighters’ resistance to their officers. 
 
The second phase of the research began by me accessing firefighters through networks at a mainly 
informal level to get interviews and observe them.   
 
 
2.6.3. Doing grounded theory  
Research along grounded lines then started in earnest.  I analysed research findings as they came in, 
breaking up the data to classify each topic under a label: a code (see Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss, 
I987: 20-25; Strauss and Corbin 1990:  183).  For example, I put all the data about firefighting into 
one code: ‘firefighting’ and this led to my realising that ‘all’ firefighters were using the same term 
‘getting in’, so I created a code for this type of data: ‘getting in’.  As the data within that code built 
up, I compared the incoming data with that already collected and I was able to hypothesis that: 
‘firefighters were always keen to fight fires, because they were ‘humanitarians, intent on helping the 
public’: a possible answer to the why part of my question on firefighting in the introductory chapter.  
My next hypothesis was to suggest that firefighters had a professional ethos: ‘to provide an efficient 
service to help the public’.  These two hypotheses appeared to be a central finding to explain the code 
‘getting in’ and fitted very neatly with the public image of firefighters as an example of selfless 
proletarian masculinity: a job which commonsense notions suggest could only be done by males.  
These hypotheses were then tested against all the incoming data (constant comparative analysis; see 
Glaser and Strauss 1967; Corbin 1986: 94; Strauss 1987: 23; Mc Neil 1990: 21) and eventually a 
stage arrived when incoming data reached saturation i.e. did not challenge the hypotheses that 
explained the data coded under the label “getting in.”  All roads, as it were, pointed to Rome and it 
would have been easy to write up and support a thesis along these lines.  This would have been 
something the fire service would have enjoyed, because it fits with its public image.   
 
However, what the fire service might have preferred did not occur, because as a sociologist I 
was looking further than the obvious.  I continued to analyse the data and some incoming data that I 
put in the code “getting in” could not be explained by the current two hypotheses: there appeared to 
be other possible reasons for why firefighters were ‘getting in’.  I then revisited all the data in the 
code “getting in” and subdivided it according to a number of reasons that I could hypothesise that 
firefighters were getting in.  Constant comparative analysis continued to test and develop what was 
now an increasingly large list of hypotheses for firefighters getting in.  For me this system has worked 
to great effect as my original two hypotheses were joined by new hypotheses that suggest there are a 
number of reasons why firefighters are so keen to fight fires and the list of these appears in Chapter 
3
164
.  Then I went on to make an analysis of the complicated dynamics that support firefighters 
apparent keenness to always be getting in at fires.  This analysis is a central finding of this thesis: a 
                                                 
164 My previous experience as a firefighter had prepared me for this approach to data handling, as this is the sort of 
dynamic process used in putting out a fire.  Chapter 3 will suggest that although firefighters would not explain it this way, 
they develop and agree hypotheses for firefighting at the station based on all the data they have accrued in the field (whilst 
firefighting).  Then at subsequent fires firefighters adapt these hypotheses and make judgements according to the incoming 
data in a similar way to how researchers carry out constant comparative analysis.  Chapter 3 will explain that firefighting 
requires a flexibility of thinking, in which all the incoming data (rate of spread of fire, heat, smoke, water supplies, safety 
of building, time left in cylinder, condition of your partner; even to questioning ‘what is that falling on your head’) is 
processed and updates the hypothesis/plan instantly as firefighters proceed through a building that is on fire.  Then back at 
the station the watch will hold a ‘post-mortem’ about the fire to see if their hypotheses need updating to take into account 
the information they have gained from the last fire.  These hypotheses I call protocols (see Chapters 1, 3 and 5). 
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theory (see Corbin 1986:  98-99).  I now argue that in parallel with the ‘obvious’ humanitarian 
motives that the public recognise when firefighters get in at a fire, firefighters seek several petty 
dividends (see Wright 1982
165
; Chapters 3, 5 and 6).  Whilst not wishing to reveal this early in the 
thesis too much about these dividends, it is sufficient to say that one dividend involves an adrenaline 
rush and that should not be surprising; a second involves firefighters seeking to ‘prove’ to themselves, 
their peers and the public that they are good firefighters. 
 
2.7. WATCHING THE WATCH 
My data is mostly qualitative; this takes a variety of forms from taped interviews, to the observations 
that I have recorded in my field book.  This data has been fully transcribed then coded into 
NUD*IST/NVIVO later.  This data, alongside my own experiential knowledge, forms the basis of my 
thesis.  However, I have used some quantitative data and this has taken two forms: first a series of 
questionnaires; second, some official statistics, which I have manipulated in SPSS.  What now 
follows is a summary of how I have collected my data.          
 
2.8. QUALITATIVE DATA 
2.8.1. Interviews with firefighters 
My interviews with firefighters have been very casual and I have encouraged firefighters to talk 
freely.  I have spoken as little as possible to reduce the very real possibility that firefighters might be 
influenced by what I said and then give me the evidence they consider I was looking for (discussed 
above).  At the start of each interview, I have pointed out to firefighters that my thesis will reflect 
what they say and that I hope to overcome one-criticism firefighters commonly make, which is ‘that 
no one listens to them’.  Firefighters have ‘proved’ to be very accommodating, lively and willing 
respondents and the norm was for me to turn on my tape recorder and ask one question, “tell me what 
it is like to be a firefighter” and they have taken over the interview.  Occasionally I have asked further 
questions, to push the agenda on, or to develop points, but my involvement has been kept to a 
minimum.  Those interviews I did not tape were recorded in my fieldbook.     
 
2.8.2. Formal interviews 
Uniformed personnel: 
 1 recruit in training (16 interviews at weekly intervals); 
 1 probationary firefighter (4 interviews at 3 monthly intervals);  
 6 focus groups with male firefighters; 
 8 senior FBU officials166; 
 7 female firefighters;  
 38 male firefighters;  
 13 senior officers.   
 
Civilians around the fire service 
 5 potential recruits; 
 13 civilians actually employed in the fire service. 
 
                                                 
165 Wright (1982) argues that apart from economic dividends that there are other (petty) dividends associated with the 
prestige of being in charge, the power to control other workers and I will use this notion to look for non economic 
dividends which firefighters (and officers) might seek during the course of their employment.  
166 FBU officials were all once firefighters and some carryout a dual role as firefighters and FBU officials.  This follows 
the same pattern and belief that provides officers through STEP that without an understanding of what it is like to fight a 
fire they cannot represent firefighters (see Chapters 1 and 5). 
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Some of these interviews are supported by repeat visits to the informants with a view to clearing up 
and developing points that were unclear.   
 
2.8.3. Observations of the fire service 
I have also spent a considerable time amongst firefighters during the research and this has been 
broken down into two types of observation.  The formal observation, when, notebook in hand, I was 
amongst firefighters and they were acutely aware of why I was there.  However, there were other 
times when I was amongst firefighters, sometimes directly related to the research, but not part of the 
formal process, and occasionally at social functions.  At these times it was impossible to divorce 
myself from my research and when something of note occurred I wrote it down (sometimes as 
firefighters spoke to me and therefore formally recorded with their knowledge, and sometimes in the 
form of observations made on pieces of paper at the time or soon afterwards).  These include: 
 12 visits made to Fire Service College to research and observe167.  These mostly involved a 
stay of 3 days and 2 nights and provided an opportunity to be amongst the fire service during 
classroom work, operational drills, social events, meal breaks and evenings in the bar. 
 5 fire service conferences, 3 as an observer and at 2 as both an observer and presenter: first, on 
fitting in (see Chapter 4); second, on officers’ belief that they had shared understandings (see 
Chapters 1 and 5).  Four of these conferences involved overnight stays and all provided an 
opportunity to continue my observation of the fire service.   
 1 recruitment testing day, which provided an opportunity to not only watch the selection 
process for recruits but to discuss with officers their selection methods (the fire service 
provided me with a video of this event). 
 1 recruit pass out parade and display. 
 8 observations of watches at firestations, covering all aspects of fire service life throughout the 
24 hours. 
 numerous social occasions that I attended (after my retirement and during my research) with 
fire service personnel that I had met during my career as a firefighter. 
 
2.8.4. Less formal data collection 
One statistic that is difficult to record is the large number of firefighters I have talked to whilst I have 
been carrying out the research.  In particular, whilst at the FSC and on stations, I have often talked 
with firefighters and officers with my notebook in my hand recording the conversation.  This has been 
mainly a fact-finding process, which has informed and verified my more formal data collection, but it 
has been extremely significant.  During these casual conversations with firefighters, I have been able 
to check detail about specific points to update my knowledge; I have also used these conversations to 
test my hypotheses.  This method of testing is actually worth recording as I am sure other researchers 
might benefit from my experience.  As an example, I have a number of hypotheses in Chapter 3 to 
suggest that firefighters build their status and gain some dividend during firefighting, and on one 
occasion, whilst talking about my research, I suggested to a firefighter that it was my perception that 
firefighters enjoy the tough and adventurous status they are given for doing their work.  He denied 
this, but when challenged he suggested that he enjoyed being a firefighter because, “what sort of job 
can you get paid for driving at 70 mph down the wrong side of Oxford Street and then jump off the 
appliance and kick down a door.”  The irony of what he had said did not miss him.  I do not consider 
this part of my research is covert, or that I have exploited these informants.  They have mostly been 
aware that I was researching amongst them and they have helped in ensuring my research is a close 
reflection of the fire service. 
                                                 
167 In the earlier stages these visits were formally made to the library and observations/interviews took place informally.  
Later I was given more access and observations/observations were formally sanctioned. 
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2.9. QUANTITATIVE DATA  
When the opportunity presented itself, respondents have completed a simple questionnaire.  This was 
to allow a limited verification of what they said and to provide me with some detail of the individuals 
I was meeting.  I also got 27 students at the FSC to complete the questionnaire and this allowed me to 
reach out to a further 15 brigades.  These 73 questionnaires were never intended as a formal form of 
data collection.  It may have been a mistake not to set up this questionnaire formally, but I did put the 
results into SPSS and it is safe to suggest that nothing from the questionnaires challenges any of my 
findings.  However, I would not wish to make any claims about the veracity of these statistics, as their 
collection was unscientific and on occasions the data is based on different, but similar, questions 
collated under one heading.  Some data I do claim as scientific and this relates to the data I have 
collated into SPSS from the LFB and from various referenced sources on: 
 the amount of emergency calls the fire service attend; 
 the breakdown by ethnicity and sex of firefighters; 
 discipline cases in the fire service. 
 
2.10. ANONYMITY  
To protect the anonymity of my respondents I have given them new names and their brigades I 
identify by a number.  I have not chosen to indicate their station or watch, because I am aware that 
some of their colleagues have known about their interviews and this detail may provide a clue to their 
identify.  For senior officers, female firefighters and civilians, who are statistically less common in 
the fire service, I have provided the briefest of detail for the same reason.  It is important to note that 
many firefighters were not in the least bit concerned about anonymity and were quite prepared 
(perhaps even wanted) for me to reveal their names.   
 
2.11. MY PAID EMPLOYMENT 
I also had the advantage of being a half-time lecturer on a Public and Emergency Services Course.  
This put me amongst 16-20 year olds who wish to join uniformed public service.  This post also gave 
me the opportunity to spend a considerable time in residence (up to five days and nights on some 
occasions) with the police and a variety of wings of the army and navy, including specialist forces.  
Whilst I gave an undertaking that my research would not in anyway report on my employment, I do 
not consider it a betrayal to state that nothing during this period of employment would challenge 
anything my thesis suggests.   
 
2.12. OMISSIONS  
There are a number of omissions within this thesis related to harassment because of gender, 
homosexuality and ‘colour/race/ethnicity’.  As I have said earlier, I have not sought out evidence of 
sexual harassment in the fire service, because others have already done this (see Hearn and Parkin 
1987, 1995: 74; Walby 1990: 52; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).  The treatment of many female 
firefighters has followed a similar course to the many women who cross the gender division at work.  
They have been harassed to show them that they have entered a male preserve and they are not 
welcome (see MacKinnon 1979; Ellis, 1988; Walby 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Morris and Nott 
1991; Palmer 1992; Herbert 1994).  Nor has this thesis specifically sought out homosexuality as a key 
issue.  Only one firefighter identified themselves as gay and I have kept that confidence.  However, it 
would be unwise to stereotype everyone as heterosexual
168
.  The FBU informally advises firefighters 
not to ‘come out’ unless they feel safe and this is not surprising in an organisation that polices sexual 
boundaries with the threat of not being actively heterosexual is to be a feminised ‘other’ (see Hollway 
                                                 
168 Heterosexuality and homosexuality are all liable to the same arguments I make about masculinity, they involve social 
constructions (see Foucault 1979; Weeks 1981; Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1987).   
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1996: 28-30).  At this moment, I consider research on how homosexuality might affect being a 
firefighter is better done by the active, but minority ‘gay and lesbian support network’ established 
within the FBU to support homosexuals (see FBU 2000).  This is not because I am homophobic (I 
was before my academic education), but I consider this is a further topic that can build from the 
findings of this research
169
.  The same too can be said of colour, and I have only interviewed one 
black firefighter.  However, these omissions are not in anyway evidence that I disagree with the view 
that the fire service is institutionally sexist, racist and homophobic (see Baigent 1996)
170
.   
 
In preparing this thesis, I have also had to make judgements about what to report.  Each of the 
Chapters 3-5 might have formed a separate thesis (early drafts of four further chapters were put on 
hold: training; the Fire Service College; harassment; humour).  At one stage I was torn between 
picking one area and developing it more fully, as opposed to what I have eventually done and 
analysed three areas: firefighting; fitting in on watches; class relations between firefighters and 
officers.  This has meant spreading myself thinner than I might have wished.  However, there is very 
little research on firefighters and I am taking this opportunity to provide a wide, although sometimes 
thinly developed view of the fire service.  I could also have written more about my methodology, 
particularly how my subjectivity influences this thesis, but that would have meant missing out some 
evidence that may never be reported on.  I hope other academics will build on this thesis; indeed, after 
reflection on what I have written and if I am going to be true to (pro-feminism and) my informants, I 
will immediately be seeking the funding to return to the field and probe again.   
                                                 
169 In saying this I am not challenging the argument of Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1987: 176) that homosexuality might 
provide a valuable starting point to think about masculinity at large.  However, a spokesperson for the Gay and Lesbian 
Support Network suggests they are in contact with 200 firefighters and control room operatives of whom only 30 have 
‘come out’ and about 15 are activists.   
170 The extent of this is clear by the sexist comments the Chief Inspector of Fire service in Scotland made in his annual 
report (HMCIFS 1998: 19), and by the Deputy Chief Officer of Manchester who suggested in an official speech to a group 
of recruits that he would “rather be gay than black” (Fire 1999: 99). 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: FIREFIGHTING: GETTING IN    
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
The Fire Service Act (1947) provides for the fire service to save life, protect property and render 
humanitarian services.  However, firefighters do not need an act of parliament to define their work; 
they have a professional ethos, which encompasses these three tasks.  Pushed hard for clarification, 
firefighters are likely to explain that firefighting involves them in a number of processes.  These 
include first, donning Breathing Apparatus (BA), in order to be able to breathe in the poisonous 
smoke filled atmosphere.  Second, entering the smoke filled building dragging their jet with them
171
 
as they fulfil their third and main priority: to locate and rescue any trapped persons.  Only after they 
are sure no one is in the building will they concentrate on firefighting.  This involves getting as close 
as possible to the fire and then extinguishing it with the minimum amount of water possible.  These 
processes firefighters would sum up as getting in.   
 
3.1.1. An introduction to firefighting  
What follows is a short piece of data, which may help to contextualise this chapter.  Colin is 
explaining how firefighters deal with the rescue of a child at a fire: 
   
Colin: We pulled up and it was just unbelievable.  I mean there was fifty or so people in the 
street and the mother trying to get in and the smoke was billowing out of the house and 
her little boy was in there.  And two crews turned up and we both got in there, one 
went in the front and one went in the back, and the first crew went up the stairs.  And 
the stairs, that’s where the fire was, they were burning through, so we got them [the 
other crew] up and then we stopped and we made sure the stairs, we bridged the 
stairs
172, made our own staircase before we even went up, sort of thing.  That’s our 
own safety, at the end of the day if them stairs go then you’ve had it. 
(Brigade four, firefighter, six years’ service, age 25).  [My emphasis and insert]. 
 
DB: Did you find the child? 
 
Colin: Yeah we got him out, he was alive, but he died three hours later: he was a bit of a 
mess. 
 
This graphic description of a firefighter’s experience in the small hours of the night provides an 
example of the highs and lows of a firefighter’s work: The Job173.  The gathered crowd and the 
desperate exaltations of the grief stricken mother would further increase firefighter’s already high 
adrenaline levels.  Their first priority?  Getting  in.  One crew immediately did this, climbing the 
burning staircase and trusting the second crew to follow an established protocol that would secure the 
stairs, making safe their route out of the building.  The outcome was that the firefighters were 
successful in rescuing the child, but the child died.  Nobody would blame the firefighters for the death 
                                                 
171 The term ‘jet’ relates to the water that comes out of the hose after the tap/control on the nozzle (branch) has been 
turned on.  The term can also be used to describe the hose and branch and risk assessment apart the first decision 
firefighter take is to decide what to use.  A ‘jet’, which is hose that comes in 25 metre lengths kept rolled up on the 
appliance and each length can be connected to the next (There are two sizes of hose, 45 mm and 25 mm known as a ‘boys 
length’ because it is smaller), or a hose-reel.  Firefighters always take a ‘jet’ or ‘reel’ with them into a fire.  This has two 
purposes; the obvious one is so that they can extinguish a fire when they find it.  Less obvious is that in a smoke filled 
building you cannot see your hand in front of your face and backtracking along the hose provides firefighters with a way 
of finding their way out in an emergency. 
172 Firefighters would do this by laying a ladder over the damaged stairs to ensure the stairs were safe in the event of the 
firefighters having to leave the building in a hurry.  The golden rule of firefighting is that you always keep your means of 
escape safe (‘open’), what firefighters will later refer to as protecting their “arse.”     
173 “It takes a special kind of person to want to do this job.  It is a job life saving, property-saving and life loving. It’s a job 
of total satisfaction and incomparable frustration”  (Hall 1991: 9). 
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of the child.  Probably most of the crowd would marvel at the firefighters’ skill, physical/mental 
strength and stoic discipline, recognising only the public status of firefighters as the heroic rescuer
174
.   
 
 Having set the scene this chapter will now draw upon firefighters’ accounts to consider the 
questions raised about firefighting in Chapter 1, which were: 
 how do firefighters develop the protocols and skills necessary for firefighting?  
what does ‘getting in’  mean to firefighters? 
why, given the apparent danger involved, do firefighters ‘get in’ at a fire? 
Each of these questions are considered in turn in this chapter and (in the style of gounded theory) I 
will first start and then develop a hypothesis about each.  In the conclusion the three hypotheses will 
again be considered and ‘finalised’.         
 
There are six further sections after this introduction.  Section 2 focuses on the how of 
firefighting, and provides an overview of a typical fire service recruit-training programme, examines 
how the watch incorporate probationary firefighters up to a point where they become part of the 
hierarchy and share knowledge to plan their protocols for firefighting.  Section 3 focuses on what it is 
like to fight a fire and uses explanations from firefighters to understand what it might be like to get in 
and from this comes the suggestion that fighting is a dangerous occupation that is made safer by the 
way firefighters develop their firefighting skills and protocols.  Section 4 focuses on why firefighters 
get in and examines firefighters’ explanations of their motivations at these times.  Section 5 examines 
if firefighters actions when they get in might involve unnecessary risk-taking (a notion I return to in 
Chapter 5).  Section 6 identifies two firefighters who do not fit with the image that other firefighters 
have given.  One of these helps ground much of the analysis that has gone before, the other ‘proves’ 
that not all firefighters are heroes.  Section 7 concludes the chapter, providing the developed 
hypotheses and an analysis.  This includes a summary that suggests watches develop protocols for 
firefighting.  These protocols support firefighters’ professional ethos: to provide an efficient service to 
help the public.  However, it is also argued that in the shadow of the professional ethos these 
protocols might have a difficult to separate relationship, with firefighters’ imagery and the subjective 
public view that firefighters will risk their lives to rescue/help them.  The analysis also considers if 
the way firefighters’ organise firefighting might involve homosociality (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; 
Cockburn 1991b; Chapters 1, 4-6).   
 
3.2. HOW DO FIREFIGHTERS DEVELOP THE PROTOCOLS AND SKILLS NECESSARY 
FOR FIREFIGHTING?  
3.2.1. The training centre 
No study about the fire service would be complete without a reference to recruit training
175
 and I 
collected a considerable amount of data from my fieldwork in the training environment.  However, I 
will not produce a discrete chapter on training, preferring to introduce my findings at appropriate 
points in the thesis.  I justify this approach because I consider that the training environment offers a 
false vision of the fire service and for the most part is a mechanical process to discipline the recruits 
and teach them the tools of their trade (see Howell 1994: 18, 1996: 27; O'Donnell 1995: 21; Chapter 
4) in preparation for the next and crucial stage of their training at the station. 
 
The typical recruit-training course lasts for 18 weeks and provides the recruit with a 
rudimentary knowledge of the tools needed to become a firefighter.  Training involves: 
 learning to obey orders and respect rank; 
 correct wearing and preparation of uniform; 
 improving fitness; 
                                                 
174The image of firefighters carrying out rescues is well recorded in classic pictures (Millais, 1885; Vigor, 1892) and in 
popular literature (see Cooper 1986; Delson 1992; Lloyd-Elliott 1992; Wallington and Holloway 1994).   
175 The LFB now have changed the title of ‘recruit’ to ‘trainee’ in order to avoid the military label the word recruit implies.  
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 gaining the basic skills necessary to test176, maintain and use the ladders, hoses/jets, pumps 
and other equipment carried on fire appliances; 
 learning search and rescue techniques; 
 passing a two week course in BA; 
 some simulated ‘hot fire’177 training; 
 understanding very basic firefighting science; 
 understanding some very basic Fire Prevention; 
 passing a first aid examination; 
 an introduction to equal opportunities; 
 passing weekly examinations and appraisals (recruits who do not meet the standard are likely 
to be ‘back squadded’ i.e. put back into the squad following their current squad). 
 
The training environment is noisy and disciplined: each day starting with a formal parade
178
; uniforms 
are maintained at military levels of smartness; instructors are called Sir/Ma’am; drills are performed 
at the shouted command of instructors, at the ‘double’179 and by ‘numbers’180.  Recruits will more 
often also receive informal advice from instructors about fire service rituals, understandings and 
customs.  Recruits are unlikely to forget this advice because it involves very real aspects about what it 
is to be a firefighter.  These will be explained in this and subsequent chapters, and include: 
 the need to ‘fit in’ and become part of the team; 
 stories about firefighters who have not ‘fitted in’;  
 the custom that probationers should look to experienced firefighters for guidance about fitting 
in;  
 the expectation that probationers are likely to be involved in various rites of passage (generally 
surrounding proving themselves as trusted firefighters) before they are accepted at the station; 
 the understanding that firefighting skills can only be learnt ‘on the job’ and that these skills are 
learnt from experienced firefighters; 
 the importance of being labelled a ‘good firefighter’ and avoiding being seen as a ‘panicker’;   
 stories surrounding the folklore of firefighting; 
 the proud traditions, elite status and esprit de corps of the fire service. 
 
Most of those interviewed about their training admit to early disorientation and confusion with 
this new way of life, which they clearly identify with the military, especially the regimentation and 
the ‘bullshit’ (see Dixon 1994).  
 
Isaac: At training school it was a very disciplined job, everything had to be polished.  ‘Yes 
sub, No sub, three bags full sub’. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 2.5 years’ service, age 25, in a focus group181). 
 
Greg: I hated it absolutely hated it .. everything about it I hated.  I hated the bullshit that went 
on, the unnecessary bullshit.  
                                                 
176 All fire service equipment is subject to stringent tests (see Chapters 1 and 5). 
177 ‘Hot fire’ training involves firefighters training in a purpose designed building in which a controlled fire is burning.  
This may include training for ‘flashovers’, which could be described as a phenomenon that may occur if the combustible 
gases given off by materials being heated during a fire do not have enough oxygen to ignite, then suddenly reach a source 
of oxygen sufficient to allow their ignition.  The explosion that follows is a ‘flashover’ or ‘backdraught’.  
178 There is evidence that formal parades might be replaced by a less formal roll call (see London Firefighter 2000: 26-27). 
179 The term to ‘double’ relates to ‘double quick time’, a military term that in the fire service means to run, depending on 
the circumstances this can mean as fast as you can or a trot (what might be currently called jogging). 
180 The Fire Service Drill Book (1987, replaced by the Fire service Training Manual 1994) lays down the precise way to 
use every piece of equipment in use in the fire service.  This includes a detailed explanation of how members of the crew 
are to operate that piece of equipment.  During initial training this makes using the equipment easier to understand, 
because each crewmember is given a number and then the task that number performs is laid down; hence drilling by 
numbers.   
181 All extracts with firefighters are taken from one to one interviews except when I indicate thus. 
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(Brigade one. 8.5 years’ service, age 33). 
 
Terri: A shock, it was very regimental and I had no experience of that sort of thing.  
(Female firefighter).  [My emphasis]. 
 
Training is physically and mentally exhausting and to pass the weekly examinations recruits report 
they spend evenings and weekends revising
182
.  This almost cuts them off from the outside world, and 
recruits will revise and socialise as a squad, which becomes a support group
183
.  For eighteen weeks 
they live, eat and sleep the fire service.  Whatever the reason they gave for joining, which varies from 
simply wanting to be a firefighter, to job security, by the time they leave the training centre the 
majority have only one ambition; that is to become a ‘good firefighter’ (explained later).  The training 
environment has served its purpose.  It has established a sense of belonging as well as ensuring the 
recruit has the basic skills and knowledge for the next stage, which will turn the training into reality.   
 
 
3.2.2. The transition to the station 
My data is very clear: the recruit joins the fire service as part of a junior squad in the training centre, 
is put in a uniform, has to run everywhere and learn to cope with military style discipline.  By the 
time they pass out at a very formal jingoistic parade, they have learnt about fire service hierarchies: 
their status has risen from rock bottom as junior squad to a high as senior squad.  Then split from their 
squad recruits go to the bottom of a new hierarchy, now, as a probationer at a station
184
.   
 
The probationers report that arriving at the station after the formality and rush of the training 
centre is like entering a different world.  First, they will meet the watch-commander who will almost 
certainly confirm what the training instructor has said (above): that it is their duty to fit in; that they 
should listen to the advice of experienced firefighters.  Meeting the watch for the first time may be a 
shock, because the apparently self-contained group may appear unwelcoming.  The shock may 
increase, because after the way the probationer has learnt to act whilst amongst officers, the watch’s 
informality with their officers is probably unexpected: most probationers admit to holding the watch 
in awe at this time, because the watch are ‘real’ firefighters and the probationer is not.   
 
At the station, probationers will immediately ‘ride’ the appliance as an integral part of the 
team
185
.  Therefore, assimilation must be quick and watch-commanders should encourage this by 
                                                 
182 The volume of written material and the need to be able to write down the large amount of tests, procedures and 
technical knowledge that was given, put a considerable strain on the many firefighters whose skills before entering the fire 
service were mainly physical.  The weekly written test, the ‘highlight’ of the week was not looked forward to and many 
firefighters look back on all this written (what firefighters would call academic) work as unnecessary in their hands-on 
job.   
183 The training centre might have many similarities with Foucaultian control, the recruit is under constant scrutiny, they 
must not let their squad down and the must achieve in the eyes of the instructors.  Recruits are almost in a panopticon and 
during this short but significant spell recruits might put their free will on hold to get through the training (see Sheridan 
1980; Rabinow 1986; Chapter 5).  
184 Depending on the brigade, probation can last from 12 to 24 months.  Failure to reach the required standard can result in 
an extended probation, or employment being terminated.  Whilst no actual statistics are available for how many of the 20 
firefighters who had their employment terminated for “poor performance/efficiency” (HMCIFS 1999: 41) in the year 
1998/9 some of these are probably recruits.   
185 There are no extra provisions made by managers for the probationer to be a ‘bolt on extra’ and have time to assimilate 
into the team.  Recruits/probationers, could be involved in a fire in their first minute on duty.  I have three examples of 
how ‘bad’ a practice this may be, where recruits during their first day on duty were given responsibilities they considered 
they were not capable of: one, when within one hour of arriving at a station a recruit was wearing BA at a fire; a second, 
where the recruit was left operating a pump; a third, where a recruit was controlling 10 BA wearers on a BA board (see 
Chapter 5 for BA boards and safety procedures).     
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incorporating the probationer into the team at drill
186
.  Drill will provide the whole watch with an 
opportunity to identify the probationer’s strengths and weaknesses.  It is likely that one of the first 
lessons a probationer learns during this drill is to slow down: a lesson the established hands will teach 
them.  Speed is reserved for the real thing, but then it must be controlled and not mechanical: the 
probationer is about to learn a completely new approach to being a firefighter compared to the one 
that training centre taught.  Three extracts follow, from: Ken a probationer; Barry, a watch-
commander; Christian, a crew-commander.  These respondents do not work together, nevertheless 
their accounts were very similar and typically represent firefighters’ responses.  From this evidence I 
conclude that much of what has been learnt at training centre will at best be marginalised:  
 
Ken: Basically the training are saying ‘you are learning the correct way and make sure you 
keep it going like this’.  But then from actual people in The Job you find out you don’t.  
You just fit in with them basically. 
(Brigade three, probationary firefighter, seven months’ experience, age 19).  [My 
emphases]. 
 
Barry: All from training centre, all that really went out of the window completely.  You had 
really start all over again.   And that was without trying to fit in with the watch, 
yunnoo. 
(Brigade one, temporary operational station officer, seven years’ service, age 34).  
[My emphases]. 
 
Christian: You only learn so much at training school and at drills.  It’s when you go outside, the 
proper part, that you need the guys around you with the experience to show you what 
to do. 
(Brigade one, leading firefighter 20 years’ service, age 38).  [My emphasis]. 
 
Ken as a probationer has been on a watch less than three months and he realises he must marginalise 
the training centre’s ‘best practice’ and fit in with how the watch organise for firefighting (see Chapter 
4 for a full explanation of fitting in).  What is surprising is that Barry and Christian who, as officers, 
might reasonably be expected to discourage this, do not.  Isaac, Fred and Perry confirm this view: 
 
Isaac: I was told at training school, just to go to one of the older experienced blokes and 
follow him around and ask for advice. 
(Brigade two, 2.5 years’ service, age 25, in a focus group). 
 
Fred: Eh .. it’s the .. the older firemen.  They were the ones who took you under their wing, 
in a way .. and they showed you the way through The Job; how to look after yourself.
  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 15 years’ service, age 37). 
 
Perry: Officers think they teach firefighters how to fight fires, firefighters know they have to 
teach firefighters how to, because they are the ones in the back of the machine with 
them. 
(Senior FBU representative).  [My emphases]. 
 
It cannot be overemphasised how much the fire service relies on experienced firefighters to teach 
probationers The Job.  Isaac’s original instructor encouraged him to seek out an experienced 
firefighter for advice on firefighting.  Paradoxically Ken received contrary advice from recruit 
                                                 
186 The word drill here relates to watch training sessions with fire service equipment.  BO's instruct stations that drill 
should take place during every shift and a record of this is kept in the drill book.  Evidence suggests drill records are 
falsified to make it appear firefighters drill when they do not (see Chapter 5), but when a probationer arrives the watch can 
expect to be drilled frequently, a further reason why the probationer is not always welcome by experienced firefighters.   
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instructors: that he was “learning the correct way” but he soon found out “from actual people in 
The Job … you don’t.”  It is clear that whilst recruit training provides firefighters with the 
‘essentials’, this knowledge is overtaken by the advice probationers get from the ‘real’ firefighters at 
the station.  Despite the massive bureaucracy, there is no formal process to shape how this works; it is 
not written down that firefighting will be taught in this way and experienced firefighters have no 
formal status in the official hierarchy.  It is just informally understood and accepted throughout the 
service that training is left to experienced firefighters, “the ones in the back of the machine.”187  This 
means the probationer has to rely on the experienced firefighter sharing knowledge, facilitates the 
marginalisation of (formal) best practice, and provides the experienced firefighter with authority over 
the probationer.   
 
As the thesis unfolds, I will argue that the situation above underpins an informal hierarchy 
amongst firefighters, but first I shall start a hypothesis, which uses the arguments above, to answer the 
how of firefighting.  Hypothesis 1: 
 
Initial training teaches firefighters about the tools of their job, but once on a watch it is almost 
inevitable (and formally and  informally accepted)  that probationers must turn to experienced 
firefighters to learn about firefighting: The Job.     
 
Having prepared such a hypothesis I am going to immediately challenge it and suggest that one 
way probationers might avoid the informal hierarchy would be to learn about firefighting from the 
wide range of Fire service Manuals
188
.  Firefighters do not think book learning can do this, as the 
following answers indicate:   
 
Fred: No instantly, you don’t learn to be a fireman from that. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Sinclair: Like, most of the blokes have got experience don’t know what is in the book, when it 
comes to what’s on the fireground. 
(Brigade one, leading firefighter, 23 years’ service, age 44, in a focus group). 
 
Don: You can read a book, but how much of that is actually useful practically?  Em,  yeah, I 
mean you can read all the manuals till you can’t take anymore information in, but at 
the end of the day you learn from the guys around you.   
(Brigade one, firefighter, eleven years’ service, age 33). 
 
Pete: Books are for the exams I think, ain’t they?  The practical side, is from the men, at the 
jobs or whatever it may be.  You learn from watching and helping them. 
(Brigade one, firefighter, 18 years’ service, age 43).  [My emphasis]. 
 
Firefighters are clear; learning about firefighting is handed down from other firefighters, “the men.”  
Fred explains where:  
 
Fred: On the back of the motor [fire appliance] basically.  Bum on the seat.  That’s where 
you learn it, out on the fireground
189.  That’s where you learn your trade. … To 
extinguish the fire you have got to get in there and do it.  That’s the thing, it’s no good 
holding back, it can go up into the roof or spread to another room.   
[My emphasis and insert]. 
  
                                                 
187 The officer sits in the front. 
188 The Home Office produce a wide range of literature about firefighting.  Most common amongst these are the Manuals 
of Firemanship, formally named as such before females joined the fire service (Home Office 1981): these are the bible of 
the fire service.  
189 ‘Fireground’ is where the fire is being fought, as in ‘battleground’. 
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Fred uses some typical fire service language to reiterate what the others have said.  He then 
indicates that to put out the fire you must get in: a term so synonymous with firefighting that it led to 
the naming of this chapter.  Fred also explains that you must get in as quick as possible otherwise the 
fire will continue to spread.  Alf speaks as if for all firefighters: 
 
Alf: How to be a fireman?  There is no training school on this earth that can teach you how 
to do that.  They can teach you the basics
190
 and then you have to apply those basics to 
learn how to do your job and the skills that you need to do The Job.  I’m still learning, 
25 years’ down the road, I’m still learning.   
(Brigade three, firefighter, 25 years’ service, age 46).  [My emphasis]. 
 
This chapter will develop Alf’s view that learning to be a firefighter is experiential and ongoing to 
suggest it is also a reflexive process from which firefighters might develop protocols for firefighting 
(see Chapter 1).  One protocol is that firefighters must always try to improve their firefighting skills, 
another is that firefighters must gel as a team and support each other.  Jo explains: 
 
Jo: I am still learning now.  This morning I had a job.  Yesterday I had a job.  I lay in bed 
thinking what could I have done better, what did I do wrong, could I have improved on 
what I did, should I have been quicker, slower, lower, higher, faster whatever?  Eh, so 
you come out of training school and you should be backing someone up
191
.  You’re 
part of a team; you need to be able to gel with anybody on that watch, be an efficient 
crew.  Whatever you do and as much as I rely on somebody else, they would be relying 
on me. 
(Female firefighter).  [My emphases]. 
 
Jo’s answer provides a considerable insight.  Jo is reflecting on what she has done almost as if she is 
still at training centre and has to pass a test, but Jo has been a firefighter for a long time and should 
have no test to pass.   
 
It became very clear that firefighters were of a similar view, that after recruit training provides 
the “basics”, you mostly learn The Job alongside your peers: “bums on the seat”; “hands-on 
experience”; “no training school can teach you”; “part of a team”; “relying” were typical examples to 
explain how firefighters learn about firefighting.  The fact that Alf is “still learning” adds to the 
considerations that Jo is approaching firefighting as an ongoing test.  Using the data so far reviewed I 
am able to develop the earlier version of Hypothesis 1:  
 
Initial training teaches firefighters about the tools of their job, but once on a watch it is almost 
inevitable (and formally and informally accepted) that probationers must turn to experienced 
firefighters to learn about firefighting: The Job.   
 
By adding the following: 
 
Experienced firefighters explain that the experiential learning process is ongoing and learnt on 
the job as part of a watch where trust between watch members is important.  It might also be that 
                                                 
190 ‘Basics’ refers to general handling of equipment and theoretical firefighting. 
191  For safety reasons firefighters will never work alone in a fire, they will always work in a minimum twos.  It is a 
protocol for the first person into the fire to take the jet and be known as ‘number 1’ (the team leader).  The remainder of 
the crew are identified as ‘backing them up’.  Sometimes ‘backing-up’ is literal in the sense that without a second 
firefighter physically backing-up the ‘jet-reaction’ might knock them over.  However, most fires are fought with hose-
reels and more often backing-up means supporting the firefighter with the ‘jet’.  In this case the experienced firefighter 
holds the jet (and is number 1) and the probationer is backing-up (number 2).  However, amongst experienced firefighters, 
unless an officer leads the team, the order is normally random: the first to get the jet is the leader; the ‘later’ arrival backs 
them up.  Holding the jet is the prime job, almost a prize, because the firefighter who does this gets in first.  Attempting to 
be number 1 might also increase the speed firefighters get off the appliance and get to the front door of the house that is 
alight. 
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individuals think reflexively off the job about how to improve their skills and develop protocols 
for firefighting, which they will continually test.  These methods are one way the skills of 
firefighting develop and they are handed down to probationers as part of the skills necessary to be 
an experienced firefighter.   
 
3.2.3. The ‘good firefighter’ 
I have used the term “experienced firefighter” to identify the firefighters who are not on probation 
from those who are.  Status in firefighters’ informal hierarchy is greatly influenced by ‘time served’.  
As in the military (Morgan 1987), firefighters will make initial judgements about other firefighters by 
asking, “how long have you done?”  However, whilst an important pointer, time served is not the only 
criterion and firefighters have to ‘prove’ to those they work with that they are a ‘good firefighter’: a 
label applied after peer group approval.  Hart (1982: 239-240) provides the following definition: 
    
The ‘good fireman’192, the emphasis is on the operational, active individual who can remain calm 
and sensible under pressure, and this is the dominant view of what a fireman’s identity involves.  
He is defined by the type of work he does, dangerous demanding, operational tasks rather than 
such non-operational features of the work as Fire Prevention and admin. 
 
Are those traits to be found within my data? 
 
Alf: I am there to do a job and I am trained to do that job and like anybody that's got a job, 
you want to do it to the best of your ability.  I would find i .. a .. a .. a humiliation; I 
would feel I was a failure if I didn't pursue my endeavour to the best of my abilities.  In 
other words I want to do my job the best I can.  Now if I get half-way up a flight of 
stairs and it just gets hot and I know it gets hot, I have experienced this .. and I turn 
round and go back and say ‘I can’t go back its too hot’.  I would be a failure .. in my 
own mind.  It might be too hot for a human to survive in and I have been in some hot 
places when it wasn’t a decision we made, it just happened when we retreated193. 
[My emphases]. 
 
It is my view that Alf is (or has been; see Chapter 4) a peer group leader with status in the informal 
hierarchy and he fits with Hart’s (1982: 239-240) definition: “the good fireman … who can remain 
calm and sensible under pressure.”  Importantly, in similar terms, that is what Alf has said in his two 
abstracts above.  Alf is a firefighter who cannot give in, but must continue, regardless of the heat, to 
get in.  When he does retreat it is almost as if by divine intervention, “it just happened.”  Alf is a 
firefighter who will seek to improve his skills until he retires and these skills he will hand down to 
younger firefighters.  These skills will include the knowledge that a ‘good firefighter’ will get as close 
as possible to the fire, regardless of the heat, before turning on the jet, otherwise you might cause 
‘water-damage’ (a test Alf applies to himself). 
 
 To improve understanding of firefighters’ term ‘getting in’, it is important to explain the 
following.  The most common medium for putting out fires is water.  There are two reasons why 
water will put the fire out: first, by smothering (blanketing) the fire by displacing the oxygen needed 
to enable combustion to continue.  Second, water will cool the material that is burning to below 
ignition temperature
194
.  Most people do not realise that when firefighters go into a building, they do 
not indiscriminately spray water everywhere in the hope of extinguishing the fire.  Experienced 
                                                 
192 There were no women in the fire service when Hart carried out his research, but many firefighters still use the term.   
193 Alf’s acknowledgement that he can retreat is discussed later. 
194 There are some substances that react violently and explode when water is applied and others that will produce their 
own oxygen. These substances are rarely found and when they are special firefighting measures are adopted.  Again 
rarely, fires occur in sensitive electrical products and if these are in isolated locations, such as a single computer that has 
caught fire, then a chemical firefighting medium may be used.  However, if the computer is burning as part of a room that 
is alight, then the more likely course is to use water. 
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firefighters teach probationers that to put out a fire efficiently, they must overcome the heat and get 
right up to the fire before they ‘open’ their jet.  Then the smothering and cooling effect will put the 
fire out; the water used to fight the fire will turn to steam
195
.  Excess water that does not turn to steam 
and damages buildings and their contents is recognised by firefighters as ‘water-damage’: a testimony 
to firefighters’ lack of skill at overcoming the heat and danger.  On return from fires the firefighters 
will hold a ‘post-mortem’196, to consider how ‘the job went’.  During this reflexive practice, the 
amount of water-damage is an important consideration.  It will indicate how skilfully the crews got 
in: if their nerve held and they overcome the heat to get close to fire before opening the jet, or if they 
panicked and ‘washed the building away’.  This is why Alf refers (above) to how it would be a “a 
humiliation” to “turn round”, because it would be an admission to the watch that he could not 
overcome the heat and reach the fire.  Alf appears to see firefighting as a personal challenge and he is 
sure to pass this understanding on to probationers.  Whilst Alf does not serve with the firefighter 
whose extract is next, it is possible to see a similar influence at work.   
 
Ashley: Not wanting to be seen by the one behind you [backing him up] as not being up to the 
task; firefighters who complain about fires being too hot are regarded as poor 
firefighters.  
(Senior FBU representative).  [My insert]. 
 
Ashley underwrites the idea that firefighting becomes a personal challenge, an essential test of a good 
firefighter and I have separated what was a single answer from Ashley as a way to indicate how 
firefighters are taught to get in:     
 
Ashley (cont.):One of the first incidents I can remember going to was in a basement.  Two blokes 
were sent in with a jet.  Went in, got halfway down the stairs and thought ‘fuck me this 
is a bit hot’ come up .. told the guvnor ‘it’s too hot down there’ and basically [were] 
told ‘what the fuck are you talking about, you get back down there’.  And they did, and 
managed to come out still safe and alive.  And I think that was a powerful message to 
me, of how you’ll be regarded if you complain that things were too hot. 
[My insert]. 
 
Sometimes on-the-job-training can be hard and Ashley provides some more insight to how 
expectations pass on in the fire service (see Alf above).  It would have been safer to fill the basement 
up with water, but water-damage and good firefighting are not compatible.  Overcoming the heat is 
just one of the hazards firefighters face and it is possible that another, which further strengthens their 
resolve to get in, is knowing colleagues are ‘backing them up’ (watching).  The following comments 
are from a focus group, but after reading them alongside Ashley’s extract, it is necessary to question if 
firefighters’ reluctance to give in is purely because of their professional ethos:       
 
Chris: I put it out and I don’t want to drench it.  I am particularly pleased if I am on the 
branch and we put it out.  I am pleased and it ain’t awash with water.  If all there is a 
little bit of steam, that is where my professional pride comes out.  In the way that I 
don’t want to wash things away.  And put it out as quickly as possible and do as least 
damage and it ain’t knee deep in water.  
(Brigade two, firefighter, 4.5 years’ service) [My emphases].  
 
Bert: But when it comes to a call we know we are alright and we certainly wouldn’t put a jet 
through from the outside, we’ll leave that to the stations.  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 11.5 years’ service, age 35). 
 
                                                 
195 As the water turns to steam this requires what is termed as latent heat and the transfer of heat in this transformation is 
an additional factor in cooling the fire, what might be called an ‘unintended consequence’.   
196 This is my term, not firefighters’ and the reason I have chosen it will be explained later.  
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Cuthbert: Certain watches have got a reputation for that. 
(Brigade one, firefighter. 8 years’ service, age 30, in a focus group). 
 
Sinclair: Washing jobs away [laughter]. 
(Brigade one, leading firefighter, 21 years’ service, age 44). 
 
Bert: They are a joke though. 
 
This focus group gives an example of firefighters’ views on water-damage.  Good firefighters will 
only ‘wash away a building’ from the outside when the ‘job is lost’ (the fire has won).  Officers will 
normally make the decision to withdraw crews and fight the fire from outside, and at their post-
mortems after a fire, firefighters frequently criticise officers for making this decision too early (see 
Chapters 1 and 5).   
 
 
3.3.4. Sharing experiential knowledge 
Post-mortems are one way that firefighters share their reflexive thoughts after a fire (see Jo above).  
Whilst Jo gave me a clue, it was not until Rays’ explanation that follows, or more my interpretation of 
what he says, that the importance of post-mortems as a way of sharing experiential knowledge 
became clear:    
 
Ray: People tell stories, the old blokes tell you about the big jobs they have been to.  
Obviously, like round here ****
197
 is the one that is always on everybody’s mind, 
because it was this watch that were there.  I wouldn’t say that you so much learn stuff 
from the stories.   The more you learn from the stories is peoples opinions on how 
things worked.  People are well opinionated on like, things that went wrong at 
incidents and how things should have been done and by hindsight, you can say that 
about anything can’t you?   In any situation with hindsight you can say ‘we should 
have done it like this; should have gone in like that’.  I think that is more, the 
storytelling is more about, like that side of it.  Rather than learning from the stories of 
the past job, but learning we should have done it like this and in future, the next time 
we get a job like this, we will do it like that. 
(Brigade one, firefighter, four years’ service, age 24)  [My emphases].   
 
Ray indicates how firefighters reflect and critique their own and colleagues’ actions at a fire.  He is 
criticising the discussions that firefighters have based on hindsight and he may not entirely 
comprehend the process that is going on here.  When firefighters critique the way they fought a fire, 
firefighters will include in the discussion experiential knowledge they obtained from their experience 
of previous fires and post-mortems.  They may also include all the stories they hear from other 
sources
198
.  Hindsight and experiential knowledge might then influence the way the watch act next 
time they attend a similar incident.  Watches may also test their ideas at formal drills and lectures, 
which then become not just a training exercise, but also a rehearsal: a preparation for real 
emergencies.  From these reflexive practices and rehearsals, the watch will develop their shared 
understandings as part of their protocols for firefighting I spoke of earlier.  For all the time I spent as 
a firefighter I did not recognise just how simply chatting about our experiences would help my watch 
to prepare for fires.  Like Ray above, I did not recognise the importance of these discussions.  I even 
had to choose the words for these processes, “post-mortems,” and “protocols.”  These are not 
                                                 
197 When there has been a large fire it generally gets named after the location, for example ‘Kings Cross’.  The name of 
this large fire is removed to retain the anonymity of the respondent.   
198 Throughout this thesis it will be suggested that storytelling is an important way that knowledge about how to behave as 
a firefighter is passed on (see Thurston 1966; Plummer 1995 cited in Thurston 1966).   
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firefighters’ words; were they aware of such processes, then firefighters would undoubtedly have 
their own words for them. 
 
Watch-commanders will inevitably be part of developing watch protocols and this might 
improve the opportunity for the watch, to recognise their commander (who is normally supervisory at 
a fire — stays outside) as part of the team that extinguish the fire.  It can also provide an opportunity 
for watch-commanders to remain in touch (albeit verbally) with getting in.  They may then continue 
to ‘talk the walk’ and thereby maintain any respect they may have earned when they were firefighters.  
One further way a watch-commander can earn respect is to lead their crews personally at a large fire.  
However, these occasions are few (see Chapter 1; Appendix 10), but can be significant and 
remembered, because firefighters will often return to the stories about the (few) makeup fires they 
attend, or they have heard about during post-mortems.  Firefighters may even pretend they were 
present at fires they did not attend, especially if the incident was a major one (Kings Cross)
199
. 
 
An important site for sharing knowledge is the Fire Service College (FSC), where most officers 
attend residential succession training (see Chapter 5).  The concentration of so much experience under 
one roof is not wasted and knowledge spreads from/between: 
 instructors and students in formal lessons200;  
 instructor to instructor; 
 the research projects and dissertations completed during courses;  
 the library; 
 through student networks that occur on the residential courses, especially in the bars.   
 
Officers who attend FSC then take this knowledge back to their brigades and it passes up and down 
within that brigade.  Despite firefighters’ argument that they can only learn from other firefighters, it 
is clear that officers play a part in the way firefighters develop their protocols, and not only by acting 
as ‘messengers’ between firefighters in different brigades.   
 
I now feel confident that I can provide a possible answer to the ‘how’ part of firefighting by 
rewording the previous Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 1 now reads:  
 
Initial training teaches firefighters about the tools of their job, but once on a watch it is almost 
inevitable that probationers must turn to experienced firefighters to learn about firefighting: The 
Job.  They will be taught that the most effective way of putting out a fire is to get in as close to the 
fire as possible, as quickly as possible contingent with the danger involved and then turn the 
water on.  However, firefighters’ training never ends, is both on and off the job, involving a 
continual round of experiential learning as watches build trust within the group, share and 
develop their collective knowledge to agree protocols for getting in safely.  Watch officers are 
part of this process and act as a channel to share and discuss this knowledge up and down 
between their wider networks and the watch.  The transfer of knowledge may be such that each 
cohort of firefighters has access to ‘all’ the knowledge, past and present about ‘The Job’.   
 
However, Hypothesis 1 is not yet complete and it will be further developed at the end of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
199 During one interview with a woman at the Fire Service College it became clear to me that a story she was telling me 
about an officer she had met was untrue in that the fire he had boasted to her about had occurred before he joined the fire 
service. 
200 Each course will comprise of a number of officers (students for the duration of the course), who will come from 
different brigades.  This can also have an international perspective, as Moreton trains international students.     
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3.3. WHAT DOES ‘GETTING IN’ MEAN TO FIREFIGHTERS? 
Now I shall build on the data so far reviewed in an attempt to consider what firefighting is like by 
asking firefighters to explain, ‘what does ‘getting in mean to firefighters?’ and by forming Hypothesis 
2 from the answers they provide.        
 
3.3.1. Tell me about ‘The Job’ 
The public image of firefighting is of firefighters working in burning buildings in sometimes 
dangerous conditions, made even more dangerous because fire is unpredictable.  I asked Ken about 
his first experience of firefighting and he told me it was not like training: 
 
Ken: I thought now we did this in training and it’s not too bad, but then stuff started to fall 
on top of you: em, I dunnoo plaster and bits of wood and stuff from the ceiling.  It all 
started burning and dropping on top of us and I thought ‘Oh’.  And that was a bit nerve 
racking, because, yunnoo, when you’re training nothing falls on you at all and it’s just 
one fire.  … And he said like, ‘hold on to me’ and went through and it was not what I 
had expected.  I had been in houses and that [in training] but, they didn’t really have 
furniture in and they were empty with one fire.  And this one, every room was on fire 
and you were tripping over stuff and it was very tight with stuff dropping onto you.  
Once you got into it you just switched on to what you were doing.  But the first steps, 
as we were going in, I was a bit apprehensive.  But he was alright, he was just 
coaching me, saying ‘we are going to do this now, keep low’ and all that sort of stuff.  
[My emphasis and insert]. 
 
This was Ken’s first ‘real’ fire and it was not like training, “stuff started to fall on top of you … every 
room was on fire.”  Ken appears to be concerned for his own safety, but you can also identify his faith 
in the experienced firefighter he is ‘backing-up’, a position from where he will be taught The Job.  
But Ken did not run away, all firefighters must overcome their fear and Ken is passing this test.  
Alex’s reaction to getting in is similar, but she has more experience than Ken and yet she still has to 
‘prove’ she can take it:    
 
Alex: It was absolutely pitch black and you couldn’t see a thing. Couldn’t see my hand in 
front of my face and I was in there with this other guy .. fumbling about.  And yeah, I 
can feel it over here and I was giving it a squirt and suddenly the ceiling started 
coming down.  It was only the plaster board and for that split second I thought ‘shit, 
run’201 and then I thought of like, another part of me said, ‘no, no, don’t be stupid 
that’s not what you do’.  It was like for that split second, I sort of jumped into it and 
then gathered my senses and I remember saying ‘we will retreat a little bit, have a look 
round, take cover’ and then you know, went into procedures. 
(Female firefighter). 
 
Alex is describing a typical incident, (she is number 1 being backed-up by the rest of the crew): “pitch 
black … fumbling about … feel it … give it a squirt … ceiling started coming down … shit, run” and 
then something prevents her from running.  Alex’s experience, including I am sure all those 
discussions at the station, takes over’: “retreat a bit … went into procedures.”  Procedures are the 
words that Alex uses to describe what I call protocols: the understandings/skills that firefighters 
develop to compare the current incident with previous ones and to help them get the confidence not to 
run away.  On this occasion protocols suggest she, “retreat a little bit,” then Alex explains how she 
assesses the situation and when she considers it safe to do so she moves forward to extinguish the 
                                                 
201 The expression “shit” in this context, in common with other walks in life, probably relates to the possibility things are 
getting dangerous or going wrong.  Firefighters often use the term shit as shorthand for having diarrhoea, something they 
relate to fear.  For example they may say ‘I was shitting myself with fear’, which means they were scared.   
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fire
202.  Assessing the situation is clearly an important factor regarding safety and Jo’s extract gives 
an even more vivid description of what it is to get in:  
 
Jo: Leave my tally on machine .. em .. yeah .. or drop it on the floor outside the job
203
.  
Started up
204
.  The hosereel is hopefully there, if not I will grab the hosereel.  Assess 
before I go in, I will think: ‘that’s the bedroom; that’s at the front’ and you will know 
that the fire’s downstairs by the time you get to the front door.  You will know where 
the fire is, you just know.  So, and then you know how fierce it is.  Whether the stairs 
are going to be gone [burnt through or in an imminent state of collapse], if it’s just in 
the front room.  If the doors shut, just check the door [handle] and open the door and 
go in and put it out.  Assess everything as much as you can in the split second time that 
it .. you probably think, go back looking at the job, you had five minutes.  You had 
three seconds and you have taken in a zillion things.  And that's why when people say 
what do you do?  You've done a million things and you don’t realise you have done 
those million things. 
(Female firefighter).  [My emphases and inserts]. 
 
Jo starts her explanation by indicating she has replaced official BA procedure with a watch protocol 
(discussed in Chapter 5) and another protocol will ensure the hosereel will be ready at the front door.  
Jo’s description is noteworthy, because it is how a good firefighter may describe getting in.  By 
combining my experiential knowledge as an ex-firefighter and a researcher, I can identify similarities 
between Jo’s methodology for firefighting and the grounded theorist’s constant comparative analysis 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967: 28-30; Henwood and Pidgeon 1993: 22; see Chapter 2).  Jo would be 
sifting, coding and analysing incoming data: the fierceness and visibility of the fire; temperature, state 
and travel of the smoke; the construction, layout and condition of the building, “a zillion things”, 
against all the knowledge (data) she has gathered since joining the fire service.  Jo was sure to, “check 
the door” handle for heat before slowly opening it, foot held against the door ready to kick it shut 
again if the fire is too fierce; check the stairs and floors with her front foot warily, weight on her back 
foot in case they are ‘gone’.   
 
It is possible now to start to hypothesise how I might answer the question ‘what does ‘getting 
in’  mean to firefighters?’  Hypothesis 2:   
 
Firefighting involves firefighters getting into a building where they might be little or no visibility, 
in hot and dangerous conditions.  To do this safely firefighters will need to have confidence in 
their partner’s and their own abilities to keep a cool head, not panic and to follow watch 
protocols for firefighting as they compare what they are experiencing at the fire, against their 
prior knowledge, to hypothesis how to get safely into a position close enough to the fire to turn 
the water on.  If they do this successfully, they avoid ‘water-damage’.  
 
                                                 
202 The “procedures” Alex refers to is likely to be the way that firefighters’ act when in danger from falling masonry.  
They move closer to the wall or into a doorway, which is likely to be a safer part of the building should the ceiling 
collapse.  From that safer position they will then judge how to proceed, following the example perhaps best explained by 
Jo (below).     
203The “tally” is a safety device, which BO's require the BA wearer to leave outside the building with the BA control 
officer.  Jo has broken this procedure and followed what must be her watch protocol and dropped the tally in a prearranged 
place (see Chapter 5). 
204 “Started up” refers to turning on the air supply to the BA set, which she is wearing and will allow her to breathe in the 
toxic atmosphere she is entering.  There is an official method of starting up but I doubt that Jo follows this, she will save 
the two minutes this takes by carrying out her own safety check as she walks towards the fire.   
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3.4. WHY, GIVEN THE APPARENT DANGER INVOLVED, DO FIREFIGHTERS GET IN 
AT A FIRE?   
This section will develop a hypothesis to assist in understanding ‘why, given the apparent danger 
involved, do firefighters get in at a fire?  This will involve me first forming, then developing, 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
3.4.1. Persons reported 
There can be no more demanding situation in a firefighter’s career than to be at a fire where people 
are trapped.  The fire service has its own terminology for these calls and a radio message will pass 
from the fireground to control, “make pumps four, ‘persons reported’.”  The description of the fire at 
the start of this chapter is typical of a persons reported scenario and how firefighters’ protocols 
bought about a ‘successful’ rescue.  At these times, firefighters will make every effort to get in and 
even a safety conscious FBU (1996: 53-54) recognise this: 
 
Firefighters feel a moral obligation at certain incidents to act immediately where life is threatened 
and rescues are required. …  a snatch rescue.   
 
The ‘snatch rescue’ could involve firefighters taking less time assessing the danger involved; they 
might even be prepared to risk their lives for the public.  A focus group explains: 
 
Keith: Half a dozen of these type of jobs where I'm  thinking, ‘I’m going to have trouble 
getting out of here’.  And you actually found how good your partner is.  One thing 
what makes you carry on is what you joined The Job for.  The excitement of that as 
opposed to anything else: it’s saving that someone, it’s at the back of your mind, 
otherwise you wouldn't be here. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 15 years’ service, age 40) [My emphases]. 
 
Ian: I think you would feel like a god amongst your fellers actually, to be quite honest. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30) [My emphasis]. 
 
Keith: When I got back and had a good chat and you have been on a high for weeks 
afterwards, because we pulled one person out and done the business for them.  I would 
say that’s what you joined for, it’s just the excitement you can’t beat it. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Keith joined the fire service to save lives and that is why he gets in.  Ian has never saved anyone, but 
is in awe of doing so.  Another focus group adds to the debate: Guy is cautious not to glamorise the 
day to day firefighting, but like Keith he realises there is a dividend in life saving, which he might risk 
his life to achieve.  For Cliff it is a matter of pride, he could not give in: 
 
Guy: Someone going into a job just like what we do day to day is not a special person. But I 
would say for someone to go in and do that job knowing they might not come out alive 
would take a special person to do that and that’s where I see us as being special   1% 
of your career you might be special the other 99% you’re just a normal Joe Bloggs.  
But for that one moment, if you’re needed to do something, then that’s when you’re 
special. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 10 years’ service, age 37).  [My emphases]. 
 
Cliff: It’s got to be your pride.   It's going through your mind there is someone in there and I 
am not going out of this house until I get them out.  Whether they’re alive or dead I am 
in here to do a job.  I have got to do it.  I can’t walk out of that door down the bottom 
and say ‘sorry Guv I couldn't do it’.     
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(Brigade two, firefighter, five years’ service, age 27).  [My emphases]. 
 
These extracts support the view, common amongst, the public that a firefighter is a hero who will risk 
his life to save others.  This public esteem is a dividend for firefighters, available regardless of their 
individual motivation for getting in.  When the time comes to hypothesise about why firefighters get 
in I must consider that the motivational factors for individual firefighters may include: a moral 
obligation; the reason why they joined the fire service; a matter of pride; the dividend (reward) they 
get for doing so.   
 
3.4.2. Last resort 
The public’s only interest is not that firefighters will get in and save them, the public are also grateful 
to know that when it is ‘only’ their property that is alight, firefighters will also help them.  Few 
members of the public have any experience of uncontrolled fire, and they will commonly say to 
firefighters, “I couldn’t do your job.”  This statement suggests the public are scared of fire and it is 
not too partisan for me to suggest the public are right to be wary, because uncontrolled fire will 
destroy everything.  The public’s preconception is that only firefighters can stop a raging fire.  
Dominic explains: 
  
Dominic: I think that deep down you know that the firebrigade is the last resort.  There is no one 
else is going to come along and do it.  That’s why we are here.  Eh, if something has 
gone wrong, then people turn to us to try and rescue a situation.  Whether it be people, 
animals, property, whatever is at risk.     They turn to us to try and retrieve as much as 
possible from that situation.  We go in there knowing that we are the last one.  If we 
fail then the whole thing fails. 
(Brigade two, leading firefighter, 24 years’ service, age 45).  [My emphases]. 
 
Dominic knows if the fire service fails, “then the whole thing fails.”  Firefighters are the 
professionals, the people who do whilst others look on and who take pride in their ethos to always 
help the public the best way they can.  Bert has a view: 
 
Bert: We like to muck around and say we are from the old school and we don’t always do 
everything by the book and that.  But the one thing we do like to think is that we are 
very professional.  So OK, this station may be a real bitch, sometimes falling down and 
we may not be the best crew like we like to think.  But we like to think when it comes 
to a call, when we get there we are at least professional. 
(Brigade one, firefighter, 11.5 years’ service, age 35).  [My emphases]. 
 
Bert’s statement, “we don’t always do everything by the book … we are at least professional”, has 
hidden meaning.  In line with other professionals, he thinks he knows better than managers do (a 
trustee of the publics’ faith in him; see Hall 1968; Wright 1982; Lucio and MacKenzie 1999).  
Firefighters are people who get things done and he is more likely suggesting that his watch will break 
the rules to achieve their professional ethos (see Jo above)
205
.  Firefighters might also consider if they 
were to stand around and not get in quickly, if at all, they might also lose public support.   
 
At this stage, there may be some benefit in starting to form of categories that might help 
summarise the reasons firefighters provide for getting in.  This will be done as a way of developing 
some understanding of the possible motivations behind why firefighters want to get in and not to 
suggest that firefighters will always behave in accordance with a category or any combination of 
categories given similar circumstance at a different time (see Giddens 1987).  Hypothesis 3:  
                                                 
205Chapters 1 and 5 compare firefighters with professionals, such as doctors, in that firefighters believe they know better 
than their bosses how to serve the public.  As in the police (Reiner 1992: 107), firefighters appear to have their own ‘ways 
and means act’; out of view of their officers they decide how fires are to be fought. 
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Getting in to fight a fire thus may involve a number of motivations for firefighters, including: 
 
a. Humanitarian: at persons reported incidents firefighters might be prepared to go that bit 
further and risk their lives to save others. 
b. Professional Humanitarian: the fire service is a last resort, if the fire service gives up the 
situation is lost. 
c. Professional Pride: firefighting is a skill to be proud of and defended. 
d. Professional Cavalier: firefighters are professionals, who may not follow the rules when 
firefighting, but will get the job done to the best of their ability. 
 
3.4.3. Is there more to firefighting than helping the public? 
To develop Hypothesis 3, especially the possibility that there might be other motivations for why 
firefighters get into a fire apart from helping the public, it is important to ask one question.  In 
complex and dangerous situations why not, “shit, run” and then, “squirt” the water from the 
comparative safety outside?  Surely, this is not just about preventing water-damage!  When I 
questioned firefighters about this, the most common response was, “it’s my job” and this explanation 
fits with firefighters’ professional ethos.  In my search for an explanation, Jo confirms what Fred has 
said earlier, that if she does not get in quickly the fire will spread, and Alex gets an adrenaline rush 
from the challenge of getting in and she looks forward to firefighting:   
 
Jo: I have got to get in and put the bloody thing out as fast as possible.  Cos, this is getting 
too hot and if it is getting hotter, hotter and I have got to start putting water on 
something quickly.  Yunnoo, it’s no good thinking .. no there is no way you could turn 
round and come out.. not at that stage.  If you’re up there and you've got water, you 
have got to use it.  And if you know it is in bedroom you just, I mean you obviously, 
you go in.  If it’s getting hot you progress .. then you still go on and you still go on .. 
you just go in and you find the fire and you put it out. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Alex: What do I want to do?  I want to get it.  I want to cool it down.  That is what I want to 
do.  I want to find where the seat
206
 of fire is.  It’s a goal.  …  It’s good fun. It’s 
exciting.  You get that adrenaline rush.  You sort of see a flat and yes here we go.  We 
have got a goer
207
, excellent!  Let’s get stuck in there, let’s get dirty and whatever.  It’s 
good fun; I enjoy it.  You don’t want to wish it on anybody, but em, you sort of think I 
could just do with a job tonight.  Just a little one; that will do.  I just want to get stuck 
in there. 
[My emphases]. 
 
The theme here could easily interpret as only suggesting that firefighters push on to get to the fire, 
because until they put water on the fire it will continue to grow in size increasing the damage and the 
danger.  However, Jo and Alex
208
 might be indicating something more than they are just ‘doing their 
job’, it may be that beating the fire is a goal.  Alex actually suggests she looks forward to firefighting, 
although she does not wish people to suffer.  Alex’s view is typical and the paradox in firefighters’ 
general impatience to go to fires is interesting.  At fires people will be suffering a loss and fire, 
                                                 
206 The actual ‘heart’ of the fire; where it is fiercest and firefighters must be close to this area if they are to avoid water-
damage when they turn on their jet. 
207 Alex uses the term ‘goer’, which has two meanings for a male firefighter: first, it relates to a fire that is burning out of 
control and will be exciting to fight; second, in common with many males, at least, it relates to a woman who is sexually 
active/exciting in bed. 
208 Alex and Jo are from different Brigades. 
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because it is not entirely predictable, always presents a danger to firefighters.  The last two 
accounts belong to female firefighters, but male firefighters Alf and Ashley have already suggested 
similar motivations.  Colin is very clear, he will try and try again to beat the fire: 
 
Colin: We couldn't see the fire and it was getting hotter and hotter and we went out and we 
had used a cylinder by then
209
. We put another one on our backs and we went in again.  
This time with a jet, as a team of four. … got as far as the stairs.  Kept putting water 
up
210, couldn’t see the fire at all and it was just getting hotter and hotter.  And eh, we 
came out and I saw our guvnor and I said ‘we are going to have to go in above it and 
come down’.  I said, ‘it’s just too hot to go up’.  Somebody, pitched the ladder and we 
went in through a window, made our way through that room into a hallway, which was 
heavily smoked logged.  Again no fire, no glow and that was when the roof exploded 
and we got evacuated out.   
[My emphases]. 
 
Colin is determined to beat the fire, but he cannot get past the heat.  He even tries to gain access from 
a higher floor, but then, “the roof exploded.”  Colin’s explanation at times makes him appear almost 
foolhardy, as if he could not admit that the fire had beaten him, and his explanation is similar to Alf’s 
earlier.  Ted too describes a situation where he wanted to get in so much he gave up an opportunity to 
observe (in safety): 
 
Ted: I was a runner first of all for main control, collecting information for the officers and 
that and I said to him, ‘I have done it what shall I do’?  And he said, ‘if you leave that 
tabard on you can just sort of wander round and have a look and see what's going on’.  
And I said ‘I want to wear BA, I want to get in there’.  And he said ‘give us the tabard 
back then’.  So I dumped that and I found a spare set … and just queued up for BA to 
get inside. 
(Brigade one, firefighter, 1.25 years’ service, age 23)  [My emphases]. 
 
Colin has put himself ‘in danger’ by getting in three times, Ted queues up to get in and Alex looks 
forward to fires.  Firefighters have shown throughout my research that they prefer to serve on busy 
stations, they are achievers who want to fight fires and they even look forward to them.  One 
interpretation of why this might be would be to hypothesise that Ted, Colin and many firefighters 
could be looking for danger at fires where the only lives that are risk are their own because they enjoy 
the adrenaline the body provides when they are in danger
211
.  As a result of the data above, I add a 
further category (e) to Hypothesis 3: 
 
e. Professional Adventurer: there may be more to firefighting than just instrumental reasons of 
pay and professional satisfaction, it could also be a way of raising adrenaline levels, almost a 
dangerous sport. 
 
3.4.4. Is there a link between ‘persons reported’ and other fires?  
                                                 
209 “Used a cylinder” means that they have used up the air in their BA set and have to go out and replace the cylinder. 
210 If a fire is very hot and firefighters cannot get near enough to it to reach it with their water, they will sometimes create a  
‘water curtain’ by turning the nozzle control onto the spray mode, this forms a barrier between the heat and the crew.  The 
use of the water curtain might be judged in any post-mortem as ‘soft’ and causing unnecessary water-damage or it might 
be judged as the right act.  Colin might also have been spraying water indiscriminately in the hope of hitting the fire; I 
have no way of making a judgement on this.           
211 The body ‘naturally’ produces adrenaline to provide the energy to help deal with a crisis.  Adrenaline might also 
provide a thrill as in say a ‘dangerous’ sport, a ‘dangerous’ ride at a theme park or (promiscuous/risky) sexual activity. 
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Two extracts follow to develop Hypothesis 3.  Ray innocently admits that helping the public may 
be secondary/additional to his own pleasure, but first Terri makes a statement that could lead to a 
considerable possibility, the suggestion that someone might be in the fire is an excuse for getting in: 
 
Terri: You know there is .. someone might be in there.  
 
Terri says, “You know there is” then pauses and corrects herself, “someone might be in there.”  
Terri’s hesitation and correction probably occurred because she recognised that I as an ex-firefighter 
might challenge what she was saying.  Terri was probably going to say ‘someone was in there’ as her 
reason for getting in.  But she would expect me to know this is an excuse firefighters use for getting 
in.  Ray provides a similar suggestion:   
 
Ray: You get the initial adrenaline rush and you find out it’s a job and you’re BA.  To go in 
there you get a further surge of adrenaline.  Yunnoo you want to get in there and do it.  
And then also at the back of your mind you are thinking ‘that is what you’re there for’ 
as well.  I mean there could be someone in there and your actions could save their life.   
[My emphases]. 
 
When Ray says, “that is what you are there for as well” is he innocently hinting that helping the 
public may almost be secondary?  His use of the word, “adrenaline” twice may indicate that seeking 
the adrenaline rush from the risk/excitement of firefighting may be as much a reason for getting in as 
“there could be somebody in there.”   
 
3.4.5. Experiential knowledge provides a possible explanation 
Firefighters are not the only public servants who enjoy risk.  The police also enjoy the action side of 
their job (Graef 1989; Reiner 1992).  Interestingly the police do not get the overwhelming public 
support that firefighters get when they go into action.  Despite arguing that they are doing their job to 
help the public, many police actions are subject to adverse public scrutiny (Scarman 1981; Jefferson 
1990; Northern 1995; Campbell 1999; Macpherson 1999).  On the other hand, the public almost 
universally see firefighters’ help as positive, particularly when they rescue people (or fight large 
fires).  Nationally firefighters rescue around 10 people a day from fires, but when this statistic is 
viewed locally, it equates to very few firefighters actually rescuing someone.  I suggest that the public 
do not base their support for firefighters on statistics, but on their understandings that firefighters are 
prepared to rescue them, which in turn is provided by those firefighters who have performed heroic 
acts.  Experiential knowledge provides some very important information as to how firefighters might 
be involved in helping the public to come to such a conclusion.  I argue this because at most fires, 
firefighters know if anyone is trapped in the building before getting in.  Yet they explain, first and 
foremost, that they get in, ‘because someone might be trapped’.  Terri and Ray make a similar 
argument and I suggest that this could be a way of manipulating a situation to increase firefighters’ 
public-status: to make it look as if all firefighters are heroic rescuers
212
.  In effect, this not only has the 
advantage of allowing all firefighters to appear as heroes, it also allows firefighters to ‘ignore’ safety 
procedures (see Chapter 5), just get on with their job and receive an adrenaline buzz.  If this is so, 
could there be more to firefighting than just instrumental reasons of pay and professional satisfaction?  
Now it is time to reflect on hypotheses 1 and 2, and question whether firefighters might use their 
actions at a fire to test their protocols and as a test of themselves against their standards of a good 
firefighter: a test that might appear reckless if it was not obscured by firefighters acting as if someone 
was trapped when they got in
213
.   
                                                 
212 This is of course similar to the way that patriarchal dividends are available to all males regardless of if they act in the 
way that provides the dividend (see Connell 1995).  
213 It may be that firefighters learn to do this from other firefighters: to obscure other purposes firefighters may have for 
getting in: a form of dramaturgical loyalty (Goffman 1956) to an image built up by generations of firefighters: an invisible 
understanding (outside of firefighters groups) that pro-feminist auto-critique aims to make visible.   
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 3.4.6. Testing yourself and others/each other   
Seidler (1997) argues that most males do not take their masculinity for granted, but constantly need to 
‘prove’ to themselves and to others that they can achieve dominant masculine standards.  Leaving 
aside at this stage the fact that some firefighters are female, it is possible that getting in might be seen 
by firefighters as a test of what might be their masculine standard: the ability to be a good firefighter 
— someone who can get in, beat the heat, smoke and danger and then put the fire out without causing 
water-damage.  I asked Jo and Ken directly if they were testing themselves.  Ken is not at all reticent 
and suggests that he is.  Ken wants to beat the fire:    
 
Ken: Yeah in a way, because every fire is different and you just want to overcome it and 
that.  But it is just really exciting and  yunnoo hardly, everyone is outside watching and 
you’re the ones who are inside doing it all.  And the public and that see you go in and 
yunnoo. I don’t know whether it is just, I don’t know what the word I am looking for, 
makes me feel good that everyone is watching in a way.  
[My emphases} 
 
Ken is not only testing himself against the fire he recognises that “everyone is outside watching.”  Jo 
is at first reluctant to accept she tests herself when she is firefighting, but then she is not sure: 
 
Jo:  I can’t say I was testing myself.  I suppose you always want to see if you can do it: can 
I take this heat; can I go a bit further; am I going to put this out or am I going to have 
to go and get.  I don’t think I have ever thought I am going to have to get out of here, I 
am going to have to go and get somebody else.  I have never thought that, but not 
because I am testing myself, but then I don't know.  If I have something in mind I need 
to do it.  If it’s running round the block I think I have got to get to that lamppost.  I 
have got to get to it, you can stop when you get to the lamppost and it’s fine it’s 
alright.  And in your head you’re telling yourself it’s OK to stop at, but who knows 
you’re telling yourself it’s OK to stop at that lamppost.  You, nobody can hear you 
saying, ‘you’re great if you stop at that lamppost’.  You think within yourself ‘you’re 
great’, but nobody else would think, ‘wow she just stopped at that lamppost, she is 
really great’.  It’s, I don't know if it’s a test. 
[My emphases]. 
 
“See if you can do it … take this heat … go a bit further” are all statements that sound as if Jo is 
challenging herself whilst firefighting, in much the same way as she challenges herself to, “get to that 
lamppost.”  This piece of data becomes more important with Jo’s recognition that there is no public 
acclaim from getting to the lamppost.  But, when Jo is firefighting she has two audiences, the public 
and her peers.  Roger as a probationer makes it very clear, he wants to go to fires so he can ‘prove’ to 
the watch that he can do The Job:    
 
Roger: You want to go out
214
 and do stuff and ‘prove’ yourself and that.  Especially when you 
first come onto the watch. … ‘prove’, you know, you get a reputation and that 
everyone says.  They probe you and that .. and you want to show you can fit in and be 
part of the team and not be some sort of twat
215
 that has .. just can’t do nothing. 
(Brigade one, probationer, 1 year’s service, age 23).  [My emphasis]. 
 
                                                 
214 ‘Go out’ is an expression for when firefighters get called to a fire, also known as ‘a shout’, ‘ a call’, ‘when the bells go 
down’, ‘a job’. 
215 The use of the word “twat” is similar to the word ‘cunt’, an insult based on feminine anatomy (see Hearn and Parkin 
1987, 1995; Dixon 1994; Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 1996).  I am reminded of a term that I heard front-line troops use 
about their officers and their ‘colleagues’ who do not actually come up to their standards: REMF, this stands for ‘rear 
echelon mother fuckers’.    
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Doing The Job well is the fundamental test for being seen as a good firefighter: to be able to walk 
the talk in the their own eyes, their peers and the public.  Identifying that they are looking for public 
recognition is not something that firefighters regularly acknowledge, but Alex is not in anyway 
reluctant to do this:  
 
Alex: It’s a good feeling that people sort of like, people sort of like,  ‘yeah it’s the 
firebrigade’.  Women coming up [laughter], coming up to you and giving everybody a 
kiss or trying to and seeing me and [laughter] ‘alright then’.  Kids love it, everybody 
just, I don’t think I have ever met anybody who dislikes firefighters.  Unless they have 
been out with one that is [lots of laughter as I understood Alex’s meaning that 
firefighters often exploit their imagery to gain sexual ‘favours’ from females216]. 
[My inserts]. 
 
Two possible further motivations are emerging to add to Hypothesis 3.  One is that firefighters may 
be treating the opportunity to get in as a test, through which they can ‘prove’ to a wide-ranging 
audience that they are good firefighters:   
f. Testing: firefighters may be proving to the public, other firefighters and themselves that 
they ‘fit in’ with the image of a ‘good firefighter’ when they are getting in (a Foucaultian 
gaze). 
The second possible motivation is that firefighters enjoy the publics’ image of firefighting and getting 
in maintains that status: 
g. status building: getting in may add to the publics’ image of firefighting. 
The last three additions to Hypothesis 3 might suggest firefighters take unnecessary risks when they 
get in: a possibility now investigated. 
 
3.5. RISK TAKING 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) are the lead agency on industrial safety and HSE (1984) 
acknowledges that firefighters would take risks to do their job.  However, the HSE view has changed 
to a point where Improvement Notices place a legal requirement on brigades to improve safety 
procedures following accidents to firefighters (see Klein 1999: 13).  In consequence, safety has 
become an important issue in the fire service, perhaps not so much because of the risk to firefighters, 
but to avoid Improvement Notices.  The fire service has responded to the HSE (Robinson 1998) by 
issuing new rules and training officers/firefighters in Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA): a formal 
protocol that requires firefighters to carryout a risk assessment before getting in.  Chapter 5 describes 
how this area is a site for resistance by firefighters who might see DRA as deskilling, but this chapter 
will now consider whether getting in involves risk taking.  Two issues will emerge: first, how 
firefighters’ skills might actually balance their actions on the safe side of recklessness; and second, 
the extent to which this balance might allow firefighters to increase the public perception that their job 
is dangerous. 
 
3.5.1. Is getting in reckless? 
This section will now ask if firefighters might be reckless when they get in, and/or are their actions a 
very skilful way of living up to an image?  The safety conscious FBU (Mathews
217
 1999: 13) are 
clear:  
 
I think that is indicative of exactly where the Service is.  It surrounds itself in the male macho 
image of firefighters who can do anything.  That we are all-singing, all-dancing SAS people, and 
that accidents and burns and injuries are par for the course.  But they are not. 
                                                 
216 Baigent (1996) indicates that firefighters often use females as pit-stops for their sexual egos (see Chapter 5). 
217 Dave Mathews was then the FBU National Officer with responsibility for Health and Safety. 
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A statement made by a principal officer with whom I was discussing risk supports the FBU 
suggestion that firefighters might not be thinking of their own safety when they get in: 
 
Hamilton: They have bugles playing in the heads as they charge in. 
(Principal officer). 
 
In some ways the question of why firefighters get in is not unique and has been asked before, for 
example Delson (1996: 2) asks: 
 
Are they adrenaline junkies ... or do they embody more wholesome traits, like fortitude, 
selflessness and commitment? ... Firefighters don't talk about bravery much ... After all they say, 
we are just doing our jobs. 
 
This quote is from an ethnographic account of interviews with over 100 American firefighters.  
However, the book provides the image I have spoken of earlier, that of the ‘reluctant’ heroic 
firefighter: a difficult image to challenge, because the public appear intent on seeing firefighters as 
public heroes and firefighters may not want to abandon that image.  The following two quotes 
concerning risk taking are from Fire (letters pages) in consecutive months.   The first is from a senior 
officer (Jones 1997: 20) who was critiquing getting in: 
 
The adrenaline, esprit de corps takes over to the extent of throwing caution to the wind.  
 
The following month an operational Sub O. (Hodgens 1997: 11) replies:  
 
The attraction of a Fire Service career for me – and I assume most of my colleagues – was the 
element of danger and risk involved.  This does not mean I am suicidal, but that I take pride in 
doing a job that most people would never consider. 
 
The view of Jones is very much on the lips of the FBU, HSE and officers (see Chapter 5), but 
Hodgens better represents what firefighters have told me.    
  
3.5.2. Heroes, risk takers or adrenaline junkies? 
Within my data I have some evidence that firefighters might be taking risks.  Colin above may be one 
of these.  Colin also told me about some over enthusiastic ‘youngsters’:  
 
Colin: They are just rushing all the time.  
(Brigade four, firefighter, six years’ service, age 25). 
 
DB: What are they trying to do? 
 
Colin: I think they want to be as good as the people in front of them. … They see role models 
that they have moulded themselves on in our watch and they want to be like them, so 
much they are forgetting the small things that have made these people the good 
firefighters that they are. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Colin is standing back from a situation more maturely than the younger firefighters whose actions he 
describes.  It is possible that these firefighters are trying to imitate the older firefighters, but as yet 
have not been given all the information they need to see beyond the ‘big picture’.   
 
3.5.3. An ‘older hand’ on the tiller 
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It may be that younger firefighters might behave recklessly (as the FBU, Officers and Colin 
suggest) in the belief that their bravado will identify them as good firefighters, but older firefighters, 
whose attention they are seeking are unlikely to praise those who act impetuously and fail to assess a 
situation.  One way that these youngsters might learn to slow down is through storytelling/post-
mortems, where experienced firefighters often refer to firefighters who rush around as  ‘panickers,’ 
‘off head on cabbage’; or ‘headless chickens’.  Once applied these labels will be difficult to remove 
and hearing stories of such labelling, might alone be enough to caution the impetuous probationer (see 
Chapters 4 and 5).  Duke describes how he approaches a fire: 
 
Duke: I am more conscious now of my safety, the people around me, and perhaps that comes 
with the experience.  Spending that extra second, if you like, thinking what I am going 
to do.  And also now, at the age of 51 coming 52, so many of the younger .. It’s like I 
am dealing with another generation .. but the times I do go in with somebody that is 
younger than my own children, if you like.  That eh, at most incidents, I am thinking, 
‘now hold on’.  Safety is uppermost in my mind, with regard to my own well being and 
who I might be in there with.   
(Brigade one, firefighter, 25 years’ service, age 51)  [My emphasis]. 
 
Age and experience appear to temper how fast firefighters approach an incident.  However, delay is 
not as most people would imagine it; firefighters do not have the luxury of time, beyond the “extra 
second”, to stop outside a fire and evaluate a series of plans.  All the time they were planning the fire 
would be spreading, so they use their skills/experience to adapt watch protocols to the current 
situation as they get in (see Chapter 1, 5 and 6).  Alf describes a typical scenario:  
 
Alf: We are going to get two guys off the back of the fire engine wearing sets ready to go 
… so we drag a reel off and we get them to the front door, get them in the place. … 
While this is all going on it takes a few seconds .. there is always more than one 
officer, that’s when the situation is assessed.  You gain knowledge from neighbours, 
from people outside and you can’t always take notice of everybody.  Basically 
speaking, yeah, you have got to get into action straight away, but while all this is going 
on, it’s simultaneous. … but you could halt it as fast. … You get two blokes up the 
staircase and you then find something out and you have got to get them out quickly. … 
The whole time you are firefighting, or you are in situations that are potentially 
hazardous, it is nice to know that the guy outside is looking after my arse.  If anything 
is going to go wrong and he is going to get me out of here because once you’re in, you 
don't know the worst of it. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Both Duke and Alf refer to the extra seconds a skilled firefighter puts into thinking about safety.  It is 
easy to see the how Alf’s watch have developed protocols to gain extra time.  These include: rigging 
in BA on route to the fire; getting the hosereel off immediately on arrival; assessing the situation on 
the move.  Alf’s use of the word “officers” is ubiquitous, ‘everyone’ outside would be watching out 
for those inside.  As well as watching out for each other, they are also ‘watching’ in a more 
Foucaultian sense to provide information for the post-mortem.  Firefighters will be conscious of this 
gaze and might expect their watch to sanction them if they do not follow their protocols.    
 
In a focus group, Pete indicates how firefighters make decisions based on the incoming 
evidence, rather than actually, “throwing caution to the wind” (Jones 1997). 
 
Pete: You have gone into a building and you have suddenly thought, ‘hang about, I don’t 
really want to be here’.  And you sort of hold fire a bit.  And you’re in the doorway 
and you shouldn’t, there is no purpose in .. tiles on the floor and that is saying to you, 
‘you shouldn’t be there’ init? … but if somebody is reported you still have a little go.  
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There comes a point you have got to know your limits.  Cos, you could cause 
problems with other people. 
[My emphases]. 
 
There are judgements going on here.  Pete’s constant comparative analysis suggests caution, “tiles on 
the floor” could be a sign that the roof may be in danger of collapsing.  Pete makes his own decision, 
he will go just so far.  There is a fire service expression ‘one hand for The Job, the other for 
yourself’218.  Simply translated this suggests firefighters should always look to their own personal 
safety whilst they are firefighting
219.  This will not prevent Pete from having, “a little go” to rescue 
someone, but Pete has a responsibility to the, “other people”, who are backing him up.  Experiential 
knowledge suggests trust goes two ways: Pete, like Alf, trusts his colleagues (both with him in the fire 
and outside) will try to rescue him in an emergency, but he also recognises he should not abuse that 
trust by risk taking for no real purpose.  As in the case of the probationers above, such understandings 
make it more likely that elder firefighters will rein in the recklessness of youth, because if 
probationers get into trouble then it is the elder firefighters outside who will not have the option of 
judging a risk, but be expected to take ‘real’ risks to their own lives to rescue them.  Proving you can 
‘fit in’ by getting in not only requires bravado, but also consideration for your colleagues and 
yourself. 
 
Away from the focus group, I asked Pete about the ‘new’ idea of dynamic risk assessment that I 
learnt about at FSC (see Chapter 5).  His answer is almost a denial that he knows about it, but what 
Pete does not recognise is that his earlier account indicates he (unconsciously) routinely practices 
such behaviour.    
 
Pete: I haven't actually been trained that way.  I am so used to getting in there and getting 
involved and you quite enjoy getting in there.  It’s in your mind you have got to put 
that fire out.  Em whether it’s persons reported or not doesn’t always matter.  You 
seem to be programmed to put that fire out and then sometimes you think what am I 
doing it’s a bit dodgy here. I shouldn’t be in this situation and you seem to know that, 
sense that and you come back a bit.         
[My emphases]. 
 
Pete is a good firefighter, he wants to get in, regardless of whether the fire is ‘persons reported’ or not 
and this relates back to my earlier argument.  He may not formally acknowledge dynamic risk 
assessment and he may believe he is, “programmed,” but he knows when to stop.  It is his decision to 
step back, as Alf and Alex did (noted earlier) and these are learnt decisions ones that make for good 
firefighters.  Getting in may pay dividends, but Duke, Alf and Pete will use their experience and 
position in the informal hierarchy to temper the inexperience of youth: they will not award the label of 
a good firefighter to those who risk their lives unnecessarily.  It is possible to suggest that rather than 
‘throwing caution to the wind’ as Jones (1997) suggests, firefighters are involved in complicated and 
skilful acts when they get in at a fire.  Firefighters may be far from reckless and as the list of 
motivations develops it may be possible to suggest that the adrenaline rush firefighters appear to seek, 
may not be so much a suicidal challenge, but rather a carefully planned adventure.  It may even be 
that firefighters have found a way of complying with their professional ethos and at the same time 
testing themselves against their masculine standards: a consideration that may involve some addition 
to the end of Hypothesis 2 concerning the why of firefighting and this will be considered in the 
conclusion. 
 
                                                 
218 According to Lloyd-Elliott (1992) the expression stems from the need to hang on to the fire appliance in earlier times 
when firefighters sat on the outside of an open appliance and rigged on route to the fire, using one hand to and the other to 
get dressed.    
219 As the firefighters at the start did by “making safe the stairs.” 
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3.6. NOT ‘FITTING IN’ 
There was one interesting example of a firefighter who may not ‘fit in’.  His evidence is almost a 
corroboration of much of my argument that firefighters might encourage their public image:   
 
Bob: No I don’t, not so far as sort of a macho sort of buzz.  I get a sort of buzz as far as ‘oh 
good it breaking the monotony, oh good we can go out, I wonder what we are going to 
have’.  I don’t get what I call a huge sort of adrenaline, if you like.  Maybe I did sort of 
at first sort of month, but now I think, and I don’t know whether or not that is to do 
with the fact that all the jobs that we have been on, none of them really. I have never 
sort of got to a job that’s been yunnoo, a job. 
(Brigade one, firefighter, 1.25 years’ service) [My emphases]. 
 
Bob’s words are suggesting some resistance to the norm.  I make this argument particularly because, 
contrary to his argument here, Bob had been to a large fire.  In another part of the interview he 
explains how, unlike Ted, he did not queue up to get in.  He chose instead to help the pump operator.  
Is Bob ‘different’ to other firefighters? 
 
Bob: I enjoy coming to work; I enjoy the shifts; I love working nights; I like the way we 
work. … When I sort of started, I thought that it’s macho and what not … the only 
experiences I can go on from the time I have been on station, none of it has been 
particularly brave and macho.  Em so I don’t, I have never felt as I am some big brave 
macho type. 
[My emphases] 
 
Bob is uncompromisingly critical of firefighters image with the public. 
 
Bob, cont.: I sort of laugh at it with my girl friend now, yunnoo.  She sort of says, she, she, I mean 
her work colleagues and that, when they all sort of say, ‘ah come on, you’re a fireman, 
you’re a fireman’.  She just looks at them and thinks, ‘what are you like’, because she 
knows obviously what the majority of this job entails.  And she looks and thinks, and I 
think, ‘if they only knew what the majority of it was like’.  Yeah I am not about to say 
there aren’t some firemen that haven't done some incredibly brave things, but I 
haven’t. … On nights, my other half compares me just to going round my mate’s 
house.  And eh sitting down and having a meal and watching telly and having a laugh.  
Probably from what I say to her that is the impression she gets.  Em, and, em, that is 
probably the impression I give her.  Even when friends ask, I find myself, sort of, 
playing it down and I think to myself, ‘why do I say that, we are all going to be found 
out’.  And I think, I dunnoo if there is this big fear that firemen are afraid of being 
found out, because if this is the job, what I am doing?  Yunnoo, a lot of the time doing 
nothing.  Em, then the big myths, I still think that there is still that myth out there that 
people, especially women, how they regard firemen if you like.  Now I am 
experiencing it, it aint true.  I know I used, em, to sort of yunnoo, when I saw a fire 
engine go past and it was at the stage when I was applying, I sort of thought, ‘Oh my 
God,  I couldn’t’.  Yunnoo, ‘they must be brave, big and strong’. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Has Bob ‘spilt the beans’?  In many ways what Bob has said challenges some of the predominant 
images given by most firefighters: “none of it has been particularly brave and macho … if they only 
knew what the majority of it was like … watching telly and having a laugh …  being found out … myth 
out there, especially women.”  Bob’s extract supports the view that firefighters support, if not 
provide, much of the image that the public have of them.  Bob may lack dramaturgical loyalty (that 
males/firefighters keep secrets; see Chapters 4-6).  However, Bob did give the impression that one 
reason for him joining the fire service was to ‘prove’ himself, “I sort of thought, ‘Oh my God, I 
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couldn’t’.  Yunnoo, ‘they must be brave big and strong’.”  Bob might have ‘proved’ himself right 
and failed when he tested himself against the standard of a good firefighter.  That might explain why 
he helps the pump operator rather than behaving like Ted and queuing up to get in.  Bob has not left 
the fire service, but he may be destined for ‘better things’.  Having already passed his first promotion 
examination, Bob may choose to leave the firestation and become an officer (see Chapters 4 and 5).  It 
is possible that Bob may not actually have ‘the backbone’ for firefighting, something firefighters do 
not like in their colleagues
220
.  Dominic explains: 
 
Dominic: There was a fellow on this watch a few years’ ago, everybody thought he was a big 
tough guy.   He had been in the military police.   He left this job and went into the 
police in London to join a special unit to go out and beat up people who have a punch 
up.  He was just a bully, but he had two BA jobs in the time he was on the watch and 
he ran out of both of them.  This was the big tough guy who could do anything. 
(in a focus group) [My emphases]. 
 
DB: What did the watch do about that? 
 
Dominic: He was .. mentioned to him that it was not the right thing to do.  
 
Experiential knowledge suggests that at this stage Dominic decided not to fully explain what would 
have happened.  “Mentioned it was not a good thing to do”, probably could convert to mean 
something stronger.  The, “tough guy” (Ricky) eventually resigned, but what happened to him in the 
meantime?  Guy indicates he was marginalised. 
 
Guy: He sat in the middle for the rest of his career.  
 
It is important to relay some more experiential knowledge.  At the start of each shift there is a roll call 
and two BA ‘wearers’ are nominated for each appliance as the firefighters who get in.  The third 
firefighter sits in the middle, is last off the appliance and will carry out the support duties outside the 
job: provide the water; run out the hose; be the BA control officer; help the pump operator.  They are 
unlikely to get in and most firefighters ‘jockey’ not to be in the middle. 
 
The same focus group provided some more information about how important it is to firefighters 
to be able to trust their colleagues.  To reinforce their beliefs firefighters will often use ‘fire service 
humour’, which can be debilitating for those on the receiving end (see Chapter 4).  However, relaying 
scenarios to new recruits is another way, and this focus group ‘invented’ a scenario to explain their 
understandings to me of how they might react if a crew member gives up too early and causes the BA 
crew, who must stay together (see Chapters 1 and 5), to leave the fire:   
 
Thomas: You would have to go with them, but you would feel rough about it.  When you come 
out you would certainly have a go at them, confront them with it.  In the extreme you 
would confront them in front of an officer.    Whether they're a mate or not.    
(Brigade two, firefighter, 2.5 years’ service, age 25, in a focus group).  [My 
emphasis]. 
 
Thomas supports an earlier view by Jo, and Alex that fear must be contained.  Fear spreading to panic 
is dangerous, because it can result in firefighters: 
 running away, endangering themselves and the colleague/s they leave in the building; 
                                                 
220 Firefighters do not take kindly to colleagues who run away because they cannot overcome their fear (see Howell 1996).  
One of firefighters’ prime rules is that firefighters never get in alone, they must always be in at least pairs and they must 
stay together.  If circumstances are such that one of them thinks that they should withdraw from the fire, then the 
understanding is that they should both withdraw.  However, withdrawing from a fire will have to be explained to the 
watch and the pressure to get in and stay in is considerable.  As with Alf (above) firefighters consider it to be a potentially 
‘humiliating’ experience if they withdraw.          
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 panicking and forgetting the protocols (“off head on cabbage … headless chicken” above); 
 not being prepared to get in to rescue a trapped colleague. 
 
However, if a colleague gives in to their fear, they may also:  
 betray firefighters’ professional ethos; 
 damage the way the public view them;  
 spoil firefighters’ ‘adventure’ when they get in.   
 
The evidence here suggests that firefighters look forward to fires for several reasons.  Apart from 
providing them with the opportunity to fulfil their professional ethos, a fire may also provide 
firefighters with the opportunity to test/increase their status, on the watch, in their community and 
personally.  However, the analysis that follows will indicate that the explanation may be far more 
complex than suggested here already.  It will also prepare the ground for the next chapter and for the 
final chapter, which will develop the analysis even further.    
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
From the way firefighters talk, their overwhelming motivation for getting in is 
humanitarian/professional and this is taken into account in Hypotheses 1 and 2, and in the early 
development of Hypothesis 3.  However, as the chapter unfolds there is an increasing suggestion that 
some firefighters are promoting personal agendas when they get in and this possibility helps in 
developing the latter categories of Hypothesis 3.  Some motivations, are for personal gratification, 
almost a dividend individual firefighters get from firefighting such as adrenaline seeking.  It is 
possible to see adrenaline-seeking from two perspectives.  Firstly, it can be an immediate gratification 
for getting in.  However, the dividend of adrenaline might also encourage firefighters to retain their 
enthusiasm to do a difficult and dangerous job for up to 30 years.  The same view may apply to the 
dividend firefighters may get when they successfully test themselves against the standards of a good 
firefighter; this also provides a motivation to continue to do a job that many rational people would not 
want to do, even once.  The possibility that firefighters are testing themselves may involve some 
adjustment to the suggestion, in Hypothesis 1, that firefighters are only testing their protocols for 
firefighting when they get in, and a slight adjustment to the ending of Hypothesis 2.     
 
Viewing firefighters’ motivations as entirely personal does not account for the possibility that 
firefighters must work with and gain the acceptance of, the watch, and proving to yourself that you 
are a good firefighter, may ‘prove’ it to the watch (and the public) as well.  In particular, the informal 
hierarchy on the watch will expect good firefighters to comply with protocols, overcome fear when 
confronted with danger and not endanger colleagues.  It may be that all firefighters’ personal agendas 
are drawn and develop from factors, which they choose for themselves for their own purpose from 
those the watch provide.  This has led to firefighters being able to share, plan and fill a vacuum left by 
officers (who no longer lead firefighters at fires; see Chapter 1).  Firefighters’ preplanning is an ideal 
way to incorporate new firefighters and preserve group safety.  This may involve firefighters giving 
up some free-will to the group; however, this thesis will show that many firefighters join the fire 
service with very clear understandings that they need to fit in with informal hierarchies because they 
expect dividends for doing so (but perhaps do not realise how much fitting in they will do; see 
Chapters 3-6).   
 
3.7.1. Homosociality 
This thesis will shortly provide evidence to suggest that firefighters’ informal hierarchy also replicates 
dominant masculine standards and patriarchal practices not entirely connected to firefighting.  It may 
even be that recruits acceptance of these standards/practices might be a requirement before 
experienced firefighters are happy to share their firefighting skills with them.  It must also be 
remembered that the fire service is an institutionally sexist organisation that prefers to exclude women 
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and will harass other groups they consider unsuitable to be firefighters: either to exclude them, or 
force them to behave in an appropriate manner (see Baigent 1996).  Lipman-Blumen (1976, see also 
Cockburn 1991b: 189) would have little difficulty identifying these processes as homosocial, since 
they involve men passing on their social and physical resources to chosen men and in denying them to 
‘others’.   
 
However, both Cockburn (1991b) and Lipman-Blumen (1976) see the possibility of this 
behaviour tipping over into homoerotic desire.  Roper (1996) makes a very similar argument and is 
more persuasive about the possible homosexual implications in this behaviour, but I have my 
reservations as to if the desire male firefighters have for working together is in fact an erotic one
221
.  
With this exception I wish to develop the views of both Lipman-Blumen (1976) and Cockburn 
(1991b) and use the working example of Cockburn (1991a): an account that describes how men 
compositors actually exclude women and men who did not conform to their standards.  These three 
texts provide some basis to suggest that many of the skills
222
, which pass within a chosen/sponsored 
group of men, are not ‘just’ work skills, but skills men learn to support their hegemony (see Lorber 
1994: 231; Kanter 1977: 181-6 above; see Chapters 4-6).  Firefighters can behave like printers and 
other workers who may prefer the “orderly reproduction between generations [of men], where 
experiential learning is valued as a way of coming to know technique and values” (Strangleman and 
Roberts 1999: 63).  But this might not just occur to keep power amongst the patriarchy.  Firefighters 
might also prefer to pass on their skills to other men, because firefighters believe commonsense 
beliefs that only men can be masculine (see Connell 1995; HMCIFS, 1998; Chapter 1).  If this is so 
then firefighters may also believe that only men can achieve the standards, which form part of the 
trust implicit in firefighters’ skills.  In particular, because lives are at stake when firefighters enter a 
burning building, they want to know their colleagues will not run away and leave them when 
confronted with danger.  Therefore, being a firefighter and staying safe is not simply a matter of 
learning physical skills.  It is equally a matter of ensuring that you can trust your colleagues and to 
‘prove’ to them that they can trust you.  The tests that Seidler (1997) suggests men constantly seek to 
pass to achieve and what I see as the “false monolith of what men are supposed to be” (Hearn 1996: 
211) may have a very real meaning to firefighters whose life might depend on a colleague.  This may 
                                                 
221 Lipman-Blumen describes homosocial as, “the seeking, enjoyment, and/or preference for the company of the same sex.  
It is distinguished from ‘homosexual’ in that it does not necessarily involve (although it may under certain circumstances) 
an explicitly erotic sexual interaction between members of the same sex.  The basic premise of this homosocial view of 
sex roles suggests that men are attracted to, stimulated by, and interested in other men” (Lipman-Blumen 1976: 16).  
Cockburn (1991b) also uses the term homosocial and recognises the possibility of erotic motives in this behaviour.  Roper, 
(1988, 1996) is also inclined to this view and recognises the emotional and sometimes erotic bonds between men.  
However, the way he sees men as preening their appearance, closely relates to how the military and to a certain extent the 
fire service, put an emphasis on appearance (see, Dixon 1994).  When emotions do develop between men in uniform, I 
think that rather than because they appear enticing, it is because they are put together in dangerous situations: a time when 
they do not look so good (see Barker 1992, 1994, 1996; Holden 1998).  One point in Roper’s argument that I would 
challenge is his argument that “life at the sharp end” (1996: 214)  has phallic connotations.  Of course whilst this is always 
in the eye of the beholder, when firefighters say they are “at the sharp end,” they mean where the firefighting is done and 
they might equally as easily say “at the cutting edge.”  I accept my interpretation is still liable to the critique I am showing 
dramaturgical loyalty to firefighters and arguing to suppress the possibility firefighters may have sexual desires/erotic 
motives towards other firefighters of the same sex, but I remain unconvinced this is so.  It may be my closeness to 
firefighters might have hidden the possibility that some male firefighters physically attract other male firefighters, but I 
was looking for it and during my fieldwork I found no suggestions of erotic or homosexual behaviour between male 
firefighters.  I realise that there are gay male and female firefighters.  The one firefighter who admitted to their 
homosexuality during an interview, did not in anyway lead me to believe their sexuality was related to their being a 
firefighter.  Rather it might be considered exactly the opposite applies and it is accepted that firefighters generally police 
sexual boundaries with the threat of not being actively heterosexual is to be less of a man: a feminised ‘other’ (see 
Hollway 1996: 28-30; see Chapter 5).  This is not to deny in any way that firefighters were not involved in the physical 
contact and camaraderie/horseplay recognised by Lipman-Blumen, (1976; see Hearn and Parkin 1987: 137-139; Collinson 
1988; Cockburn 1991b) and it may be that firefighters handle their fear of homosexuality by compulsory heterosexuality 
and homophobia.  This is not to suggest that Firefighters do not have emotions, but I would argue that most firefighters do 
not aim these erotically towards members of their own sex, at least whilst at work.   
222 These might also be identified as a “chain of ceremony” (Goffman 1997c: 29). 
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then explain firefighters’ preference to hang out with other males (see Roper 1996) and to find out 
if there are any Ricky’s (see above). 
 
Notwithstanding firefighters lack of erotic motive towards their own sex, I do believe that male 
firefighters prefer to work with people they see as like them.  Therefore, the concept of homosociality 
might help us to understand the way that males in the fire service might wish to sponsor other males 
as opposed to females.  It could be that male firefighters might prefer male recruits, because they 
expect them to have already started to learn the particular masculine understandings that firefighters 
informal hierarchies develop into protocols surrounding firefighting.  Ignoring for the moment the 
hegemonic reasons why embodied masculine standards have developed over the centuries, it is 
important to recognise that some of those standards might be positive and very close to those that 
good firefighters require if they are to continue to fight fires as they currently do.  In so much as 
Kanter (1977: 3) recognises that both Marx and Smith consider the job makes the person, it may be 
interesting if this thesis were to recognise that firefighters’ masculine standards, so treasured by male 
firefighters, which may help to perpetuate men’s hegemony, are not limited to men, but socially learnt 
and available to women.  In particular, it has to be recognised that if firefighters’ masculinity can be 
related to the way firefighters do their job, then the final chapter should consider how to describe the 
gender of those female firefighters who gain the human capital to be seen as good firefighters.   
 
 
3.7.2. Heroes 
Firefighters in popular literature (see Whalen 1980; Cooper 1986; Delson 1992; Lloyd-Elliott 1992; 
Wallington and Holloway 1994) are afforded a heroic imagery.  However, it is a feature of this thesis 
that the firefighters I interviewed did not overtly boast about heroism.  This reluctance was difficult to 
understand because the heroic status afforded to firefighters should be a dividend for their willingness 
to help the public in sometimes difficult and dangerous situations.  I speculate that this may be a form 
of image manipulation (see Goffman 1997b), through which firefighters, denying their heroism, 
actually accentuate the image of the heroic firefighter.  Experiential reflection reminds me that my 
peer group ridiculed any firefighter who boasted of their heroism: a lesson that pays dividends once 
individual firefighters recognise for themselves that shy heroes are more popular than a brash ones
223
.  
Not appearing brash though does not prevent firefighters from gaining a dividend by ‘innocently’ 
linking themselves with the rescues made by other firefighters.  When firefighters’ argue ‘there may 
be someone in there’ (and they know there is not), their suggestion serves as a reminder to the public 
that firefighters are selfless heroes: a form of dramaturgical loyalty that might also cover up the risk 
taking that firefighters are involved in when they get in just to test/prove their image (see Chapter 5).  
This may be an example of one more homosocial understanding that passes between generations of 
chosen firefighters.  Hypothesis 1 will be amended to reflect this and the previous discussion.    
 
3.7.3. The hypotheses  
I now have a set of linked hypotheses, which might answer my questions about firefighting.  First, in 
answer to the question, ‘how do firefighters develop the protocols and skills necessary for 
firefighting?’, I suggest Hypothesis 1:  
 
Initial training teaches firefighters about the tools of their job, but once on a watch it is almost 
inevitable that probationers must turn to experienced firefighters to learn about firefighting: The 
Job.  They will be taught that the most effective way of putting out a fire is to get in as close to the 
fire as possible, as quickly as possible contingent with the danger involved and then turn the 
water on.  However, firefighters’ training never ends, is both on and off the job, involving a 
                                                 
223 This is a combination of dramaturgical discipline (Goffman 1959: 216), not over acting; and dramaturgical 
circumspection (Goffman 1959: 218), arranging in advance how to manage the show.   
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continual round of experiential learning as watches build trust within the group, share and 
develop their collective knowledge to agree protocols for getting in safely.  Watch officers are 
part of this process and act as a channel to share and discuss this knowledge up and down 
between their wider networks and the watch.  The transfer of knowledge may be such that each 
cohort of firefighters has access to ‘all’ the knowledge, past and present about ‘The Job’.  This 
sharing is a homosocial process and alongside the protocols for firefighting, the watch might pass 
up and down there are other protocols, some of which require firefighters to take part in a series 
of dramaturgical acts to ‘prove’ they are good firefighters.   
 
In answer to the question ‘what does getting in mean to firefighters?’, I suggest Hypothesis 2 as 
amended: 
 
Firefighting involves firefighters getting into a building where they might be little or no visibility, 
in hot and dangerous conditions.  To do this safely firefighters will need to have confidence in 
their partner’s and their own abilities to keep a cool head, not panic and to follow watch 
protocols for firefighting as they compare what they are experiencing at the fire, against their 
prior knowledge, to hypothesis how to get safely into a position close enough to the fire to turn 
the water on.  If they do this successfully, they not only avoid ‘water-damage’, they have also 
taken part in a test to ‘prove’ themselves against the standards of a good firefighter.   
 
In answer to the question ‘why, given the apparent danger involved, do firefighters get in at a fire?’, I 
suggest Hypothesis 3: 
 
The majority of firefighters argue they are intent on getting in to beat the fire and this supports the 
professional ethos, but other testing and image building processes are at work at the same time.  
Getting in is not a reckless process, but skilled use of firefighters’ understanding of the risks 
involved that have been discussed in hypotheses 1 and 2, to enable firefighters to balance their 
actions on the safe side of recklessness for what may be a range of other motivations:  
 
a. Humanitarian: at persons reported incidents firefighters might be prepared to go that bit 
further and risk their lives to save others. 
b. Professional Humanitarian: the fire service is a last resort, if the fire service gives up the 
situation is lost. 
c. Professional Pride: firefighting is a skill to be proud of and defended; 
d. Professional Cavalier: firefighters are professionals, who may not follow the rules when 
firefighting, but will innovate to get the job done to the best of their ability. 
e. Professional Adventurer: there may be more to firefighting than just instrumental reasons 
of pay and professional satisfaction, it could also be a way of raising adrenaline levels, 
almost a dangerous sport. 
f. Testing: firefighters may be proving to the public, other firefighters and themselves that 
they ‘fit in’ with the image of a ‘good firefighter’ when they are getting in (a Foucaultian 
gaze). 
g.  Status building: getting in may  adds to the publics’ image of firefighting. 
These three hypotheses do not explain the two firefighters who do not appear to fit in: Ricky left the 
fire service and whilst (Bob) might not be so happy to get in he has stayed.  Bob’s situation is yet to 
be understood and will be born in mind for the remaining chapters.   
 
Looking back on what I have found, it might be that the way some firefighters get in is a test of 
not only of their ability to be seen as a good firefighters but also of their masculinity (see Seidler 
1997).  However, testing, because it adds an incentive for firefighters to save life and property, is 
positive for the public because it ensures that firefighters are always keen to go to fires and get in 
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when they get there.  Testing is also positive for firefighters, because they know their colleagues 
share the same understandings as themselves, are also trying to pass the same test and are unlikely to 
let them down.  However, if homosociality ‘forces’ firefighters into proving their masculinity by 
getting in faster and further than is necessary, then this creates some difficulties in seeing firefighters’ 
actions as entirely positive.  Given the current lack of knowledge about the dynamics of what is 
happening here, trying to separate the way firefighters test themselves from their stated desire to help 
the public might have knock-on effects that upset the status quo: the ways in which generations of 
firefighters have spent time in preparing for a fire.  In particular the way they fit their team together, 
which is not only desirable, but may be essential in such a potentially dangerous occupation.  One 
important outcome of this process (whether it is to allow firefighters to ‘prove’ themselves or to 
support their professional ethos) is that firefighters share their experiential knowledge within their 
hierarchy and (innocently) develop protocols that improve their ability to firefight more efficiently 
(and safely).  
 
Before moving on it is interesting to note that female firefighters are also testing themselves 
against the standards of a good firefighter (similar standards to the ones that may ‘prove’ firefighters’ 
masculinity.  As a pre-cursor to my final analysis, it is important to recollect that earlier I argue that 
the way this behaviour develops is a form of homosociality, which involves firefighters passing on 
their skills to people like themselves — people with their understandings about testing against 
masculine standards.  These types of gender solidarity are only generally understood as happening 
exclusively between men, or between women, as a group (see Lipman-Blumen 1976).  That female 
firefighters appear to be participating in firefighters’ hierarchy, meeting the standards for firefighters’ 
masculinity and positively enjoy the experience, suggests they must be part of the homosocial process 
too.  It also increases the question mark over how to describe female firefighters’ gender.  Both these 
issues will be considered in the next chapter, which looks at firefighters relations at the station, and in 
subsequent chapters. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR RELATIONS AT THE STATION: FITTING IN  
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on firefighters’ relations at the station and seeks to answer the question, ‘how do 
firefighters organise their social relations at the station?’.  The term ‘fitting in’ will feature throughout 
because it is common currency in the fire service and everyone, from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector 
of Fire service to recruit firefighters, uses the term.  Ted provides an example of how a firefighter 
might explain fitting in:   
 
Ted: Like when we were new, until they think they can trust you, you are not going to be 
accepted.  You are, but it takes time to get in and when they know they can trust you 
and you fit in.  
(Brigade 1, firefighter, 1.25 years’ service, age 23).  [My emphases]. 
 
Ted’s use of the word “get in” is unconnected to getting in at a fire, he is referring to how a 
probationer might ‘get in’ or ‘fit in’ with the watch224.  Ted’s use of the word “trust,” also has a 
slightly different meaning to the ‘trust’ that firefighters develop to ensure their colleagues have the 
same standards as them whilst firefighting, but it may be wrong to see it as unconnected.  In previous 
chapters, I have hinted that apart from firefighting, firefighters may use their hierarchy to organise 
other agendas.  ‘Fitting in’ could be one of these agendas: a second way firefighters test for ‘trust’, 
but this time not only about firefighting but equally as much about the taken for granted 
understandings that exist between men through which they organise patriarchal relations (see 
Lipman-Blumen 1976; Willis 1977; Hartmann 1981; DiTomaso 1989: 88; Jackson 1990; Cockburn 
1991a, 1991b; Hearn 1994; Connell 1989, 1995; Collinson 1992, 1996; Office for Public 
Management 1996; Seidler 1997; Walby 1986, 1990, 1997; Grint 1998
225
).  Firefighters do not 
publicly acknowledge that their relations are patriarchal, but neither do they acknowledge their 
informal hierarchy and I am unsure as to the extent to which they recognise it themselves.  However, I 
am convinced that the notion of trust between firefighters extends to a point where there are 
understandings that they do not consciously reveal and they act to hide.  Firefighters’ hierarchy and 
agendas may be amongst these, and this chapter investigates what it means to ‘fit in’ at a station, the 
extent of the involvement of firefighters’ hierarchies in this process and looks for patriarchal agendas.   
 
The chapter starts by suggesting that informal hierarchies come as no surprise to new recruits: 
their knowledge of such hierarchies has been part of their life in families and at school.  School, as 
Prendergast and Forrest (1998; also see Willis 1977; Jackson 1990; Seidler 1997; Connell 2000) 
explain, is where boys (and girls) learn about hierarchies.  For boys their hierarchy has a base: first, 
on age, then size; second, on the toughness that leaders in the group are able to portray.  Prendergast 
and Forrest also suggest that although boys’ hierarchies are embodied, proving your place in it rarely 
actually spills over into actual violence.  Respect more often transfers through a series of messages 
and symbolic behaviours that younger boys learn from their peers.  The outcome is that the alert 
younger boy recognises that older boys get respect from the younger boys and use this observation to 
his advantage.  He will defer his gratification: first, accepting the hierarchy; then when his time comes 
by displaying measured aggression he gets respect (see Willis 1977; Jackson 1990; Seidler 1997).  It 
is, of course, men’s understanding of hierarchies that underpins a great many patriarchal and 
homosocial relations (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; Segal 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Walby 1997).  
However, it is important to identify if when these homosocial relations occur, they do so to ensure 
firefighters fit in with fire related safety protocols or other agendas, in particular sexism.   
 
                                                 
224 Firefighters language can at times be confusing, they do not have precise meanings for words, in this case and the next, 
their words may almost require an in-house translator.   
225 Chodorow (1978, 1994, 1997) points to fact that women, universally, are largely responsible for early child care will 
have much to do with the way men organise patriarchal relations. 
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To do this I am going to investigate: first, what are ‘the expectations and realities surrounding 
a probationer who arrives on the watch at the bottom of the hierarchy, even if they are an automatic 
member of the hierarchy, and then try to follow how a firefighter might climb the ‘rounds’ (as 
firefighters call the steps of their ladders).  The emphasis of this chapter is that, despite sometimes 
being unhappy with the way the informal hierarchy operates, most firefighters appear to fit in with it, 
and importantly expect that by joining and climbing the hierarchy they will receive dividends for 
doing so.  To explain how this may occur I again develop a series of hypotheses, which may help 
explain some patterns or stages of reaction by firefighters to the informal hierarchy.  Three types of 
resistance emerge.  The first, the most common form, appears almost a rite of passage through which 
firefighters test their status on each ‘round’ of the hierarchy.  The second resistance involves leaving 
the watch, either on promotion or by transferring sideways into ‘staff’ (support departments).  The 
third resistance is very rare and involves an individual not accepting the authority of the informal 
hierarchy despite the enormous pressure for them to do so. 
 
4.2. THE GAZE OF EXPERIENCED FIREFIGHTERS 
4.2.1. Watching 
The previous chapter has shown that efficient watches will develop trust amongst themselves by 
establishing protocols for firefighting and then submitting to their own gaze and that of the watch to 
‘prove’ they can be trusted not to let themselves and the watch down.  Therefore, any newcomer to 
the watch might disrupt these protocols and endanger the team
226
.  Dominic suggests everyone will be 
watching him: 
 
Dominic: If a bloke joins a watch, obviously everyone is looking at him.  Whether he has come 
from training school or another station/watch.  Everyone is looking at him consciously, 
or not.  They’re sussing out his good points, his bad points.      
(Brigade 2, leading firefighter, 24 years’ service, age 45, in a focus group).  [My 
emphases]. 
 
Dominic’s language suggests he does not even consider that any newcomer might be a woman.  His 
reaction is a clear example of how male firefighters’ language marginalises women.  Cockburn 
(1991a) suggests that women who join a predominantly male workforce, present a threat to the taken 
for granted trust that exists between males (see Kanter 1977: 208-242; Salaman 1986: 38; Cockburn 
1991b).  In the context that Cockburn uses trust, she refers to men believing that women will undo 
their comfortable social relationships/understandings, which have given order to their lives since at 
least their school days (see Prendergast and Forrest 1998 above).  Male firefighters have more than 
‘proved’ they will respond badly to women in these circumstances (see Hearn and Parkin 1987, 1995: 
74; Walby 1990: 52; Howell 1994; Baigent 1996; Lee 1996; Richards 1996; Archer 1998; HMIFS 
1999).  However, there is a requirement to look past Dominic’s sexism, to consider how difficult this 
area is in an organisation where ‘trust’ is also about ‘safety’.  As the example of Ricky (the ‘tough 
guy’ in Chapter 3) has shown, until tested, any newcomer might run out of the building, or present a 
similar threat to safety.  Therefore, surveillance might identify if the newcomer presents a challenge 
to the protocols that all firefighters develop in relation to safety.  However, it might also be that the 
watch will want to know if a recruit will support their taken for granted masculine understandings.  
More likely the watch’s gaze will be testing for both, because the links between the two 
understandings make them currently contingent on each other.   
 
4.2.2. Advice 
                                                 
226 To an extent anyone who joins a watch (probationer, experienced firefighter, or officer), is treated similarly, but their 
experience will normally ensure they fit in easier than a probationer.  Of course a new officer might become a new broom 
and try to change the watch, but most will have sufficient common understandings to ensure they at least settle in before 
trying to make any changes (see Chapter 1). 
  
85 
After the findings of Chapter 3 there can be little doubt that probationers should follow the advice 
of recruit-trainers and watch-commanders, and seek out an experienced firefighter to ‘teach them the 
ropes’.  Duke explains the advice he might give, emphasising that the team already have rules for 
safety and that the probationer should not disrupt these.  Probationers should listen and learn: 
 
Duke: You are not an individual; you are coming in straight away to be part of a team: a team 
that hopefully know what they are doing with regard to, first of all, to safety.  And you 
have got to come in and just accept, whatever age you are, however clever you are, 
that you have got to start and em, em, and absorb, absorb that knowledge. 
(Brigade 1, firefighter, 25 years’ service, age 51).  [My emphases]. 
 
Duke’s argument emphasises the importance of the informal hierarchy and regardless of their age or 
cleverness, the relative unimportance of the probationer.  Duke might also be concerned that 
newcomers will try to interfere with current protocols.  Christian is clearer, what the team do not need 
is for someone to try to change things:    
 
Christian: Well it’s the tradition.  They need to be able to fit in .. without being lairy and start 
telling you .. how to do it.  If they have got a good idea, I listen, but I don’t like people 
who come along and tell me, yunnoo .. very loud and trigger happy
227
. 
(Brigade 1, leading firefighter 20 years’ service, age 38).  [My emphases]. 
 
Ian’s answer is even more direct: 
 
Ian: Just keep your head down and keep your gob shut for a little while and see what 
happens. 
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30, in a focus group). 
 
It appears that the majority of experienced firefighters will expect probationers to conform with the 
way the watch organises.  Forcing probationers to fit in is hardly conducive to equal opportunities, but 
given the expectation that probationers must immediately ‘ride’ to fires (see Chapter 3) it would be 
easy to justify Duke’s, Christian’s and Ian’s attitude as a temporary safety arrangement.  However, 
Alf provides some indication that it is not only safety that probationers must fit in with, but also social 
understandings:  
  
Alf: Now there is a guy I work with, he has just joined, he is nineteen, I was eighteen.  I got 
these mirror images of me at eighteen and the way I had to behave.  I had to behave.  I 
wasn’t allowed to behave the way I wanted, I just had to conform.  This young guy has 
come in and he can sit around the table and have an opinion with serving members, 
even the OIC
228
 … He has only been out of training school six months … I had been in 
The Job five years’ before I would have dared to make some of the utterances that he 
has. 
(Brigade 3, firefighter, 25 years’ service, age 46).  [My emphases]. 
   
Alf has a difficulty relating his probationary experience with that of the current probationer.  Alf’s 
comments may be simply nostalgic (for times past when he believes recruits were more respectful) 
and he may have difficulty in accepting that the way the watch has organised will change over time 
(as has society).  Alerted to some difference between expectation and outcome, I pursued this matter 
further by asking about watch organisation: 
 
                                                 
227 This use again of military language is similar to another fire service expression ‘shooting off your mouth’; both suggest 
speaking out inappropriately. 
228 Officer in charge of the watch: the watch-commander. 
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Alf: I work on a watch strength of sixteen; if you take out the four officers, they have to 
administer, … You are talking about twelve firefighters, we have female, ethnic 
minorities, two of. … I am the longest serving firefighter … there is another guy who 
has got four years’ less than me and the rest go down from 15 years’ to 10 to 5 to six 
months. … I find that the 15 to 20 year intake resent the attitude that he has got far 
more than I do.  But, I am not so sure that is because I am 45 and they are 35 and they 
are still fiery and up for an argument.  I suppose that when I was 35 I was the same … 
let them argue it out, it’s not that important. … the five year blokes are well tuned in 
with the blokes who have only done two years’ … so they gradually step into line with 
each other.  So there is always somebody on the watch that you have got a rapport 
with; you know there is somebody behind you; somebody in front of you.  Somebody 
you can relate to or with, whether he has done a few years’ more or a few years’ less.  
And there are outspoken personalities who dig their heels in and not accept any 
change, they are becoming rarer, more often than not people gradually come to accept 
change and reform.  You know there is somebody behind you somebody in front of you. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Alf suggests that officers “have to administer.”  He then explains how firefighters’ informal hierarchy 
organises during officers’ absence.  His explanation provides a considerable insight on how the watch 
organise to “gradually step into line with each other” in an informal hierarchy linked to ‘time served’.  
Such an arrangement allows experienced firefighters to provide an example for ‘younger’ firefighters 
to follow.  However, Alf recognises that he may (currently) be handing down this responsibility to the 
next cohort who are “still fiery and up for an argument.”  This suggests that getting the watch to fit in 
may not always be so easy, or important to him as he nears retirement.  These relationships, through 
which experienced firefighters police younger members behaviour, have previously been connected to 
firefighting (see Chapter 3).  What Alf is talking about are relations at the station and Chapter 1 
suggests that when the informal hierarchy and the watch-commander come to an ‘arrangement’ life at 
the station can be comfortable (see Chapter 5).  This alone is an important motivator for maintaining 
firefighters’ hierarchy, but time served also provides status in the hierarchy.  Recognising this 
dividend can then become an important motivator to maintain the informal hierarchy, for both young 
and old (see Prendergast and Forrest 1998).  It may also explain why Alf and the other experienced 
firefighters above have such strong views regarding probationers’ behaviour.  Probationers (or any 
other newcomer) can always be somewhat problematic in that they bring the possibility of resistance 
to the informal hierarchy.  In addition, if they do not fit in, they may well threaten the whole process.  
Resistance might even threaten the way that firefighters develop their firefighting protocols.  
Nonetheless, “sussing out .. bad .. good points,” cannot be merely seen in a safety context, although 
firefighters frequently speak as if it is.  Firefighters’ surveillance of newcomers might also be a 
concern that they will not fit in with their social arrangements (see Hochschild 1983
229
; Cockburn 
1991a; Chapters 1, 3, 5 and 6).   
 
4.2.3. Fitting in     
Chapter 3 suggests that probationers arriving on a watch have expectations and perhaps a little 
trepidation about fitting in.  I asked some firefighters who had recently experienced this situation 
about their thoughts at that time; Jack is clear about what is expected:  
 
Jack: Keep your head down .. and .. and be quiet and what have you, and then gradually.  
Yunnoo like .. that .. yunnoo, you feel allowed to be yourself a bit more and more. 
(Brigade 1, probationary firefighter, 1 year’s service, age 27).  [My emphases]. 
 
Richard expresses a very similar understanding to Jack: 
                                                 
229 Hochschild (1983) indicates that historically the ‘carrying’ of gender work relations by the group, beyond the 
individual, shows how institutions are a site of gender perpetuation and creation. 
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Richard: I have been biting my tongue with a lot of it while I am on probation; I think it is a 
requirement.  Em, you just take it and say nothing.  One, I don’t want to make it worse 
for myself and two, I think it is a bit of respect for the blokes who have been in The Job 
longer than I have.  Em .. but eh .. after a while, especially after I have done my 
probation, finished that .. then … maybe.  If I think that something needs saying then I 
will probably say it, but at the moment I am quiet happy with, eh, quite happy with not 
saying anything. There is a lot of stuff that is a bit unfair, but that is the way it is.  I 
would like to think I would like to treat someone slightly better than I would be treated 
myself.  Not that I have been badly treated. 
(Brigade 1, probationary firefighter, one year’s service, age 26)  [My emphases]. 
 
As with most the firefighters I interviewed, both Jack and Richard realise that the watch expects 
probationers to be ‘seen and not heard’.  One feature of the language that is common to firefighters, 
regardless of their brigade, is the use of the term “keep your head down.”  This metaphorical use of 
language originates in the military where such action was necessary to avoid snipers.  However, the 
meaning is clear and Richard’s comments provide some indication that he realises the potential the 
watch have to make life ‘difficult’ should he be, “trigger happy” and start telling the watch how to 
organise.  Jack and Richard appear to understand that if they bide their time, they can ease their way 
into the hierarchy and their views will eventually count.  Ken, in contrast to Jack and Richard, has had 
little experience of paid work.  However, he also appears to hear a similar message and accepts his 
‘novice’ status:       
 
Ken: What they are saying is …’keep your nose, keep your head down, keep enthusiastic, 
ask questions and be busy’.  And that, and that is what I am doing and I spoke to the 
leading firefighter who I am following everywhere.  If we get called to a job I am 
going to be backing him up, always getting to go in. I was chatting to him and he says 
‘that, at the moment, I seem to have the right attitude; doing really well’. 
(Brigade 3, probationary firefighter, seven months’ experience, age 19).  [My 
emphases]. 
 
Ken’s relative youth is no barrier to his accessing knowledge about informal hierarchies and he 
accepts what is happening, apparently without resistance.  Roger is in little doubt about how the 
watch expect him to behave and then suggests a reason for his compliance: 
 
Roger: Kept me mouth shut, kept me head down sort of thing; tried to get on with my work 
and that and do what ever I was told .. the senior members and that.  You have just got 
to fit in with them haven’t you?  
 
I asked Roger why he had to fit in. 
 
Roger: Yeah, you have heard stories and that, of people who come in and mouth off and that 
and so. 
 
DB: And what happens to them? 
  
Roger: You never really shake that in The job, once you get known as a tosser
230
. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
                                                 
230 This derogatory term for men that masturbate, or women who do it for them is typical of language used by males to 
feminise and thus subordinate other males (see Jackson 1990; Lewis 1991; Dixon 1994) by suggesting they cannot get 
proper sex.  The term ‘wanker’ might easily have been used and individual’s attempts to avoid such negative labels are a 
powerful social process (see Goffman 1997a). 
  
88 
 
Roger may be explaining one example of what Richard describes as, “making it worse for myself”, 
when he suggests a watch may actually ‘enforce’ their hierarchy by threatening to attach the label, “a 
tosser” to anyone who does not keep their “head down” and “mouths off.”  Chapter 3 has already 
suggested how a watch sanction the dangerous practice of panicking at fires by telling stories which 
compare panickers with good firefighters.  ‘Tosser’ is a similar negative label, which the watch use to 
police their norms, in this case by cautioning probationers against trying to change the way things are.  
Not unnaturally, most firefighters attempt to avoid the negative labels and chase the positive ones.  
Despite Alf’s earlier comment that young firefighters talk out of turn, all the probationers I spoke to 
would understand Ian’s message: “keep your gob shut.”  The data so far suggests all firefighters will 
respect the informal hierarchy: Richard’s and Jack’s respect is equivocal; Ken’s acceptance is 
automatic; Roger’s expectation is enforced.  This respect for the social dictates of the watch hierarchy 
occurs without any formal requirement for recruits to do so: a similar arrangement to the process 
which makes probationary firefighters go to experienced firefighters for their knowledge about 
firefighting (see Chapter 3).   
 
4.2.4. Previous experience 
Probationers may already have some ideas about how to fit it from their experience during recruit 
training (see Chapter 3).  However, I did not expect that the potential recruits Ken and Lee would 
have the insight they so clearly have:   
 
Ken: Probably the same way as I did coming to college.  I changed slightly .. just a bit, 
yunnoo, to get in with people. … You don’t come and just, don’t go in straight away.  I 
suppose once you have been there, you loosen up a bit more, you just become yourself. 
(Potential recruit to the fire service, age 17). 
 
When I asked Ken who he thought would be in charge, his understanding was even more surprising: 
 
Ken: Em .. responsibility lies with the officer, but then it’s the men.  I think its the men, cos 
they are sort of one.  If they don’t want to do something or they don’t agree with 
something, then there going to say .. make the officer’s life a misery if they don’t think 
he is right.  But then it is going back to the rules.  It is like the officer who is in charge, 
it’s like the college, sometimes the class can rule over the teacher. 
(My emphases). 
  
Lee explains his understanding of how informal hierarchies reinforce their power: 
 
Lee: Not bullying as such, but piss taking and all that sort of thing at the station.  I don’t 
think it would be bullying, just a wind up like … like everyone does at college. 
(Potential recruit to the fire service, age 17). 
 
Before joining the fire service, potential applicants have some understanding that they may need to fit 
in.  Their knowledge about the workings of informal hierarchies could indicate that they have been 
talking to the experienced firefighters (above), but they have not.  More likely, their experience of 
work, family life and socialising, reinforces their recognition of the playground hierarchy
231
.  As 
Willis (1977) suggests, school often prepares working class boys for their life at work.  Ken and Lee 
are examples of this and Ken, in particular, relates his experience of the big boys at school who 
control the playground and sometimes the classroom, to the ‘older’ hands at the firestation.  Ken 
understands that a hierarchy based on legitimate authority (teacher/officer) can have anomalies when 
a powerful informal group confronts it: a process that provides order at school, may also apply in the 
firestation.  The same might apply to Jack, Richard, and Roger; they all appear to recognise that as 
                                                 
231 Canaan (1996) and Willis (1995) suggest that young men, especially those in the pub scene, will find ‘playground 
posturing’ may not be enough to reinforce their place in society and acts of violence may be needed to support their status.   
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probationary firefighters that they will need to first fit in by respecting  ‘older’ hands; then they can 
start to climb the hierarchy.  This recognition is just one of the understandings that develop between 
males, but it underpins their patriarchal relations and the understandings that develop from them (see 
Lipman-Blumen 1976; Kanter 1977; Hartmann 1981; DiTomaso 1989: 88; Segal 1990; Jackson 1990; 
Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Hearn 1994; Collinson 1996; Seidler 1997; Grint 1998).  The arguments of 
Chapter 3 suggest firefighters’ informal hierarchy facilitates protocols for safety on the fireground, 
but it is my view that these understandings have their origins in the much wider set of relationships 
between males.   
 
 
4.2.5. Behaviour learnt at work 
Collinson (1988, 1992; see also Cockburn 1991a) describes how in the engineering workshop the 
younger man’s respect for the older man’s skills establishes a hierarchy between them in the formal 
areas at work, and that this formal authority then transfers to an informal hierarchy, which 
consolidates its authority by the pranks that reinforce an apprentice’s inferior status.  Then, informal 
secondary agendas, which include compulsory heterosexuality and feminising the office staff, to 
support what Collinson (1994: 33) calls “resistance through distance,” can become almost as 
important part of the apprenticeship as the formal one.  I discuss this area extensively in Chapter 5 but 
it may be that male firefighters, engineers and printers have chosen their career because they 
recognise the long-term gain of joining an informal hierarchy.  The process may even be two-way and 
where work is organised through informal hierarchies the employers may even be looking for people 
who will have such understandings: a self-fulfilling prophecy
232
.   
 
4.2.6. Some recruitment criteria 
Throughout the whole of my research, despite making considerable noises to the contrary, the fire 
service appears to be an organisation that is looking for the type of person who might understand 
(even enjoy) masculine hierarchies.  The LFCDA (2000), a pro-active equality employer, asks 
questions of prospective firefighters 
233
: 
 Have you worked as part of a close-knit team? 
 Are you prepared for the demands of working in a disciplined uniformed service in which you 
will have to take orders from other people?  
 
To answer any of these questions negatively will ensure that applicants do not get to the next phase, 
the physical tests.  These physical tests should also follow strict equal opportunities guidelines, but 
despite the best of intentions this is not happening as my time spent observing physical tests in 
Brigade 5 (not LFCDA) indicates
234
.  Two recruitment officers had very clear opinions: 
 
Frank: Would like to look for people like us, [then with cynicism] but not allowed. 
(ADO). 
 
                                                 
232 I will return to this subject in Chapter 5, but it may be that organisations, which seek to deskill employees might wish 
to break informal hierarchies by a “corporate colonisation” (see Strangleman and Roberts 1999: 51), which weeds out all 
those that keep the informal cultures alive, and employ people with no experience of informal hierarchies.  It might be too 
much of a conspiracy theory to identify that equality (or health and safety) legislation may be one way of breaking 
firefighters’ hierarchy, but it has to be considered.  If female firefighters, do in effect break firefighters solidarity, it may 
be that they will unwittingly help the employers, because then firefighters may not be so able to resist cuts in the fire 
service.  
233 All application forms that I have seen ask similar questions to this. 
234 During my visit I watched officers treat the one female applicant very differently to the male applicants.  She was not 
picked on for wearing jewellery and the males were.  She was given a lighter hose to run-out than the male applicants.  
Criticism was not levelled at her for not pulling her weight in the team exercises, as it was on the males (and she failed).  
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Duncan: [To be successful, recruits needed] intuition; teamwork and stickability; obeying and 
understanding orders. 
(Station Officer). 
 
Frank’s ‘nod and a wink answer’ left me in no doubt that he would be looking “for people like us.”  
When an application form for the fire service recognises that recruits are required who have, “worked 
as part of a close knit team”, it is easy to see that even during the recruitment process that the fire 
service is looking for people who will fit in: males. 
 
The data so far suggests that a number of factors may be in place before a probationer arrives at a 
station.  These can lead to:  
 recruits being picked who have experience of men’s informal hierarchies;  
 the recruitment process being self-fulfilling; 
 the training centre preparing the recruit for firefighters’ informal hierarchy by pointing out that 
only firefighters can teach them their job and that the group will sanction anyone who resists 
fitting in (see chapters 3, 5 and 6). 
 the watch has an established hierarchy, with which probationers are expected to fit in. 
 
4.2.7. The link to the operational 
The evidence so far has been mostly related to how firefighters might fit in with and be chosen to fit 
in with, informal hierarchies at the station.  There has been some suggestion that this process might 
link with firefighting protocols (and possible even masculine standards).  The next extract relates to 
getting advice on operational skills and this will improve the insight that Chapter 3 provides about the 
(homosocial) way firefighters pass on their firefighting protocols.  Ray explains that some 
experienced firefighters freely gave their knowledge and others expect to be asked: 
 
Ray:   Maybe they are not always forthcoming, as say you want, to [say] ‘do this’ like and 
‘this like that’ and the end of the night you have to come up to them and say ‘I am not 
sure what I am doing here’ or ‘should I be doing this or doing that’?  You do get 
certain people who are willing to put themselves out to help yuh and others you have 
to sort of ask them. 
(Brigade 1, firefighter, four years’ service, age 24).  [My insert]. 
 
I asked Ray why this was: 
 
Ray:  I think with a lot of people, they are expecting to be asked.  It’s probably from their 
point of view, it is a bit to do with you’re coming in as an outsider on to their sort of 
territory. … Then it shows you are willing to work for getting some knowledge, as 
opposed to sitting there and telling you everything and not getting anything back in 
return.  If you have got to go to them and ask them, it shows you respect them in the 
fact that they have been in longer than you. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Chapter 3 argues that probationers learn the skills they need to become firefighters from experienced 
firefighters and in doing so, it is self-evident that it is in the interest of experienced firefighters to 
share their skills, because this makes their work safer and it provides younger firefighters with a skill 
they might want to help defend (against officers attempts to deskill them, also see Chapter 5).  Now 
Ray explains, that before he can access the skills of firefighting from experienced firefighters, he may 
have to show them respect.  Ray’s explanation might apply to a great deal of the data already 
reviewed and one explanation that fits with Ray’s account, is that knowing the probationer needs their 
skills encourages experienced firefighters to first require them to ‘bend the knee’, before they can ‘sit 
at the knee’.  In this way respect afforded to gain access to firefighting skills, extends to an 
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acceptance by most probationers of the experienced firefighters’ authority per se.  Such a situation 
confirms the informal hierarchy and encourages the probationer to fit in with all the watch’s norms 
(positive or negative).  It may even be that officers reinforce the informal hierarchy, and increase its 
influence over probationers, by suggesting they should fit in.   
 
Apart from Alf, it is common for the watch to expect the probationers to wait for about six 
months before starting to get a voice in the hierarchy.  However, this is conditional and to gain some 
sense of order out of my data I will start to construct a numbered list of categories that may help 
identify the different reactions probationary firefighters might have to the hierarchy: 
 
1. Accepters: Ken, Roger and Ray accept the hierarchy and both Ray and Roger provide 
some reason for why this is.  
2. Conditional accepters: Richard indicates he is not entirely happy deferring to such social 
pressures, but has done nothing to resist publicly.  
 
Jack provides evidence of a possible further reaction: 
 
Jack: I just started sticking my head up a bit earlier … You see what you can get away with 
and you take it from there.  If they say to you ‘you’re getting a bit too, a bit too game’. 
(Brigade 1, probationary firefighter, 1 year’s service, age 27). 
 
Jack’s resistance appears measured: a test to find out the extent of the boundaries laid down by the 
informal hierarchy for his behaviour.  When senior members cautioned him for being too familiar, he 
accepted their authority.  But this might not continue for much longer:    
 
Jack: … once the probation is over you can do what you like, but you don’t want to start 
standing up to people while you are in your probation. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Jack’s test indicates the possibility that not all probationers keep their resistance to the informal 
hierarchies private.  Jack’s example suggests a third reaction to the hierarchy:   
 
3. Testers: Jack and the recruit mentioned by Alf, indicate how probationers might test the 
hierarchy.   
 
 
4.2.8. Theoretical sampling for resistance 
At this point in the data collection I wanted to find if any firefighters would openly and persistently 
resist informal hierarchies.  Using my networks, I theoretically sampled (Glaser and Strauss 1967) for 
such firefighters.  One firefighter was identified to me as not only resisting the informal hierarchy, but 
also as being harassed by peer group leaders for his resistance.  I interviewed him about his 
experiences: 
 
Colin: There are sheep and there are shepherds, or a shepherd.  And a lot of people only see 
that way and anything that this person says is always right.  And they have got to have 
their own minds and you get appreciated for it at the end of the day.  If you have got 
your own mind and people realise that you don’t mind standing out from the crowd, at 
the end of the day you will gain respect.  It will take time, but you do gain respect at 
the end of the day. 
(Brigade 4, firefighter, six years’ service, age 25). 
 
How did the ‘shepherd(s)’ operate? 
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Colin: Just overpowering .. it’s hard to explain, ‘come on lets do this’ and it just rolls.   
Starts, it’s like a snowball and it just gets bigger and bigger and you get caught up in it 
as it rolls and gets bigger.  And that’s the only way I can explain it in our watch. 
 
Colin’s description of probationers’ behaviour, as like sheep following a leader, is common in the fire 
service.  However, when officers use this language they are often being more derogatory, alluding to 
all firefighters as a mindless flock, as opposed to a bonded group.  This can particularly apply when 
officers talk about the FBU’s influence over firefighters:   
 
Shaun: [Firefighters] are like a shoal of fish, they dart here and there
235
. 
(BCC student).  [My insert]. 
 
The context in which this officer makes his comment suggests that firefighters blindly follow the FBU 
(see Chapter 5).  Despite being pejorative, these metaphors reinforce the informal hierarchy by 
promoting a view that individuals should conform/bond and that probationers should simply follow 
their leaders.  The politics of what Shaun was saying will become more obvious in Chapter 5.  Colin’s 
‘goatish’ behaviour view may be a reaction to the watch’s refusal to accept his previous experience, 
not a resistance to the informal hierarchy per se.  Colin is finding it difficult to accept that age or 
experience before joining the fire service counts for little on the watch: it is ‘time served’ that counts 
(see Morgan 1987):   
 
Colin: It’s been hard to start again, it means nothing to **** fire service what I done.  I am 
back to square one again.  I am the new boy.  I was the new boy for a couple of years’ 
at my first station in the Army.  Well you know what its like
236
. 
 
It was Colin’s desire not to go through the process of earning respect again in the social hierarchy, 
rather than a resistance to the social hierarchy, which made him a subject of my theoretical sample.  
The firefighter who pointed Colin out to me had not realised that Colin has no problem in 
acknowledging the informal hierarchy in the civilian fire service.  Colin’s difficulties arise, because 
having served his time and presumably fitted in with the Army fire service, he does not consider that 
any move into a new hierarchy might involve a second set of humiliations.  It appears that to ‘real’ 
firefighters Colin’s time in the military fire service provides little kudos and he must start again.  
 
Colin’s resistance is similar to Jack’s, a conditional resistance, unlikely to challenge the 
informal hierarchy; a test of his status made more difficult because of his previous experience in the 
Army Fire service.  What follows from Colin and Jack suggests they ‘fit’ within category 3:  
 
Colin: You have got to get on, there are no ifs or buts, you have got to get on with people and 
if you don’t fit in you have got to change your way, or you’re not going to fit in.  But 
you can change your way to such an affect that you don’t change completely, but you 
change to please them, but in your own mind you’re true to yourself, if you see what I 
mean. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Jack: I will always fit in because I have got to work with them, so.  I don’t mean it in that 
way, because I have got to work with them, I wouldn’t want to alienate myself, 
                                                 
235 This extract was collected during a debate by the Brigade Command Course on the Grey Book dispute (see Chapter 1 
and 5).  These officers had a view, challenged by the data from the FBU in Chapter 5, that the FBU were able to blindly 
lead their members: to an extent they even supported a view widespread amongst officers in the fire service that there is 
strong element of radical politics influencing the leaders of the FBU.  These officers took no account of the fact that 
members of the FBU actually vote to take part in their resistance to employers/officers when national disputes occur, or 
vote, as it were, in their informal hierarchies when the resistance is more local. 
236 This is a rhetorical question: a situation that happened frequently as respondents accepted that as an ex-firefighter I had 
joint understandings with them. 
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because I think you have got to have on a watch, you have got to be tight. … I will 
just be myself.  I have no reason to want to be anyone else.   
[My emphases]. 
 
Both Colin and Jack have indicated that they are not sheep; they are testing boundaries.  They are 
accepting the existence of the informal hierarchy, but remain “true to yourself” by negotiating their 
place in the hierarchy
237.  Jack’s extracts suggest he decides to submit to the hierarchy, accepting that 
better things will come in the future: a form of deferred gratification.  However, in the future, after the 
socialising effect of the watch, “doing what you like” and “staying true to yourself” are unlikely to 
have the same meaning.   
 
4.2.9. The experienced firefighter 
Most, but not all, the data collected supports to the point of saturation (see Glaser and Strauss 1967) 
the hypothesis that most firefighters (for a variety of reasons) are prepared to fit in with watch 
understandings.  Some firefighters (like Jack and Colin) did appear to have a need to explain to me 
that they had their own minds and could resist watch norms if they wanted.  This indicates they were 
reflexive enough to be aware of the processes going on around them.  However, combining my 
observations, interviews and experiential knowledge provides a strong body of evidence to suggest 
that generally resistance is sporadic and more about establishing boundaries of where to fit in, rather 
than a challenge to the expectation that watch members should fit in.  Therefore, I shall provide a 
category that the experienced firefighter might recognise: 
 
4. Conformers: Christian, Dominic and Ian who ‘maintain’ the watch norms and fit in; expect 
others to fit in as well. 
 
4.2.10. Retiring firefighters 
During my fieldwork, it was possible for me to observe watch members ‘disappearing’ from 
communal areas/activities.  These tended to be the older more established watch members, but could 
also include younger experienced firefighters.  Alf in particular described how he is not so interested 
in the cut and thrust of communal behaviour and I would also locate Duke in this group.  Retreating to 
the more isolated corners of the station, to read a book, or have a snooze, were perhaps better options 
than admitting they no longer wanted to ‘play’, or be sociable.  This is not a stereotype for older 
firefighters, because sometimes they will ‘play’, and they will definitely involve themselves in 
developing protocols and the story telling discussed in Chapter 3; in particular in adding that almost 
essential nostalgic element that tradition gives to culture (see Strangleman 2000).  The research has 
benefited from the experience of talking to some of these ‘elder statespeople’ and apart from some 
reluctance to get out of bed during the night for false alarms, or other ‘time wasting calls’238, there 
were no noticeable features about their behaviour or attitudes to suggest anything other than they were 
taking an opportunity to spend time alone, or slow down their life-style.  Their ‘dedication to 
firefighters’ professional ethos was as much a paramount feature of their interviews as it was for 
‘younger’ firefighters.  ‘Older’ firefighters, of course, have less need to fit in, because they already 
have a firm grasp of how to fight fires.  Disappearing so to speak, once you have earned your right to 
do so, is unlikely to threaten the hierarchy and is a dividend for time served.  This suggests a fifth 
category: 
                                                 
237 Goffman’s work analyses how individuals operate to provide and create image and how in ‘total institutions’ the 
“indignities he or she must suffer from others, such as teasing, poking at negative attributes, and name-calling … adopting 
a stance is compatible with their conception of self”  (Goffman 1961: 23).  The fire service may not rank as a total 
institution, but the process is somewhat similar.  
238 These would be to false alarms or when the public call the fire service to help them with what firefighters might term as 
‘not their job’; cats up trees would be an example.  The police too have a view of what their job is and call some of the 
‘softer’ community style policing “rubbish” (Reiner 1985: 95). 
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5. Retirers: Duke and Alf, once established on the watch some firefighters move away from 
mainstream social activities and this causes no problems in the informal hierarchy.  
 
4.2.11. A first exception 
There was one particular exception to the way that an established watch receive a probationer.  This is 
when a female turns up instead of the male that Dominic (above) was expecting.  Then firefighters are 
confused about how to behave: 
 
Terri: It was awful actually, the first couple of weeks, ‘cos they hadn’t had a girly on this 
station.  They were all pussy footing around, “don’t swear; don’t do this; don’t get 
undressed’.  You know things like this, ‘Terri is about’ and then three or four weeks 
into it they all realised I was one of them and did the same as them, it was good. 
(Female firefighter).  [My emphases]. 
 
DB: What did you feel would have happened if you hadn’t? 
 
Terri: What if I didn’t fit in  with them?  I’d been miserable. 
[My emphasis and insert]. 
 
Terri’s evidence could suggest firefighters can simply turn on and off their beliefs that probationers 
must fit in, but I think that would be an oversimplification.  Terri may have been fortunate to meet a 
‘sympathetic’ watch, but I consider that if the firefighters had not soon “realised she was one of them” 
their behaviour may have been different.  “Pussyfooting around” was more likely an artificial 
environment that male firefighters probably could not sustain, and evidence suggests that soon the 
male firefighters would have been less understanding (IT 1995, 1996
239
; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).  
Terri’s extract suggests her watch played a waiting game; as soon as they realised they could impose 
their will on Terri, they treated her just like any other probationer.  Interestingly, it also appears that 
this was what Terri wanted, to become one of the boys and fit in.  In Chapter 1 I suggest that females 
are making their own decisions (at least as much as male probationers) when they fit in and Terri’s 
reaction matches with previous findings (Baigent 1996), which suggest inclusion is what many female 
firefighters want most of all.  However, that does not mean that the behaviour they ‘have’ to adopt 
and the treatment they receive is ideal, or their first choice.  Two female firefighters explain: 
 
Jayne: A long hard tough way of doing it.  I don’t regret it now, but it should have been 
easier, a less outgoing person would have given up. 
(Female firefighter). 
 
Sue: Just get on with the job and fit in with your watch. 
(Female firefighter). 
 
These are complicated issues, but Jayne’s and Sue’s comments are not really different to Jack’s and 
Colin’s. 
 
4.3. REAL RESISTANCE 
During the research, despite my efforts at theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967), I have not 
met any firefighters who refuse outright to accept the authority of the informal hierarchy.  However, 
during the interviews there were occasionally references made to support my view that such 
individuals exist, but this evidence was always secondhand; about others.  I prefer to hear evidence 
                                                 
239 The fact the fire service appealed what was a such a blatant case of harassment might be seen as providing evidence to 
support the view that the fire service is institutionally racist (see also HMCIFS). 
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firsthand, especially when I am sampling for information about a politically charged area where an 
informant may be criticising a third party for challenging their group norms.  I had to make a choice, 
whether to use the reported data about third parties, or not.  Eventually I decided to do so, thus there 
were three examples of individuals who have resisted the hierarchy and have not fitted in.  The 
evidence starts with a focus group in Brigade 2, consisting of firefighters from two stations discussing 
an individual that both groups knew
240
:     
 
4.3.1. ‘Tubby Taffy’241 
Isaac: On my training course we had one guy out of twenty people who isn’t a team member 
and it shows.  He’s been moved around.  Now he’s only been in two and a half years 
now, same as me, went to his watch they did not like him, so he got moved. 
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 2.5 years’ service, age 25). 
 
Ian: He probably is on his way to wrecking another watch is he?  
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30). 
 
Michael: Tubby Taffy. 
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30). 
 
Keith: No comment, I had a barney with him last week. 
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 15 years’ service, age 40). 
 
Isaac: Didn’t fit at training school, he didn’t fit at his station, obviously he doesn’t fit at 
another station, he is isn’t fit for the job. 
 
Ian: He came in thinking he was an officer and he doesn’t fit in. 
 
From their comments, you can sense the hostility these firefighters have for ‘Tubby Taffy’.  One 
reason for this was that he resisted their right to give him the nickname ‘Taffy’.  From my experience, 
I have no difficulty in imagining the treatment that ‘Tubby Taffy’ would receive in return for this 
resistance.  The term ‘tubby’, in a fitness orientated world, is pejorative and ‘Taffy’ has overtones of 
institutional racism.  Anti-racism, anti-harassment and equality training is so 
undeveloped/unsophisticated at most firestations that few in the fire service would probably even 
recognize that ‘Taffy’ could be a racist term (see Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).  Firefighters would 
more likely point to all those in the fire service who willingly accept such a nickname and this clouds 
the issue even more
242.  However, Taffy did not accept the watch’s nickname and (because he was a 
probationer) I would expect that most firefighters would view his behaviour as an outright challenge 
to their authority.  Then the name-calling would increase in consequence, fuelling a spiralling circle 
of harassment that follows ‘Tubby Taffy’ from station to station.  ‘Tubby Taffy’ is an example of 
how, “once you get known as a tosser”, the name can stick.   
 
4.3.2. ‘Charlie’243 
An example from Brigade 3 illustrates how a watch can create a circle of harassment around a 
firefighter who refuses to show deference: 
 
                                                 
240 It is important to note that this information was not the result of my search for ‘deviant’ firefighters and was innocently 
provided. 
241 ‘Tubby Taffy’ is a firefighter with 3 years’ service, aged 33. 
242 Collinson (1992: 108) argues that taking the piss out of each other and the acceptance of nicknames is a sign that real 
men can laugh at themselves.  Tubby Taffy is not prepared to accept this behaviour and those who do may just be 
supporting a hegemony that leads to a spiral of violence to those who will not.   
243 Age 30, 1 year’s service. 
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Ken: He is giving it all mouth and that he is the best at this and that and he was doing 
simple things wrong and they thought ‘yeah’.  They said to me ‘he made the mistake, 
he came in thinking he was the kid and he shouldn’t have done’.  Em, because of that 
they really give it to him and anything.  If you see a spazz
244
 or someone walking 
down the road, they say, ‘oh look there is Charlie, there is his wife’ and all this sort of 
stuff and he takes it now.  He says stuff back, but they just give it back to him even 
more.  He is not going to win. 
[My emphases]. 
 
The evil and the depth of this abuse should require no explanation, except to illustrate how personal a 
watch are prepared to be about Charlie (and his wife) for resisting their authority.  It is also an 
example of how an able-bodied group, who might well collect money for disabled children, are 
prepared to abuse the same children: to almost identify those, who are not part of the operational 
firefighters’ environment and not privileged to share in firefighters able-bodiedness, (and Charlie) as 
an ‘other’.  Charlie is not in the same brigade as those earlier informants who warned that 
probationers should be ‘seen and not heard’, but I am convinced that if they saw it necessary to push a 
probationer back into line they would act in a similarly.  Recently I have been informed that Charlie 
has gone the same way as many firefighters who do not fit in; he has changed stations.  However, 
either his reputation went before him or he is just unable to fit in, because this informant (who is 
unaware that I know about Charlie’s history) tells me he is still being harassed.   
 
4.3.3. ‘I am a mild man’ 
Brigade 1 has an example that provides an insight to how much a probationer can resist, but like 
‘Tubby Taffy’ also ‘chooses’ to move on.  Pete is a watch leader with the respect of other members of 
his watch and fits in with category 4 (conformer): 
   
Pete: I am fairly norm, normally I am a mild man, but this kid [Arthur], he got me wound up 
and I had to have a word with the sub about this fella.  Em, well, what I said to the sub 
was that ‘I would stab him’ [laughter]245.  He’s moved on. … He was always, yunnoo, 
cocky, lairy, know it all, yunnoo. 
(Brigade 1, firefighter, 18 years’ experience, age 43).  [My emphases and insert]. 
 
I was surprised at Pete’s reaction and I asked what happened.  Pete was clear, the whole watch ganged 
up against Arthur, but he did not give in: 
 
Pete: No, he was just too lairy.  He just, whatever you said he, yunnoo, ‘I don’t care’, 
yunnoo and all this lark. 
 
There clearly are some firefighters who do not want to fit in and will resist whatever the cost.  From 
these three examples it is possible to suggest that there are some (however few) firefighters who 
actually resist the informal hierarchy, but they all share the same outcome, they move on:     
 
                                                 
244 ‘Spazz’ is a shortened term for ‘spastic’ (cerebral palsy sufferers), and one form of humour I heard on many stations 
prior to the research is to tell a story with actions about the group of spastics who are told if they can clap their hands they 
can have an ice-cream.  When one eventually does this and is given an ice cream they miss their mouth and push the ice 
cream into their face.  The way this story is then turned around on Charlie is a clear example of fire service humour used 
to inflict pain on those who fail to submit to the informal hierarchy.  Once again, the use of language that would be totally 
inappropriate in many environments provides a good example of lack of equality training or its effectiveness and puts 
firefighters close to those dominant groups in the classroom who use similar language to label those with academic 
inadequacies as others (see Haywood and Mac an Ghaill 1996: 56).    
245 This is the only overt reference to violence that I found in during my research and I have no idea if it was real or not.  It 
is so accepted within the fire service that firefighters do not fight, that I consider this was a metaphor to explain just how 
upset Pete was. 
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6. Resisters: firefighters who would openly and persistently resist informal hierarchies like 
Tubby Taffy, Charlie and Arthur.  These firefighters may constantly move from watch to 
watch. 
 
4.4. HUMOUR 
The three examples of firefighters who have not fitted in and those whose fitting in has apparently 
been mostly to avoid the gaze of the watch, leads me to talk about fire service humour, and in 
particular, how firefighters use humour to police their norms (see Walby 1991; IT 1995; LFCDA 
1995; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).  It was my intention to have a chapter on fire service humour, but 
there are not enough words available in this thesis to accommodate everything.  Therefore, a whole 
chapter has been reduced to this small section, which focuses on how firefighters use the dark side of 
humour as a test of themselves and against deviant firefighters.  I will take as given that 
sexist
246
/racist/disablist remarks/jokes are common on a firestation and that this is one-way in which 
firefighters point to ‘their superiority’ as white, able-bodied males.  In common with other 
masculinity projects, fire service humour often appears to be about the social survival of the fittest 
(see Collinson 1992: 110), although I have a wealth of evidence to suggest that firefighters might 
romanticise their humour as just a laugh
247
, time filling
248
 or stress relieving
249
.   
 
4.4.1. Humour in dangerous occupations 
                                                 
246 Sexist humour, innuendo and pin-ups/pornography has always been a fact of life on a firestation: ‘a laugh’ (see Howell 
1994).  To a large extent this behaviour is now outlawed by management, but outlawing something in the fire service does 
not stop it happening.  More often, when a female firefighter serves on a watch the viewing of sexually explicit material is 
likely to be covert, but not always.  Female firefighters can acquiesce to or accept the presence of pornography.  Even 
when ‘hidden’ most female firefighters are aware they are never far away from pornography on a firestation and the 
effects of this knowledge are almost as much a harassment as if it were visible.  It may even be more of an harassment, 
because it is more difficult to challenge covert material than visible examples.  As a visitor to a firestation I would not 
have expected to see such literature, but I cannot remember a visit I made when I did not manage to find some visible 
evidence of sexist material. 
247 I attended a retirement function of a popular senior FBU official during the course of this research.  The function was 
attended by several hundred firefighters and their families; a range of senior officers including The Chief; a FBU National 
Officer and several Executive Council members.  During an entertaining speech lasting over one hour made by an officer 
he said, “Alfred was a good firefighter.”  Someone in the crowd called out “fireman” and the speaker replied, “thank you 
for that”; Alfred raised his hand in acknowledgement and the audience murmured in support.  This was not the only 
example of sexism in the speeches and cameos played out to the receptive audience.  One of the cameos involved an overt 
example of racism, where a blacked-up man ran onto the stage in grass skirt carrying a spear; another involved an ongoing 
joke at the expense of disabled wheel-chair users.  The FBU National Officer was visibly ‘squirming’ and the occasion did 
not really provide him with a platform to speak out, but when his turn came he did make a reference to the difficulty he 
had speaking on such a platform.   
248 Firefighters get bored at the firestation whilst they are waiting for calls.  They will look for ways of filling these spaces 
by playing tricks on their colleagues.  Many, like Rob later in this chapter, would describe firefighters’ behaviour as 
childish at these times.  Jokes are often spontaneous, but can also be part of a carefully laid plan: a windup involving 
contextual and repetitive humour that tests a firefighters’ reactions, only funny at the time, such as touching someone’s 
shoulder and making them look, or walking into a room and saying, ‘he has got a big head hasn’t he’.  When someone 
replies ‘who’ saying ‘humpty dumpty’.  
249 Firestations are also at the cutting edge of black humour, and they will develop jokes to turn round tragedy.  If someone 
loses their arm they will say he is [h]armless.  By contextualising any tragedies, especially those involving loss of life, into 
another form, the watch can re-group to avoid the personal anguish such circumstances could create: a diversionary tactic 
which avoids facing the pain victims suffered by erecting a wall between them and the situation.  Firefighters have the 
advantage they are not directly involved at a personnel level with work related tragedies, but they do witness these 
tragedies at close hand and they are caring people with families of their own.  There is a whole body of evidence to 
support my view that firefighters use humour to control their emotions at incidents and break ‘the ice’ of silence that can 
descend after being involved in tragedy (Hassard 1985: 189; Wallington 1989: 177; Docherty 1991: 71; Hall 1991: 33; 
McLeod and Cooper 1992: 27; Delson 1996).  Other professions use diversionary tactics as well.  “Black humor, an 
appreciation for the absurd or the bizarre, allows nurses to detach from extremely stressful situations, survive emotionally, 
and continue to give good care.  Such humor is often a source of embarrassment to the staff, in that it makes them question 
their own feelings of tenderness and caring.  On the other hand, they all readily admit the humor permits them to survive 
and serves as a cohesive force in the unit during times of stress” (Hutchinson 1986: 201).    
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Humour in dangerous occupations can be explained as “caustic wit and rudeness [that] is 
symptomatic of the close relations between the men”  (Pitt 1979: 38 cited in Collinson 1988).  It has 
already been established that the firestation is not an area patrolled by managers and firefighters have 
the space to talk throughout the shift.  This space allows firefighters’ informal hierarchy to use 
humour to colonise not only the breaks (see Goffman 1959; Linstead 1985 cited in Collinson 1988), 
but also most of the working day.  I believe humour to be the enforcing arm of firefighters’ hierarchy, 
which firefighters use to bully those who do not follow the rules.  ‘Motivated’ equal opportunities 
workers acknowledge this: 
 
Hilary: The vehicle for bullying is humour. 
(Senior civilian equality adviser). 
 
Chris: Firefighters join as nice people, yet to a greater or lesser extent this is lost in service.  
The organisation must knock it out of them. 
(Senior civilian equality adviser). 
 
 Perry: … wouldn’t be tolerated in most workplaces.  Heavily influenced with racism heavily 
influenced with sexism.  On some occasions it can be the most incredibly dry laconic 
humour you can ever get, which has always been true of people who every now and 
again face dangerous situations.  But I think generally the undercurrent of humour has 
always been very internal; wouldn’t be the type of humour they would get away with 
indoors around their mum and dad, or their children. 
(Senior FBU representative). 
 
 
These equality workers have no doubt that firefighters’ humour is not fun (see LFCDA 1995; FBU 
1999a) 
 
4.4.2. Teamwork and the windup 
Most firefighters do not recognise their humour or horseplay as bullying.  Most firefighters defend 
their humour by suggesting it is a means of testing each other.  Chapter 3 has spoken of operational 
tests, but the windups, as firefighters call their attempts to get a reaction from their colleagues, are less 
covert and actually acknowledged as tests.  At the start of this chapter we heard from Dominic about 
the watch’s gaze: a subject he returned to later in the focus group discussion: 
 
Dominic: Em, everyone has got to be looking at you.  They have got to be testing you out in all 
different ways.  And the bullying you mentioned earlier on, I would not call it 
bullying, but I would say piss taking and everything else to see how you react.  
(My emphases). 
 
Guy: That builds up the teamwork doesn’t it.  
(Brigade two, firefighter, 10 years’ service, age 37). 
 
Dominic: To find out how you react to a given situation.  To find out if you can take it or 
whether you can’t. 
 
Words, around firefighters, can become confusing, but it is clear to me that what I define as bullying 
is my current subjective view of my own behaviour when I was a firefighter, which I thought of as 
“piss taking” (also known as ‘humour/banter/windup’).  Dominic and most firefighters are very clear, 
“piss taking” to see “how you react” is an inclusive, not an exclusive, process, which helps in 
teambuilding by involving everyone in testing each other.  This testing process is common amongst 
males and designed to identify if another male has the necessary masculine understandings to ‘prove’ 
  
99 
they can ‘take it’ (see Mac an Ghaill 1996: 68250).  Simply put it is a test to see if the recipient has 
the strength to control their emotions and not ‘bite back’.  Firefighters know that if they are woundup 
(react), they not only provide their colleagues with a laugh, they have also failed a test of their 
(masculine) reliability.  They might crack under pressure and they will be seen as weak and irrational 
(feminine).  It is difficult not to consider that females might feel completely excluded by such 
behaviour (see Collinson and Hearn 1994: 3
251
; FBU 1999c).  Humour though does not only wear 
down female firefighters and in the same focus group evidence of the strain their own humour causes, 
emerged:  
 
Cliff: You have just got to learn to live with it. 
(Brigade two, firefighter, 5 year’s service, age 27). 
 
DB: Is it something that you enjoy? 
 
Cliff: Not all the time.  No it can get to a stage when you are just fed up with it.    I am sure 
we all get to that stage as well. 
 
Guy: Yeah you can do, but just like Cliff says, you just learn to live with it and adjust.  
 
Cliff: You need a break sometimes, like your four days off, after you come back you feel 
refreshed again. 
 
Guy: And you start all over again. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
I visited these firefighters several times and they were a closely bonded watch, with very ‘good’ 
working relationships and mutual understandings.  It may be possible that there were hidden 
undercurrents I did not find, but I do not believe so.  It was this watch whose ‘boob test’ I passed (see 
Chapter 2) and they trusted me as much as any watch I observed.  Had they not done so, it is unlikely 
that they would have been so open about how difficult the humour could become.  Their explanations 
almost appear to suggest that their humour got out of control; that the watch had created a dynamic 
that was bigger than any individual.  It is important to acknowledge this was not a group of 
probationers talking to me, but experienced firefighters.   
 
Humour appears as a considerable ‘force’ behind firefighters’ informal hierarchy, which may 
have various positive outcomes for firefighters, but there have been a number of incidences when the 
informal hierarchy have acted to use horseplay/humour/testing as harassment.  It is easy to see (but 
not defend) why ‘fire service humour’ is aimed abusively at certain groups (women, probationers and 
resisters): it is an attempt to drive them out or bring them into line.  Not quite so obvious is the way 
firefighters use humour to patrol their hierarchy as a constant test of the masculine understanding that 
it is weak to be woundup.  It may even be that the windup is a rite of passage for recruits to pass 
through, but a rite of passage that never actually ends; what others in the fire service might see as an 
initiation ceremony. This behaviour serves as a reminder (and example) to firefighters of how 
uncomfortable life can become if they were to challenge watch norms and draw the full gaze of the 
watch upon themselves.  However, firefighters have not generally seen their humour as harassment, 
despite having a victim and an audience.  They acknowledge that humour can be difficult to handle, 
                                                 
250“New members are teased incessantly and tested to see whether they are ‘man enough’ to take the insults couched in the 
humour of ‘piss taking’ and the embarrassment of highly explicit sexual references. Those who display a willingness to 
‘give it and take it’ are accepted into the masculine subculture, while those who ‘snap’ have failed this particular test of 
manhood and are likely to be kept at a distance”  (Mac an Ghaill 1996: 68; see Goffman 1959: 211; Hearn and Parkin 
1987; Collinson and Collinson 1989: 95; Collinson 1992: 111). 
251“Within organizations, many men do not seem to recognise their actions as expressions of men’s power and male 
identity.  Where men see humour, teasing, camaraderie and strength, women often perceive crude, specifically masculine 
aggression, competition, harassment, intimidation and misogyny” (Collinson and Hearn 1994: 3). 
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but many consider it an acceptable part of their working arrangements: a price they have to pay to 
be part of the team/watch.  For the majority of firefighters, being part of the watch is integral to their 
work and while they may not fully recognise it, humour is actually a resource they use to ensure the 
watch adopt and comply with a variety of norms.  It may be that notions of a dynamic that is out of 
control are not so misplaced and that many firefighters fit in then replicate the same ‘harassment’ on 
the next generation almost without thinking.  This resource is learnt homosocially. 
 
4.5. OFFICERS 
4.5.1. Leaving the operational watch  
As I said earlier, it is surprising that anyone resists the informal hierarchy in the fire service and 
overtly refuses to fit in.  The examples above clearly indicate it is possible, but this may always 
involve the resister moving on at regular intervals, presumably as the pressure/humour from the watch 
becomes too much for them.  However, there are other ways to avoid the informal hierarchy that do 
not involve direct resistance, including seeking promotion, or moving sideways away from a station 
to areas of work that the watch would call ‘non-op’252.  The explanations that follow are from officers 
who, having shared the experience of being a firefighter, might experience the pull, or push, of the 
watch.   
  
Patrick explains that right from the start he did not enjoy being on a watch: 
 
Patrick: I was quieter than most and I didn’t altogether like the practical jokes.  I was never one 
really for practical jokes. Fortunately they never played too many on me.  I didn’t like 
it, but I understand it’s part of the way of the firebrigade.   
(Residential Officer attached to FP). 
 
Patrick provides some data to support a view that humour on a firestation can be a form of 
harassment.  I asked Patrick why he sought promotion: 
Patrick: Well I think we all joined for the same sort of reason, we all wanted to render 
assistance to the people.  Our clients as they like to call them these days, our 
customers.  It was all very well, but in those days it was a matter of: clean the fire 
engine, wash it out, make sure the tyres are pumped up; clean the floors; do the 
cooking, which I never used to like anyway.  Always seemed to make a mess of it for 
the watch and I don’t think they thought much of it anyway.  So I wanted some better 
job satisfaction, so I looked at what the Lf’s253 were doing and found that that was a bit 
more interesting, a bit more demanding.  So I took promotion and eh, enjoyed it. 
[My emphases]. 
 
From Patrick’s answer it is possible to suggest he did not fit in on a firestation: he did not enjoy 
cleaning, cooking or the humour.   However, he did want to “render assistance.”  Rather than leave, 
Patrick chose promotion, spending 18 years’ serving in areas that avoid the informal hierarchy.  This 
opportunity is available to any firefighter who might like to escape and still serve in a variety of ‘non-
op’ jobs/promotions.  Most officers would not be as honest as Patrick so I have formed a category for 
those who choose to leave the watch either as resistance or for promotion:    
 
7. Careerists or Movers:  Patrick who does not fit in with the watch, but still wants to ‘serve’ 
and resists by moving sideways.  There are a variety of opportunities to escape the 
operational side of the fire service by moving to different spheres such as: administration, 
personnel, Fire Prevention, Communications, Research and Development, Training and 
Senior/Principal Management. 
                                                 
252 ‘Non-op’ can be used broadly to apply to anyone in the service who is not actually ‘riding’ a fire appliance.   
253 Leading firefighter, a JO (junior officer), increasingly called a crew-commander. 
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Patrick was not the only officer to explain his dislike for working on an operational watch.  Rob (Fire 
Prevention Station Officer from Brigade Eight) told me that he considered firefighters behaved like 
“animals” at stations and changed “from children into men when the bells actuated.”254  Rob did not 
want to return to operational duties and his reference to children relates to firefighters’ ‘childish’ 
humour.     
 
4.5.2. Careerists 
Not all officers leave the station because they have difficulties with firefighters.  The considerable 
opportunities for promotion (Flanagan 1998) can pull officers.  Alistair’s view is a familiar one:  
 
Alistair: The watch officer is the best job in the fire service. 
(BCC, student). 
 
In an extended set of quotes, watch-commander Barry explains the type of quandary Alistair faced 
before he chose  to leave the “best job in the fire service” for senior rank.  Barry joined the fire service 
specifically to become an officer: 
   
Barry: I really wanted somewhere I could progress through and that is really, what appealed 
in the firebrigade.   
(Brigade 1, Watch Officer, seven years’ service, age 34).   
 
Barry also displayed very similar reactions to the informal hierarchy as many firefighters: 
 
Barry: A bit of a shock, but you know the ropes.  Get in, head down and em.  I settled in quite 
well and I had a couple of ups and downs with certain people, certain things.  I think I 
was quite lucky .. I think you are lucky when you come in a bit later in life and you 
have got a bit of experience behind you and you can adjust a bit more.  You see the 
younger blokes, perhaps it takes a little bit longer. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Barry might be seen as passing through categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 of being a firefighter before choosing 
promotion.  Barry had been an engineer, but he identified fire service humour as extreme:  
 
Barry: Yeah, it’s eh .. the engineering trades a bit lairy, but not as lairy as this job.   This job 
is totally unique. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
Barry’s quandary is that he joined to become an officer but he enjoys firefighting: 
 
Barry: Yeah that’s the sort of quandary I am in with the promotion at the moment.  Cos, once 
you take [further promotion], where I am, you sit in the one seat
255, and you’ve got to 
detach yourself a certain amount.  And you have got to take one step back and control 
the situation, rather than be part of the situation.  And I still like sitting on the front of 
the pump, or in the back BA
256
.  I have only been in The Job for seven years’ and I still 
enjoy it.  Yunnoo, that sort of .. it’s not what I joined the job  for, but once I joined The 
Job I really enjoy it. 
[My emphasis]. 
                                                 
254 These remarks were not tape recorded, but key words were recorded in my field book. 
255 This indicates he is the officer in charge. 
256 ‘The back’ is the position the firefighters occupy en route to the fire and the two outside riders wear BA and ‘get into’ 
the fire. 
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What Barry is saying here is that as a, ‘rider officer’ he enjoys being part of the firefighting team, but 
he realises if he stays true to his original reason for joining and seeks further promotion, he will arrive 
at fires by car and then he will be, “one step back.”  Barry then went on to explain why he enjoys 
firefighting, which shows just how much his view accords with firefighters who do not choose 
promotion (see Chapter 3):   
 
Barry: It’s the text book answer, sense of achievement, pride and all those sorts of things.  
You actually really enjoy what you are doing, yunnoo, you’re there to help people and 
enjoy helping people. 
[My emphasis]. 
 
DB: And that’s the reason that you enjoy it? 
 
Barry: Well there is also the other reason, the buzz, the thrill, yunnoo.  I have been a bit close 
to the wire a couple of times and eh I think it, actually when you have been in a couple 
of situations where it gets a bit close to the wire, it makes you appreciate life a little bit 
more. 
[My emphases]. 
 
Barry ‘enjoys’ the “buzz”, the realisation of what it is like to be in danger “close to the wire.”  
However, Barry has a plan for his progression:  
 
Barry: Eh I think once .. I would like to actually .. the ideal route is to do your ops 
[operational] bit and then go sideways to Fire Safety.  I done five months in Fire 
Safety, not last year the year before and really enjoyed the job, but don’t enjoy the nine 
day fortnight.  But I think once I take the move, I perhaps put the going out and riding 
machines a little bit behind me.  Em, get settled, do me bit where you actually take the 
responsibility on board and then I think I will slide across quite happily … I  would 
perhaps go across to tech
257
. 
[My emphases and insert]. 
 
Barry realises that further promotion will involve him in moving away from the watch and working 
alone at a desk: a situation that will not only remove him from the action, but will probably make him 
an outcast (see Chapters 1, 5 and 6)
258
.  Barry, after fitting in with a number of categories, is currently 
an example of a watch officer who must decide whether to stay in the best job in the fire service or 
move on.  There are at least two possible options open to Barry, leading to hypotheses 8 and 9:  
 
8. Reluctant Careerists: Torn between the watch and the desk: firefighters who join the fire 
service as a career intending to be promoted, but become acculturated/happy on a watch 
and do not leave. 
9. Sympathetic Careerists: Barry and Shaun, who are prepared to leave their station to further 
their career, but their reluctance to do so may always make them sympathetic to the 
informal hierarchies operating on a station.     
 
Now with nine categories that might explain the routes firefighters take within the informal hierarchy 
and how some move into the formal hierarchy, it is time to look for an analysis of what this thesis so 
far suggests about fitting in. 
 
                                                 
257 Technical services. 
258 Hart recognises that many officers have “a lack of interest in promotion outside of the operational” (Hart 1982: 123). 
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4.6. LINKS BETWEEN GETTING IN AND FITTING IN  
There is what appears as two ‘ubiquitous’ processes on watches, getting in and fitting in, and it may 
be helpful to summarise these at this stage.  In its operational organisation the fire service applies 
well-tried and tested national standards and procedures, which ultimately focus on getting fire 
appliances to a fire.  The firefighters who comprise that attendance, collectively adapt some of these 
procedures at watch level as part of their protocols, which they argue is the best way to support their 
professional ethos: to provide an efficient service to help the public.  This mix of both formal and 
informal firefighting protocols may vary between watches, but are so similar that they enable 
firefighters to work together at large makeups (up to 50 pumps and beyond).  However, arguments 
that firefighters’ professional ethos is the driving force behind their informal adaptations have been 
qualified by my suggestion that firefighters may not only be serving the public when they get in, but 
also a number of other agendas surrounding being a good firefighter.   
 
4.6.1. At the station/fitting in 
It also appears the formalised structure, of written orders, uniform, saluting, ‘yes sir/madam’ 
discipline learnt at training centre, is subject to an informal mix by firefighters’ hierarchy.  This 
hierarchy also provides some order to ensure, as much as possible, that firefighters fit in with each 
other, ostensively, so they can develop and adhere to their firefighting protocols.  For probationers 
this can involve a period of adjustment, during which they must first show respect to experienced 
firefighters, then gradually they participate in the hierarchy and in the development of firefighting 
protocols.  This process seems logical enough, if it was not for my suggestion that some firefighting 
activities are considerably influenced by firefighters’ attempts to maintain/test their ability to be seen 
as a good firefighter in their own, their peers’ and the public’s eye (see Chapter 3).  If my argument is 
only partly true, then the informal hierarchy might be seen as reinforcing not only firefighting 
protocols, but masculine ones as well.  Further complicating this issue is the way that firefighters 
might be developing their more personal agendas in the shadow of firefighting; making the two 
almost indiscernible from each other.   
 
Whilst firefighters are always prepared for a fire, there will be many days, even on the busiest 
of stations, that there are no fires.  This leaves a great deal of social space, both formal and informal, 
and firefighters’ hierarchy helps to organise this.  During at least part of their stand-down time 
(Chapter 1) most watches will organise team games that improve their group ties and fitness.  
However, it is possible that after a period of obsessional sporting activity, a new activity may develop 
in ‘the wings’ as the next obsessional activity.  Some watches have little interest in physical fitness at 
all, preferring instead sedentary group activities whenever possible.  Group activities can also be 
paradoxical and one watch actually celebrated its diverse dynamics by suggesting that they were all 
individuals.  On this watch, the peer group leaders were big muscular males who spent a considerable 
amount of time in the gym.  Weightlifting is an individual sport and this would support their 
contentions about being individuals.  However, the ‘whole’ watch were obsessional about their fitness 
activities: the ‘weak’ as well as the ‘strong’ were individuals together.  One almost calculable sign of 
the diversity of how different watches develop relates to trade union activity.  In Chapter 5 a senior 
FBU official considers some watches will be active trade unionists, others less so and it came as no 
surprise to find this might depend on if the peer group leader is a union activist or not.    
 
Despite the whole shift being spent mostly in situations where firefighters can chat without 
restraint, meal breaks are normally important areas for ‘reaching out’ to the whole watch.  I have 
observed many meal breaks and these provide a further example of how similar (even in its diversity), 
a watch can be.  At one extreme, an interview I was involved in overran and the watch waited for the 
two of us before eating.  At the other extreme, one watch had no communal system for preparing 
meals and each firefighter brought in their own food; some even ate in separate rooms from the 
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others
259
.  However, as this thesis will continue to argue, while not all firefighters are social actors 
and some will stand aside or resist group norms, there always appears to be a core group, which 
provides the group dynamic that firefighters need to be effective in their work.  This core group might 
be friends off duty as well as on, and some watches will socialise together off duty, playing sport and 
meeting off duty.  Many firefighters work together in their ‘fiddle jobs’ and some firefighters even 
employ other firefighters (see Chapter 1).  Charity work is also common amongst firefighters who use 
their public profile to good avail
260
.   
 
4.6.2. Why is there so little resistance? 
It appears that most firefighters enjoy firefighting, their informal hierarchy supports their professional 
ethos, sustains their social relationships and possibly other agendas.  This thesis so far has shown 
(with some notable exceptions) that if you fit in with the informal hierarchy in this mainly white male 
workforce, life can be happy, stable and rewarding.  But, as any visitor to a watch will quickly 
recognise, firefighters have very different characters and are inclined to be strong willed.  Whilst one 
might expect personalities to be put on one side at operational incidents, it is surprising that they fit in 
so well at the station.  The same too may be said of probationers who arrive at a station: they too fit in 
— a  round peg in the right hole as it were.  It could be argued that the informal hierarchies are so 
powerful that they not only subsume individual resistance, but they can also overcome individual 
firefighters’ will.  I dispute this possibility; firefighters’ hierarchy is not a reified phenomenon, its 
existence is a joint act of will of the watch.  I am accept that firefighters may give up some agency to 
the group, but the watch is not a shoal of fish and it is difficult to understand why the group remains 
so harmonious.  Consequently, I ask myself a further question: how do groups in such close proximity 
manage to sustain their harmony?   
 
4.6.3. Self-selecting groups and transfers 
I almost missed one explanation for why there is so little disagreement on a watch, because it was so 
obvious to me: firefighters form self-selecting groups
261
 and can transfer almost at will between 
watches.  Transferring allows firefighters who do not fit in on one watch to move on.  Tubby Taffy, 
Arthur and Charlie have done this
262
, although apparently they have not put their past behind them as 
successfully as the following example.  This is taken from an article in London Firefighter (Jones 
1999: 27) where a black female firefighter is asked, “what’s been your best/most memorable moment 
at work?”  Her answer was “Joining Acton blue watch and leaving my old station behind.”  Self-
selection through transferring may also explain why different watches can have a professional ethos in 
common with ‘all’ firefighters and similar protocols for firefighting, and yet each watch can be 
individual and have different social relationships, interests and patterns of behaviour.  It might even 
suggest that outside of the operational sphere each watch develops its own unique ‘personality’.  This 
is not to reify the watch, but to suggest that a watch is likely to comprise of people who have ‘chosen’ 
to serve together because they have similar views and that this may become a circular process, in 
which ‘proving’ that you belong fit in becomes a self-perpetuating process.      
 
4.6.4. The right to transfer 
                                                 
259 It may be that I missed the opportunity to find out some something very important from this watch, but it was not 
possible to return and look again at the consequences of this behaviour.  
260 In a sign of both their ability to collect money and the public’s trust of firefighters, one station spontaneously decided 
to collect for Children In Need and stood at the traffic lights outside their station.  They took with them the buckets off the 
appliances and collected over £3000 from passing motorist in under three hours.  Such was the trust that the public have in 
firefighters that no one asked them what they were collecting for.    
261 Grint (1998: 279) uses this term to explain how miners used to pick who they worked with underground. 
262 Collinson (1992: 93) points out that often workers are trapped in situations where they cannot move to other work to 
avoid conflict with people they do not like.   
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Transferring is a Grey Book condition of service
263
 and is usually a relatively easy process, which 
allows firefighters to transfer from watch to watch, station to station and brigade to brigade.  Most 
brigades publish a transfer list at regular intervals and in essence, all a firefighter has to do is to find 
someone who has similar qualifications and they can then ‘mutually exchange’ stations.  The process 
can become very sophisticated when direct transfers cannot be achieved and can involve a whole 
chain of firefighters moving to different watches.  Officers, who may wish to ‘help’ an unhappy (and 
potentially disruptive) firefighter to transfer, can frequently facilitate these complicated transfers.  
Choosing the right watch to transfer to is also made easier by the way that when a watch experiences 
a temporary shortage of firefighters, that other stations fill that shortage on a shift-by-shift basis (by 
‘ordering a firefighter on ‘outduty’ for the shift’).  Outduties, as can be imagined, are not popular, 
because they can involve a firefighter being an outsider with an unfamiliar watch.  However, the 
firefighter who is not happy on their watch can get some respite by volunteering for the outduty.  
Moreover, whilst on outduty the unhappy firefighter can take the opportunity to identify if the watch 
they are spending their outduty with, is one they might want to transfer to and if anyone there wants 
to transfer.   
 
Firefighters do not only transfer when they are uncomfortable, they could transfer for a whole 
host of reasons.  For example they: 
 consider it is time for a change; 
 consider they would like to work at a busier or quieter station; 
 would like to live nearer to their work; 
 have found a watch that displays similar interests to their own; 
 wish to be stationed with their friends or their ‘fiddle job’ companions.     
 
Leaving/transferring can be an important feature in maintaining watch harmony, because unhappy 
firefighters can ‘choose’ to join another watch, and this is an alternative to seeking promotion or 
leaving.  Transferring can also prevent the abusive behaviour of a watch against someone who does 
not fit in from developing or even being recognised publicly.  This can have a variety of impacts, not 
the least of which is that the watch can actually set out to force someone to transfer as may have 
happened to Arthur, Charlie and Tubby Taffy.  Rather than interfering in this possible harassment, 
officers may even prefer to leave the informal hierarchy to organise watch relations.  This sort of 
recognition by officers enhances the authority of the informal hierarchy and reduces the requirement 
for officers to manage difficult situations
264
.   
 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that most firefighters share an overwhelming desire to fit in with watch 
norms.  The list of categories produced throughout this chapter is now updated to provide some guide 
to how firefighters experience fitting in on a watch. 
 
Probationers: 
1. Accepters: Ken, Roger and Ray accept the hierarchy and both Ray and Roger provide 
some reason for why this is.  
                                                 
263 Does not normally apply to probationers. 
264 Officers could not arrange Charlie’s transfer against his wishes.  Nor have officers the ability to transfer those 
firefighters who are harassing Charlie (as a summary punishment).  There is an agreement with the FBU that all transfers 
have to be justified, just to prevent officers having vendettas against firefighters.  The FBU argument is that if a firefighter 
is being difficult, officers should manage the situation, or use the disciplinary code.  This is a typical example of how the 
discipline code works against officers rather than for them, because it is difficult to identify peer leaders as breaking the 
rules, when they organise the informal hierarchy.  Organisations, trying to affect corporate colonisation by breaking the 
informal hierarchy are often seen to be moving on peer leaders (see Strangleman and Roberts 1999: 51).  The FBU 
agreement effectively prevents this.   
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2. Conditional accepters: Richard indicates he is not entirely happy deferring to such 
social pressures, but has done nothing to resist publicly.  This may be a similar reaction to 
that of the female firefighters, Terri, Jayne and Sue. 
3. Testers: Jack and Colin indicate the first real signs of public resistance to the peer group’s 
expectation, but this may more a testing of boundaries and almost a rite of passage.   
  
Experienced firefighters: 
4. Conformers: Pete, Dominic, Ian and Christian who ‘maintain’ the watch norms; fit in and 
expect others to fit in as well. 
5. Retirers: Duke and Alf, who once established on the watch move away from mainstream 
social activities and this causes no problems in the informal hierarchy.  
6. Resisters: Tubby Taffy, Charlie and Arthur who would openly and persistently resist 
informal hierarchies.  These firefighters may constantly move from watch to watch. 
 
Officers: 
7. Careerists or Movers:  Patrick and Rob, who do not fit in with the watch, still want to 
‘serve’ and resist by moving sideways to different spheres of the fire service such as: 
Administration, Personnel, Fire Prevention, Communications, Research and Development, 
Training, Communications, Training and Personnel, or take promotion to senior rank.  
These firefighters may actually never have fitted in and may in part comprise of ‘Resisters’ 
above (and may not have joint understandings with firefighters about their professional 
ethos; see Chapter 5).   
8. Reluctant careerists: who are torn between the watch and the desk.  These include 
firefighters who join the fire service as a career intending to be promoted, but become 
acculturated/happy on a watch and do not want to leave. 
9. Sympathetic careerists: Barry and Shaun, who are prepared to leave their station to further 
their career, but their reluctance to do so may always make them sympathetic to the 
informal hierarchies and family life at a station.     
 
It may be that fitting in is not so much an outcome, but different stages or processes that 
firefighters might pass through that then lead to outcomes.  First and foremost, the probationer has to 
fit in by accepting the informal hierarchy.  Second, the probationer learns their work-related and 
social skills.  At the same time firefighters have to fit in with the social behaviour on watches, which 
in any formal sense might not always be work-related.  However, it should come as no surprise that 
the majority want and do fit in, because most people have a strong desire to either be part of, or at 
least not be excluded from a social group (see Morgan 1987: 48).  In particular, this chapter 
recognises that most firefighters experience a considerable pull and push to fit in.  Most of those who 
join The Job do so for a number of dividends.  Work to a firefighter is not a four letter word (see 
Collinson 1992) and their desire to fit in pushes them towards firefighters’ hierarchy, which pulls 
them into a circular process, that first encompasses each new member, and in turn those members 
become part of the process that makes (and polices) the hierarchies norms and then reaches out to the 
next cohort of firefighters.   
 
My findings concerning ‘the pull’ are not surprising and this reflects in the overwhelming 
number of applications those ‘others’ outside of the fire service make to join when vacancies occur.  
However, the high retention rates suggest that firefighters are happy to stay and accept the ‘the push’ 
to fit in exerted by firefighters’ informal hierarchy.  This hierarchy is capable of exerting considerable 
influence over the probationer, because experienced firefighters control access to the skills needed to 
become a firefighter (see Chapter 3).  However, in their role as gatekeeper the hierarchy also require 
the probationer to respect them before they will pass on these skills and in this way they appear to fit 
in successive cohorts of firefighters.  Fitting in appears to be a dynamic few firefighters can avoid and 
most probationers are likely to suppress some of their own negative feelings to fit in: either by a 
conscious decision to do this, or because they are caught up in the, “snowball” (Colin above): a 
dynamic that watch leaders use to sweep away opposition and collect everybody together.  One 
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possible outcome of joining the informal hierarchy for probationers is that their socialisation 
involves accepting the way the watch acts, and has the outcome that they start to act like them as they 
increasingly fit in; become part of the dynamic that form the watch norms and in turn persuade others 
to fit in.   
 
Many probationary firefighters have shown their awareness of the potential of the informal 
hierarchy to make life difficult if they do not fit in and have done so without experiencing any 
harassment themselves.  Supporting my analysis is further evidence from prospective recruits to 
indicate that at least some of those applying to join have an already existing expectation that they will 
need to fit in with informal hierarchies.  There is also evidence to suggest that the fire service actually 
filters for recruits who have some awareness of masculine hierarchies/understandings.  Until 1982, 
these gatekeeping practices managed to exclude females from becoming firefighters.  However, this 
misogynist gatekeeping was successfully challenged, but led and continues to lead to serious 
consequences for female firefighters (Walby 1991; IT 1995; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999; Corby 
1999).  To some extent, the fire service may be moving from gatekeeper’s outright refusal to accept 
female firefighters and thus the direct and vile harassment that males use to try and deny female 
firefighters access may be reducing.  Evidence from Terri, Jayne and Sue, hardly varies from their 
male counterparts; both male and female firefighters want to fit in, but do not altogether enjoy the 
process (category 2).  What may be different is that male firefighters probably have insider experience 
of male hierarchies before joining the fire service (see Willis 1979, 1995; Canaan 1996; Prendergast 
and Forest 1998).  This experience may allow them to realise the benefits in terms of patriarchal 
dividend (see Connell 1995) if they “keep their heads down” and defer their gratification until they 
have fitted in.  In particular, it may be that male firefighters are likely to see their treatment as a rite of 
passage and not as personal, or as harassment.  However, for Terri at least, it was not her first time 
amongst male hierarchies and her words indicate she wanted the “pussyfooting around” to stop, so 
she could become “one of them.”  I prefer not to view Terri’s behaviour as being forced, but her own 
decision (see Chapter 1).  Terri and other female firefighters may be developing human capital (in line 
with prospective male firefighters) to enhance their career prospects in a male organisation: a further 
example to add to those Walby (1997) notes earlier (see Chapters 1 and 6).     
 
What I call ‘the push’ to fit in could be seen as homosociality (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; 
Cockburn 1991b; Roper 1996; Chapter 1) as particularly in the fire service ‘gatekeepers’ may have 
hidden agendas concerning: how firefighting should be done (see Chapter 3); who should be 
firefighters (see Chapters 1, 5 and 6); firefighters status/imagery (see Chapters 3 and 5) and a variety 
of localised watch norms.  Much of the behaviour of the informal hierarchy in introducing and 
policing its complex homosocial practices of fitting in can also be formally labelled as harassment 
(see MacKinnon 1979; Walby 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Morris and Nott 1991; Palmer 1992; 
Herbert 1994).  At least four examples of resistance have clearly been harassed (Tubby Taffy, Charlie, 
Arthur and Ricky/tough guy).  These examples and the example of Patrick and Rob also indicate that 
not everybody fits in.  Despite possible abusive attention being focused on them, some have survived 
outside of the informal hierarchy and two have made careers away from the watch: they have ‘fitted 
in’ as Fire Safety Officers  (it is also possible that Bob (Chapter 3 may find himself led to non-op 
duties).  This thesis does not aim to develop an understanding of officers’ needs or experiences.  
However, officers, in a similar way to female firefighters, bring evidence to the research to help in 
identifying how masculinity might develop socially in the fire service.  Officers’ evidence indicates 
how for some, promotion has been a means of escape from the group: they have almost been levered 
off the watch to pursue their individual objectives.  Whilst some have almost taken promotion 
reluctantly, because they know they are giving up a job they enjoy, and sitting behind a desk may not 
be so glamorous, but it pays better and you are less likely to get injured.  However, it is interesting to 
note that officers may leave a watch for two almost opposite reasons; those more interested in officers 
may wish to pursue this.   
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5. CHAPTER FIVE CLASS, HIERARCHIES, RESISTANCE AND GENDER 
CONSTRUCTION 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have examined two areas central to firefighters’ work (and firefighters’ 
gender construction) ‘getting in’ and ‘fitting in’.  These are contested sites where firefighters organise 
informal hierarchies in order to resist senior officers and adapt rules.  However, this is not a complete 
view, and there might be more to discover about the gap between firefighters and officers by looking 
directly at firefighters’ hierarchies, resistance and gender construction from a class perspective.  This 
will occur in the main body of the chapter, but to prepare the ground I first intend to take a brief look 
at how the fire service is located in economic class terms.  Then, I shall use class as a framework for a 
debate to understand firefighters’ resistance to officers as a struggle over non-economic (petty) 
dividends (see Wright 1984).  
 
5.1.2.Traditional class relations 
In Marxist terms, the fire service has no obvious ‘product’ and therefore firefighters do not produce 
surplus-value for capital to exploit.  As such, the fire service might not be part of dominant class 
relations and antagonisms at work, which simply put, are viewed as a conflict over how capital tries to 
exploit workers and take the surplus-value of their labour.  A more complex perspective would 
describe capital and labour relationships as exploitative in three areas of control concerning: the 
product; the process; investments and profits, and from these come the basic antagonistic and 
contradictory relations that progressively separate the worker from their labour (see Braverman 1974; 
Wright 1982a).  However, capitalists cannot ignore fire, as the Great Fire of London has shown (see 
Segars 1989; Chapter 1).  Therefore, for capital, the fire service is a necessary evil: an extreme case of 
an unproductive industry that reduces capitals’ profits (see Braverman 1974: 419; Cardechi 1983: 
132).  There are other publicly financed industries/services, with a similar location – health is one 
example.  Whilst parts of the ‘welfare’ sector recently returned to private ownership, a large non-
profit-making sector remains.  Some of these services are tested against psuedo-markets and (under 
Conservatism and to a lesser degree under New Labour) have been increasingly subject to economic 
rationalisations.  The fire service is one of these, and whilst cost has been a consideration since 
Massey Shaw’s days (see Chapter 1), there is increased effort to elevate financial efficiency over 
service efficiency by cutting and deskilling the fire service.  Nevertheless, with the exception of some 
areas in Denmark, I know of no examples of a public fire service being privatised
265
.  However, it is 
possible to put firefighting on an economic base by theorising that the money capital saves when 
firefighters extinguish a fire is an economic product, capable of having a surplus-value that in turn is 
set against the cost of the fire service
266
.  It is then possible to argue that capital might have a second 
                                                 
265 In Denmark there is an organisation called Falk.  This private company organises a variety of activities such as 
breakdown services (like the AA), security (like Securicor) and particularly in the countryside, it organises the fire and 
ambulance service.  When other countries were organising their welfare state activities through nationalisation, Denmark 
found it expedient to turn directly to the private sector for the fire service.  Despite being private, the fire service in 
Denmark organises along the same lines as the UK.  In the UK this does not always mean the fire service has to be run by 
the state.  Capital already runs its own (private) fire service at chemical and petroleum plants, where an instant response is 
preferable to the longer time it takes for the local authority fire service to attend.  Until recently Heathrow fire service was 
not part of the local authority system for exactly the same reason, but now the London Fire Brigade have built a station at 
the airport and taken over this responsibility.  In the same way Kent Fire service provide a station specifically for the 
Channel Tunnel.      
266 Chapter 1 argues the fire service was originally organised by capital to reduce the loss to fire insurance companies.  
Now it is a public service the links with capital may be less than clear, but still there.  Capital contributes through business 
rates for the fire service, but this investment might be well spent, because if the fire service is efficient in service terms, 
then insurance premiums (which capital also pays) are kept low.  Fire-insurance companies are also capitalist 
organisations, their profit is the balance between overheads such as fire losses and income from premiums.  It is also 
important to note that if fires are not quickly and effectively putout and the building is severely damaged then that trader 
stops trading.  Loss of life in a fire can also be viewed from a similar perspective, because when a worker dies their skills 
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reason for reducing the cost of the fire service.  Either way officers who support/organise cost 
cutting and the deskilling of the fire service (or at least are seen by firefighters to be doing so by not 
publicly resisting change as police and military officers do) may then appear to represent capital and 
the antagonism between officers and firefighters can appear as a classic class struggle in which 
firefighters are resisting in defence of their class (against the bourgeoisie/officers): a class acting 
consciously for itself against exploitation (Giddens 1982: 163-164; Crompton 1998: 200; Grint 1998: 
94).    
 
However, this would take a considerable denial/rejection of officers’ working class origins and 
it might be expected that officers who were themselves once firefighters should have shared 
understandings with firefighters about their professional ethos.  It may be that officers whom are 
found actively supporting cuts in the fire service could be acting in false consciousness, but this is not 
my view.  I prefer to look for more tangible reasons to explain the antagonism between firefighters 
and officers
267
, and it may be that officers are trying to change classes by achieving upward mobility 
or that there is some personal benefit for them in exploiting firefighters.  For example, it may be that 
when officers are promoted and are deprived of their ability to get in at a fire, they get their thrills 
(and ‘prove’ their masculinity) from bossing firefighters around: a situation that capital is ‘happy’ to 
accept, because one way that officers ‘prove’ their power is to deskill firefighters and cut the fire 
service, and this coincides with capitals’ prime aim.  Dividends, such as the power to boss someone 
around that cause antagonism within a class (though not always directly associated with economic 
profit), might appear as petty dividends (see Wright 1982a: 113; Grint 1998: 148).   
 
 Given that there are likely to be gender dividends, which provide economic advantage for men 
(see Connell 1995), this chapter will focus directly on the antagonistic relations within the fire service 
over petty dividends (see Wright 1982).  In so doing, it will be important to question if antagonism 
between officers and firefighters occurs, not to defend against capital per se, but as a defence of 
resources firefighters (and officers) use to acquire petty dividends (and this may tell us more about 
how firefighters construct their gender).  Section 2, which follows immediately, provides a clear 
example of how relations between firefighters and officers might become antagonistic by examining 
single tier entry promotion (STEP) and its main dynamic shared experience.  This firmly establishes 
that a gap forms between firefighters and officers who have different expectations of outcomes from 
shared experience.  Section 3 focuses on how firefighters separate themselves from officers by 
creating a distance between firefighters’ hands-on, blue-collar (masculine) skills and officers’ white-
collar (feminine) work.  Section 4 investigates four key activities in the fire service where firefighters 
resist officers’ attempts to ‘prove’ their authority: dynamic risk assessment; BA control; training; fire 
prevention.  Section 5 examines some areas where firefighters might be seen to be unambiguously 
constructing their masculinity, for example firefighters’ sexual adventures, their public status and 
prejudiced views on female firefighters.  Section 6 is a brief examination of an official dispute 
between FBU and officers/employers, which suggests that the FBU provides an umbrella under which 
all firefighters can gather.  The conclusion returns to the debates on petty dividends.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
are lost to the company that employs them; if the death occurs at work this would normally involves some extra payment 
by insurance companies.  Therefore, it is possible to suggest (however tenuously) that firefighters’ professional ethos 
supports capital as well as the public. 
267 If officers were really acting in false consciousness they would be more likely attempt to colonise firefighters 
professional ethos (see Strangleman and Roberts 1999: 51), and especially firefighters entrepreneurial skills to improve 
service at point of delivery.  Currently, Post or Neo-Fordism/Total Quality Management/Human Resource Management 
encourages workers to participate in the their work process by involving them in decision making at the lowest possible 
level (almost as employed entrepreneurs).  The employers’ hope in doing this is that quality and production will improve 
continuously as a result and traditional workplace resistance, which occurred under rigid Taylorist systems of labour 
control will wither (see Farnham and Horton 1993; Maidment and Thompson 1993; Pollitt 1993; Grint 1998; Strangleman 
and Roberts 1999). 
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5.2. THE OFFICERS   
5.2.1. Single tier entry promotion (STEP) 
Every officer starts his or her career as a firefighter.  Starting at the bottom does not appear to 
influence the financial efficiency of the fire service because the Audit Commission (1995) accepts 
that Chief Officers successfully control budgets of £1.474 billion (HMCIFS 1999).  However, 
successfully managing budgets is not the whole story.  The fire service is required by government to 
be an equal opportunities employer (Straw 2000; see also Bucke 1994).  The extreme way STEP 
restricts promotion to an internal labour market (ILM) and locks the workforce to their employment 
(see Burawoy 1979), may reduce the cost of training, facilitate close evaluation of promotion 
candidates and normally gets workplace approval
268
.  However, taken to the degree that it is in the fire 
service, where all officers must serve their time as firefighters and receive their training in-house, 
STEP isolates the fire service from outside influences, particularly in the management field
269
.  The 
experience officers gain as firefighters is also likely to influence their future decisions; this might not 
have the outcome that firefighters would always like, although it operates to perpetuate the status quo, 
particularly in respect to masculinity and homogeneity (see Young 1991; Reiner 1992; Office for 
Public Management 1996; Owen 1996; Corby 1999: 98-99).  The fire service has already been shown 
to screen for masculine understandings by recruiting a predominantly working class male, able-
bodied, white and heterosexual workforce: a situation where employing the stereotype only ‘proves’ 
the stereotype (see Chapters 1 and 4); it should come as no surprise that fire service promotion can 
involve patronage
270
.  Chris, an equal opportunities adviser to the fire service, explains:   
 
Chris: The Fire Service recruits from a narrow band of people, unlike the police and army.  
This is good for equality in that everyone gets a fair crack of the whip: no elite group 
or class provides the officers, as each person has a chance to achieve full potential.  
But can be bad in regard to patronage.   
(Senior civilian equality adviser). 
 
The narrow band the fire service recruits from is white, male, able-bodied and working class.  
Patronage negatively affects equal opportunities (see Kanter 1977; MacKinnon 1979; Cockburn 
1991a, 1991b), in the fire service restricts the promotion of “boat rockers” (Hart 1982: 159) who 
might challenge tradition and/or the abilities of current officers (see Dixon 1994
271
) and can lead to 
the ‘Peter Principle’ (see Peter 1968; Buck 1997; Young 1991; Dixon 1994).  Not unexpectedly, I 
found no officers who would argue against STEP
272
.  The Dean of the FSC justifies the fire service 
view:   
 
The fire service is a vocation … motivated more by a sense of public service than by monetary 
awards … Graduate entrants could never fully participate in the professional ethos of the British 
Fire Service because this ethos is founded on the shared experience of having been a firefighter.  
(Willis-Lee 1993a: 11-2).  [My emphasis].   
                                                 
268 The ‘whole’ fire service support STEP (see Ord 1993; CFBAC 1994; Manuel 1999; Smith 1998; Thornton 1999).   
269 It may be that STEP is a questionable ‘genuine occupational requirement’ (see Lewis 1992: 36; Palmer 1992: 72), 
because it not only prevents suitably trained managers from joining the fire service at the appropriate level, it also denies 
access to people at those levels, who cannot meet the fire service’s medical standards and could never successfully apply 
for a job as a firefighter.   
270 Flanagan (1998), argues that 83% of Chief Officers admit to helping ‘suitable’ candidates.   
271 Dixon (1994) suggests that in the military, where he considers many officers have lacked intellectual abilities, officers 
restrict and stop the promotion of entrepreneurial officers who might be intellectually free thinking enough to challenge 
the system.  Such a criticism might well apply to the fire service where officers often see critique as a personal criticism of 
them because they are responsible for the system.   
272 There are at least three reasons for this.  First, it would allow outside managers to compete with them for their jobs.  
Second, outsiders with entrepreneurial/academic skills might challenge current officers way of organising the fire service 
as they did in the health service (see Lucio and MacKenzie 1999: 158-161).  Third, if officers were to criticise the 
‘meritocratic’ system, especially those who went before them, then they would be criticising in effect themselves, or at 
least the system that they would argue chose them. 
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Willis-Lee argues against graduate entrant level, suggesting instead the importance placed on officers’ 
“shared experience” of the fire service’s raison d’etre – the saving of life, the suppression of fire and 
the rendering of humanitarian services (the product of firefighters’ labour).  Officers will also have a, 
“shared experience” of having fitted in, or at least having worked on a watch (see Chapters 1, 3 and 
4).     
 
5.2.2. Principal officers’ view 
The Fire Service College trains most officers in the fire service and I gained access to two consecutive 
Brigade Command Courses (BCC), which train potential Chief Officers
273
 (see FSC 1999).  This was 
an excellent opportunity to mix with those selected to lead the fire service in the future.  I shadowed 
them in formal sessions, at meals, in the bar, at a ‘landing party’274 and playing golf (rather, they 
played golf and I followed them round: an excellent situation in which to meet people and gather 
data).  The selection process for the BCC is competitive and appears to be uncompromising:    
 
Chief Officer: The BCC cannot get enough good students for next year so has been cut back from two 
[courses] a year to one.  
(All details withheld).  [My insert]. 
 
There is no compromise on standards of entry for the BCC and if promotion remains limited to STEP, 
then it is clear that there will not be enough trained officers to fill the expected vacancies: 
 
Alistair: Not enough courses to provide all principal officers that will be needed in the future: 
387 applied for this course, short listed to 59, 11 selected.   
(BCC student).  [My emphasis].    
 
The fire service’s current inability to provide suitable candidates to run two BCC’s a year places a 
question mark over who fills the vacancies that still exist when all those judged to be suitable have 
been promoted.  Given the limitations of STEP, in the future (and perhaps now), untrained (and by 
inference unsuitable) officers may fill the vacancies for principal officers.   
 
5.2.3. The BCC view 
My access to those chosen to lead the fire service in the future provides an opportunity to investigate 
Willis-Lee’s (1993) claim that officers had “shared experience” with firefighters.  I did this in the 
awareness that when people who are part of a shared experience/understanding (especially a class 
grouping) move away and adopt different value, this can be a site of conflict (Hollway and Jefferson 
2000; see Collinson 1992, 1994; Hearn 1994).  However, the majority view amongst officers confirms 
Willis-Lee’s argument.  Officers are convinced (or at least they tried to convince me) that without 
experiential knowledge of being a firefighter they could not do their job.  Moreover, they also 
considered that they could update their shared understandings by attending fires and talking to 
firefighters.  However, Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that firefighters might have something to hide from 
officers and it would be reasonable to expect that this might influence the discussions between 
firefighters and officers.  In reply to a question about this situation, Arnold’s answer was simple:  
 
Arnold: Certainly when I was a firefighter even the Divisional Commander coming to the 
station would be an event.  And we would be up and polishing things and making sure 
the appliance was together and all the usual bullshit sort of stuff.  I think a lot of that 
                                                 
273 Currently this is the only course that the Home Office funds at the FSC, presumably because the Home Office has an 
interest in providing suitable principal officers.   
274 ‘Landing parties’ are not so much parties, but an in-house name for when students at FSC meet for late night drinking 
and socialising at the end of their accommodation corridors. 
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has gone now anyway.  Certainly, when I go on a station I wouldn’t expect 
firefighters to be anything like we were when a senior officer came. … Now when I go 
on a firestation I tell everybody before I go and we sit down and have a cup of tea out 
of uniform .. relaxed dress anyway and we sit round and have a cup of tea
275
.   
(BCC student).  [My emphases]. 
 
Despite admitting the “bullshit” he provided for senior officers when he was a firefighter, Arnold 
does not believe firefighters will bullshit him.  This presumption by officers that they were still ‘in 
touch’ was a common response, and only one officer challenges this possibility:    
 
Alan: People at my rank like to think they are.  You go on stations, not to try and be part of 
it, but you let them know you were once part of it, but you get the impression that they 
are not suffering you.  You get the impression that ‘he really doesn’t know what it’s 
like any more’.  And I don’t think I do to be honest with you. … I get the impression 
that they tell you what they think you want to hear and they show you what they think 
you want to see. 
(BCC student).  [My emphases].   
 
Alan’s minority view, suggesting that he expects firefighters to only show him what they judge he 
wants to see, might paradoxically imply he is in touch
276.  Alan’s colleagues, though, appear to suffer 
the same deception they effected on senior officers when they were firefighters.  It may be implicit in 
Alan’s extract, but I will make it clear by adding that firefighters are only likely to show senior 
officers what they judge is safe to show them.  Firefighters are also sufficiently mischievous to flaunt 
their disrespect for officers and deliberately provide them with information just to wind them up.  The 
failure of officers to recognise this probability in the way I believe Alan has, provides the evidence to 
suggest how out of touch officers might actually be.  Officers’ almost omnipotent self-belief in their 
ability to remain in touch, is the other half of an argument firefighters make time after time: ‘Officers 
always believe that they have the ability to succeed where others have failed’.   
 
5.2.4. The view from the station: “all piss and importance” 
It would be unreasonable not to expect some resistance from firefighters to their officers.  However, I 
was not prepared for firefighters’ vehemence, or the degree to which they would support Alan’s view.  
Christian explains just how inept senior officers might be at using shared understandings to relate to 
firefighters:   
 
Christian: The Deputy Chief comes down for a chat and I had a particular thing that I wasn’t 
happy about.  And perhaps because I didn’t put it over to him correctly he snubbed me; 
cut me down yunnoo; shot me down in flames
277
.  And at the end of it I thought I have 
wasted my time there.   
(Brigade one, leading firefighter 20 years’ service, age 38).  [My emphasis]. 
 
The view that officers did not like criticism, or were not listening is a common one.  Pete, Fred and 
Patrick have a similar view to Christian:  
 
Pete: You get a lot of them just don’t listen.  They don’t want to know you.  They are 
actually talking to yuh and you know that when you talk back they are not actually 
listening to yuh, yunnoo [laughter] … He just didn’t want to know, all piss and 
                                                 
275 Presumably this is similar to a ‘hats off’ meeting.  
276 It is interesting to note, after my earlier comments on ‘boat rockers’, that Alan’s promotion had stalled a number of 
years ago and his place on this prestigious course is seen by him as an opportunity to revitalise his career.  I recognise in 
Alan something of the entrepreneur: an officer who traditional officers might think would rock the boat.   
277 This is a reference to the way that aeroplanes were shot down, as for example in the war. 
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importance, you know what I mean … you soon suss them out and you don’t want 
to talk to them because you know it is a waste of time; not listening.  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 18 years’ experience, age 43).  [My emphases and insert]. 
 
Fred: I don’t know quite what it is when they get the white-shirt278 on em.  They loose touch 
with what the motors
279
 are all about, what being a fireman’s all about.  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 15 years’ service, age 37).   
 
Patrick: They seem to have missed the point somehow.  They have moved up the ranks and 
sometimes they don’t always remember their roots, where they were, their job to the 
public.   
(Residential Fire Prevention Officer).  [My emphasis]. 
 
Firefighters’ argue that when officers don the “white-shirt” and dismissively show a lack of interest 
about what firefighters have to say about The Job, that officers have lost touch with “their roots … 
their job to the public.”  Rather than increasing understanding, officers’ shared experience appears to 
be creating a distance between them and firefighters.  It is almost as if the officers appear to ‘know 
better’ now they have a (middle class) white-shirt and that all they were part of before, when they 
were (working class) firefighters, is no longer relevant.   
 
5.2.5. Respect 
In Chapter 3, I suggested that senior officers were liable to lose respect during ‘post mortems’.  This 
effect can increase, if, after a makeup, a senior officer holds a collective debrief of the crews that 
attended the fire.  According to one officer
280
, these debriefs frequently reduce to a point where the 
firefighters and officers are involved in ‘mud-slinging’ exercises.  Senior officers then presumably 
disappoint firefighters by not respecting their views, which given their so called joint understandings 
firefighters still expect officers to do.  More than that, officers’ attitude on these occasions is almost 
bound to be seen by firefighters as breaking the joint understanding (which supports the whole notion 
of STEP) that firefighting is a hands-on skill and cannot be understood by people outside (a place 
where senior officers inevitably are).  Officers having betrayed that understanding, it is only a short 
step for firefighters to start to think that officers are no longer interested in (what firefighters believe 
to be) a further joint understanding, firefighters’ professional ethos: to provide an efficient service to 
help the public (see Hollway and Jefferson 2000; Chapters 1 and 3).   
 
The evidence suggests that shared experience (Willis-Lee 1993a) might not improve the 
understanding between officers and firefighters, but damage it.  It might even be that some senior 
officers are deliberately distancing themselves from their past location and understandings as 
firefighters, ‘proving’ as it were their ‘calling’ (and firefighters’ belief) by changing (classes).  Some 
officers can recognise that they have lost the trust of firefighters: 
 
Alistair: The relationship between firefighters and officers is all right up to Station Officers, 
who they trusted, but above that they hate them. … Firefighters told Docherty281 that 
the most stressful period of their service was not when they were at fires, but when 
senior officers lined them up and questioned them
282
.   
                                                 
278 This is not a metaphorical use of language as in class structures but a reality.  All ranks up to and including sub officers 
wear blue shirts and station officers and above have white shirts: a similar division exists with fire helmets with blue 
shirted workers having yellow helmets and white shirted officers have white helmets.    
279 ‘The motors’ as Fred describes them are the fire appliances, but his use of this phrase is probably better described by 
the work the appliances do and in my estimation he might just as easily used the words ‘The Job’.  
280 This officer was a student on the Brigade Command Course and all details are withheld. 
281 This comment relates to a research project on stress in the fire service, Docherty (1991).   
282 When senior officers visit stations, firefighters often ‘parade’ in a line, where they stand at attention as the senior 
officer walks along the line asking firefighters technical questions.   
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(BCC student). 
 
Alistair provides evidence to suggest that there is a point when shared understanding might divide 
officers and firefighters: the point when an officer leaves the watch (possibly even their class) on 
promotion to senior officer.  Alistair’s second statement requires some explanation, because it may be 
difficult to understand why answering questions can be more stressful to firefighters than firefighting.  
An explanation may also help to reveal the formal organisation of relations between firefighters and 
senior officers, which can often result in officers taking token actions to ‘prove’ they are in control 
(see Howell 1996).  
 
 Formal procedures allow visiting senior officers to require firefighters to line up at attention.  
Officers can then pass down the line asking technical questions and firefighters must post-script their 
answers with “Sir283.”  Firefighters dislike this demeaning situation and may suffer additional stress 
because firefighters’ own emphasis that their job is hands-on marginalises the acquisition of technical 
knowledge (see Doyle 1996; Chapters 3 and 4).  Firefighters therefore realise that senior officers have 
the ability to belittle them if the officer asks a technical question which they cannot answer.  
 
5.2.6. A telling example 
Proving your place in the hierarchy does not only occur between firefighters on watches.  Officers 
‘prove’ their place too.  Justin (a civilian student at university who has firefighters on his course) 
explains:   
 
Justin: If there is an officer in the room and there is an ordinary firefighter they will act as 
subordinates.  And they will go with the pecking order in the way they talk sometimes.  
We have witnessed one subordinate officer, or ordinary firefighter, putting his point 
forward.  And the officer [who was also a student] wasn't happy with what he was 
saying and they stepped outside, argument wise and they were both having a go.  And 
in the end the subordinate had to back down.  The simple fact the officer said ‘I am an 
Officer’.   
(Civilian student).  [My emphasis and insert]. 
 
Justin provides further evidence of the distance officers are creating between themselves and 
firefighters.  If firefighters must acknowledge senior officer’s ‘superiority’ in a ‘civilian’ university, 
then a serious question mark must be cast over Arnold’s belief that a cup of tea can overcome the 
distance between him and firefighters
284
.  Given that firefighters actions in such formal settings 
appear to be in contradiction with the findings of Chapters 1, 3 and 4 (that firefighters almost appear 
to ignore their senior officers’ rules), the bullshit theory might be truer than Arnold would care to 
believe.  It might easily explain firefighters’ paradoxical behaviour, as firefighters acting a part 
(bullshitting) when senior officers are present
285
 (just as Arnold did when he was a firefighter).  
Significantly, the recent Thematic Review on equality (HMIFS 1999) could be an example of how 
firefighters might act when a senior officer visits.  It is possible to suggest that the findings of what 
really amounted to a series of one hour visits to a number of stations by principal officers gave a new 
meaning to ‘hit and run research’ (see Chapter 2); I would not be surprised to find that firefighters 
exaggerated the situation just to windup senior officers
286
. 
                                                 
283 There are currently no operational female senior officers. 
284 In effect the cup of tea approach is similar to the ‘soft soap’ approach of new managerialism (see Collinson 1992: 50), 
but hardly likely to break down this might of right approach just reported, nor the fact that firefighters (above) know that 
rather than valuing criticism it is seen as personal  (see Dixon 1994: 207). 
285 Formal visits to a firestation by senior officers are not frequent and given the shift system some firefighters might not 
see a senior officer for years. 
286 Researchers will always have difficulty getting ‘honest’ data, but when high ranking fire service officers carry out 
research amongst firefighters (especially when they only spend an hour with them, arrive in official cars and lack research 
training) they are vulnerable to all the difficulties returning researchers might experience (see Jackson 1987; Wolf 1996).    
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5.3. CREATING A DISTANCE 
Grint (1998: 221) suggests manual labour is a site where proletarian masculinity, “aggression, 
domination and physical strength — is embodied in many notions of trade union power and working 
class resistance.”  However, the decline in the industries where proletarian masculinity is celebrated 
(see Braverman 1974; Cockburn 1991a; Strangleman 1998; Blum, 2000:) might have reduced one 
important site where males claim their natural advantage over females (see Connell 1995), were it not 
for some industries (almost tokens by comparison with previous times), which keep alive the 
celebration of men’s physical skills.  In these industries, men claim their (working class) embodied 
work separates them from women and distances them from other men (middle class office workers 
and managers) who participate in ‘subordinate feminine labour’ (see Lipman-Blumen 1979; 
Hochschild 1983; Collinson 1988, 1992; Game and Pringle 1984; Pringle 1989).  Collinson (1994: 
33) continues the argument:   
 
[Engineers] elevate the ‘practical’ and ‘commonsense’ knowledge that they believed was a 
condition and consequence of manual labour over the more abstract and theoretical forms of 
knowledge found in the middle-class world of white-collar work and management. … an 
unproductive ‘paper chase’ and ‘pen pushing’ that had little or no relevance to the important 
realities of manufacturing heavy vehicles. … The few manual workers who had been promoted 
were dismissed as ‘yes men’ for having sacrificed their independence, autonomy, even their 
manhood in hierarchical conformity. It was widely believed that ‘Blokes are made to change’ once 
they were promoted. 
[My emphasis and insert]. 
 
The fire service is another organisation requiring the hands-on technical skills of engineers and where 
‘blokes might change [class] on promotion’.  Firefighters can still claim the patriarchal dividends 
from the ‘best’ images of proletarian masculinity (see Whalen 1980; Cooper 1986; Lloyd-Elliott 
1992; Wallington and Holloway 1994; Chapter 3) and they are also resisting the economic 
rationalisations and deskilling (see Cameron 1999a 1999b 1999c 1999d 1999e; FBU 1999a 1999b; 
Gilchrist 1999), which has decimated British industry (see Braverman 1974) and public service (see 
Maidment and Thompson 1993; Hutton 1995; Jenkins 1995).  But does this separate firefighters from 
their officers?  Despite the challenge to Willis-Lee’s (1993a) notion of shared experience, firefighters 
still expect that officers should (and would) have this experience.  Colin explains:  
 
Colin: They have got to know what it’s like to appreciate .. you can’t send someone into a 
burning factory, because you can’t appreciate what they [firefighters] are going to be 
dealing with inside it if they [officers] have never ever done it.  
[My inserts].   
 
Colin is arguing that without the shared experience of knowing what it is like to be in a fire that 
officers would not have the skills to control firefighting operations (see Willis-Lee 1993a).  Alf adds 
to a description he gave in Chapter 3 of the qualities of a good firefighter: 
 
Alf: What I would call a good fireman is somebody that knows how to do his job on the 
fireground and provide a good service to the public: a good fire officer who can fill out 
all the paperwork and do all the other bits and pieces, to me isn’t a good fireman.  
[My emphases]. 
  
Alf supports Colin’s and Willis-Lee’s argument by arguing a good fireman is someone with shared 
experience.  His extract also suggests he is distancing good firemen from good officers who can only 
do the “paperwork” and lack firefighters’ shared understandings of firefighting: officers without 
experiential skills who might order firefighters to do the wrong thing.  Duke provides an example:   
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Duke: I was on the ALP
287
 … The officers that were there screaming, ‘get it up, put it up, 
get your jacks down, what are you doing?’ … It was a situation of you couldn’t do 
that.  
 
Duke then explained how he refused, on grounds of safety, to comply with the officer’s orders.  The 
first sentence of Duke’s next extract expresses a view that supports Willis-Lee (1993a), but the 
remainder of the extract might not get his approval: 
  
Duke: I would still say that experience still counts for so much in this job.  Rather than 
somebody who has risen through the ranks fairly quickly because they have been able 
to absorb knowledge. … Anyone that is academically … the exam process … it’s a 
piece of piss to them.   
[My emphases].  
 
Despite not passing any exams, Duke is very senior in the informal hierarchy.  His answer elevates his 
own importance and he distances himself from those academic officers who may not have had time to 
gather shared experience.  The focus group that follows provides a powerful argument from some 
experienced firefighters:   
 
Pete: You hope that the bloke sitting in front there has got a little bit of experience and what 
have yuh.  The good ones, the ones that come through and uses yuh .. that’s a good 
JO
288
.  He uses people and uses their brains, rather than saying you will do this right 
and wrong.  He has got to be a bit careful, take a little bit of advice at times and they’ll 
do right won’t they?  
[My emphasis]. 
 
Norman: Yeah.  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 21 year’s service, age 41, in a focus group). 
 
Pete: But there are some coming through the system in the last few years that really and 
truly are, as far as firefighting goes, they have read it in a book, but aint done it.  
[My emphases].    
 
Firefighters expect that shared experience will result in ‘good’ officers who understand ‘The Job’, 
respect firefighters’ ability to pass up knowledge and have the hands-on experience to lead 
firefighters safely when they get in.  In a faint whiff of nostalgia Pete refers to what is happening now, 
as opposed to in the past, by drawing attention to what is becoming a recurring theme amongst 
firefighter, the academic knowledge of officers who have not ‘served time’ as a firefighter and no 
longer have the (shared) experience to lead at fires.  The discussion continued in this theme until 
Carl’s summing up: 
 
Carl: It’s like the bloke from training school init?  Come into the brigade and went up to the 
training centre and eh he was sitting there and saying, ‘oh yeah my days on the station 
are gone now I am a manager.  I am going to go to the fire safety’ and do this, that and 
whatever.  I thought he had done like fucking fifteen years or so, you know what I 
mean?  And I found out he had done three or four, whatever.  He weren’t qualified.  
[My emphasis].  
 
Shared experience to these firefighters means time spent firefighting and this officer’s attempt to 
create an illusion that he had served his time (talk the walk) did not work.  Colin too raises what 
                                                 
287 Arial Ladder Platform, a self-supporting platform that can extend to over 100 feet.  
288 Junior officer. 
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became an almost mandatory subtext about ‘academia’, which to firefighters can apply to 
anything that is not ‘hands-on’: 
 
Colin: The only way to gain experience is through doing years and doing The Job.  That’s the 
only way and rushing people is not the way.  I don't think especially with graduates as 
well .. I mean they look at .. it’s obvious that they want these people to get through.  
The people with slightly a bit more up top.  They may not be great with their hands or 
a good firefighter, but up top, they have got all the brain power and you could see them 
pushing them people through.  
[My emphases].   
 
There can be no doubt, that firefighters have little regard for officers who cannot do The Job.  One 
extract from another focus group probably sums up ‘all’ firefighters’ views: 
 
Ian: Yeah there all degree’d up or O levels this.  There are the sort of people who go 
straight through the ranks and become a leading fireman after two years.  And they’re 
OK in the office, but they’re shit on the fireground.  And it’s the blokes who have done 
a couple of years that are covering their arses.  And then these people are getting put 
through the ranks and going higher and higher: promote the wankers out of the way.  
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30). [My emphases].  
 
This focus group were very direct; academic officers who lack shared experience, might risk 
firefighters lives, particularly if they ignore firefighters’ expertise.  Firefighters answer is to create a 
distance: “promote the wankers out of the way.”   
 
 Firefighters’ uncompromising view of some officers as academics, follows an argument in 
Chapter 1 that senior officers no longer get sufficient operational experience, consequently are out of 
touch and may lack the experience to provide safe leadership at those few makeups they attend.  Alf 
provides an example: 
 
Alf: People who I would rather not work alongside and I hate to have to say this .. em .. 
most of those have ended up as senior officers [laughter].  Cos they don't actually have 
to do it … they have bent over backwards to get promoted so they don't actually have 
to be on the fireground … they are now our hierarchy [laughter].  
[My emphasis and insert].  
 
Alf is distancing himself from those officers that use promotion to escape from firefighting: officers 
who may also comprise the ‘Careerists or Movers’ category in Chapter 4 and leave the operational 
watch as quickly as possible.  Liam calls them ‘flyers’:  
 
Liam: Those ADO's or DO's don't know a lot.  Just sit in offices and read a lot … Flyer, right 
place, right time … some might have experience, some jump experience, go to FP.   
(Brigade seven, Leading firefighter, 5 years’ service, age 38). 
 
There is no doubt that despite arguments about shared understandings, there is a distance between 
what officers may or may not have been when they were firefighters and what they are now (they 
have left the class of firefighters).  You do not even have to be a firefighter to recognise this as Hilary 
explains: 
 
Hilary: No senior officer can talk to firefighters.  In reality they can’t talk the role.   
(Senior civilian equality worker) [My emphasis]. 
 
Firefighters are busy creating a distance between themselves and officers, and firefighters’ perception 
that officers cannot ‘walk the talk’ becomes real in its consequences (see Thomas 1909). 
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5.3.1. Paperwork  
Closely associated with the ‘prized model’ of working class hands-on proletarian masculinity is the 
argument that paperwork is somehow not proper work (see Collinson 1994).  Firefighters’ 
characteristic dislike for paperwork and academia widens the distance between them and their 
officers.  When I asked Terri if she was interested in promotion, her answer provides a clear link 
between respect, operational experience and firefighters’ views on office work: 
 
Terri: [T]o get the respect you need, I think you have got to have that operational experience. 
… I wouldn’t want to be really shoved into some office somewhere and forgotten 
about, yunnoo   [laughter] and vegetate there.  
[My emphasis and inserts]. 
 
Terri argues that the embodied activity of the vital and alert notion of getting in, which firefighters use 
as a benchmark, is in powerful contrast to the paperwork of officers.  Firefighters appear to be busy 
distancing themselves from the many officers for whom they have no respect and consequently do not 
trust.  Officers whose promotion is based on academic prowess, rather than shared experience: a 
belief firefighters support by associating officers with pen-pushers and firefighters own clear view 
that promotion should only be available after a considerable shared experience.  Their argument shifts 
from a belief in shared understandings to suggest that ‘academic’ officers were never ‘real’ 
firefighters (like them) anyway and just passed through the rank (class) of firefighter on route to 
‘better’ things.  Keith provides an explicit example of firefighters’ view of academic officers: 
   
Keith: You get one of these young upstarts, these boys coming along and the only reason why 
they’re there is through exams; through paper work. … He cannot fit into a team. …  
So he is going up on his academic side, from office to office to office.  Occasionally he 
gets thrown back into operational and he finds out he can’t do and he strives harder 
and goes back into his office.  
(Brigade 2, firefighter, 15 years’ service, age 40, in a focus group).  [My emphases].  
 
Keith’s lack of respect for officers is obvious.  He uses two of the worse insults that a firefighter can 
make about a ‘colleague’: accusing him of not being able to do The Job and hiding in the office.  Such 
a statement might paraphrase firefighters’ and indeed Collinson’s (1994) argument about the distance 
between the ‘workers’ and the academic pen-pushers they do not trust.   
 
5.3.2. Would you take promotion?  
The view that men “sacrifice their manhood … change once they were promoted” (Collinson 1994: 
33) might not get Young’s (1991) support, because he argues that masculinity is a central feature of 
police promotion.  However, masculinity comes in many forms (Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Hearn 
1994; Connell 1995) and, as I argue in the introduction, has no fixed meaning (except through the eye 
of the speaker/interpreter; see Thomas 1909; Giddens 1979; Kondo 1990).  In Collinson’s case, the 
eyes belong to engineers; in Young’s case police officers; and in my case firefighters.  On the sliding 
scale of “what is masculinity?” it might be safe to talk of a (working class) proletarian masculinity 
that celebrates physical deeds and a (middle class) white-collar masculinity that celebrates managerial 
authority.  The police position on this scale is somewhat ambiguous, their masculinity involves 
‘proving’ they are in charge, sometimes physically, but more often involves a physical presence, 
which supports a psychological approach
289
.  Despite the distance between the physical and 
psychological, Neale (1995, cited in Collinson and Hearn 1996: 3; see also Collinson et al 1990) 
provides some metaphors that bridge the gap.  
 
Captains of industry consistently presented ‘heroic’ images…depicted and portrayed themselves 
as ‘hard men’ virile swashbuckling and flamboyant entrepreneurs  
                                                 
289 This suggestion may be interesting to follow up in further research. 
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It appears that even those sitting behind a desk might want to imagine themselves ‘as if’ they were 
achieving an embodied masculinity, thereby supporting and placing themselves within the 
commonsense understandings on gender divisions (see Connell 1995).  This might give some sense of 
understanding senior officers as trying to create an illusion that they are both proletarian firefighters 
and tough managers/officers.  From firefighters’ perspective this could appear that officers are trying 
to ‘steal’ firefighters’ proletarian imagery and sit behind a desk with it: a role firefighters have already 
feminised
290
; something that firefighters (and the engineer above) must inevitably deny if they are to 
preserve their (subjective) working class masculinity.   
 
 As part of a powerful hierarchy (one function of which may be to conservatively defend their 
class), the way firefighters’ distance themselves from officers could be influential in persuading some 
firefighters not to seek promotion.  To search for evidence that this might happen, I used my 
experiential knowledge as an ex-firefighter to judge that the following two firefighters had the mental 
ability to become officers.  They both denied any interest in being officers:   
 
Jack: Not at the moment no.  I have done my part-one for the Lf’s291, but em probably just 
because you do .. you do it because you do.  It’s the way the system works, if you do it 
you don’t have to do your qualified’s292.  People tend to, em,  people just expect you 
do it really.  I thought everyone was doing it, so I just did it.  Although it’s nice to have 
the ticket there if you want to have it in the future .. but at the moment I want to be 
going into jobs.  I don’t want to be standing outside.   
(Brigade one, probationary firefighter, 1 year’s service, age 27).  [My emphasis].  
 
Richard:   When I first joined the brigade I thought I would, yunnoo. I would like promotion, use 
my degree, get on with it.  But at this present moment in time I am quite happy to do 
what I am doing. … I just want to get the exams under my belt. … I am quite happy as 
I am and I think it is necessary to get the experience before .. I really need to get the 
experience myself, to know what I am sending people into before I actually send them 
in.  
(Brigade one, probationary firefighter, one years’ service, age 26)  [My emphases]. 
 
Jack and Richard enjoy the hands-on ‘getting in’ of firefighting.  Despite a structural arrangement that 
encourages exam taking, nothing during their interviews led me to believe they were currently 
seeking promotion.  Whilst attitudes can change, these two potential officers were more interested in 
achieving the accolade of being a good firefighter than becoming officers.  It is also possible that 
these two firefighters recognise that their entrepreneurial skills (might only be free) would be 
restricted and even work against them if they followed the promotion trail (see Dixon 1994; Baigent 
1996). 
 
5.3.3. Senior officers’ views 
                                                 
290 Collinson (1992: 36 citing Gray 1987) acknowledges that by acting to feminise the males in charge of them and to 
promote their own physical skills, male workers actually conform to the loutish way that managers see them (see Rob’s 
reference to firefighters as “animals” in Chapter 4).  
291 The “part-one of the Lf’s”, is a reference to the first part of the statutory examination for the leading firefighter rank.  
This is a written examination and the part two is a practical examination. 
292 After four years service, firefighters can take a practical examination to ‘prove’ they are qualified (in some brigades 
this is almost a formality and others a more recognised procedure; there are no reported failures).  This qualification is 
currently worth £1731 per year (2000/2001).  Passing the Lf’s examination provides an exemption from this process and 
this might encourage firefighters to then look to get the actual rank (colonising them).  However, this does not mean that 
firefighters will necessarily begin to conform to the rules and bureaucracy within the fire service, which could undermine 
the informal hierarchy.  Those I interviewed who were showing an interest in promotion were mostly only interested in 
operational ranks (up to and including watch-commander), which allows them to keep their hands-on skills as a firefighter, 
remain on the watch and continue to resist senior officers.     
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My findings suggest that there is a considerable distance between the orthodoxy of what 
firefighters think an officer should do/be and the reality.  Officers, on their part, may wish to create a 
distance in some areas, but they still believe they are good firefighters and Chapter 1 provides 
evidence of how officers may elevate their role outside the fire above that of firefighters who have got 
in.  Over the many examples of such attitudes, which senior officers showed me, I have chosen a 
civilian (with more opportunity to talk to principal officers than I was ever going to get) to represent 
their view: 
 
Clio: I deal quite regularly with the Chief’s and the ACO’s.  That’s the sort of level I tend to 
deal with, not so much the junior officers because of the job I do.  When they’re 
socialising they also say, ‘yeah I was at this .. I came on the scene and I was dying to 
get in there’. ... They all still want to have those hoses and put the fire out293.   
(Civilian worker). 
 
5.3.4. Conclusion 
The evidence in this section does not support Willis-lee’s (1993) view that shared experience binds 
firefighters and officers together.  Officers lose the respect of firefighters when they leave the station 
(their class) to take senior desk bound command: a position that firefighters feminise and distance 
themselves from.  However, without questioning firefighters apparent deference to visiting senior 
officers firefighters’ resistance might be obscured.  At this time, firefighters’ actions are difficult to 
reconcile with the powerful group that they appear to be in the rest of the thesis.  After the ‘game’ 
officers start by their ‘us and them’ behaviour (lining up firefighters and drawing rank at university) is 
unmasked, it is easy to see firefighters’ deference on these occasions as partly an act.  In Weberian 
terms, it is possible that firefighters metaphorically keep dusted a Weberian iron cage of bureaucracy 
which they jump into when an officer visits.  This is what firefighters would call a windup (see 
Chapter 4), because they are mirroring back to senior officers a reflection that senior officers want to 
see: a reflection that ‘proves’ officers’ superiority and officers have believed it.  In answer to any 
question about who is managing the fire service, it must be considered that firefighters may be as 
much managing their officers, as the other way around.  This may be an extreme example of ‘image 
management’ by a group who are supposed to be subordinate (see Goffman 1959, 1961, 1997c).  
However, officers do not seem to recognise what is happening and argue they are in control so 
convincingly that they appear to believe their own argument: a situation that becomes real in its 
consequences (see Thomas 1909; Janowitz 1966: 301).  Or that is how I put it as a sociologist; as a 
firefighter I would have suggested bullshit baffles brains
294
! 
 
 To help understand why firefighters are able to resist their officers I have drawn from the notion 
of resistance through distance (Collinson 1994).  Firefighters’ arguments largely echo the views that 
proletarian workers have about office workers (Connell 1989, 1995; Collinson 1994).  One particular 
example of this relates to officers behaviour on the fireground, an area where there is supposed to be 
shared understanding.  However, there is little shared understanding in the way that firefighters 
vehemently distance themselves from those officers who they define as academic and who they do not 
trust at fires.  This vehemence might be explained by seeing officers as denying their class roots (see 
Hollway and Jefferson 2000) and be in part caused by the orthodoxy that firefighters and officers 
share common understandings about their professional ethos (that officers presumably held before 
being promoted), which firefighters believe officers are now denying.  Again, following Thomas 
                                                 
293 This view is born out by others, “every officer has an ordinary fireman inside him somewhere”  (Hart 1982: 164).   
294 At these times firefighters might well be seen by Goffman (Lemert and Branaman 1997; see also Ditton 1980), as 
skilled interactionists who pit their wits against the observation powers of officers (see Hassard 1985: 180).  In slightly 
different terms to the way it is reported elsewhere in this chapter, firefighters might call this a successful windup.  The 
way officers have reacted to believe what firefighters have shown them, might not be a traditional success in the way 
firefighters seek to get a reaction from their colleagues, but the intention to get a reaction is the same (made all the funnier 
when an officer does not realise it).    
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(1909), once distance is acknowledged by firefighters, the consequences for officers, especially in 
the way firefighters stereotype outcomes, can become ‘real’. 
  
5.4. WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
Foucault argues that in the military “the machine required can be constructed” (Rabinow 1986: 179).  
Any visitor to a fire service training centre might be forgiven for believing that during recruit 
firefighter training, firefighters are almost machines in the course of construction.  But, this is a false 
picture of the fire service (although it may not appear so to the recruits in training) and as Chapters 3 
and 4 suggest, once firefighters (the machines) are free of the training centre, its influence is replaced 
as probationers become actively involved with firefighters’ informal hierarchy.  This does not mean 
that firefighters will forget the lessons of basic training, but they will learn a new approach to how 
things are done.  Their new peers (the experienced firefighters) will also teach them that when 
confronted by visiting officers set on proving their importance, a firefighter might find it expedient to 
massage an officer’s ego by reflecting back the image that officers want to see.  For firefighters, 
possible humbling situations (firefighters lining up above) can then be reconciled against the end gain 
that once officers have had their egos massaged, they will leave the station and might not return for 
years.  Firefighters can also laugh amongst themselves at how they have woundup the officer. 
 
5.4.1. How the watch organise 
However, one other group are present and witness firefighters’ behaviour towards senior officers, the 
watch-commanders.  They are in an ambiguous situation, they work day-to-day with firefighters and 
they must operate (at least appear to) within the formal hierarchy: a delicate negotiation.  The 
successful watch-commander also requires two contrasting management styles — on the fireground, 
they must be directive (authoritarian) and at the station, they must be able to participate and work with 
the firefighters (see Davies 1980: 52).  Alternating, at a moments notice, between these two worlds 
and styles of management cannot be easy, nor can most officers expect to be experts in both styles.  
The following extract from Graham (1992: 18; see also LFCDA 1995; Baigent 1996) does not 
surprise me in the least:  
 
Many leaders often emerge who are not junior officers and indeed their leadership is sometimes so 
strong it can overwhelm the weaker junior officer and management becomes almost a competitive 
issue.  
 
When I was a watch-commander I thought at the time I was in charge, but I know realise that running 
the watch was rarely “a competitive issue”, which I subjectively viewed myself as winning, but more-
often a compromise in which I might well have been a lesser partner.  Alf explains:   
 
Alf  I think some of the decisions of the general running of the watch are negotiable, i.e. if 
a watch-commander requires you to act in a certain way all day every day and the 
whole watch disagree with that, you call a meeting and you say sorry Guv, but we 
don't like this.  We don’t want to get up at 0900 and polish fire engines till 1345, we 
think that is too much.  We don't mind polishing the fire engines, we’re quite prepared 
..  we know they have got to be cleaned up .. how about if we just do it every other day 
until 1130’.  And then you strike a good compromise and you then build a working 
relationship, as far as that goes.  Yes you have a watch-commander but his role is 
negotiable.  We are not tin soldiers; we are human beings; we have opinions and we 
are all entitled to voice them.   
[My emphases].  
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In an organisation with formal/written rules, Alf is describing the informal compromise between 
the watch and their officers
295
.  Firefighters can often work together for decades and experiential 
knowledge suggests that there will very often be flashpoints.  These are more common when a new 
watch officer arrives, but in a group so socialised to fitting in, boundaries will generally be negotiated.  
There is a fire service expression, ‘don’t wash your dirty linen in public’ and firefighters were not 
always so ready to explain problems within the watch, nor the negotiations that sorted them out:   
 
Ted: It would be behind closed doors anyway. 
(Ted, Brigade one, firefighter, 1.25 years’ service, age 23). 
 
However, unlike the BCC student above, I did not just pop in for a cup of tea with firefighters 
during my research.  I spent time with them and eventually I gained a considerable amount of data 
from firefighters about the informal negotiation at stations.  Watch-commanders were not so 
accessible, nor prepared to trust me.  Only one watch-commander admitted to the watch organising so 
democratically.  However, any officer caught negotiating the rules would be subject to censure, or 
worse and I am not at all surprised by their silence.  Accepting that watch-commanders were unlikely 
to provide evidence of compromise in a direct form, I used my experiential knowledge to look at a 
number of key sites and to explore whether firefighters were resisting specific BO’s with their watch-
commander’s complicity.   
 
5.4.2. Dynamic risk assessment (DRA)   
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have followed up their concerns about safety in the fire 
service by issuing several ‘Notices’296.  The fire service response relates to improving management of 
firefighters (see Robinson 1998) and during my observations at the Fire Service College (FSC), I 
found that this was being done by training watch-commanders to implement DRA.  By attending a 
lecture on DRA I found this ‘new’ safety feature requires watch-commanders to balance firefighters’ 
safety against the potential risk, before allowing firefighters to get in.  The teaching includes the 
possibility that officers might have to prevent firefighters from getting in if officers judged the risk 
too high.  This appears to conflict with the findings of Chapter 3 and firefighters’ response to DRA 
might provide an early ‘barometer’ to firefighters’ resistance, and watch officers’ complicity in this.  
Given that this ‘rational’ intervention by officers has FBU support (Mathews 1997), during a break in 
the lecture, I asked a group of officers, from a variety of brigades, about what impact the lecture had 
on them.  Their answers were immediate; all suggest a considerable resistance to DRA and I quickly 
scribbled these answers in my fieldbook:  
 it’s one thing talking about it in the classroom situation. On the fireground the last thing on 
your mind is a court of law; 
 anoraks (a new word describing officers who did not have any idea of the real world, as these 
watch-commanders see it, of firefighting); 
 the hardest thing of all is to stop the crew; 
 the crew rig in B.A. on route to a persons reported, they are already breathing air before they 
get off; 
 if you tried to stop them they would push you out of the way. 
 
There were clearly concerns amongst these watch-commanders, if not outright resistance to the whole 
notion of DRA.  If these concerns influence watch-commanders behaviour more than the training they 
                                                 
295 It may be that the close affiliation the fire service has with the navy could be important here.  There were some 
surprisingly liberal regimes in the 18th century navy, where officers sometimes took a vote before entering into a battle 
(Grint 1998: 53).  Nelson’s decision to break the rules by using his blind eye is perhaps the most celebrated act of 
disobedience in the British military and naval traditions may contrast considerably with the army whose blind obedience 
led to the carnage at Balaclava.   
296 A HSE ‘Notice’ requires that immediate action is taken to improve safety in specific areas.  This is a considerable 
rebuke by an agency whose powers were first resisted by the fire service, but now have to be recognised.  The ambiguities 
of this have been discussed earlier (see footnote in Chapter 1)  
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are being given, then DRA might not improve the management of firefighters.  Therefore, I 
looked to see if DRA is an area of compromise and negotiation between firefighters and their officers, 
or if firefighters listen to their union.  Jasper suggests not: 
 
Jasper:     I would have thought no.  It’s [DRA] very much a thing now isn’t it, where as perhaps 
twenty years ago it wasn’t?  No I don’t.   
(Brigade one, Leading Firefighter, 29 years’ service, age 52). [My insert] 
 
DB: You rely on other things? 
 
Jasper: Yeah, perhaps thirty years’ worth.  
[My emphasis].  
 
Jasper’s reliance on his thirty years experience is a confirmation of how important experiential 
knowledge (and their own protocols) is to firefighters (see Chapter 3).  I asked Pete where his 
dynamic risk assessment card was
297
: 
 
Pete: I think it is in my locker
298
.  It is something that we are all supposed to be aware of.  
Everybody seems to have done in a roundabout way in the past.  It’s written down 
now, it’s on paper.   
[My emphasis]. 
 
There seems to be no escaping the confidence that firefighters have in their own abilities.  They are 
quite certain they have already taken into account what officers have now written down
299
.  Arnold 
suggests that despite being a principal officer, some joint understandings remain: 
 
Arnold: Whatever label is put on it [DRA], we have always gone about it in the same way: 
getting off the machine; sizing things up; making assessments; deploying. … The 
attitude was we are here to do a job, get in and put it out.  … and get back to the 
station. 
[My emphases and insert].   
 
Arnold’s shared experience leads to him unwittingly supporting Pete and Jasper who have their own 
protocols for carrying out a DRA.  Significantly, Arnold’s shared experience could mean he is a 
sympathetic careerist (see Chapter 4, category 9) and this could prevent him from ‘chasing up’ watch 
officers to ensure that they manage the way firefighters get in.  It is interesting to note that Arnold 
also remembers how important it is to firefighters to get back ‘on the run’.   
 
5.4.3. Officers’ caution 
However, it would be naive to believe that DRA is not having some impact on firefighters and there is 
evidence in Chapter 3 that this might result in some conflict with officers over getting in.  Firefighters 
also argue that DRA has made officers more cautious and that this might also result in them being 
withdrawn from fires too early.  Carl’s point of view might have real consequences regarding fire 
damage:  
 
Carl: The JO's are definitely more cautious now … So much more careful, they will 
withdraw you when you think everything is fine. … It can be very frustrating, very 
frustrating.  … If you can get into a building and get stuck in, you can perhaps stop it.  
                                                 
297 The risk assessment card is a check list that brigades are increasingly supplying to firefighters so that they might carry 
out their own check of safety features before they get in.  
298 It should actually be in his fire tunic pocket on the appliance, so he can follow the check list on arrival at a fire. 
299 The way firefighters take into account their safety at fires is through their protocols (see Chapter 3). 
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As a fire in one room might spread to the whole top floor if you fight it from the 
outside.   
(Served in two brigades, firefighter, 6 years’ service, age 24).   
 
Could it be that Carl’s frustration is because officers are ignoring his skills?  Jo is clearly angry about 
how officers ignore her experience: 
 
Jo: Frustration … they have seen a crack and I know they are only taking our safety into 
their consideration, but sometimes you wonder if they are taking our knowledge and 
our perception and our experience and abilities .. expertise into account.  Quite often 
you just stand with jets and you see the whole place go.  
(Female firefighter).  [My emphases]. 
 
Once crews are withdrawn, the fire can only be fought from outside and this effectively results in the 
loss of the building
300
.  Chapter 1 explains that these situations might be difficult to assess: officers 
might be too safety conscious; firefighters might be anti-officer.  It may even be that by relying on 
officers to withdraw them, as opposed to making their own decision to withdraw, firefighters can shift 
the blame for the loss of a building to the officers.  Then firefighters do not have to admit to being 
beaten by the fire; their image, at least in their own eyes and for those within earshot of their 
criticisms of officers, is not tarnished.  It appears that despite DRA being a safety issue, firefighters 
will still resist being managed by BO's, the FBU or the HSE regarding getting in.  Nothing, it appears, 
will prevent firefighters from helping the public, or improving their own status.    
 
5.4.4. BA Control 
There are strict rules that lay down how BA Control should operate
301.  However, Jo’s evidence in 
Chapter 3 suggests that firefighters will break BA rules and there is nothing in what follows to 
suggest that her case is unique.  Ken is fresh from the training environment and should be expected to 
have high standards:  
 
Ken: Put the stuff [BA] on, checked each other over and then the entry control bloke, he 
came and took the tallies and read them.  … It wasn’t so correct as it is in training .. 
em .. because he didn’t have the board and that all set up.   
(Brigade three, probationary firefighter, 8 months’ experience, age 19).  [My 
emphasis and insert].  
 
I interviewed Ken every week during his recruit training and he frequently relayed to me how the 
instructors had warned him that once on the station he should resist any attempts by the watch to 
compromise the very high standards of BA safety he was learning.  This situation was of considerable 
interest to me, because I was aware that the watch would  
likely compromise BA safety standards and this would test his resolve, and that his reaction would 
provide important evidence about the authority of the watch hierarchy.  Despite my pushing him in 
this area, Ken was adamant, he would not compromise BA safety procedures.  However, at his first 
‘real’ BA incident, he did compromise and is still doing so.  I was not at all surprised that Ken 
                                                 
300 Not to be pursued in this thesis, if safety measures increase fire losses then capitalists may well have views on this. 
301 These rules are set in a joint committee at the Home Office with the responsibility to set national safety standards that 
Brigades then adopt in their BO's.  In this case how to monitor BA wearers at a fire by ensuring that before firefighters 
enter a building they must be ‘checked over’ by a BA control officer who will detach their tally from the BA set, record on 
this tally how much air is contained in the BA set and the time the BA wearer enters the building.  This tally is then placed 
in the BA board and a record of the BA crew’s location is recorded alongside the tally.  The BA control officer then 
calculates how long the BA crew’s air will last and the time by which they must be out of the building.  If the firefighters 
do not come out by this time then various emergency procedures are implemented.  At larger incidents two BA wearers 
(known as the emergency crew) are kept back from firefighting with the BA control to be deployed specifically for rescue 
in these types of circumstances. 
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‘failed’, because throughout my fieldwork it became clear that if following formal safety 
procedures would delay getting in when firefighters’ protocols indicate it was safe to do so, 
firefighters would get in (see Chapter 3).  BA is just another area where firefighters informally 
establish watch protocols that supersede BO’s, as they do for anything else associated with 
firefighting.  At serious fires, where firefighters perceive a ‘real’ risk, their protocols will follow 
official procedures.  At less serious incidents, firefighters will compromise and manoeuvre round 
BO’s that slow them down.  Their protocols will ensure that BA tallies are somewhere safe, like the 
drivers boots, before they enter the building
302
.  Meanwhile, the person appointed as BA officer will 
be helping the crew to get the equipment necessary for the firefighters to enter the building, only once 
this is done will they set up the BA control according to BO's.  Even a FBU official acknowledges 
bending the rules: 
 
 
Chris: We had got it worked out, we put the tally in the board, we are systematic about it; our 
tallies stay outside
303
.  We don’t go through the whole procedure. 
(Senior FBU representative).  [My emphasis].  
 
 
No firefighters I spoke with said that they follow formal BA procedures on house fires and initial calls 
to some larger incidents.  Once a fire had been ‘made-up’ and/or the danger increased, firefighters did 
not need to be ‘forced’ to follow BA procedures: they make that decision for themselves.   
 
 
5.4.5. ‘Drilling’304 
Most BO’s instruct firefighters to train every day.  It is not unusual for the types of drill and the 
minimum time to be spent on them to be written in BO's; each firefighter generally has a training 
record, which watch officers and firefighters sign to record the drill they have done.  However, during 
a formal inspection, HMIFS (1996, section 5.38)
305
 found that:  
 
 [Training was] just completing a paper record and then watches do as they wish in an 
unstructured and unmonitored way when they feel it necessary to train. 
 
I set out to find if there was evidence to support what HMIFS had found.  Jo confirmed she did not 
drill every day and then she turned her answer into a complaint about senior officers:      
 
Jo: No we don't.  I think there are too many of them that are paid to come up with fantastic 
ideas .. that aren’t realistic.  That don't take into consideration station life .. how busy a 
station may or may not be .. em .. and a lot of the senior officers are the people who 
didn’t stay on the station very long and didn’t do a good job in the first place.  
[My emphases].  
                                                 
302 To avoid this situation there have been attempts to provide a simpler BA control board, which firefighters might put 
their tallies in.  Whilst these had been issued in one brigade I visited they had been withdrawn because of disputes over the 
clock on the board. 
303 In the past shortages of personnel meant that only the driver was free to do the BA control, but they were also required 
to work the pump, provide the water and any other equipment.  BA control was often neglected through expediency and 
making sure your tallies were outside was a first step to safety.  Currently it is standard practise for a BA control officer to 
be nominated at role call.  However, as in the past, firefighters are hard pressed at the initial stages of a fire and this duty 
may be left until after the ‘important’ things have been done.  The designated BA control officer will then collect up the 
tallies and put them in the board.   
304‘Drilling’ or ‘drills’ are firefighters’ colloquialism for the formal drill period, when firefighters practise/rehearse for 
fires. 
305 The HMIFS routinely inspect each brigade.  As Chapter 1 suggests, this inspection started out as an audit of the 
provisions of the 1947 Fire Service Act, but now looks at how efficiently Government money is being spent, if safety 
procedures are being followed and more recently equality requirements: a public report is produced.     
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Jo’s comment about there being too many senior officers is a very common response by firefighters 
and her suggestion that senior officers might not be very good firefighters confirms in an innocent 
way the views of earlier informants.  I asked Jo if the station complies with the, “fantastic ideas,” she 
complains about: 
 
Jo: Maybe for a day or two until the thing goes away [laughter].  If they think they are 
going to be checked on for the first month then they will do it for the first month, but 
as soon as everyone .. it will hopefully disappear.  
[My emphasis and insert].  
 
Jo explains quite clearly how much firefighters might manoeuvre a situation to give the impression to 
senior officers that they are in charge (see above).  I asked Jo what she did when ‘one bell’ rang. 
 
Jo: There is an initial ‘oh my god what are we doing ..  should we be doing this right now’.  
But there is an initia .. ah .. is this right, is that right, have we filled the log books 
out
306
, have we done the role boards
307
? 
 
Jo, provides evidence of how firefighters operate a mental check to ensure the officers will find what 
they want to see: a station run in accordance with their orders.  I asked Jo about Drill Records and her 
‘tongue in cheek’ answer suggests watch officers’ complicity in watch resistance by completing a 
“paper exercise” (HMIFS above) to ‘prove’ firefighters complete their drill requirements:  
 
Jo: I haven’t signed in two years .. but I have done thousand of hours of drills.  
  
The amount of drill a watch undertake can vary, but I was surprised to learn how little drill Ken had 
done, in view of the fact he had only been on the station six days: 
 
Ken: The Watch Officer has taken me outside and got me to work the pump and the 
lightweight portable pump and build a dam and things like. … The whole sort of watch 
hasn’t done a proper drill.  (Brigade three, probationary firefighter, five months’ 
experience, age 19). 
 
One month later:  
 
Ken: They have said to me ‘if you want to we’ll just come outside and do it,’ … They get 
me to do it once a week, or once a tour I mean, or once every two tours.  They are 
quite good.  
 [My emphases].   
 
Ken and Jo do not work together, nor are they in the brigade that drew the HMIFS’s comments above.  
Resistance to drill might be very widespread and a FBU safety adviser links deaths in service with 
some disparaging remarks about American firefighters:  
 
Reginald: Americans are proud of their role of honour
308.  ‘Rescue One309’, said ‘when you do 
7000 calls a year, then you don’t need to train’.   
                                                 
306 There is a record of each piece of fire service equipment, which records if the appropriate test has been done.  Many 
Brigades also still retain a Log Book, which is a written record of everything that happens during the day. 
307 One safety feature is that the crew of an appliance should have their names entered on a role board, which is kept on an 
appliance.  This is done in case the crew attend an incident and the building collapses.  Then any rescue crews will have a 
record of how many crewmembers there were on the appliance.  Crewmembers frequently change appliances during the 
day and the change should be recorded on the role board and in the Log Book.  
308 This is the list of names of firefighters who have died at fires.  In the USA (with a population of around 200 million) 
one firefighter is killed on duty every three days (Laughlin 1986: v11).  The actual statistic for the period 1990-1999 is 
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It might not only be US firefighters that are reluctant to train. 
 
5.4.6. Fire Prevention (FP)/Community Fire Safety (CFS) 
Government’s instruction to the fire service to shift their emphasis from suppression (firefighting) to 
prevention (HMCIFS 2000: 26; O’Brien 2000), is supported by the FBU and has been blocked by 
institutionalised resistance at firefighter level (Sweeney 1999).  Both Hart (1982) and Howell (1994) 
acknowledge that firefighters resist FP by claiming it is not their job
310
.  In testing for this possibility, 
I was fortunate to meet with Lionel, a very senior Local Government Association (LGA) official:    
   
Lionel: The employers recognise that attempts to increase the amount of FP work firefighters 
are prepared to do is not an institutional issue where you tell the Chief Officer what 
needs to be done and it happens.  Employers are aware of the difficulties with 
firefighters’ cultural resistance and that the bulk of firefighters joined the fire service to 
fight fires.  Nevertheless, they are trying to persuade firefighters to intervene and help 
prevent fires rather than carrying out the dangerous work they joined to do.  
(LGA official).  [My emphases]. 
    
Lionel suggests the employers are aware that firefighters, “joined the fire service to fight fires” and 
their preference for the physical work of firefighting above mundane FP work.  Senior officers are 
very aware of this difficulty: 
 
Adam: To think you can click your fingers and turn everybody into a community safety 
officer is all bollocks.  Some people will get into that, because it can be a natural 
tendency to want to teach and pass on information.  But from  a personnel perspective, 
when some of my colleagues get all upset about ‘how the blokes don’t care, they only 
want to bash around on ladders and everything else’, my reaction to that is what do we 
expect, that is what they, we joined for.  
(BCC student)  [My emphasis].   
 
Albert: Questionnaire [from his survey] indicated that firefighters were not interested in FP.  
When questions were asked in general terms they thought it was a good idea, but as the 
questions became more pointed: are you prepared to spend 50% of your time doing FP 
then they were anti.  200 years of tradition came whacking off the paper: hundreds of 
years of heroic acts, selflessness came into play.  They don’t get the excitement … 
firefighters  say  ‘you are moving the goalposts, not the job I joined to do’.  
(BCC student).  [My emphases]. 
 
Firefighters ‘prove’ the officers’ suggestion:  
 
Roger: The way I look at it you know you come into The Job … sort of you expect to go 
out
311
 sort of thing.  Really, that is what it is all about, innit, at the end of the day?  I 
know it’s also about Fire Safety and everything as well, you don’t want people to get 
hurt ..  it’s going to happen anyway.  So you  might as well be there to .. to try and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
961 firefighters killed on duty (National Fire Data Center online).  According to statistics supplied by the FBU, in the UK 
(with a population around 50 million) between January 1990 and April 1999 22 firefighters have been killed at operational 
incidents.  There were 1.8 million fires in the USA in 1999 for a loss of 112 firefighters’ lives, six times more fires than 
England and Wales where there were no firefighter deaths. 
309 The world famous New York fire crew. 
310 There is evidence in trade journals that Fire Prevention work is being undertaken by firefighters, but my fieldwork 
suggests that, at least in the areas I researched, the subject is at best marginalised.  It may be that FP is being packaged 
under a new term Community Fire Safety, and being done in a more interactive manner with firefighters being encouraged 
to mix in the community.  This in effect may change their public profile (discussed later).     
311 ‘Go out’ is what firefighters say when they respond to an emergency call. 
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counteract it or whatever.  It’s like sort of playing for a premiership side and being 
on the bench all the time innit?  
(Brigade one, probationer, 1 year’s service, age 23).  [My emphases].  
 
Terri: It’s not what I have trained to do, sit behind a desk and do that.  Yunnoo, sit behind a 
desk and all the paper work.  I want to be out there doing the manual work, doing, 
yunnoo getting on the appliances   I suppose you see the public in Fire Safety but it is 
not my sort of scene.  I mean I will do it for the stint, if I have got to, but.  
[My emphases] 
 
It could not be clearer, supporting their views expressed in Chapter 3, firefighters just want to be 
firefighting; not doing paperwork, despite understanding how FP/CFS benefits the public.  Colin 
explains: 
 
Colin:         Statistics show they save more lives than we do.  At the end of the day you have really 
got to want to do it.  Some people say it’s a stepping stone up the ladder .. you can go 
in there for a year and you come out as a sub officer or station officer or something.  
There is that element to it and some people want to do it.  I mean I joined with a lad 
who wants to do FP.  I don't know if he'll change his mind.  I mean he’s quite an 
academic anyway.  
(Brigade four, firefighter, two years’ service, four years’ service in the army fire 
service, age 25).  [My emphases].   
 
For Colin FP is done by someone else, “academics” who as Terri suggests, “sit behind a desk.”  Only 
one firefighter, Alex, was positive about doing FP: 
 
Alex: I think they go well together, because you learn from both.  If we don’t have FP .. 
people have come up to me and said ‘do you know what I should do about this 
installation’? … because I have done FP or what ever, I can say ‘yes’, or ‘I know a 
man who can’.  It is usually a man who can.  [laughter].  
(Female firefighter).  [My emphasis].  
  
 
With the exception of Alex, my research suggests that firefighters feminise FP, supporting the view 
that firefighters can and do resist the FBU’s, Government’s, employers’ and officers’ demands for 
their involvement in FP (see Hart 1982; Howell 1994; Sweeney 1999).  There was no evidence to 
suggest firefighters’ fear that FP could reduce the need for firefighters, nor that they are against FP 
per se.  Firefighters’ resistance to FP appears to challenge their arguments about ‘always wanting to 
help the public’ and that they join the fire service to ‘save life’ and I ask a question: is firefighters’ 
reluctance to carryout FP because it does not involve any possibility of firefighters being seen as 
proletarian heroes in the image of Saved (Millais, 1855)?  I will return to this question in Chapter 6, 
but before I do it is necessary to consider if firefighters’ resistance  to FP might be bound up in their 
relationship with the public.  In talking with officers from the fire prevention branch of the fire 
service, it is clear that in enforcing FP legislation in industry they meet considerable resistance: a 
thorn in the side of capital rather than an asset
312
.  Firefighters involvement in FP may result in them 
having a similar conflict with the public, who might soon lose their appreciation of firefighters if FP 
becomes an intrusion into the privacy of the home
313
.    
 
 
                                                 
312 FP officers can and do maintain fire safety legislation in industrial, commercial, retail and entertainment premises.  The 
requirement that employers provide adequate means of escape from fire, provide firefighting equipment and staff training, 
can be expensive and can limit the use of a commercial premise.  FP officers have the authority to shut a premise if the 
owners refuse to comply with their requirements and Capital does not welcome such ‘unnecessary’ expense, or intrusion.  
313 In the USSR, FP departments were part of the KGB. 
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5.4.7. Conclusion 
This section has shown that despite fire service claims that they are a disciplined service, the reality is 
somewhat different.  Officers might find it surprising, but in four areas where officers legislate to 
make firefighters’ job safer (DRA; BAC; training; FP), firefighters are successfully resisting their 
authority.  Importantly firefighters’ resistance almost has to have the acquiescence of watch-
commanders and often goes against the best intents of the FBU.  It appears as if firefighters are acting 
conservatively (as if a class in itself) to protect the way their job is currently being done and the 
dividends they get from doing it that way.   
 
5.5. MASCULINITY       
5.5.1. It’s a man’s job    
Kanter (1977) might easily explain the solidarity and trust that firefighters develop as a trust that 
males develop with people like themselves (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; DiTomaso 1989: 88; Office for 
Public Management 1996; Owen 1996; Seidler 1997; Corby 1999: 98-99; Rutherford 1999: 120).  
Research in the fire service suggests that to firefighters, “people like themselves” are those who 
embrace firefighters’ proletarian masculinity (see LFCDA 1995; Baigent 1996; Richards 1996; 
Howell 1996; HMIFS 99).  This section will now focus directly on three further areas, which might be 
crucial to firefighters’ masculinity and its dividends: firefighters’ sexualised imagery; firefighters’ 
public status; female firefighters. 
 
5.5.2. Sexual adventures 
Over recent years, firefighters have become male pin-ups.  The pictures are explicit and support fire 
service institutional sexism by portraying the fire service as a male world and firemen as sexually 
available (see Carroll 1999; Appendix 13).  However, these are male pin-ups and firefighters’ 
portrayal is not submissive as is a super-model (see Chapter 1).  The image that stares back from these 
pictures unashamedly portrays raw power, sexuality and proletarian masculinity.  Much to most 
firefighters’ disgust they are also a gay icon314.  
 Experiential knowledge suggests that firefighters are aware that there is something about their 
work that makes them attractive to women.   I have successfully exploited this dividend when I was a 
firefighter and fieldwork at FSC suggests firefighters’ visits to local bars and nightclubs are a 
celebrated feature of ‘village’ life315.  Susie explains: 
 
Susie: Well there’s ‘The Bugs’, a lot of people go there just to be picked up. … They come 
from miles around.  Evesham women come into ‘The Bugs’.   
(Civilian employee). 
 
It appears that male firefighters not only go out looking for sex, but that women who want a sexual 
adventure might go looking for firefighters.  Firefighters’ behaviour in a local pub is an example: 
  
Maggie: I really play up to some of the comments they make .. asking me out or making 
comments. … I would have to say too that I have been out with a couple of them.   
(Female bartender). 
 
At the FSC I was told of a standing joke between two females: 
 
Vic: Yeah firemen, they are all ten years younger than they actually are; no, they are not 
married; yes, they are looking for the perfect relationship [laughter]. … I have 
eavesdropped on some of their little chat up lines that have gone on .. places like the 
                                                 
314 Firefighters also feature in Gay magazines (Gay Times 1998).   
315 The Bell, Marilyn’s and The Bugs (named after the Ugly Bugs Ball) are all examples of these. 
  
130 
 
Bell and Marilyn’s that is.  What they are saying and it’s so funny.  It’s like they 
are getting into the stereotype of this is what is expected of me.  
(Civilian employee).  [My emphasis].                   
 
Getting into the stereotype or not, there can be no doubt that firefighters trade on their sexualised 
imagery.  Colin adds to this view: 
 
Colin: Firemen they are always seen by the women as bloody heroes and you drive round it’s 
unbelievable. … In the summer the women just go mad.  I think you are expected to … 
to just go out and just shag women and stuff like that.   
 
Promiscuity, like firefighting can be an adventurous activity
316
 and the fire service even have a section 
that answers, “calls and letters from heartbroken women trying to track down firefighter ‘lotharios’” 
(Webb 1998: 26-27; see Alex Chapter 3). 
 
 During my attendance at various sociological conferences, I frequently talk with feminists about 
my study.  Their reactions to ‘firemen’, as they inevitably call firefighters, conjures a fondness tinged 
with sexual and heroic imagery that at times has been more than surprising.  I expected female 
sociologists would be more aware of how their words could be interpreted, especially how they 
stereotyped firefighters as male and how their ‘fondness’ might be analysed as contributing to or even 
part of the hegemony that subordinates women. 
 
5.5.3. Special people 
Apart from those women hurt by firefighters promiscuity, there is little evidence of any public 
criticism of firefighters.  Even when The Home Office held a news conference to publicise male 
harassment of female firefighters, the report (HMIFS 1999) only received one day’s attention in the 
newspapers (Wilson 1999) and politicians sprang to support firefighters (see Tebbitt 1999, reproduced 
in Appendix 14).  Given also that aware female sociologists pay such tributes to firefighters, ignoring, 
but presumably not unaware of the way that male firefighters treat women, then the public probably 
prefer the Tebbitt (1999) view that supports the commonsense cultural understandings about 
masculinity, which this thesis is challenging.  Firefighters appear to hold a special place with the 
public, a view not only recognised by Lionel (above):    
 
Hilary: The problem of fire service is that firefighters are God-like characters, held in such 
public esteem.  Unlike the police, firefighters do not have to court public opinion.   
(Senior civilian equality advisor) 
 
In many ways, the fire service is a similar organisation to the police, but there are also distinct 
defaults in the public’s eyes: police’ unpopularity is as legendary as firefighters’ popularity.  But if 
people see firefighters as, “God-like,” firefighters don’t recognise this status — or do they?  The 
response below by a focus group is typical and might be interpreted as another example of 
firefighters’ false modesty (see Chapter 3): 
  
Ian: Not really.  I don’t see myself as more special than my friends, even though they say 
‘fucking hell Ian I don’t know how you do that’.  
(Brigade two, firefighter, 8 years’ service, age 30 in a focus group). 
 
Unidentified: You get that all the time don’t you? 
 
                                                 
316 According to Kimmel (1990: 108), “Sex is about danger, risk, excitement [masculine]; safety is about softness, 
security, comfort [feminine]”(My inserts).   
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This was the majority view that firefighters ignore the imagery, but after the evidence of Chapter 
3, I would challenge this view.  Trevor’s ‘honesty’ is unusual: 
 
Trevor: You want people to look at you and think your doing a good job and that, ‘look at him 
he is a fireman’.  It is, it’s a respected job innit?  You want people to feel well of yuh, 
so yeah, I suppose it’s what I believe.  I like doing it, but then I like what people think 
about me because I do it. 
(Brigade one, probationary firefighter, 1 year’s service, age 27). [My emphases].  
 
DB: Do you see yourself as a hero?  
 
Trevor: Yeah, I suppose if I am honest. 
 
As in Chapter 3, it is possible to argue that the reluctant hero is a more acceptable form than the one 
that Trevor portrays.  I am also sure if Millais’ hero could talk, he would say ‘I am only doing my 
job.’  Justin sums up my recollections of firefighters, which is more in line with the imagery on the 
pin-up calendars:   
 
Justin: You can feel the testosterone as soon as you walk into the room.  
 
Justin suggests he found that the firefighters he met emphasised the heroic physical nature of 
firefighters’ work and what he saw as their heterosexuality.  Such images may be of interest to some 
female sociologists, but could create difficulties for women who choose to become firefighters.  My 
previous research and that of many others (Devine 1993; LFCDA 1995; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999) 
supports the view that women are discouraged from being firefighters.  Whilst I will not repeat such 
arguments in detail, the next subsection does provide some idea of the difficulties that women might 
experience in the fire service.   
 
5.5.4. Female firefighters  
The first fulltime, female firefighter joined the fire service in 1982 and females currently comprise 
less than 1% of firefighters.  Following several wake-up calls from the FBU over 15 years, HMIFS 
(1999) appears as the last straw to persuade the Home Secretary to act to improve this situation.  He 
now requires that by 2009 15% of firefighters should be female.  However, 60% of female firefighters 
are concerned that positive action might cause repercussions (LFCDA 1995: 14; Baigent 1996; see 
also Cockburn 1991: 216; Faludi 1992).  One form of repercussion is for male firefighters to voice 
their concerns about women’s physical abilities.  Richards (1996: 114) found that whilst male 
firefighters are easily able to maintain their fitness levels, they have concerns about the difficulties 
females have in staying fit.  In consequence, female firefighters may have to ‘prove’ themselves more 
frequently than male firefighters (see Devine 1993; O'Donnell 1995: 46; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).  
Physical strength has often been central to the gendered division of labour (Kimmel 1987; Cockburn 
1991a; Lorber 1994; Connell 1995) and if any feature of male firefighters’ hostility has prominence, it 
is in this area.  Keeping fit apart, many male firefighters are concerned that females will not have the 
strength to do The Job
317
.  Male firefighters have the notion that physical standards have been lowered 
to allow women to join and already it is folklore that instructors are forced to retain sub-standard 
females (LFCDA 1995; CCC 2000).  I received several accounts of how females were ‘helped’ in 
training and despite my scepticism, my informants perceive the ‘facts’ as real: standards have been 
lowered.  Bert is under no illusions about the importance of strength: 
                                                 
317 Wollstonecraft (1994) was aware that unless women exercised their physical bodies as well as their brains they were 
going to contribute to their own subordination.  One group of women who were not discouraged from developing their 
physical bodies were Afro-Americans and firefighters have clearly not heard of Sojourner Truth.  “Look at me! Look at 
my arm! … I have plowed, and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me- and ain’t I a woman?” 
(Hooks 1981, 160).   
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Bert: If you take the top ten physical people who apply for The Job the women wouldn’t 
would they?  To be honest the strongest women can’t compete with us physically.  
(Brigade one, firefighter, 11.5 years’ service, age 35, in a focus group).  
 
Firefighters appear to elevate physical strength above all the other attributes a firefighter needs.  It 
would be easy to follow this male agenda if I did not realise that whilst firefighters have to be strong, 
strength is relative as firefighters, are part of a team
318
.   
 
5.5.5. Female ‘irrationality’  
The view that females are irrational is a further commonsense notion that males develop to 
subordinate females.  As reported in Chapter 2, Ian has no doubts:  
 
Ian:  The scenario I imagine is your going into a fire … with a bird [female] and she’s got 
PMT, or she’s got her period and like you .. it’s just in the back of your mind.  
[My insert].  
 
I was tempted to ignore the evidence (above) from males who complain about female firefighters, 
because their knowledge was anecdotal.  None of them actually work with female firefighters.  
However, I am glad I ignored this temptation, because from firefighters own words it is easy to see 
how the range of convincing stereotypes that firefighters develop about females can and have become 
folklore.  None of the men who actually work with female firefighters made any complaints about 
them.  Nor did their acceptance of female firefighters appear to repeat the ‘yes but our female is 
special approach’ found in the Washington Police (Frieze, et al. 1978: 281) or in commerce 
(Rutherford 1999: 117).  Nor are female firefighters marginalised into women’s work, as they can be 
in the police (see Young 1991; Fielding 1994).  If anything female firefighters are put right into the 
thick of firefighting; they are passing the test. 
 
5.5.6. Where are we now? 
In a closer look at masculinity, firefighters are given the status as: ‘a man’s man’; a hero (see Whalen 
1980; Cooper 1986; Lloyd-Elliott 1992; Wallington and Holloway 1994) and a public protector with a 
powerful sexual dividend.  In line with the sort of behaviour one expects from those who marginalise 
women, firefighters make a work environment ‘where females might not flourish’ (see Cockburn 
1991b) and harass women that join the fire service (see FBU 1985, 1991; (see Hearn and Parkin 1987, 
1995: 74; Walby 1990: 52; Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999) almost as a gender class of men (see Hearn 
1994).  However, my fieldwork suggests that firefighters who do not work with females subscribe to 
folklore based on somewhat dated, but nonetheless powerful, stereotypes about women’s weakness 
and irrationality.  Such a testimony is discounted by the experiential knowledge of firefighters who do 
work with females; they have not raised any concerns.  This raises a question, which might need to be 
answered elsewhere, about who is harassing female firefighters, because there is considerable 
evidence from a chat line I subscribe to (fairness@egroups.com) that the harassment of female (and 
many other) firefighters continues (see Baigent 1996; HMI 1999).  The FBU’s and employers’ 
attempt to improve recruitment of female firefighters is now targeted through a high-powered 
committee (EOTG 2000a, 2000b, 2000c) and this might improve female recruitment.  However, 
firefighters’ resistance will not be easy to overcome, all the more so because as the evidence above 
suggests it is more to do with firefighters’ perceptions than any reality that can be addressed.  The 
only people who seem convinced that females can do The Job are the few men who work with them 
                                                 
318 However, it must be remembered that the norm is for firefighters to work in pairs when they get in and in the event of 
one crewmember being injured it is realistically expected that the other team member should be strong enough to drag 
their partner away from danger.   
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and their union.  Once again, this points to how it is hands-on experience that counts for 
firefighters, not what they read, or what the employer, or their union tells them.       
 
5.6. THE FIRE BRIGADES UNION (FBU) AND CLASS 
The FBU is a very left wing union that continues to use traditional militancy including strike-action to 
protect firefighters from the worst ravages of neo-liberal efficiencies and Taylorist deskilling (see 
Segars 1989, Bailey 1992; Darlington 1996, 1998).  It is important to recognise that these efficiencies 
are determined by economics, not public service factors and FBU resistance is not just about jobs, but 
also a defence of firefighters’ professional ethos: to provide an efficient service to help the public319.  
Currently the FBU resist every attempt to cut the fire service and employers’ agendas to elevate 
economics above public service issues have not been as successful as in other industries
320
.  The FBU 
have innovatively turned the tables on the (economic) notions behind Best Value, by persuading the 
public to react against politicians who attempt to cut their fire service (see Lucio and MacKenzie 
1999: 168-169; Price 1999).  Nor have firefighters been drawn into believing the soft soap approach 
of officers who try to paternally appear as if acting in firefighters best interest during attempts to cut 
the fire service.  One bad example anywhere in a brigade, such as lining up firefighters to question 
them, is enough to distance firefighters from their officers and a reminder of the ‘them and us’ (class) 
divide.   
 
5.6.1. Smash and Grab  
During my research the aptly named ‘Smash and Grab (or ‘Grey Book’) dispute’ started and this was 
another attempt to rationalise the fire service (see Cameron 1999a 1999b 1999c 1999d 1999e; FBU 
1999a 1999b; Gilchrist 1999), which further increased class solidarity amongst firefighters.  Whilst 
my interest is more in firefighters’ informal resistance, ‘Smash and Grab’ provides an opportunity to 
look at an area that might provide clues as to how firefighters organise themselves and mobilise 
public support.  At the BCC a very senior LGA officer comments about this dispute:  
 
Lionel: The union is able to mobilise public support and the employers always start off streets 
behind in any public dispute.  
[LGA official].  
 
Lionel points out that employers acknowledge public support for firefighters, but the discussion that 
followed was very one sided and the BCC were in general agreement that the dispute was to be a 
watershed in the fire service.  “Perhaps the last one” one officer commented.  Another officer 
suggested, “the employers shouldn’t back away.”  There can be no doubt that these officers wanted to 
curb the FBU’s resistance to cuts and deskilling.  Whilst the LGA may be acting to support capitalists, 
it is more likely that senior officers vehemence in following this lead is in defence of their petty 
dividend (to be able to order firefighters about): a situation that the FBU frustrates by providing an 
umbrella for resistance.       
 
 FBU literature, the four national FBU representatives I spoke with and Segars (1989; see Bailey 
1992; Darlington 1998), confirm a view that the FBU is a class-conscious organisation that defends 
their members’ jobs and retains a high quality fire service for the public.  However, I question, how is 
                                                 
319 In reacting to protect the public so to speak, the FBU is using its right, given by the government when the fire service 
was returned to local authorities, to be an organisation with authority on technical questions within the fire service (see 
Segars 1989: 342).  This is similar to how other professional bodies act as if to protect the public.    
320 Similar circumstances applied in the railways when Beeching and Reid cut the service to save money, but the rail 
unions were less successful in resisting the cuts (Strangleman 1998, 1999).  It might be that the current failure of the 
railways to maintain safety and services is as a direct consequence of the Beeching and Reid cuts.  Had the rail unions, for 
instance, successfully motivated the public, then perhaps the cuts might not have been made and rail safety would not be 
such an issue and roads less congested.   
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it that where the railway unions failed (Strangleman 1998), the FBU have been successful?  I 
asked Ashley if a Vanguard might be leading the FBU: 
 
Ashley: Not a Vanguard, wider than a Vanguard.  I think possibly 20-25% feel that way.  There 
is another 25% of the other extreme who are purely selfish and don’t give a fuck for 
anybody.  It’s the 50% in the middle who see it with that small ‘c’[onservative]  
(Senior FBU representative).  [My insert].   
 
Ashley’s response provides some suggestion of how solid the FBU is.  Whilst 25% of the members 
might be selfish and 50% conservative, they are all able to find common cause with the ‘Vanguard’ to 
fight the employers.  In what might appear a somewhat light-hearted approach to class issues, Ken 
perhaps speaks for many of those who Daniel did not identify as a Vanguard, when he describes an 
FBU march he attended: 
 
Ken: We just went in the morning straight from work and we stood outside for a little bit 
and did a bit of yelling and all that stuff, which was quite good.  And then we ended up 
in the pub afterwards.  It was a really good day.  
[My emphases].   
 
Throughout this thesis, I have reported how firefighters manage to find common cause in their work.  
Their reasons might vary, but there is something about being a firefighter that binds firefighters 
together.  Beneath Ken’s light-hearted approach, he has a sense of belonging, what Grint (1998: 221) 
calls a coming together of masculinity, and militancy in proletarian masculinity.  Perhaps it is better 
to suggest that firefighters’ resistance is successful (where the Rail unions failed), because they are 
able to encompass, under one umbrella, the different types of class awareness that Giddens (1982: 
163-164) recognises: those who have revolutionary consciousness and are acting against capital; those 
who are aware of other classes and who act conservatively to protect their job, and add to this public 
support
321.  What this means for firefighters’ masculinity will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.7. CONCLUSION     
It is clear that firefighters have considerable control over what might be seen as the means of 
production in the fire service.  These I see as their product (firefighting), the resources for their 
product (the amount of firefighters and equipment) and how their labour is used (the way they 
carryout firefighting and resist other types of work).  However, I will not quantify firefighters’ 
resistance in macro economic terms, but rather as a resistance to protect the many varied petty 
dividends they gain from doing The Job their way.  Officers it appears attempt to gain their dividends 
from ‘controlling’ firefighters and in both cases, it may be argued that resistance is antagonistic, 
because both groups may by trying to access a central petty dividend associated with who controls the 
fire service.  That central dividend has much to do with how each might achieve their masculinity
322
.     
 
5.7.1. Officers’ petty dividend 
                                                 
321 The outcome to the dispute was that FBU mobilised their members, the public and prepared for strike.  The 
Government intervened and an enquiry was set up, presumably to avoid the political ramifications a strike in the fire 
service might have on voters, and the role that public support for firefighters took in the government’s decision not to 
confront firefighters should not be underestimated.  Despite clear suggestions that the government were going to outlaw 
strikes in the fire service (Milne 1999), in the end the government probably recognised that firefighters would stick 
together and that as Lionel (above) might have advised them, there are no votes to be won in taking on public heroes.  
That report is now complete (and both sides have accepted the findings, see Burchill 2000) and cuts are avoided for the 
moment.  However, the ‘Smash and Grab’ dispute has not really ended, because it probably never will, and a successful 
strike ballot has just (30-4-01) forced the Berkshire Fire Authority to back down over cuts in the service. 
322 In these circumstances where two groups of workers are in antagonistic relations with each other, they are acting 
conservatively (without in this case revolutionary consciousness) to protect their interests; they are seen to be acting as a 
class in itself (see Giddens 1982: 163-164; Crompton 1998: 200; Grint 1998: 94).   
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My thesis is not primarily about officers and the evidence that they provide originates from my 
interest in firefighters’ resistance.  Therefore, officers’ evidence might be incidental to this thesis, 
were it not to point to the possibility that whilst officers gain no economic benefit from any surplus-
value that capital may take from firefighters, they do collect other organisational assets (petty 
dividends) in the form of their given right to lead firefighters.  Therefore, officers might also be 
constructing their masculinity at work and seek to ‘prove’ it in a number of ways323.  This may 
include ordering firefighters around, cutting the fire service, deskilling firefighters, implementing 
FP/CFS and paradoxically supporting equal opportunities.  Further research would be necessary 
before making a substantive argument that officers are actually constructing their masculinity in this 
process, but the suggestion is that this might be happening.   
 
5.7.2. Firefighters’ petty dividend 
This chapter provides evidence to suggest that firefighters’ hierarchies (originally seen as the way 
firefighters organise to defend their skills and any other agendas concerning masculinity) can also be 
seen in class terms as how firefighters organise to build a gap between themselves and officers.  In 
particular, firefighters organise their hierarchies to resist their officers’ attempts to deskill and cut the 
fire service.  To act as it were, alongside, and in addition to (sometimes even in opposition to) the 
FBU
324
, to protect The Job and what appear to be joint understandings amongst firefighters.  
Firefighters’ resistance to cuts provides them with considerable control over the resources required to 
run the fire service (see Chapter 1; Segars 1989; Bailey 1992; Darlington 1998).  However, any 
dividend that firefighters’ gain from their resistance, will only apply whilst firefighters are able to 
control the workplace in such a way that they continue to construct their masculinity in its present 
form.  If, for example, officers deskill firefighters, then firefighters’ dividend will inevitably reduce 
and the whole process of how firefighters construct their masculinity might be endangered
325
.   
 
One reason why firefighters are able to resist their officers is because they have shared 
understandings that bind them together: a form of dynamic homogeneity of purpose that makes sense 
to them.  Part of the reason why firefighters’ actions are so successful stems from their ability to 
support their professional ethos and at the same time construct their masculinity.  This is a process 
that may rely on homosociality and harassment/bullying to construct, conserve and police their 
masculinity: a dynamic that, in turn, will only be successful whilst they preserve their professional 
ethos by successfully resisting officers over petty dividends
326
 and capital over the resources required 
for firefighting.  My analysis is that the antagonism over petty dividends is central to the social 
construction of firefighters’ masculinity.    
                                                 
323 The notion of given authority (dieu et mon droit) might extend to such an extent that fire service officers actually 
believe it is true; almost as if they are seeking to ‘prove’ they are infallible: as a Calvinist might want to ‘prove’ their 
‘calling’ (see Weber 1971).   
324 This is not to reify the FBU, but in many ways revolutionary activists (see Giddens 1982: 163-164) in the fire service 
act as a Vanguard to ensure the FBU provides the organisation to focus firefighters’ discontent. 
325 When a worker has this amount of control in the workplace, they may be technocrats (see Wright 1982; Lucio and 
MacKenzie 1999), similar to independent artisans operating within capitalist organisations.  Workers who are still 
operating as: “residual islands of petty-bourgeoisie relations of production … they maintain the work process of the 
independent artisan” (Wright 1982: 127).  However, before they gain this classification they must have “some control both 
over what is produced (minimal economic ownership) as well as how it is produced (minimal possession)” (Wright 1982: 
128).  It is common to see this control as exerted by professionals, such as doctors, accountants, lawyers (Lucio and 
MacKenzie 1999: 158-161), but this does not exclude manual workers from being seen in this way.  Although since the 
1970’s, the decline of industry (and the unions) the groups of manual workers who might previously be seen as having 
control over their labour have diminished. 
326 It may be necessary to repeat my view that saving life gives firefighters a psychological (petty) dividend.  This is 
similar to the personal dividends firefighters get when they fight fires; complete ‘dangerous’ work; help people in distress.  
This dividend might also involve the status surrounding being seen as a good firefighter.  Public praise might also be 
another dividend and the same way that patriarchal dividends extend to all males (see Connell 1995) all firefighters gain 
from the bravery of some firefighters.  Cutting the fire service and deskilling would alienate firefighters from this 
dividend, their work and their masculinity and therefore this as much as any other reason might explain why firefighters’ 
resistance is so powerful.   
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Firefighters’ resistance might not only be about petty dividends directly associated with the fire 
service.  If firefighters’ masculinity contributes to dividends provided to all males from “[m]ass 
culture generally assum[ing that] there is a fixed, true masculinity … inherent in a man’s body” 
(Connell 1995: 45; see Chapter 1), then firefighters’ resistance returns to an economic base, because it 
can then be seen as supporting the gender division of labour and capital.  However, still unresolved is 
the question of how we describe the gender of those female firefighters who challenge outright the 
commonsense notion above and the gender division of labour, by acting in a similar manner to their 
male colleagues at work: a situation that will be addressed in the final chapter.       
  
137 
6. CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this conclusion I will concentrate on the four questions I set at the start of the thesis, but first I wish 
to remind the reader that this thesis has a political motive to assist the fire service with its difficulties 
over equal opportunities.  One chief officer who spoke to me about harassment perhaps best describes 
these difficulties.  He said, “I know it’s wrong but I can’t stop it, how do I do this?”  This was an 
extremely powerful man and yet there was real sense of inevitability in his eyes.  I recognise this 
rhetorical question for what it then was: unanswerable.  No written or verbal instructions, specialist 
training, tribunals, or Official Enquiries have changed, in general terms, the way women are seen and 
treated by the British Fire Service, and that chief officer knew this.  Therefore, in my research I chose 
to take a different perspective view, focus on firefighters’ day-to-day behaviour in order to produce a 
reflexive view of firefighters’ actions looking for the unacknowledged conditions and unintended 
consequences of these actions (see Giddens 1979: 56), rather than searching for high profile cases of 
harassment, which are easy to find but do little to suggest a way forward.  Therefore, all the time I 
have been reporting what firefighters have told me, I do so in a way that any firefighter might 
recognise as happening on their firestation.  However, I add an important element to this account– that 
of pro-feminist auto-critique to suggest some ‘invisible’ conditions and consequences of firefighters’ 
words and actions.   
 
This has led to an account, which aligns with those who do not see structural restraints in a 
system as physical restraints, but as social constructions that the participants constitute and react to on 
a day-to-day basis (see Giddens 1979).  As an example, firefighters’ informal hierarchy may appear to 
control firefighters, but it is a social structure (with no formal authority) and if probationary 
firefighters wanted to, they could resist it.  However, few do and because the watch actually 
constitutes the hierarchy and the probationer wishes to join and impress them, they fit in.  Chapter 4 
provides evidence of how some do resist and there are repercussions for this behaviour: clearly if 
firefighters do not come into line they may be denied access to firefighters’ hierarchy and the skills of 
firefighting.  They might also be subject to the worst excesses of firefighters’ humour.  For most, 
resistance was unlikely, because it seems that before they join probationers already understand they 
must fit in, possibly as part of a far wider cultural understanding of what acceptance in such a 
fundamentally male occupation requires.  As I have already argued, before university I celebrated, 
sought after and tested myself against the attributes of working class, patriarchal masculinity.  My 
whole life appears as a precursor for the next stage as I moved from boy, to youth, to (patriarchal) 
firefighter as I believed and followed commonsense understandings about masculinity.  I now accept 
this was a choice, but – if I was to become/remain a firefighter – I recognise that the choice was 
limited to my acting as others around me acted.  This resulted in my choosing to fit in with 
firefighters’ hierarchy, and then, importantly, for me to climb the rounds of the hierarchy and play an 
increasing part in organising how the hierarchy operated.  Then of course, having climbed my way to 
the top of firefighters’ hierarchy, if I was to get the dividends I expected, it was in my interests to 
ensure that those below me followed suit.  I believe that without the benefit of a ‘late’ education that I 
would not have the tools to recognise the negative side of my behaviour, and I would still be 
celebrating patriarchal masculinity and not critiquing it. 
 
Now I shall look closer at the areas I suggested I would investigate at the start of the thesis and 
the questions I raised.  These are:   
 
Firefighting:  how do firefighters develop the protocols and skills necessary for 
firefighting?  
what does ‘getting in’ mean to firefighters? 
why, given the apparent danger involved, do firefighters ‘get in’ at a 
fire? 
Relations at the station: how do firefighters organise their social relations at the station? 
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Class: can the dynamic between class, hierarchies and resistance help 
explain how firefighters construct their masculinity? 
Gender: how do firefighters construct their masculinity and what does this tell us 
about gender debates? 
 
To each of these areas I devote a section, but my overall findings suggest that all three areas are 
closely connected and therefore each section will reflect this view.  Then at the end of the chapter I 
will reflect on the research and the research process overall.  Throughout I intend to both summarise 
some findings already analysed within each chapter and to continue the analysis to aid the debate I 
hope will continue after this thesis has been completed. 
 
6.2. FIREFIGHTING 
6.2.1. Outcomes from firefighting 
I consider that firefighters’ professional ethos: ‘to provide an efficient service to help the public’, and 
their raison d’etre – the  saving of life; the suppression of fire and the rendering of humanitarian 
services – provides a powerful argument for why firefighters fight fires.  It suggests that firefighters 
have a sense of honour, which they fulfil by doing a good job for the public.  Firefighting allows 
firefighters to:  
 do their best for the public whilst firefighting;  
 undertake meaningful employment, providing pay and security;  
 get job satisfaction and status;  
 know best how to do a job and do it that way;   
 have a central and agreed purpose (to get in); 
 collect dividends in the form of an adrenaline buzz and self-satisfaction; 
 form bonds with their colleagues and develop norms and values (although this sometimes has 
to be enforced); 
 belong to a group that will help them form opinions and understand the world. 
 
Firefighters have developed a style for firefighting, which they call ‘getting in’.  While I agree that 
getting in involves a risk, I would suggest that in reality firefighters’ professionalism significantly 
limits the risk involved.    
 
Firefighters are professionals in their own terms and that they learn their skills experientially.  
There is no better example of this than the way firefighters prepare in advance for decision making at 
fires.  At the fire firefighters rarely have the luxury of standing back to form a plan, because while 
they do so the fire will likely increase in intensity and the situation they are planning for will change.  
Therefore, to assist them to react successfully, firefighters have to plan before an incident for 
whatever eventuality may confront them.  On successful watches, this includes the post-incident 
sharing of knowledge amongst the peer group and self-criticism in ‘post-mortems’ around the mess 
table.  Through this process the combined knowledge of the watch, both past and current, is passed 
around in the form of story telling and critical reflection
327
.  Then when the team go into action they 
have a basis of shared understandings about how each other will react and when they are confronted 
by an unfamiliar or familiar incident they use experiential knowledge to react accordingly: firefighters 
rely on their experience to almost ‘throw-up’ an answer.   
 
If I were to stop my analysis at this point I might satisfy any readers who are firefighters.  But I 
would not be happy myself.  My research suggests that firefighters are no just selfless public minded 
citizens simply going about their work to the best of their ability.  As I have shown there is evidence 
                                                 
327 This includes knowledge gained as the watch-officers share their knowledge with other officers and throughout the 
whole network of the fire service and back down again to the watch: the effect being that firefighters have access to all the 
knowledge about firefighting (once they can access firefighters’ hierarchies).   
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that firefighters’ protocols not only help them to fight fires more efficiently for the public, but are 
also about individual status as a good firefighter (someone who can get into a fire and overcome the 
danger involved).  If these two outcomes do not clash, it might be that firefighters’ service to the 
public is improved.  However, if status presentation is important, even to the extent that it became the 
prime motivator for some of the decisions made at fires, it could endanger the team at a fire.  This 
effect might be doubly negative if the source of knowledge (that the firefighter making the decision 
draws on) is itself a consequence of some other firefighter ‘talking the walk’ (and seeking to raise 
their profile round the mess table by making up stories to ‘prove’ through their words rather than 
actions they can pass the test) of a good firefighter.     
 
I have considerable admiration for how firefighters resist many of the cuts officers would wish 
to make to their service.  While firefighters are acting again as professionals, by generally knowing 
what is best for their service and fighting for it, it is also possible to see firefighters’ resistance to the 
cuts in a less positive light.  If those cuts went through then this would have a serious affect on the 
way firefighters construct their masculinity.  Without the ability to ‘prove’ themselves good 
firefighters, firefighters would not be able to create an ‘other’ out of those who do not, cannot, or are 
prevented (sometimes by firefighters) from fighting fires.  In creating this ‘other’ (the people who 
cannot fight fires), firefighters can then see themselves as those who can fight fires: ‘special people’ 
with the ability to do what ‘others’ cannot.  Firefighters then take a subjective view of themselves as 
an object they admire
328
; that they believe their peer group and the public admire and then test 
themselves against this view.  It is within this process of subjective self-objectification that firefighters 
form their masculinity.  However, I do not think this is something new, but a way that firefighters 
historically ‘prove’ themselves to be good firefighters: a learnt behaviour passed down homosocially 
by one cohort of firefighters to those selected to be the next.  In am not suggesting that firefighters’ 
masculinity is reified, or in anyway pre-given in a biological sense; firefighters’ are active subjects in 
this process.  This may not apply to all firefighters, and it is clear that some firefighters do not 
develop their individual view of a good firefighter in circumstances they would choose.  However, 
those that do join the hierarchy (which sets the standards that they will effectively test themselves 
against), reflexively view themselves as objects to see if they have achieved these standards from their 
own perspective, fellow firefighters and the community they serve
329
.   
 
6.2.2. Serving the community 
The community firefighters serve is essential to this whole process, because it is not only vital for 
firefighters to fulfil the image that the public expects, but to also ensure this image is also a public 
expectation: a circular process that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of mirrored images (see 
Goffman 1997b, 1997c).  In this respect it is interesting to note that the basis for public support of 
firefighters is closely associated with firefighters’ claim that they are in the fire service to save life: a 
claim potential firefighters make even before joining the fire service.  However, some of the evidence 
firefighters have given during this research does not exactly accord with the notion of firefighters as 
only selfless individuals acting to protect their community and this evidence enables me to pose and 
answer three questions.  First, ‘why do firefighters think they know more than their officers and break 
the official rules laid down for firefighting?’  The immediate answer is, that it is firefighters who 
arrive at fires, gain access to the building, rescue any trapped persons and put out the fire, so probably 
it is firefighters who know best how to do this, and if officers do not listen to firefighters it is almost 
inevitable they will fight fires their own way.  This would be firefighters’ argument (although not 
officers
330
) and again, because of the public support firefighters get for their view, it is difficult to see 
further than this analysis.  But, there is evidence in this thesis that suggests, that by firefighting in a 
                                                 
328 This view might be seen as narcissistic (not directly in the psychological sense), but more as a form of being able to be 
proud of oneself (see Collinson 1992). 
329 This recognition owes much to Collinson (1992) 
330 Chapter 1 indicates that by studying statistics, rather than officers’ stories, it is possible to see that officers do not 
attend many fires at all.  Indeed, most firefighters do not attend that many fires per year and only get ‘experience’ after a 
considerable period of service. 
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particular way firefighters not only help the public, they also ‘prove’ and test their ability as a 
good firefighter (and gain considerable personal dividend from achieving this accolade).     
 
The second question is, ‘why are firefighters prepared to strike against the cuts their officers 
might impose and leave the public exposed to even greater risks of fire?’  One answer to this question 
is another question, ‘how do firefighters stop the cuts to their service if officers are determined to 
implement them?’  However, there is a paradox in firefighters’ actions when they strike to protect The 
Job: on the one hand, they are protecting their professional ethos; on the other hand, they are working 
against it.  Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that firefighters are not only protecting the community 
and their professional ethos when they resist cuts.  An argument has been developing throughout this 
thesis that there are fundamental links between the way firefighters do The Job, firefighters’ own 
perceptions of themselves as good firefighters and firefighters’ masculinity.  Therefore, if firefighters 
did not in the last event strike to prevent their officers from cutting and deskilling the fire service, 
they may no longer have access to the way they currently test and ‘prove’ their masculinity.   
 
I will shortly return to the question of how firefighters define their masculinity, but there is one 
area where there can be little doubt that firefighters are acting against public interest and that is when 
they resist fire prevention (FP) duties.  Consequently, the third question is mostly rhetorical.  ‘If, as 
firefighters argue, they follow their professional ethos, the prime outcome of which is to save life and 
prevent damage from fires, then why do firefighters resist FP, which would undoubtedly stop fires, 
limit the damage that occurs when a fire starts and save lives?’  The paradoxes within a situation 
where a confessed life-saver is prepared to risk their life to do so on one occasion (at fires), but not on 
another (by carrying out FP/CFS) are worth examining, because firefighters’ resistance may explain 
where firefighters’ priorities lie: to the community, or to their sense of self (subjectivity) and their 
masculinity.  The reply is to use an argument firefighters make before they join the fire service and 
throughout their careers, ‘that firefighters’ prime motivation for joining the fire service is to save life’, 
and to this statement the findings of this thesis add, ‘but this is conditional and firefighters only want 
to save life at ‘the sharp end’, when saving life involves the actual rescue of members of the public’.  
By being reactive to fire, firefighters create their public profile; they are seen to be doing their job and 
to be heroes.  Firefighters’ public status, then in turn, supports one of the ways firefighters reflexively 
view themselves as objects in the eyes of the ‘others’ that say “I couldn’t do your job” (a view of 
themselves that Chapter 3 suggests firefighters might actually provide for public consumption in the 
first place).  It appears that FP does not fit in with the way that firefighters want to be seen and despite 
their claims that they want to help the community, firefighters are not enthusiastic about shifting their 
emphasis from fire suppression to fire prevention.  In this regard firefighters do not want to always 
help the public by saving them from fire (the same might be said when firefighters go on strike).  
Firefighters prefer to be seen to be firefighting; despite the possibility that much of their time is spent 
standing-by waiting for fires, firefighters are not enthusiastic about using this time for FP.  Evidence 
suggests at least three possible reasons for this and they are explained under the subheadings below.   
 
Spoiling The Job: a chance to ‘prove’ masculinity 
The first is obvious; FP could become so successful that firefighters would eventually do 
themselves out of a job.  I have heard firefighters argue that ‘FP is spoiling The Job’, in effect they 
argue that the fire prevention departments’ involvement in commercial and industrial premises is 
preventing many of the fires: ‘good jobs’ that firefighters used to attend, enjoy and at the same 
time use as a means of ‘proving’ themselves as good firefighters by passing the tests they have set 
themselves, which in turn is one of the tests of their masculinity.  Therefore, by firefighters own 
admission it is possible to suggest that firefighters who do not cooperate with the implementation 
of FP, must be aware that they could be helping the public by doing this work and that they are 
prioritising their pleasures above helping the community
331
.   
 
                                                 
331 Were firefighters to be ‘forced’ to undertake FP, then capital would have found another way to exploit firefighters’ 
labour, because FP gets more value out of firefighters’ labour and capital could save more money if FP reduces fire losses.   
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Paperwork 
The second reason why firefighters say they dislike FP is because of the paperwork.  Firefighters 
despise paperwork; anything not hands-on (academic) they feminise and this is one reason why 
firefighters distance themselves from their officers: officers do paperwork (see Chapter 5).  In an 
industry where the further up the promotion ladder you go the more time that you spend behind a 
desk, firefighters’ views largely echo those views that proletarian workers have about office 
workers (see Collinson 1992, 1994).  However, firefighters emphasise this distinction to distance 
themselves from those officers who claim a shared experience.  Indeed, when officers sitting 
behind a desk claim that they too are firefighters, this can create a situation whereby firefighters 
may need to distance themselves even more from such non-proletarian labour to protect their 
status
332
.  Therefore, firefighters are unlikely to want to be associated with anything resembling 
paper or academic work that might contaminate their hands-on physical skills in the way they 
assume it has for their officers.   
 
The firefighter as the public’s friend 
There is also one other explanation and this relates to firefighters’ status with the public.  As 
argued above, the public are important in providing an ‘other’, against which firefighters can 
construct their masculinity and then support their status as popular heroes.  If firefighters were to 
be involved in FP then their relationship with the public could change, because what might start 
out as firefighters helping the public to prevent fires, could easily change into firefighters 
intruding into people’s lives and into their homes: a form of policing and a statutory duty 
firefighters might not want.  In particular, firefighters might resist this duty because alienating the 
public will inevitably affect the way the public help firefighters to construct their masculinity.  If 
firefighters lost their popularity, the public might not be so easy to convince that firefighters are 
heroes for doing a job the public cannot.  This would then reduce firefighters’ ability to reflexively 
view themselves as objects; an ‘other’ in the eyes of the public.  Alienating the public could also 
reduce the support they give firefighters in resisting cuts in the fire service.  The public might even 
support those cuts, in the belief that FP is reducing the amount of fires and firefighters are not as 
necessary (a view capitalists might take).  Public support may be a crucial constituent in the 
cocktail that the FBU mix to resist cuts (see Chapter 5).  Its loss might well mean that that 
firefighters’ industrial strength relied solely on themselves (as will be discussed more extensively 
in a later section) and it might be that officers could: 
 cut the fire service; 
 reduce job security; 
 reducing firefighters’ control in the workplace; 
 deskill firefighters; 
 enforce safety procedures. 
 
Officers’ influence would then increase in direct proportion to how much control firefighters lost.  For 
firefighters, the consequences would then be that their informal hierarchies would be less likely to be 
able to function as they did and the manner in which firefighters develop their masculinity would be 
under threat. 
 
Throughout the evidence suggests that firefighters consistently juggle their professional ethos 
against and with more personal agendas and the evidence suggests that firefighters’ agendas to help 
the community are more often mutually inclusive with constructing their masculinity.  However, 
firefighters’ resistance to FP/CFS tells us a lot about what might happen if helping the public goes 
against firefighters’ long term view of how they ‘prove’ their masculinity.  It helps to explain much of 
the evidence firefighters have provided, particularly why in resisting safety procedures, it appears that 
firefighters act against their own interest, because they increase the risks to their own lives.  In my 
                                                 
332 Contrary to public perception and the view that officers would wish others to see, officers no longer lead firefighters at 
a fire and firefighters have filled the gap by developing their own dynamic decision-making process.  Technology in the 
form of BA has effectively deskilled officers and empowered firefighters (see Chapter 1).   
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view beneath this apparent paradox there lies a deeper agenda and this involves the ways that 
firefighters construct their masculinity by setting themselves apart from ‘other’ males.  This they do 
by protecting their standards for entry and by maintaining an ‘other’ out of those who cannot (or 
whom firefighters will not allow to) achieve their standards.  However, there are problems with this 
view, because whilst a current cohort of firefighters may set themselves standards for their 
masculinity, this does not mean that the next cohort will accept them.  Nor does this view account for 
why ‘all’ firefighters appear to have the same standards.  The next section will consider these issue.     
 
6.3. FITTING IN 
The way firefighters’ explain their actions during firefighting appear as if they are status-building and 
this includes the possibility that firefighters may be trying to act as Millais or Vigor portray a fireman.  
To an extent, firefighters’ status-building might be advantageous for the public, because it ensures 
that firefighters are always keen to carry out their duty.  However, as this thesis has shown, it might 
also mean that firefighters differentiate between those who can and those who cannot do The Job, 
leading to firefighters stereotyping whom they would like to work with and to exclude: ‘others’ 
(males who have no wish to test themselves against firefighters’ standards, non-whites, females and 
homosexuals).  However, firefighters appear to remain selective and even after their selection process 
for entry to the fire service they develop standards for a good firefighter and ensure that new recruits 
fit in with these standards.  These standards, especially how firefighters agree their protocols for 
firefighting, serve firefighters (and the community) well by reducing the risks to firefighters when 
they undertake (potentially) dangerous work.  I refer to firefighting as potentially dangerous, because, 
whilst something unforeseen may go wrong, as long as firefighters are able to agree and comply with 
their protocols for firefighting they can balance the risk element on the safe side of danger.  It is not 
surprising under these circumstances that firefighters prefer to work alongside those that they believe 
will be able to obtain and share their standards, namely white, working class, able-bodied, fit and 
heterosexual males.  
 
I see firefighters constructing themselves and their informal hierarchy by their own actions (in 
‘cahoots’ with others of a like mind).  In so doing firefighters fit in with their own standards because 
it makes sense to do so and were the majority of firefighters to accept this system did not work it 
would inevitably collapse.  That is not to preclude the possibility that charismatic leaders keep the 
system very much alive, and that some of these have negative agendas and are able to bully those in 
the hierarchy to join with them in forcing newcomers into those agendas.  This possibility apart, it is 
clear that whilst firefighting involves ‘getting in’ as it currently does, there is a need for those in the 
hierarchy to ensure they can trust each other to follow their protocols.   
 
Such a system inevitably has to deal with those who will not fit in with firefighters’ protocols 
for firefighting and it is not surprising that firefighters have found ways to exclude or marginalise 
them to positions where they do not need to be trusted.  Such a position might be outside of the 
building during a fire and Chapter 3 has shown that ‘deviant firefighters’, such as Ricky, were put in 
the middle seat to achieve this effect.  It is also interesting that ‘outside’ is also the location that 
officers now have at a fire.  Experienced firefighters, by keeping back their skills until they believe 
they can trust those that they pass them to, may also be seen as insuring the process is a selection, 
which only allows those they identify as ‘the fittest’ to get the skills needed to be firefighters.  It is for 
this reason that I suggest firefighters’ exclusionary practices are homosocial333.  Firefighters’ 
socialisation prior to joining adds to a belief in the fire service that men are more likely to testing 
themselves against the sort of standards (which form an important part of firefighters protocols for 
firefighting) that firefighters need if they are to get in safely, and both provide (for the public) and 
‘prove’ (to themselves and their peers) their masculinity in the process.   
 
                                                 
333 Not because they have any erotic desire to work alongside men as others might suggest (see Lipman-Blumen 1976; 
Cockburn 1991b; Roper 1996).   
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Such is the way that firefighters learn to rely on expected behaviour within their watch, that 
any change, however small, is liable to upset firefighters’ safety at fires.  Change might also upset 
their status, their reference group and their masculinity, and in consequence firefighters’ first reaction 
is to resist change.  To give an example, firefighters have resisted changes to their uniform
334
 and 
before each change is accepted it has been resisted, tested, complained about, adapted, tested and so 
on until firefighters are convinced it will do the job.  The same applies to why experienced firefighters 
are sceptical about probationers.  Probationers or indeed any newcomer has to be tried and tested 
before they are accepted.  Similar to a new pair of boots, probationers have to be moulded so they fit 
and do not restrict the way firefighters do The Job.  However, resisting change is not always 
beneficial, but if firefighters are going to accept change they have to be convinced of the need to do 
so, not just be ordered to change.  This thesis might help firefighters to accept one change that they 
still appear reluctant to accept, that females can become firefighters.  It may be that male firefighters’ 
resistance to female firefighters might not only be about men protecting their masculinity.  Mixed in 
amongst the reasons one might find is the belief amongst firefighters that only men can have the 
commonsense understandings needed to attain the standards necessary to be a firefighter.  By 
investigating firefighters it has been shown that not only do firefighters set and test themselves against 
their standards for a good firefighters, which in turn provides an important element of their 
masculinity, but that these standards are not intrinsically male at all.  They are standards achieved by 
an act of will; standards that likeminded women can and do achieve as well.  
 
I would for a moment like to refer to my own experiences before university.  As an academic, I 
now recognise that if I was to return to the fire service I would be consciously joining a male 
conspiracy if I continued to deny women’s right to join the fire service on the basis that they could not 
do The Job.  However, if I reflect back to the times that I was a firefighter, I cannot recall hearing any 
argument other than the commonsense view, which suggests,  “Mass culture generally assumes there 
is a fixed, true masculinity … inherent in a man’s body” (Connell 1995: 45).  The outcome for 
women is that firefighters’ thoughts can and do easily turn into actions to make women feel 
unwelcome and exclude them from the fire service.  The subsequent absence of women then becomes 
‘proof’ that females cannot be firefighters.  If today’s firefighters have the same understandings that I 
had then, they are unlikely to have the resources to recognise their own bias, but this is not to say the 
resources are not available, because the FBU and the employers are constantly trying to update 
firefighters’ views on equal opportunities.  However, making the resources available does not mean 
that firefighters have or will use them.   
 
                                                 
334 When I joined the fire service, my uniform was very similar to the one my Victorian predecessors had worn.  It was 
black, making it difficult for me to be seen in the dark.  The helmet, was made of cork and this would protect me from 
falling water and to a limited extent falling debris, but there was no protection for my eyes.  My tunic was made of wool 
and whilst wool does not readily burn, it does absorb water: a wet tunic is heavy, cold and will also freeze, the water will 
also turn to steam and scald the wearer if it gets very hot.  My leggings were plastic and because they did not cover my 
bottom it got wet.  The leggings also had to be smart and I had to polish them with flammable boot polish.  My boots were 
made of leather and these too were polished to make them shine, but the polish did not stop them leaking and my feet got 
wet.  On my belt I had a belt-line, which had to be white, so I scrubbed it with scouring powder and the inside went rotten 
(but it looked smart).  We were not allowed to wear gloves and no torches were issued.  My uniform was not practical, but 
like those worn by the military it provided the right image).   
As firefighters we laughed at the uniforms that insurance firefighters wore, because they were impractical (see Appendix 
2).  In the same way I am sure future generations will laugh at the uniform I was issued with in 1962 and was still wearing 
in 1980.  On reflection, I remember that my comrades and I resisted the change to dry, warm and safer uniforms: partly, 
because they spoilt our status; partly, because change is not easily accepted in the fire service.  Any piece of new 
equipment has to be rigorously field-tested first.  New helmets in particular were one item that improved safety, but 
changed the image firefighters had of themselves and firefighters resisted these.  As they did the wearing of gloves, this 
might have stopped the injuries to firefighters’ hands, but they stopped you being able to feel what you were touching: to 
wear gloves was also soft/feminine.  The move to wearing BA at all incidents was resisted by old hands, because it 
removed the test of being a smoke-eater (see Chapter 1).   Now firefighters have a space age uniform, but despite the field 
tests, which ‘prove’ firefighters will be much safer, drier and warmer, they still complain; particularly that it spoils their 
status.  It almost seems that the ritual is that every new piece of equipment has to be tested, complained about, adapted, 
tested complained about and eventually when firefighters are convinced it works it is accepted.   
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Currently I see firefighters dividing between three groups (although this is not an either or 
and is contextual on the situation at the time): first, those whose beliefs have not moved far from the 
commonsense view; second, those who realise the hegemony at work, consciously marginalise the 
feminist critique and the efforts of the FBU and employees; third, the minority of firefighters who 
publicly support female firefighters.  These first two groups are then partly responsible for why there 
are fewer female firefighters than might be expected, because they make convincing arguments that: 
‘The introduction of females into the fire service has reduced standards and made The Job soft’ and 
that ‘female’s ‘natural’ femininity is a source of danger to the men who work alongside them’.  
Current debates more often pass both possibilities off as a classic malestream excuse.  However, there 
may be a lack of sophistication in this approach, because it conflates the two groups of ‘doubters’ 
when trying to affect change, rather than looking at them as two separate groups.  My own auto-
critique provides a useful clue here; in an unreconstructed organisation like the fire service, it is 
necessary to convince those male firefighters who actually believe the commonsense arguments about 
strength and irrationality that these arguments are flawed.  Firefighting, as it is currently practiced, 
can be a life and death job.  Firefighters have to know their colleagues can be trusted to follow their 
understandings and the informal but sophisticated tests within their working arrangements provide 
this knowledge (see Seidler 1997).  In this context it could be argued that the first group of firefighters 
above are not so much rejecting equal opportunities, rather they actively choosing homosociality and 
will only pass on their skills to those that their socialisation leads them to believe can be trusted to 
support them: other men.  However, it is possible that homosociality does not only need to be about 
men preferring to work with men per se.  It could equally be a way of ensuring a preference to work 
with people who can achieve firefighters’ understandings/protocols/masculinity.  To date, 
commonsense notions, which underwrite traditional gender divisions of labour, have assumed this 
understanding/masculinity is essentially male
335
.  Now I argue (and to a limited extent have 
demonstrated) that the way firefighters ‘prove’ their masculinity whilst firefighting, might not be a 
male preserve: female firefighters are doing it as well.  This information needs to be made available 
to firefighters in a way that they can understand.  They are unlikely to just take the word of their 
employers, or academia: they need some proof that their hands-on approach to life and their primary 
reference group can recognise.   
 
Once this information is made available to firefighters, they will then have a choice.  They can 
join with the second group above who consciously continue to resist the obvious, that females can 
learn to be firefighters.  Better, perhaps they accept that their masculinity is a social attribute and that 
firefighters’ informal hierarchies are able to teach women as well as men how to be firefighters.  Then 
female firefighters can be treated with no less suspicion than any other recruit and be freely taught the 
major and positive attributes that they see as the skills that constitute firefighters’ masculinity.  The 
less positive attributes, which firefighters might try to impose on each other can then become a focus 
for research aimed at making further change possible.  Indeed female firefighters are already doing 
this, because whilst they are accepting the way firefighters fight fires, their networks are actively 
discouraging the negative behaviour of their male counterparts
336
.   
 
                                                 
335 Whilst not wishing to widen this debate at this stage, it would be wrong not to comment on the landmark refusal by the 
European Courts to refuse an appeal to allow women to become Royal Marines.  In my opinion this decision was based on 
the very situation of men believing women cannot adopt their standards in regards to masculinity and how when it came to 
national security the possibility of upsetting the men and consequently risking national security, it was more important to 
deny women equal opportunities.  The court ruled that as the Royal Marines were the, “point of the arrow head … 
intended to be the first line of attack. … The exclusion of women from service in special combat units such as the Royal 
Marines may be justified under Article 2(2) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions, by reason of the nature of the activities in question and the context in which they are 
carried out” (European Court 1999). 
336 In particular, women’s networks in the fire service are actively discouraging all three of what are possibly the most 
significant negative aspects of firefighters masculinity, their institutional sexism, racism and homophobia.  It may be that 
these networks are consciousness raising groups attempting to raise women’s understandings, but some women resist 
joining them (see Andrews 2000).   
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6.4. CLASS 
The fire service is an unwanted expense for capital, but in an advanced capitalist society capital 
cannot do without a fire service.  Firefighters’ work is therefore secure and even more so since local 
authorities have replaced the insurance companies who previously ran the fire service.  However, the 
local authorities are in somewhat of a contradictory situation in relation to the cost of the fire service: 
on the one hand, the electorate appear to want to retain the fire service in its current model and on the 
other hand capital would like to reduce the cost.  Similar divisions exist within the fire service, with 
senior officers appearing to support the view of capital, and firefighters following and setting the 
electorates’ view.   However, officers are not so much representing capital when they try to cut and 
deskill the fire service, rather that they see this as an opportunity to ‘prove’ their masculinity by 
confirming they can control firefighters (antagonism between masculinities).  Firefighters are resisting 
these moves by officers and I am more certain that for firefighters, this resistance is necessary if they 
are to be able to continue to ‘prove’ their masculinity.  In particular, I recognise that firefighting, 
especially the way it is currently done, is central to firefighters achieving what they recognise as their 
masculinity (and a (petty) dividend that firefighters get for being recognised by themselves, their 
peers and the public as good firefighters).  I have already described how this reflexive process works, 
but in class terms, when officers try to cut the fire service, firefighters’ resistance is not just about 
financial utility or even job stability.  It may also be about the dividend of firefighters’ masculinity.  
Were officers able to cut what firefighters call The Job firefighters’ whole sense of being might be at 
stake.  Therefore this as much as any other reason might explain the strength of firefighters’ resistance 
to their officers.  In so much as it is possible for me to theorise about firefighters in class terms, I see 
firefighters’ acting through their informal hierarchies as if they were a class who are defending 
conservatively against officers, who may themselves be seen as another class intent on gaining 
dividends from controlling the same area: these relations might be called antagonistic.   
 
Firefighters’ informal hierarchies are not new; they existed long before I joined the fire service.  
However, in earlier times firefighters’ hierarchies have worked more closely alongside (colonised 
within) the formal structures of the fire service.  More recently an increasing awareness, brought 
about by frustration at their conditions of service, provided firefighters with the initiative to flex their 
industrial muscle
337
.  As a result the FBU demanded and got during the 1960’s: 
 better pay and a reduction in hours; 
 brigades brought up to their staffing establishment; 
 a radical change in their working arrangements, particularly the reduction in their cleaning 
duties; 
 their duties to be seen in a more professional light, especially by the introduction of FP. 
 
During these disputes relations between senior officers and firefighters soured.  Possibly firefighters 
became more aware that alleged joint understandings between them and officers (see Chapter 5) were 
not joint at all, and that officers had their own agendas, which all the time officers were serving by 
allowing firefighters to believe they shared their understandings.  Whatever the reason, firefighters 
increasingly withdrew the respect they had previously given to senior officers.  As resistance became 
more entrenched, firefighters increased their demands for a safer fire service and senior officers once 
again opposed firefighters.  The FBU again made demands and got from the 1970’s onwards:  
 an increase in crew sizes; 
 the increasing provision and use of BA; 
 improved uniforms for firefighting.   
 
                                                 
337 Firefighters, in fact became part of the dynamic industrial unrest from the 1960’s: a time when workers increasingly 
industrialised until the Callaghan government focused on curbing the power of the trade unions and in particular 
‘reforming’ public services.  What followed became known as ‘the year of strife’ and this saw many public services, 
including firefighters take part in strikes, and prepared the ground for the Thatcher government in 1979 and the neo liberal 
revolution, which saw public services unions decline. 
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As we saw in Chapter 1, not all firefighters were happy at the increasing use of BA, because one 
way that firefighters ‘prove’ themselves was through their ability to be seen as ‘smoke-eaters’.  
However, this resistance only lasted until those firefighters found that BA actually increased their 
ability to get into a fire and provided another way to ‘prove’ their masculinity, and were able to join 
with those firefighters who supported the health and safety reasons for wearing BA.  The increased 
use of BA had two further outcomes, which again reduced firefighters respect for officers because: 
 officers (who could not wear BA and stay in control of the fire) had to stay outside; 
 lacking officers’ ‘expertise’ inside the building, firefighters had to reskill and organise their 
own safety protocols. 
 
Nevertheless it is still difficult to fully understand why firefighters and senior officers found 
themselves on opposite sides of the industrial fence during the firefighters’ strike of 1978-9, but they 
did and now there seems no going back.  Firefighters and senior officers are currently in an almost 
permanent state of conflict over a wide range of issues in the fire service
338
.  It is possible to see this 
conflict in classic class terms as officers (suffering false consciousness and trying to reduce the cost to 
capital in the belief that this improves the service to the public, but at the same time it might be 
argued that whilst capitals’ and officers’ interests are both being served by officers attempting to 
control firefighters, officers and capital exist in a marriage of convenience (see Hartmann 1981).   
 
For whatever reason, firefighters militancy exists very much in an environment whereby 
firefighters increasingly organise to ‘save’ The Job from their senior officers who attempt to reduce 
the cost of the fire service.  Compared with other industries firefighters have been successful; the fire 
service remains more or less intact and there have been no compulsory redundancies.  To date 
firefighters’ job security may be the reason why they have not gone the way of those engineers who 
have had to look outside of their work for their masculinity, or by setting themselves apart in 
competition with their work colleagues (Collinson 1992: 181-182) and forgot their main task was a 
collective resistance to capital (see Burawoy 1979: 67).  Firefighters have maintained their status 
collectively and it is important to note that the decision by their union to insist that every firefighter 
can do every job and that no extra pay is available for ‘qualifications’ has served firefighters well.  
Firefighters were flexible specialists (before the term was used by Piore and Sabel 1984), a 
community of (almost) equals who cooperate to ‘produce the goods’ and firefighters’ requirement 
that they share their skills (after an initial selection) helps maintain firefighters’ safety and improves 
their service.  If there is any competition amongst firefighters, it is a competition to include everyone: 
to ensure everyone has the protocols necessary to be a good firefighter and become a safe working 
colleague
339
.  This has given them the solidarity to stay together (fight capital) and currently 
firefighters are so secure in their job and confident about their masculinity that they do not blame the 
system, or lack of education for their position (see Collinson 1992).  It sometimes appears that to 
firefighters a formal education is actually a disadvantage, and this is shown by the way firefighters 
denigrate their ‘academic’ officers and elevate their hands-on working class masculinity: a 
masculinity they celebrate with their colleagues and also with the tacit approval of most of the 
community they serve.  In fact, it is almost essential that ‘others’ recognise firefighters’ masculinity 
for it to be successful.   
 
Firefighters’ resistance emerges as the combined will of a collective of individual firefighters 
who are constructing their masculinity at work (both past and present).  Fire service culture and joint 
understandings appear larger than that of any individual constituent.  My suggestion is that 
firefighters’ resistance to management is only successful because they have public support and a 
                                                 
338 It is interesting but the level at which this conflict takes place is currently unpredictable.  In some brigades all senior 
officers support all measures to subordinate firefighters, but in others only principal officers will be found supporting 
attempts to cut the fire service.  The same might be said about deskilling support may be mixed varying between those 
measures with a clear health and safety content and those designed just to ‘prove’ who is in charge.   
339 It may well be a worthwhile lever for change if the FBU were to point out that if male firefighters do not soon accept 
that women are part and parcel of their hierarchy that they may well get into the sort of competition that causes labour to 
take its eye off of capital. 
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common cause (and the dangers of how FP might damage this have already been raised).  This 
allows firefighters to resist locally as a watch and nationally as firefighters.  In this way, it is possible 
to see firefighters conservatively protecting themselves as a class in itself.  It must not be forgotten 
that they are facilitated in doing this by the Vanguard of firefighters who act with revolutionary class 
consciousness and act as a class for itself (see Giddens 1982; Segars 1989; Crompton 1998; Grint 
1998) to provide the umbrella of the FBU for all firefighters’ resistance.  However, the price of 
freedom from managers’ iron cage, may the acceptance of another iron cage, as the individual is 
‘forced to fit in’ with other individuals, albeit (and specifically) their own peer group.   
 
Whilst it is possible to argue that firefighters are improving the product/service the public 
receive by their resistance, firefighters’ resistance as not a ‘compliance’ in the terms Collinson (1992) 
argues about ‘commodified forms of labour’.  Firefighters may appear to be legitimising the official 
hierarchy, but when they do (finding it expedient to suffer the humiliation of publicly doffing the 
cap), they do so in the knowledge that they can marginalise officers’ influence when out of sight.  In 
behaving this way firefighters avoid the vicious circle of elite control, where managers turn workers 
resistance into a company asset by colonising informal cultures into formal ones (see Strangleman 
and Roberts 1999).  It may be that once again firefighters are going in a different direction to the rest 
of the community
340, because up until the 1960’s any informal culture firefighters had appears to have 
been colonised by the fire service tradition (see Chapter 1).  This might explain why firefighters’ 
conditions were so bad, because they were caught in a vicious circle of control (see Collinson, 1992).  
However, that colonisation required firefighters and officers to have joint understandings, mainly 
about their professional ethos: to provide an efficient service for the public.  When firefighters became 
aware that officers were breaking that ethos (by attempting to deskill and cut the fire service in direct 
opposition to firefighters’ attempts to improve their service and their own conditions), the scales 
might not have fallen from most firefighters’ eyes341, but they became sufficiently angry to break with 
tradition and to kick-start their resistance
342
.  From that point on the relations between firefighters and 
officers became increasingly antagonistic as firefighters became increasingly aware how much they 
(and the public) were being exploited.  It is even possible to argue that currently firefighters’ 
operating through their informal hierarchy may have turned everything upside down by effectively 
colonising official structures to maintain an efficient fire service at point of delivery (which both the 
public and firefighters argue for).  Interestingly, in being able to protect The Job, firefighters are also 
protecting the way they form their masculinity and the ‘others’ that help them to do this (with all that 
this might mean for firefighters and the public).   
   
Firefighters’ job security has not just happened; firefighters have made it happen by organising 
through the FBU.  But that is not the whole story, because many public service workers have 
organised in a similar way and not had firefighters’ success.  I consider that one reason for this is that 
government have not felt they will achieve sufficient financial savings (when balanced against the 
cost to them in votes that they might loose) to make it worthwhile taking on this popular group of 
workers
343
.  It may be that the FBU leadership and class conscious militant members act as a 
Vanguard, which mixes the cocktail of public support and firefighters militancy, but when the public 
recognise the firefighter as a hero who rescues them from fire, they do so because it is firefighters 
who have supported this image.  This is an outcome of one of the three ways that firefighters 
construct their masculinity, as objects in the eyes of themselves, their colleagues and the public.   
                                                 
340 I would like to refer back to something I said earlier: “This ability is what firefighters believe sets them apart, even as 
special, from the ‘others’ who run out of the buildings they go into.” 
341 And revealed to firefighters what was their real relationships with officers as representatives of capital and encouraged 
the revolutionary consciousness necessary for all firefighters to organise publicly as a class in itself, to generating the 
committed social relations through which change could be realised.   
342 Giddens (1979: 6) understands that even the weakest actors in a relationship are capable of resistance.  This notion is 
not new and Goffman (1961) had shown that some of the weakest members of our society can and do resist total control.  
It may be that firefighters were in a similar relationship with their officers because of the military discipline in the fire 
service. 
343 It has to be remembered that firefighters operate in all areas of the country and might be expected to gather the same 
level of support ‘everywhere’.  They are not a group of workers who gather support in an industrial heartland.     
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Therefore, firefighters’ active development of their own status with the public has dividends in 
the construction of firefighters’ masculinity and in protecting firefighters’ ability to retain control 
over how they do this.  In this context, it is also necessary to explain why those firefighters without 
revolutionary class-consciousness are so prepared to stand under the FBU umbrella.  Firefighters’ 
masculinity and the watch that helps them achieve/provide their masculinity, is integral to their 
understandings of themselves and the world, and that part and parcel of this process is the way that 
firefighters test themselves as an object who can achieve what the ‘others’ (the public and perhaps 
even officers
344
) cannot, the standards of a good firefighter, which in turn leads to the public seeing 
firefighters as heroes.  If firefighters were not to protect the environment that allows them to do this, 
and gave the officers free reign to deskill and cut the fire service, firefighters would risk losing the 
very source of their way of knowing the world and themselves
345
.   
 
One point to highlight is that much of firefighters’ resistance may not be as deviant as the 
officers would suggest.  Firefighters’ successful resistance may have been born out of a need to 
defend firefighting from those forces that sought to change the fire service from the publicly accepted 
model of efficiency, which believes that firefighters should be service effective, rather than cost 
effective.  Such a view might also explain why firefighters ignore so called safety procedures that 
might curb their getting in, and which in turn might increase the risk because the fire gets bigger
346
.  
This might be a circle it is impossible to square with both firefighters and the public who each want 
the fire to be beaten and what commonsense might suggest is a possible taking of risks for no real 
purpose.  There are unresolved dynamics here, which may link a variety of issues and may be 
currently irresolvable, because a variety of explanations may apply.  One central question raised from 
this whole thesis is, ‘why is it that ‘all’ firefighters behave so similarly in resisting the structures that 
would control how the fire service operates?’  Despite working in isolated patriarchal islands of 
resistance, firefighters overcome their officers’ rules and even though their union provides an impetus 
for unity, the paradox is that much of the unity the FBU provides is in the way firefighters resist its 
policies on safety and equality.  Class bonding may be one reason for this, but this may because they 
are a class of men as much as any other explanation.   
 
6.5. GENDER 
6.5.1. Dividends 
                                                 
344 It may be helpful if I were to repeat an argument made in part in this chapter and throughout this thesis.  Firefighters 
might define others, as those who cannot do The Job, to include the officers who have left their ranks and given up their 
joint understandings about professional ethos.  Before the new requirement to wear BA at all incidents, officers led 
firefighters when they got in at fires (see Chapters 1, 3 and 5).  This gave officers’ respect and authority, since firefighters 
relied on officers’ skills, as good firefighters, to protect them.  Officers now have a management role outside of fires and 
this has two effects.  First, officers no longer have the opportunity to ‘prove’ to firefighters, by leading them into a fire that 
they have the embodied experiential expertise to be considered good firefighters: officers have been deskilled.  Second, 
firefighters have re-skilled as a consequence, have developed their own expertise when getting in and no longer have to 
rely on officers.  The result, firefighters marginalise officers as desk-workers who do the paperwork and in so doing they 
create a distance between their masculine and officers feminine work.  Having done this, firefighters can then be quick to 
draw conclusions about firefighters who do and officers who look on and take the credit.  Antagonism and separations may 
exist now not only over officers’ authority, but also over if officers are firefighters at all.  In consequence, firefighters’ 
resistance  might increase against their officers to resist officers taking some of firefighters’ acclaim (and status) and sit 
behind a desk with it.   
345 It may be that the exceptional retention rates amongst white males in the fire service (see Chapter 1) are because having 
created an ‘other’ out of those who are not firefighting, firefighters are almost afraid to leave the watch for fear of losing 
the way they subjectively see themselves.   
346 This raises the possibility (that will not be followed up by this thesis) that whilst the HSE might appear to help the 
working class whilst they are at work, they might also contribute to their deskilling.  This could be particularly true for 
firefighters if ultimately the skill of getting in is stopped and replaced by firefighters standing outside a building squirting 
water through the windows.  The public might also lose from such a change as the recipients of a service not so much 
geared to protecting them or their property, but ‘over’ mindful of firefighters’ safety.    
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The way Firefighters socially construct their masculinity provides several dividends.  Chapter 3 
argues that firefighting and in particular getting in, might give firefighters at least two psychological 
dividends: an adrenaline boost and a chance to ‘prove’ to their colleagues, the public and themselves 
they are worthy of the title, good firefighter.  In particular, because firefighters follow commonsense 
views that suggest masculinity can only be male, firefighters’ masculinity would inevitably be 
damaged, in their terms, if females were shown to be doing their work (thus possibly feminising it).  
In such a situation male firefighters are inevitably driven to resist officers’ attempts to implement  
equal opportunities; act against female firefighters by harassing them and making them unwelcome 
(see Baigent 1996; HMIFS 1999).   
 
Hartmann (1981) argues that because both capital and men exploit women that both 
relationships are antagonistic
347
.  However, I do not pursue or support the view, here, that firefighters 
are using harassment to maintain the economic and cultural advantage that underpins patriarchy (see 
MacKinnon 1977; Hochschild 1983, 1989; Walby 1988, 1990, 1997; Segal 1990; Connell 1989, 
1995; Cockburn 1991a; Collinson and Hearn 1996)
348.  In this thesis, I prefer to identify firefighters’ 
action against women as conservative, an attempt to preserve their masculinity, which they closely 
associate with the commonsense notion that masculinity must be male.  However, I do recognise that 
because the fire service is a site that still celebrates/reproduces traditional forms of proletarian 
masculinity, that firefighters help to support the commonsense cultural assumption of an essential link 
between men and masculinity, which in turn leads to the hegemony of men’s superiority (see Connell 
1995).  Firefighters do this by providing and perpetuating the understanding that they are the men 
who protect: almost Weberian patriarchs (see Runciman 1978: 226) who use their socially developed 
skills as if they were ‘natural’ attributes to look after ‘others’ (women, children and weaker men).  
Firefighters are in effect the White Knights that defend the ‘others’ against the Red Devil: fire.  This 
ability is what firefighters believe sets them apart, even as special, from the ‘others’ who run out of 
the buildings they go into.  The others who like officers stand outside and observe at a fire, help them 
to define their masculinity.   
 
 
6.5.2. Challenging (essentialist) commonsense views about masculinity 
Sociologists, particularly feminists, argue that there is nothing essential about masculinity or the 
gender division of labour.  Rather it is a collection of normative standards historically and 
contextually socially reproduced amongst men to perpetuate their hegemony (see Lipman-Blumen 
1976; Kanter 1977; Willis 1977; DiTomaso 1989: 88; Jackson 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b; Hearn 
1994; Collinson 1996; Office for Public Management 1996; Seidler 1997; Grint 1998).  The way men 
learn how to do this starts in the home and develops at school (see Prendergast and Forrest 1998) and 
by the time they go to work they have learnt about masculine hierarchies.  I argue that some of those 
who enjoy that process, especially when it involves physically proving yourself, in the playground, 
                                                 
347 Engels, (1973: 29-46) argues that this subordination would end once the real dispute with capital is over.  This 
approach to gender class relations elevates material relations with Capital as if it were the sole cause of gender conflict: a 
pure abstraction that pays no attention to the possibility that feminism is a class in antagonistic relations with males, who 
must also then be a gender class in opposition to both capital and patriarchy, and the view that patriarchy may pre-date 
capitalism (see Hartmann: 1981: Walby 1986; Coole 1993: 19, 29-30).  This leaves a gender class of men (Hearn 1994: 
48) who might also be acting to conserve other (not so economic) patriarchal dividends: a dispute that might not end at 
‘The Revolution’ or in any post-capitalist society.   
348 I would in no way wish to imply that I deny that male firefighters might harass female firefighters to maintain 
economic advantage for their sex.  Nor would I deny that if Hartmann’s (1981) argument were married with Wright 
(1984) that most males do not gain a petty dividend from the way they organise the gender hierarchy within capital 
relations (see Connell 1995; Chapter 1); amongst themselves.  It is just that I wish to focus on other reasons for why male 
firefighters might harass females.  I have already implied in the text that it might be possible to equate the relationship 
between officers and firefighters in very similar terms to the way that Hartmann (1981) has.  Firefighters would then be 
seen in place of females and officers might then be seen as males who act in exploitative terms alongside capital.   
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during sport and in the pub (see Willis 1979 and 1996; Connell 1995; Canaan 1996; Prendergast 
and Forest 1998), are the people who apply successfully to become firefighters
349
.   
 
Up until 1982, the fire service took for granted that women did not have the standards to be a 
firefighter and none were employed.  Then in 1982, as a bolt out of the blue, women challenged 
commonsense understanding and the first fulltime female firefighter was employed.  Male firefighters 
reacted with harassment to make females unwelcome, and this has been successful because almost 20 
years later there are only 258 wholetime female firefighters – 0.7% of the 33,949 establishment.  One 
reason for the male rejection of female firefighters might be that male firefighters are concerned 
women might not have the necessary informal male understandings that firefighters develop into their 
protocols for safety
350.  To a degree, this can be true: a case where the stereotype ‘proves’ the 
stereotype, because women who have not been given the opportunity to achieve physical skills, or 
manoeuvre in male hierarchies are being denied the human capital to become firefighters.   
 
I contend that this situation is not only changing, but that it has changed
351
.  Until recently, I 
lectured on an FE/HE course to prepare youths to join uniformed emergency service and the military.  
I undertook not to carry out research amongst them, but I do not consider I have broken that trust by 
reporting how acutely aware I am that many of the female students who are studying on this course 
and have set their sights on becoming firefighters, police officers and joining the military, are 
showing exactly the same understandings about embodied hierarchies as the male students.  In this 
context, it may be they are developing human capital (see Walby 1997), in the form of the embodied 
physical skills and by operating in the male hierarchies in college, to prepare themselves for entry into 
careers in the emergency services and the military.  In particular, it is clear to me that these students 
have been encouraged to (and are prepared to) confront tests of their physical and psychological 
strength and to realise that when they get hurt they do not cry.    
 
6.5.3. Risk taking 
There is a literature, which suggests that one-way men ‘prove’ their masculinity is to take risks and 
young working class males are group at highest risk dying in road accidents or from homicide 
(Scambler, and Higgs 1999).  In the pub or the street, men, particularly young men, take risks when 
they are violent to other men.  However, they calculate this risk by picking on men they judge they 
can beat (see Willis 1995 p.114; Canaan 1996)
352
.  This is a particular skill, that males might develop 
to appear to be random, but is actually calculated to provide success.  Firefighters might appear as a 
group who have almost perfected this process in a far less negative way.  This thesis suggests they 
‘prove’ their masculinity by being seen to take risks when they fight fires, but they calculate this risk, 
which they know they can beat, and the closer they get to the wire the more adrenaline they obtain
353
, 
                                                 
349 Men who were uncomfortable with embodied masculinity are unlikely to apply to join the fire service; if they do they 
are likely to be rejected (see Chapters 3-5).  It may even be possible that men who are less physical go into white-collar 
jobs and develop other forms of masculinity (see Collinson and Hearn 1996), and it would be worthy of further research in 
the fire service to establish if officers might almost sit between these two groups.  They may have been comfortable 
enough with embodied hierarchies to seek real status as an embodied male, but having gained entry to the fire service 
might have found they were not exactly suited to it and not wishing to give in (and trapped by the ILM), may have sought 
out promotion and this situation may apply to Bob (see Chapters 4 and 5).   
350 I cannot emphasise enough my concern that I might be misunderstood to be ignoring the important hegemonic reasons 
why male firefighters would want to exclude women.  I am not emphasising these because it is necessary to try and move 
this debate on to a situation that might explain to men why their actions are so unnecessary and in turn damage their 
outlooks on the world. 
351 To an extent, my argument challenges what Prendergast and Forrest (1998) found in the playground they studied.  It 
might even be that they did not look for such a possibility, or more likely that their female subjects did not at that age 
show any interest in joining boys’ hierarchies.   
352 In turn this might explain why males: rape females; abuse children; assault their wives who they see as weaker.  In a 
similar way harassment and bullying at work is always done by people who believe they are stronger than those they 
violate (see MacKinnon 1979; Walby 1990; Cockburn 1991a, 1991b).   
353 According to Stoller (1975, 1991, cited in Butt and Hearn 1998: 203-227) “‘thrill’ always involves the making safe of 
anxiety-provoking events through playing with them … That which is threatening may also be exciting.”   
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and the more they fit with their subjective reflection of themselves as objects of respect in their 
own, their peers’ and the public eye.  In the same way it should not be surprising that male firefighters 
get a buzz from risk taking promiscuity, which appears to be a further proof of masculinity
354
.   
 
6.5.4. The inconsistency of masculinity 
In Chapter 1, I supported a theme raised by Hearn (1994, 1996) and reiterated by Connell (1995: 67) 
that despite the celebration of manual labour being an important part of proletarian masculinity, there 
is no objective consistency to masculinity.  Contextually, I accept that most men will construct their 
individual masculinity according to a cultural understanding: a false monolith/normative standard of 
what men are supposed to be.  At the start of my research I set out to question how this understanding 
and my occupation as a firefighter influenced my gender.  I had no doubts that masculinity was a 
social application that had many forms and for each of these I might expect to find a social reason for 
their existence and not a biological one (see Rabinow 1986: 4).  Therefore, when the research 
started I had a good idea of where I wanted it to go, but at that stage, I was not exactly breaking new 
ground, many had been there before me.  However, my research was in a new area and by using pro-
feminist auto-critique to study how firefighters construct their masculinity, my particular aim was to 
help the fire service with its equal opportunities difficulties.   
 
I also anticipated that as firefighting might be considered a high profile ‘male’ job, which 
contextually supports the false monolith of masculinity and that if I could ‘prove’ how social these 
attributes were to firefighters, I might challenge the essentialist link that commonsense views apply to 
masculinity and to firefighters.  In so doing, I was also hoping to subvert a patriarchal hegemony that 
provides a dividend for men; in particular, I hoped to challenge one patriarchal dividend, the 
sequential traditional gender division of labour (see Collinson 1988; Kimmel 1987; Cockburn 1991a; 
Lorber 1994; Connell 1995), which in turn supports the view that firefighters are male.   
 
I had been doing my research for four years when Lorber (2000) suggested a degendering 
movement amongst feminists and my research was beginning to suggest it might be possible to use 
the high profile public figure of the firefighter to deconstruct masculinity.  To build on earlier 
arguments: we all make choices and take down the barriers that provide, “a structural, historical 
context that shaped options and their motivation to choose one option over another” (Gerson 1986: 
116).  I hope this research provides some tools to help to do this, because I consider I have shown that 
people of a like mind (regardless of their sex) who set out to become good firefighters construct the 
main elements of firefighters’ masculinity.  The other elements are more a local construction, peculiar 
almost to the watch on which a firefighter serves and throughout the country each watch will have its 
own ‘agreed’ way of fitting in with these.  Some watches will require a high commitment to fitness, 
others might look to extreme forms of heterosexuality and sexism and sit up all night watching porn 
videos, others will have a strong connection to the union and some will be avid fund raisers; as I said 
earlier ‘after a period of obsessional … activity, a new activity may develop in ‘the wings’ as the next 
obsessional activity’.   
 
Whilst I said at the start of this thesis I have no belief in masculinity as pre-given, I did 
recognise that firefighters might find it difficult to understand life without such a word.  Although a 
sociologist’s view, I suggest that to firefighters their masculinity is:  
 
Firefighters’ masculinity is a social construction and has a central feature that firefighters 
achieve by passing the test of being seen as a good firefighter.  The standards for this test are set 
by the watch in the form of ‘universal’ protocols for firefighting and individually each firefighter 
has their own subjective interpretation of what these standards are, and when they get in at a fire 
                                                 
354 It seems that many men who should not have to ‘prove’ anything to anyone still need to take risks in this way.  One 
might wonder, if it had not been made so public, how (Clinton) the most powerful man in the world in 1999 got his 
excitement (see Harris 1995; Hearn 1999; Norman 1999)    
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they set out to achieve them in their own, their watch’s and the public’s eyes.  The other 
elements are a more local construction, variable and peculiar almost to the watch on which a 
firefighter serves, and throughout the country each watch will have its own ‘agreed’ way of fitting 
in with these.  Those who firefighters see as failing to achieve these standards then become an 
‘other’, someone who firefighters marginalise and judge themselves against.  This combination is 
what firefighters call their masculinity.   
 
6.5.5. A way forward 
One, if not the most, negative feature attributed to masculinity is that it creates a hierarchy that 
subordinates females and valorises attributes that perpetuate violence.  These hierarchies underpin 
masculinity and the commonsense understandings that only men could be masculine, leading to the 
current understanding of homosociality, as a way in which men perpetuate the gender division of 
labour.  However, some of the evidence from this thesis suggests that it may not be possible to carry 
out firefighting as it is currently done without firefighters’ informal hierarchies.  Therefore whilst I 
have no intention of arguing that the critique of masculinity should cease, it is possible that feminists 
and pro-feminists have become so intent on critique, that they ignore some positive outcomes of some 
men’s behaviour, and the reality that (for whatever reason) women often turn to men (employed in 
male jobs) for protection/help.  The firefighter is a case in point and no amount of bad press has been 
able to topple their status with the public and even feminist sociologists.  What has been missed, is 
that firefighters protect everybody from fire, not only damsels in distress, but also ‘other’ men who 
need help.  It is firefighters’ ability to help the public and the fact that even now the fire service is 
predominantly male that allows firefighters to provide an image of masculinity.   
 
My qualitative methodology, which was in part adopted to convey firefighters’ views and 
experiences in a way that would make sense to them has brought to light some unexpected data on 
female firefighters.  As I note in Chapter 3 female firefighters describe their job and how they 
firefight in almost identical terms to male firefighters, generally on most issues their voices cannot be 
told apart.  This suggests that women see themselves as firefighters as effectively and in the same 
terms as men.  This came as a complete surprise to me, and from this evidence I suggest that female 
firefighters too are achieving the masculine standards that I set out to find amongst male firefighters.  
This leads me to pose some questions for future research.  The first question is, ‘what do we call the 
gender of women who are good firefighters and therefore achieve the attributes central to how 
firefighters construct their masculinity?’  This leads to a second (if it is possible to avoid getting tied 
up in debates about other features not so central to firefighters’ masculinity), to ask a second question, 
‘if a women adopts (positive) masculine traits, is this necessarily negative?’  It also has to be 
considered that, if in reply, feminists were to argue that female firefighters were being forced to adopt 
firefighters’ masculinity, then they may be ignoring the possibility that female firefighters might be 
using their own agency fit in with (and become part of) firefighters hierarchies.  This could then lead 
to feminists marginalising female firefighters as deviant, in a similar way that men do when they say a 
women “has balls” or   to help men make these female trailblazers invisible.   
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6.6. REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH 
Reflecting back on the research process, I will start by it was just like firefighting in that it was 
enjoyable, frustrating at times and hard, it was very hard, much harder than firefighting.  It provided a 
challenge and as a man I am used to testing myself against challenges.  Unsurprisingly, so too are 
women; it is just that men do not always recognise this.  I have found that capturing data at source, 
from the lips of firefighters a most enlightening process.  When I returned home with the tapes in my 
pocket, I did not realise how much information they held.  I thought that collecting data was a simple 
academic process; one I had to ‘get through’ on the way to my PhD.  I did not really understand at the 
start of the research what ‘academic process’ meant, as I do now.  Before transcribing the tapes, I 
played them in my car in very much the same way as people listen to music.  I can still now hear 
some of the voices and what firefighters told me is the story I have related.  However, I have also 
been sceptical and subjected what I have been told to the gaze of pro-feminist auto-critique.  This has 
been a rewarding experience and it is my view that this thesis does actually make visible some of the 
invisible aspects of men’s power, that Hearn (1994) asks for.   
 
Throughout the data collection process and in handling the data afterwards, grounded theoryhas 
been an incredible friend; it is my view that Glaser and Strauss (1967) was written specifically to 
enable me to produce a thesis that both academics and firefighters can understand!  My informants 
voices have a central place and to make the thesis available to firefighters, I have tried to arrange the 
text to make much of what I would have said in my words, available in firefighters’ words.  I hope 
that firefighters do not see this as some academic trick, but rather a genuine attempt to provide them 
with information through a medium they might empathise with and understand.  I am trying, as it 
were, to capture firefighters’ hands-on approach, because I recognise that they are more likely to 
accept the main findings of this thesis if they can relate them to their world as they know it.  I want 
firefighters to feel comfortable reading this thesis and if they find my findings difficult, I hope they 
will not only see academic writing and cast the thesis aside, but that they will be able to see what they 
said and maybe think again.            
 
There is another reason why I have prioritised firefighters own understandings.  The fire service 
does not have much time for academia or independent researchers.  In particular, the fire service does 
not have much time for sociology.  This I understand as a dislike for the theoretical in an organisation 
so geared to hands-on problems and immediate answers that it has difficulty in recognising that 
‘firefighting’ approaches are not always the best fix.  It is sad too that no one has recognised that the 
way firefighters prepare for fires by sharing knowledge and developing protocols, is indeed a 
theoretical approach.  Proof of how ill-advised the fire service might be about sociology might be 
taken from the fact that despite a long-term commitment to equal opportunities and proclamations that 
their culture must change, they have little understanding of how they might do this.  To be even more 
contentious, I might suggest that the fire service does not really understand its own culture at all.  But 
I would say that wouldn’t I, because I am a sociologist carrying out independent research on the fire 
service.   
 
My experience during this research has not been one of being welcomed back as an old boy, 
which I undoubtedly am.  Access has not been made easy, and I had extensive communication with 
two brigades, including several meetings and one eventually refused me access, because of the, “large 
amount of research going on in the brigade.”  The letters and meetings with the second brigade 
eventually dried up and having found other ways of getting my data I let the matter drop.  On the 
positive side, some doors have been opened to aid my research and as ever, firefighters have been 
more than willing to talk to me.  But in the main the structures of the fire service have not been 
welcoming.  The Home Office equal opportunities department have ignored letters from my 
supervisor and when sometimes their replies arrived, often after three months, they have given little if 
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any assistance
355
.  Currently I am trying to negotiate a copy of the latest report on leadership and I 
have just returned from a meeting with HMCIFS Meldrum
356
.  We got on so well that I am chastened 
by my earlier remarks, but sadly it was all too late and whilst much more might have been done if our 
understanding had been found earlier, I do have the opportunity to say my research is in effect 
‘independent’.   
 
However, what the fire service is good at is creating an image to court public support.  One of 
these images is the public profile of the heroic (male) rescuer, sometimes covert, but often overt, like 
the male pinup calendar of firefighters on sale at the Fire Service College in December 2000 (see 
Appendix 13).  These pictures portray such sexually provocative poses as to leave little doubt that the 
fire service is a place where women might expect to be made welcome for sexual encounters, but not 
as work colleagues
357
.  It is this face of the fire service that has to change.  No longer is it right, if it 
ever was, for a public body to display (and sell) such institutional sexism as part of its culture.  But 
how is the fire service to change if it restricts access to, or even fails to reply adequately to 
independent researchers?  Strangely, the answer lies in an area ostensibly far away from the fire 
service, feminism.  If it had not been for those female firefighters who had challenged the male 
domination in the fire service and the assistance they got from ‘others’ outside of the fire service, then 
it may be that the fire service could remain a closed male order.   
 
In what is almost a repeat of the happenings in the wider world, it has taken politically-inspired 
women to challenge male domination.  Early female firefighters were not willing feminists and they 
were reluctant to cry foul when they were harassed.  However, harassment is so much a way of life in 
the fire service that men were never going to stop it.  In the end, the excesses against females became 
so great that a female firefighter found her way into the public eye (see Hearn and Parkin 1987, 1995: 
74; Walby 1990: 52) and at an industrial tribunal £200,000, the largest compensation package for 
sexual harassment at that time, was awarded to Tanya Clayton, (Graves 1995; IT 1995; Veash 1997).  
From that point on the fire service tried to take note, not I suggest because harassment was wrong, but 
because the expense of not doing so might be too great!  In the round, it has cost the fire service much 
more than that.  There have been (funded) enquiries and research in abundance, and they all point to a 
deviant culture that has to change.  However, these enquiries have taken their evidence from officers 
and sometimes female firefighters; on the few occasions they have listened to male firefighters I 
believe they were often deceived.  No one stayed long enough to hear an in depth story, no one has 
looked beyond the surface and no one has looked past the image the fire service portrays of itself
358
.   
 
                                                 
355 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Fire service were very keen to get my original dissertation (Baigent 1996), so much so I 
was asked to email it so that an inspector could read it over the weekend.  The inspector did not acknowledge receipt, nor 
have the courtesy to comment on its contents.  When I asked for some reciprocal assistance in the form of a 
complimentary copy of the inspectorates report on equality (HMIFS 1999, costing £30), there were none available, despite 
1000 copies being prepared for the press launch, and I heard an inspector say in the background “Oh it’s him again.”   
356 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Fire service, the most senior fire service officer and in line responsible to the Home 
Secretary. 
357 I challenged a senior academic at the FSC about this and he not only defended their sale, but also indicated that he had 
bought some for his daughter-in-law.   
358 In this respect the current enquiry on leadership (HMIFS 2001) has come about due to a recommendation of (HMIFS 
1999), which was about the failure of the fire service to implement equal opportunities.  HMIFS (2001) was published on 
1st of May and I could not obtain an advanced copy.  I have read it and I feel confident that I can continue with my 
decision to print this thesis on the 2nd of May without alteration and without denying anything to my research.  In many 
ways our two documents are complimentary, HMIFS (2001) found that: there was a gap between officers and firefighters 
understandings about service delivery; that a top down command structure might not provide the public with best value; 
that promotion procedures needed to be rethought, and this includes accelerated promotion and that candidates might be 
sought from outside the fire service for senior ranks.  Perhaps the most salient view of the report would be to suggest that 
although it has not been put in specific terms, the fire service has recognised that it has failed to colonise firefighters’ 
culture and is seeking new ways to do so.  The report comes very close to understanding what is wrong, but may be 
insufficient in detail to explain why it is wrong and this could affect any changes that might come about.  However, whilst 
the report suggests improved management as a way of improving delivery (and equality) it is easy to see that one 
suggestion within the report regarding an increase in CFS is one way that cultures might merge if firefighters can be 
persuaded to take on this work in the long term.   
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The failure to implement equality at work is a real indictment of a service proud of its 
traditions of uniformed hierarchical discipline and unswerving humanitarian public service for the 
common good.  This failure is made worse because all other official fire service structures, The Home 
Office, The Fire Service College and The Fire Brigades Union have an agenda to provide an equality 
workplace.  Such a dedicated culture, an almost perfect example of a legal/rational Weberian 
hierarchy, should make it easy for senior officers to control firefighters, but they cannot
359
.  This 
means that it is necessary to question why and one answer might suggest that the fire service is, in 
effect, a victim of its own propaganda.  The officers who perpetuate the belief they are in charge of a 
disciplined workforce, may actually know this to be untrue, but it is not in their interest to reveal this 
possibility.  To do so could threaten current management structures, and highlight the failures of a 
leadership who can only remain leaders whilst they and the rest of the world believe their story.  
Effectively the fire service may be failing to own up to its problems.  This is why I say the fire service 
does not favour independent sociologists, because they may point to a failure in a system whereby 
officers try to stop harassment by ordering it to stop in the full knowledge that to a large extent their 
orders will be ignored.   
 
The fire service makes great play of acknowledging its institutional sexism and blames ‘the 
culture’ (HMIFS 1999), but has little understanding of that culture and  those ‘unacknowledged 
conditions’ and ‘unintended consequences’ in firefighters’ actions, which cause institutional sexism.  
This shows a considerable neglect of the resources available to the fire service, especially from 
sociologists (who might look beyond a belief in bureaucratic authoritarianism to find out why the fire 
service fails to incorporate firefighters’ culture in its own).  Weber’s (Runciman 1978: 229) argument 
that charismatic leadership only has authority whilst it retains support may provide a clue that the fire 
service might wish to follow.  Since the 1960’s firefighters’ resistance to officers has increased, this is 
in part because they are less accepting of officers’ rational authority, but this may have come about 
because of a decline in officers’ opportunities to achieve charismatic authority.  It is clear that officers 
lost charismatic authority as firefighters became aware of three things (in no particular order):  first, 
officers were breaking with joint understandings about efficiency; second, officers resisted 
firefighters’ attempts at improving conditions; third, officers were no longer able to get in with 
firefighters.  Even worse for officers was the fact that their declining charismatic leadership was 
countered by firefighters’ peer group leaders who increasingly gained charismatic leadership and are 
now effectively custodians of firefighters’ professional ethos and possibly more.  This subject in 
particular needs further research.   
 
6.7. THOUGHTS ABOUT FURTHER RESEARCH 
Looking at further possibilities for future research, it is clear that my deliberations about the gender 
label for a female firefighter who passes the test as a good firefighter needs further investigation.  
This might involve looking at those range of jobs, from blue-collar to white-collar, through which 
men might describe their masculinity and then to identify if in the same environment women develop 
a similar human capital to the one that fits with men’s descriptions (see Walby 1997).   
 
There are at least two further areas in the fire service that could benefit from more research.  
The first concerns the relationship between firefighters and officers and how this relationship forms 
into a resistance through which firefighters (and possibly officers) are competing to ‘prove’ their 
masculinity in the same area.  This research should have at least two aims: first, to stop what is a 
damaging dispute and wasted effort over who controls the fire service and second, it should look at 
                                                 
359 There is an interesting similarity here with research provided whilst with the army.  The Army claims to be part of the 
most disciplined force in the world and yet those soldiers who were in charge of my students on one stay with the army, 
‘proved’ to be nothing but a bunch of drunken, sexist, hooligans and I had to intervene to stop them abusing the girls and 
boys in their charge.  In a more public statement of the armies sexism and lack of control the Officer Commanding the 
guards base at Catterick publicly warned his soldiers about risking sex with two women in the town who ‘had aids’ (BBC 
Newsnight 16-12-97): shades of the way the Contagious Diseases Act of 1864 (see Mort 1987), which suggested sailors 
could not be controlled but women could. 
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what the public wants, what they are prepared to pay for and then look for ways to achieve this.  
Such research should be guided by findings here that it can be tempting to follow what officers’ think 
(because officers will make believe they hold power in the fire service) and consider that firefighters 
provide another version and also key players in what is happening.  In fire service terms, researchers 
may even have to think the unthinkable (of officers) that much of what firefighters are doing is right 
and that their struggle with officers might occur because officers’ interests are less in serving the 
public (who despite any arguments to the contrary is the primary stake holder in the fire service) more 
about serving themselves.  Equally as unthinkable, it might be that research should consider whether 
single tier entry promotion is any longer relevant to managing the fire service.   
 
The fire service will also benefit from further research to try and further identify the negative 
and positive attributes associated with how firefighters construct, perpetuate and police their 
masculinity.  It is no good just telling men who are doing a good job for the public that they are 
wrong about the way they form their masculinity.  It is necessary for research to find how to reduce 
the negative factors in this process without disturbing the positive ones.  This is a task that calls for 
careful attention, sensitive awareness of the complexity and paradoxes involved, because if taking 
away the negative points were to result in more people dying in fires, or firefighters’ humanitarian 
calling being broken, then the ends might not justify the means.   
 
Such research might easily be paralleled by research in the police, who at this distance I would 
firmly associate with many of the findings in this thesis
360
.  In particular, my findings regarding 
firefighters’ informal hierarchies (primary reference groups), which provides understandings on how 
The Job is done, how to resist officers and a source of their views of the world could equally apply to 
the police.  Where others have been convinced the police have a problem with their cop/canteen 
culture (Macpherson 1999) I take the view that ‘culture’ is just a word like masculinity, convenient to 
use, but so contextual to the individual or the ‘in’ group that it forms a drifting smoke screen that is 
impossible to pin down
361
.  It is interesting that, like firefighters, the police also see their work as The 
Job: a job that they, as professionals, know how best to do.  I am very aware that when a police 
recruit leaves Hendon they are vulnerable in exactly the same way as the new firefighter probationer.  
They meet the ‘men’ (who they are in awe of), who will teach them The Job and tell them that they 
must forget much of what they have learnt.  The police even have a name for the way they teach new 
recruits, they call it ‘puppy walking’.  The new, and vulnerable, recruit is aware that if they do not 
comply with whatever canteen/cop culture means to the person with the ‘lead’ (and puppy walking 
them), they will not get the information they need to become police officers, or at least most believe 
that is so.  As Macpherson (1999) argues, police racism affects the police’s ability to do their work, 
but all the efforts and all the money spent has not stopped police racism.  Might it be that that research 
in the police could benefit from looking to see if the dynamics between firefighters and officers (that 
this thesis has found) might transfer to the way policing is organised?  It could be that the interaction 
between masculinity, public service ethos and homosociality may be such, that whilst officers might 
create an illusion of being in charge, they may be involved in a struggle of similar proportions to that 
in the fire service.  This might have similar outcomes, as constables and officers, both appearing 
intent on providing a good service, may also be constructing their masculinity at the same time.  And, 
as in the fire service, it may be that constables have a far greater degree of control of how The Job is 
done than otherwise recognised.   
                                                 
360 One way forward might be research aimed at finding if the education of potential recruits for all uniformed public 
services at a much earlier stage, amongst Public and Emergency Service courses in FE and HE, could improve equal 
opportunities.  Researching here might provide some advantage of understanding more about the general aspirations and 
qualities of both young men and young women that attract them to such work before they begin more specialist training on 
the job in whatever service they ultimately choose.  Research should also consider if it is possible to attract a wider section 
of the community to education linked to public services than currently apply to the uniformed services.  It may also be that 
by a specific partnership at an educational level, in which uniformed public servants actually mentor students the learning 
curve might be two-way. 
361 It is my view that Macpherson’s account of cop/canteen culture took the view that is was a simple form of behaviour 
that actually took place in the canteen and took little account of how powerful a group the experienced constables were in 
the police: it is my view that a similar situation exists in the fire service (see McCollin 1999). 
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6.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Traditionally the fire service has always been a male group, who lived and worked (and have always 
been aware that they sometimes died) together.  Firefighters are individuals and as such they construct 
their individual masculinities, but because it would be a monumental task to look at all of these, this 
thesis has sought out the dominant features of what I call ‘firefighters’ masculinity’: the masculinity, 
which ‘all’ firefighters might follow.  From what firefighters have told me it is clear that firefighters 
socially reproduce the main attributes of their masculinity alongside the tests for how their informal 
hierarchy, defines a good firefighter: someone who can get in at a fire whilst ‘others’ outside look on.  
 
With what is a strange sense of irony in this predominantly male group, firefighters have told 
me that living on a watch is like living in a family and the requirement to fit in with their hierarchy on 
the station is a recognised feature of fire service working arrangements; especially because it is at the 
station where firefighters form their protocols for firefighting and decide who can be a good 
firefighter.  Having established this possibility it is just a short leap to establishing that being together 
on the watch provides a sense of security to firefighters, and that their informal hierarchy becomes a 
primary reference group through which they understand the outside world.   
 
Thus in many respects, the fire service is a closed organisation and in no particular order, 
central findings of this thesis conclude that the fire service:  
 provides, with some reservations about FP/CFS, an excellent service to the primary 
stakeholder, the public;  
 restricts entry to those who show working class masculine standards, particularly the 
requirement to be hands-on, fit, strong and able-bodied and a preparedness to ‘prove’ and test 
themselves against those standards;  
 is racist, sexist and homophobic in favour of white, heterosexual males (see Baigent 1996; 
HMIFS 1999); 
 maintains patriarchal traditions and in particular male hierarchies;  
 promotes from within its own organisation; 
 remains secure employment, so firefighters can go to work ‘knowing’ that they do not face job 
insecurity or redundancy; 
 provides employment, which firefighters form an attachment to, enjoy and stick with until they 
are liable for a pension; 
 provides employment that firefighters consider to be worthwhile and they construct a work 
ethic that they defend (on their and the public’s behalf) against their officers and employers 
who seem intent on cutting the service;  
 is a public body with considerable public profile and support; 
 is a symbol (an overt icon) of masculinity at work; 
 provides firefighters with a way of knowing the world (the watch, in particular, becomes a 
primary reference group); 
 allows firefighters to form their subjective view of the standards of a good 
firefighter/masculinity at work, by being an active subject in setting standards for how their 
work is done, then testing themselves against these standards and  reflexively look at 
themselves as objects that achieve these standards.  
 
Nothing in this thesis can fully portray the closeness between groups of firefighters as they congregate 
and develop their primary reference group and how work, talk and play are so synonymous that work 
(including firefighting) can then become almost a social event to be looked forward to.  But this is not 
so for the public, they are frightened of fire and the fact that firefighters ‘go into buildings as 
everyone else is running out’ adds to the view that firefighters might see themselves as a ‘special 
people’ who the public turn to in case of emergency.  In affect, firefighters act out at work how they 
subjectively judge they expect to be seen, by themselves, their peer group and the public.  In so doing 
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they set themselves apart from the ‘others’ who cannot meet their expectations.  It is these ‘special 
people’ that this thesis has studied, a group of ‘special’ men and women. 
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APPENDIX ONE: ESTABLISHMENTS 1998-2000 adapted from HMCIFS, 2000; 2001;FBU, 2000a 
1998-1999 Establish Actual   Male Female White Black Asian Other 
FCDAs         
Manchester 2170 2135 2134 1 2119 12 3 1 
London 5972 5973 5905 68 5710 168 18 77 
Mersyside 1487 1457 1453 4 1450 2 1 4 
S Yorksire 914 907 901 6 894 9 0 4 
Tyne Wear 992 994 993 1 993 0 0 1 
W Midlands 2067 2060 2052 8 1972 43 24 21 
WYorkshire 1736 1723 1717 6 1712 7 4 0 
TOTAL 15338 15249 15155 94 14850 241 50 108 
FA England        
Avon 668 651 643 8 645 6 0 0 
Beds/Luton 315 315 307 8 306 5 1 3 
Buckingham 315 305 300 5 301 4 0 0 
Cambridge 269 263 259 4 256 3 0 4 
Cheshire 618 624 623 1 621 3 0 0 
Cleveland 615 603 603 0 601 0 2 0 
Cornwall 181 183 182 1 182 0 0 1 
Durham/Darl 406 399 398 1 397 2 0 0 
Cumbria 279 277 275 2 276 1 0 0 
Derbyshire 481 472 463 9 467 3 2 0 
Devon 558 558 552 6 555 2 1 0 
Dorset 292 296 295 1 295 0 0 1 
East Sussex 435 431 424 7 428 0 2 1 
Essex 920 914 912 2 911 2 1 0 
Glouc 227 227 223 4 224 2 0 1 
Hampshire 754 766 764 2 764 2 0 0 
HereWorcs. 358 350 346 4 348 2 0 0 
Herts 589 557 553 4 551 1 0 5 
Humberside 710 700 696 4 700 0 0 0 
Isle of Wight 61 61 60 1 61 0 0 0 
IslesScllly 9 9 9 0 9 0 0 0 
Kent 952 938 937 1 934 2 1 1 
Lancashire 1007 1007 1001 6 1003 3 1 0 
Leicester 497 488 484 4 479 4 5 0 
Lincolnshire 193 192 191 1 190 2 0 0 
Norfolk 286 282 280 2 278 4 0 0 
NYorkshire 362 364 357 7 363 0 0 1 
Northamps 297 293 290 3 293 0 0 0 
Northumberl 203 199 198 1 199 0 0 0 
Nottingham 578 586 579 7 579 2 3 2 
Oxfordshire 235 233 231 2 233 0 0 0 
R Berkshire 427 416 415 1 409 2 2 3 
Shropshire 203 201 199 2 201 0 0 0 
Somerset 174 176 176 0 176 0 0 0 
Stafford 494 489 480 9 480 7 0 2 
Suffolk 259 256 253 3 256 0 0 0 
Surrey 729 692 678 14 689 2 1 0 
Warwick 294 291 287 4 287 3 1 0 
W Sussex 394 395 384 11 395 0 0 0 
Wiltshire 212 210 207 3 208 2 0 0 
TOTAL 16856 16669 16514 155 16550 71 23 25 
FA- WALES         
M & W Wales 505 496 493 3 495 1 0 0 
North Wales 284 284 282 2 284 0 0 0 
South Wales 966 958 954 4 953 2 1 2 
TOTAL 1755 1738 1729 9 1732 3 1 2 
G TOTAL 33949 33656 33398 258 33132 315 74 135 
% females 0.7665795 % male 99.233420 %non white 1.1558117 % white 98.844188  
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1999-2000 Establish Actual   Male Female White Black Asian Other 
FCDAs         
Manchester 2155 2071 2070 1 2055 12 3 1 
London 5682 5754 5687 67 5496 167 19 72 
Mersyside 1420 1420 1415 5 1413 4 1 2 
S Yorksire 917 919 908 11 905 9 1 4 
Tyne Wear 1007 1017 1013 4 1015 1 0 1 
W Midlands 2025 2034 2023 11 1968 41 4 21 
WYorkshire 1698 1680 1674 6 1669 7 2 2 
TOTAL 14904 14895 14790 105 14521 241 30 103 
FA England        
Avon 668 661 653 8 654 6 0 1 
Beds/Luton 315 305 298 7 297 4 1 3 
Buckingham 313 307 302 5 303 4 0 0 
Cambridge 269 263 259 4 256 3 0 4 
Cheshire 617 632 632 0 628 2 1 1 
Cleveland 615 589 588 1 584 1 4 0 
Cornwall 181 182 181 1 181 0 0 1 
Durham/Darl 406 402 399 3 400 2 0 0 
Cumbria 277 277 275 2 277 0 0 0 
Derbyshire 481 479 467 12 474 3 2 0 
Devon 555 561 554 7 559 2 0 0 
Dorset 292 294 293 1 293 0 0 1 
East Sussex 427 424 416 8 420 1 2 1 
Essex 919 923 920 3 920 2 1 0 
Glouc 229 224 220 4 220 2 0 2 
Hampshire 756 768 764 4 765 2 1 0 
HereWorcs. 358 353 348 5 350 3 0 0 
Herts 576 581 576 5 575 1 0 5 
Humberside 710 711 707 4 704 2 1 4 
Isle of Wight 61 60 59 1 60 0 0 0 
IslesScllly 9 9 9 0 9 0 0 0 
Kent 952 942 941 1 939 2 1 0 
Lancashire 1013 1008 1002 6 1004 3 1 0 
Leicester 497 495 491 4 487 4 4 0 
Lincolnshire 193 193 191 2 191 2 0 0 
Norfolk 296 298 295 3 294 4 0 0 
NYorkshire 362 349 343 6 348 0 1 0 
Northamps 297 295 292 3 292 0 0 4 
Northumberl 205 205 202 3 204 0 0 1 
Nottingham 578 581 576 5 573 4 1 0 
Oxfordshire 235 235 233 2 235 0 0 0 
R Berkshire 427 409 408 1 403 2 2 2 
Shropshire 203 197 195 2 197 0 0 0 
Somerset 179 175 175 0 174 0 0 1 
Stafford 493 480 473 7 473 6 0 1 
Suffolk 256 249 246 3 249 0 0 0 
Surrey 710 706 692 14 672 4 0 0 
Warwick 294 289 285 4 283 5 1 0 
W Sussex 399 394 379 15 393 0 0  
Wiltshire 216 215 212 3 212 3 0 0 
TOTAL 16839 16720 16551 169 16552 79 24 33 
FA- WALES         
M & W Wales 501 495 493 2 494 1 0 0 
North Wales 289 284 281 3 284 0 0 0 
South Wales 966 975 969 6 970 3 2 0 
TOTAL 1756 1754 1743 11 1748 4 2 0 
G TOTAL 33499* 33369 33084 285 32821* 324 56 136 
% females 0.86% % male 99.1 %non white 1.57 % white 98.43 = 
* in the stats produced by HMCIFS report 1999/2000 these two figures are different 
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Despite two years having elapsed since the Minister for State for the Fire Service set targets for 
minority ethnic* and female recruitment**, the progress is slow.  Compared with the year 1998-1999 
this year’s figures show that out of a total establishment of 33499 uniformed firefighters in England 
and Wales: black recruitment, increased by 9; women’s recruitment, increased by 27.  The statistics 
indicate that Asian recruitment, decreased by 18 (although after checking with a very helpful Robert 
Scholfield at the government statistical office it appears the statistics for Asian’s employed is 
incorrect.  The total Asians employed as fulltime firefighters in 1999 should have read  53 not 74).   It 
is interesting to also note that the totals for 2000 are different for the total employed in the ethnicity 
statistics and gender statistics.  
 
To achieve Ministerial targets for recruitment of female firefighters on today’s establishment of 
33499 there will have to be just over 5000 female firefighters.  This will mean that over 4700 female 
firefighters will have to be recruited, trained and in service by the year 2009.   
 
* Home Office (1999) Race Equality—The Home Secretaries Employment Targets, London: Home 
Office. 
 
** Home Office (2000) Fire Service Circular 1/2000, unpublished internal memorandum. 
 
ADDENDUM 
To provide a more up-to-date view the statistics for 2003 are now added.  The year 2003 was a target 
year for Straw’s (1999) ‘targets’; at this time it was hoped the fire service would employ 3% women.  
Readers can judge for themselves how successful this has been.  
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Avon 620 1 9 2 2             4   1       639 10 
1.6 97.0 0.0 
Bedfordshire & 
Luton 
308 1   5     1 1       3           319 11 
3.4 96.6 0.0 
Buckinghamshire 325   1                 3 1         330 7 
2.1 98.5 0.0 
Cambridgeshire 209 1 6 3 1 2 1       1   1     1 47 273 6 
2.2 76.6 17.2 
Cheshire 618             1       1   2   1   623 6 
1.0 99.2 0.0 
Cleveland 581       1       3       1         586 3 
0.5 99.1 0.0 
Cornwall 191           1                     192 2 
1.0 99.5 0.0 
County Durham & 
Darlington 
405                     1   1       407 5 
1.2 99.5 0.0 
Cumbria 274                                 274 6 
2.2 100.0 0.0 
Derbyshire 461             1     1     3 1     467 14 
3.0 98.7 0.0 
Devon 563                         2       565 11 
1.9 99.6 0.0 
Dorset 300 1             1             2   304 5 
1.6 98.7 0.0 
East Sussex 408   6 1   3         2 1         2 423 10 
2.4 96.5 0.5 
Essex 924   2 2   2 2 1 1     1 1 1       937 15 
1.6 98.6 0.0 
Gloucestershire 222 1           1       3   4   2   233 17 
7.3 95.3 0.0 
Greater 
Manchester 
1,910 9 32 3 1 3   2 2   2 12 3 4 1   155 2,139 13 
0.6 89.3 7.2 
Hampshire 797             1       1           799 10 
1.3 99.7 0.0 
Hereford & 
Worcester 
343 1 2 1   1           2       1   351 12 
3.4 97.7 0.0 
Hertfordshire 536 1 3       6             2     16 564 7 
1.2 95.0 2.8 
Humberside 706 2 4 1 2 2 1         1   2       721 10 
1.4 97.9 0.0 
Isle Of Wight 60   1                             61 1 
1.6 98.4 0.0 
Isles Of Scilly 10                                 10   
0.0 100.0 0.0 
Kent 872   3     1   1     3 2         56 938 9 
1.0 93.0 6.0 
Lancashire 1,005                   1 2           1,008 13 
1.3 99.7 0.0 
Leicestershire 467   1   1     4       3   2       478 3 
0.6 97.7 0.0 
Lincolnshire 187   1 1 1   1         1           192 4 
2.1 97.4 0.0 
London 4,511 88 546 29 17 14 40 21 3 1 9 149 21 41 1 47 220 5,758 123 
2.1 78.3 3.8 
Merseyside 1,328 1                 1   1 6 2 3   1,342 15 
1.1 99.0 0.0 
Mid & West Wales 496 1   1                           498 8 
1.6 99.6 0.0 
Norfolk 15                     1 2       270 288 3 
1.0 5.2 93.8 
North Wales 297                                 297 4 
1.3 100.0 0.0 
North Yorkshire 95 1 4       1                   250 351 9 
2.6 27.1 71.2 
Northamptonshire 202 4 2 1 1   1         1   1     94 307 3 
1.0 65.8 30.6 
Northumberland 204 5                               209 6 
2.9 97.6 0.0 
Nottinghamshire 578   3         3     2 1   2       589 9 
1.5 98.1 0.0 
Oxfordshire 232         1                       233 4 
1.7 99.6 0.0 
Royal Berkshire 409   10     1         2   1 1   3 9 436 4 
0.9 93.8 2.1 
Shropshire 207 2 3 1               1   1   1   216 7 
3.2 95.8 0.0 
Somerset 180                         1       181 2 
1.1 99.4 0.0 
South Wales 963             1 1     3       1   969 6 
0.6 99.4 0.0 
South Yorkshire 888 5 3 3 1 1           7   1 1 4   914 20 
2.2 97.2 0.0 
Staffordshire 452 4 1 5   2 2           2 1 2     471 15 
3.2 96.0 0.0 
Suffolk 197                     1         52 250 8 
3.2 78.8 20.8 
Surrey 705             1       3   1       710 17 
2.4 99.3 0.0 
Tyne & Wear 993           3       2     1       999 12 
1.2 99.4 0.0 
Warwickshire 266             4 1     8           279 8 
2.9 95.3 0.0 
West Midlands 1,747 12 124 1 1 1 1 5 1   1 44 2 9   22   1,971 27 
1.4 88.6 0.0 
West Sussex 332                               63 395 16 
4.1 84.1 15.9 
West Yorkshire 1,649   1 5 1 4   3 7   2 4   2       1,678 24 
1.4 98.3 0.0 
Wiltshire 216           1         4           221 7 
3.2 97.7 0.0 
Total 30,464 141 768 65 30 38 62 51 20 1 29 268 36 92 8 88 1,234 33,395 567 
1.7 91.2 3.7 
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APPENDIX TWO UNIFORMS 
On the day that fire-insurance premiums were due there was a parade of firefighters in the City of 
London.  The distinctive uniform, more there to advertise individual companies, was totally 
inappropriate for firefighting (see Segars 1989).  Dixon (1994) would understand about inappropriate 
uniforms that were designed more to flatter the organisations and to create an image, than to be 
practical (see Strangleman 1997). 
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APPENDIX THREE: RISK ATTENDENCES  
 
  
1. A risk: Three pumps will attend this category two to arrive within 5 minutes and the third 
within 8.  Typically, this area will have a concentration of large buildings such as 
hotels, offices, factories or shops.   
 
2. B risk:  Two pumps will attend this category, one to arrive within 5 minutes and the second 
within 8.  Typically, this area will be similar to A risk, but less concentrated. 
 
3. C risk:  One pump should attend within 8-10 minutes.  However, although not required to do 
so most brigades send two pumps to all fires in buildings.  Typically, this area is urban 
housing where most lives are lost in fires.   
4.  
5. D risk: One pump should arrive within 20 minutes.  As above most Brigades but not all will 
send two appliances to fire-calls in buildings.   Typically, this area will be sparse rural 
but can include small villages. 
6.  
Special risk: In areas considered to be of high risk, such as hospitals, large industrial plants, and 
airports then brigades may provide a special attendance, which may  include special appliances such 
as turntable ladders, hydraulic platforms, emergency tenders, foam tenders or fireboats 
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APPENDIX FOUR: DISCIPLINE 
 
According to the HMCIFS (1999: 38), in the year up to 31-3-99, 410 cases were investigated under the Fire service 
Discipline Regulations and 242 were not proceeded with or were dismissed.     
 1997/8 1998/9 
Dismissal 21 18 
Required to resign 1 8 
Reduction in rank 15 15 
Stoppage of pay 48 42 
Reprimand 58 62 
Caution 44 55 
Total some cases involved more than one 
award. 
187  200 
  
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APPENDIX FIVE: STATISTICS FOR NATIONAL CALLS  
YEAR 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1998% of  
emergency calls 
1998% of 
all calls  
Total calls  988914 1148812 1060845 991435 900287     
Fires  398012 516157 444863 397569 344761 68.57080916 38.29 
Road traffic accidents 28871 31810 32170 34263 34823 6.926077159 3.86 
Special services not road traffic accidents 134265 153975 152690 129368 123197 24.50311368 13.68 
False alarms 427766 446870 430034 430235 397506   44.15 
Total fires and special services 590902 632655 614894 593866 555526 100 100 
Breakdown for Fires 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998%   
Fires involving property or causalities  165447 169978 175267 171188 169688 49.21902419   
New fires 4428 5151 4502 4583 4489 1.302061428   
Chimney  18106 15862 18291 13952 11810 3.425561476   
Small fires such as grass and rubbish 210031 325166 246803 207846 158774 46.0533529   
Total fires 398012 516157 444863 397569 344761 100   
Fatalities 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998%   
Dwellings 385 460 454 455 407 75.93283582   
Other buildings 36 41 28 27 27 5.037313433   
Road vehicles 72 77 59 75 59 11.00746269   
Other locations 42 49 47 48 43 8.02238806   
Total fatalities in fires 535 627 588 605 536 100   
Rescues               
By fire service  3419 3624 3835 3964 3896 57.90725327   
By people other than firefighters 2683 2549 2586 2756 2832 42.09274673   
Total people rescued in fires 6102 6173 6420 6720 6728 100   
Special Services               
Road Traffic Accidents 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998%   
People rescued  7215 7429 8091 8249 8823 25.33670275   
Not involving rescue of people 21656 24381 24079 26014 26000 74.66329725   
Total road traffic accidents 28871 31810 32170 34263 34823 100   
Special Services (not RTA) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998%   
Spills and leaks 12060 14035 13623 14068 13679 11.10335479   
Water removal/provision 13411 18182 15149 13631 13759 11.16829144   
Effecting an entry 26195 27172 27510 15887 14871 12.07091082   
Lift  23233 24648 23289 24241 23889 19.39089426   
Making safe 4037 3764 4504 7643 4379 3.554469671   
Animal rescue 6031 6934 6510 6624 6242 5.066681819   
Standby or precautionary for hazards 2153 2256 2384 2277 1961 1.59175954   
Other 47145 56984 59721 44997 44417     
Breakdown of other for 98/9               
Brigade not required         15561 12.63098939   
Provision of advice         6961 5.650299926   
Rescue/release of people         8839 7.174687695   
Removal of objects from people         4382 3.556904795   
Assisting police investigations         2032 1.649390813   
Industrial accidents people trapped/injured         324 0.262993417   
First Aid         1731 1.405066682   
Aircraft accidents         386 0.313319318   
Railway accidents         95 0.077112267   
Recovery of objects         550 0.446439443   
Suicide         706 0.573065903   
Farming accidents         83 0.06737177   
Sports activity accident         77 0.062501522   
Others unspecified         2690 2.183494728   
Total for special services not road traffic 
accidents 134265 153975 152690 129368 123197 100   
Total for road traffic accidents 28871 31810 32170 34263 34823     
Total for all special services 163136 185785 184860 163631 158020     
Statistics produced from HMCIFS, 1999; Home Office 1999b.  All fire statistics are for calendar year.  All special 
service incidents are for financial year. 
  
181 
 
APPENDIX SIX: LONDON CALLS 
         
Fig 1       new system  
Call type 1996/7 % 1997/8 % 1998/9 % 1999/00 % 
Primary fire (inside building) 20418 10.7166476 20216 11.9959 19822 12.3338 22088 12.6532 
Secondary fire (in the open) 32279 16.94204466 26183 15.5367 21199 13.1906 27170 15.5644 
Chimney fire 154 0.080828863 101 0.05993 96 0.05973 92 0.05270 
False alarm – automatic 33891 17.78812341 40593 24.0875 43272 26.9251 47976 27.4833 
False alarm - good intent 21894 11.49134501 18603 11.0388 15698 9.76778 14113 8.08471 
False alarm - malicious 15879 8.334295582 13817 8.19888 12995 8.08589 12534 7.18017 
Special Service 65813 34.54279206 48344 28.6868 47162 29.3456 50089 28.6937 
Flood call** 198 0.103922824 666 0.39519 468 0.29120 502 0.28757 
TOTAL CALLS*** 190526 100 168523 100 160712 100 174564 100 
         
 
 
 
 
Fig 2     1998/9  1999/00  
Fire deaths     78  77  
Fire injuries     1777  1626  
Fire rescues     685  239  
details for deaths, injuries and rescues 
only available for financial years 1998/9 
and 1999/2000 
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 LFB percentile stations: for all emergencies; for all fires.         
 Fig 3   
         LFB ALL EMERGENCY CALLS PERCENTILES*, yellow highlight indicates the average calls a firefighter might attend  
 FINANCIAL YEAR 96-97 all calls 97-98 all calls 98-99 all calls 99-00 all calls 
 
STATIONS* 
Valid 111 111 111 111 
 Missing 3 3 3 3 
   Mean 1696 1495 1425 1547 
         Firefighter      Firefighter      Firefighter     Firefighter 
 
Percentiles 
1 189 Biggin Hill 47 200 Biggin Hill 50 171 Biggin Hill 42 166 Biggin Hill 41 
 25 1121 Woodford 280 968 Bexley 242 979 Surbington 244 1017 Eltham 254 
 50 1694 Croydon 423 1402 Stanmore 350 1352 Barking 338 1468 Bow 367 
 75 2090 Hornsey 522 1896 Hornsey 474 1753 Shoreditch 438 1943 Enfield 485 
 100 3747 Soho 936 3697 Soho 924 3696 Soho 924 3954 Soho 988 
               
               
 Fig 4              
 LFB FDR1 FIRE CALLS PERCENTILES*;  yellow highlight indicates the average calls a firefighter might attend 
 FINANCIAL YEAR 96-97 fire calls 97-98 fire calls 98-99 fire calls 99-00 fire calls 
 
STATIONS* 
Valid 111 111 111 111 
 Missing 3 3 3 3 
   Mean 182 180 177 198 
       Firefighter    Firefighter   Firefighter    Firefighter 
 
Percentiles 
1 48 Biggin Hill 12 46 Biggin Hill 12 40 Biggin Hill 10 50 Biggin Hill 12 
 25 122 Westminster 30 125 Addington 31 130 Wallington 32 138 Addington 34 
 50 172 Woodside 43 166 Lewisham 41 164 Lewisham 41 182 Hornchurch 45 
 75 236 Norbury 59 232 Stanmore 58 224 Mitcham  56 257 Hammersmith 64 
 100 373 Tottenham 93 400 Southall 100 391 Tottenham 97 431 Tottenham 107 
               
 * Not including Barbican, Shooters Hill and Heathrow.             
 Applies only to calls on stations ground; this does not include calls when one station provides part of the attendance for another stations calls,    
 e.g. if a one pump station gets a fire call the second pump for the attendance comes from the next nearest station and this is not get recorded in the statistics  
 The figure for firefighter relates to the annual amount of fire calls divided by 4 (because the calls are shared between 4 watches    
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 Stats provided by LFB; placed into SPSS and correlated; and worked in Excell to produce charts.       
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E42 BIGGIN HILL 189 200 171 166 49 45 44 48 39 52 39 37 4 4 2 2 50 60 47 47 . . . . . . . 0 
F35 WOODFORD 1121 655 592 742 111 104 122 121 495 197 96 164 . 1 1 . 246 164 142 209 1 5 1 . . . . 6 
H37 WALLINGTON 1037 862 789 856 163 134 130 150 223 169 109 150 3 . . 1 259 202 190 194 . 5 . . . . . 5 
H26 ADDINGTON 1042 866 725 924 138 125 121 138 320 301 203 344 2 3 1 1 306 230 168 194 2 1 1 . . . . 2 
F39 HORNCHURCH 1001 890 864 990 133 119 145 182 324 259 190 236 2 1 4 4 225 196 218 226 . 2 . . . . . 2 
E30 ELTHAM 825 643 888 1017 108 127 157 184 182 144 226 287 . . . . 216 147 193 214 1 6 . . 1 . . 7 
H28 WOODSIDE 1252 964 1023 1047 172 164 147 200 220 181 148 205 1 . 1 . 487 325 407 294 . 3 . . 1 . . 4 
E28 BEXLEY 966 968 958 1131 158 159 139 156 285 210 238 294 2 . . 1 191 202 196 235 5 2 2 . . . . 4 
H39 SURBITON 1151 1103 979 1160 130 122 126 142 159 125 107 137 1 2 . 2 254 231 190 239 39 2 1 . . . . 3 
E21 LEWISHAM 1576 1395 1324 1297 156 166 164 153 257 194 114 123 1 1 . . 520 370 370 362 6 1 . . . . . 1 
G22 STANMORE 1562 1402 1403 1334 210 232 185 168 189 157 144 146 . 1 1 1 464 314 283 335 5 4 1 . . . . 5 
F27 BOW 1450 1362 1384 1468 138 157 163 171 329 283 250 305 . . . . 656 595 599 638 3 6 . . . . . 6 
H36 MITCHAM 1610 1378 1211 1511 228 208 224 271 412 327 237 471 2 2 . 1 411 323 289 312 1 5 . . . . . 5 
H32 NORBURY 1913 1695 1389 1530 236 235 237 297 360 325 229 310 1 1 . 2 649 532 452 443 2 7 . . . . . 7 
F43 BARKING 1810 1590 1352 1651 257 222 247 306 438 405 339 490 . . . . 584 543 419 369 1 7 1 1 . . . 9 
H31 CROYDON 1694 1636 1566 1702 228 234 222 243 261 201 128 186 2 . 2 2 532 430 448 442 2 10 1 . . . . 11 
A32 HORNSEY 2090 1896 1849 1863 247 295 298 293 178 184 189 192 4 1 . 2 799 506 482 500 2 5 1 1 . . . 7 
F24 SHOREDITCH 1385 1289 1753 1942 113 114 140 156 181 185 174 226 3 1 . . 663 546 765 780 2 10 1 . . . 1 12 
A35 ENFIELD 1966 1898 1662 1943 271 247 286 300 475 298 188 312 2 1 2 2 434 332 316 408 . 5 1 . . . . 6 
A25 WESTMINSTER 2064 1970 1879 1987 122 110 128 127 137 97 108 122 1 1 . . 722 643 580 694 4 4 . . . . . 4 
G24 SOUTHALL 2206 2152 2160 2131 306 400 372 392 375 301 278 264 2 . . . 606 387 388 395 1 6 2 1 . . 1 10 
G36 HAMMERSMITH 2799 2436 2308 2348 291 262 238 257 217 197 157 178 1  . 1 1 1154 809 767 789 4 2 . . . . . 2 
A33 TOTTENHAM 3330 2778 2745 2891 373 372 391 431 586 417 289 440 2 2 2 2 1264 787 829 800 4 10 . . . . . 10 
A24 SOHO 3747 3697 3696 3954 226 237 247 203 253 212 177 200 1 . . . 814 756 763 826 6 11 . . . . . 11 
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E42 BIGGIN HILL 19 13 9 15 24 25 25 13 4 3 5 4 
F35 WOODFORD 98 84 126 128 116 83 83 84 55 30 22 36 
H37 WALLINGTON 183 178 208 241 127 98 98 74 79 65 54 46 
H26 ADDINGTON 62 54 70 103 80 74 74 68 134 77 88 76 
F39 HORNCHURCH 115 142 152 226 119 108 108 89 83 68 47 27 
E30 ELTHAM 92 81 131 113 81 78 78 112 146 75 103 107 
H28 WOODSIDE 137 92 130 135 139 96 96 114 96 83 94 99 
E28 BEXLEY 84 170 176 281 184 135 135 97 62 61 74 67 
H39 SURBITON 392 451 418 469 148 95 95 102 67 68 43 69 
E21 LEWISHAM 209 331 428 378 246 102 102 101 187 182 146 180 
G22 STANMORE 317 405 460 453 280 171 171 117 102 100 159 114 
F27 BOW 107 122 186 198 119 80 80 70 101 117 106 86 
H36 MITCHAM 161 233 212 229 184 107 107 113 212 156 142 114 
H32 NORBURY 199 218 198 216 218 136 136 148 250 203 137 114 
F43 BARKING 116 97 96 139 168 117 117 176 247 171 134 171 
H31 CROYDON 333 477 539 566 211 149 149 159 127 86 78 104 
A32 HORNSEY 419 501 404 507 244 194 194 149 199 195 282 220 
F24 SHOREDITCH 238 247 457 503 96 129 129 172 91 89 88 105 
A35 ENFIELD 305 635 502 582 297 234 234 190 182 137 134 149 
A25 WESTMINSTER 762 833 816 845 196 150 150 119 124 115 97 80 
G24 SOUTHALL 339 405 664 681 318 228 228 192 260 349 230 207 
G36 HAMMERSMITH 694 727 756 754 261 207 207 229 181 183 182 140 
A33 TOTTENHAM 274 452 582 667 440 295 295 253 391 353 357 298 
A24 SOHO 1442 1726 1853 
233
8 769 497 497 245 242 189 159 142 
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LFB Make-ups        
Fig 6         
LFB: Makeup incidents (including Special Services) for financial years 1995-99  
Amount 
of pumps 
4 6 8 10 12 15-20 Total  
1995/6 492 66 16 9 2 4 589  
1996/7 516 89 13 3 3 9 633  
1997/8 507 72 13 11 1 5 609  
1998/9 505 57 8 6 2 3 581  
         
264 senior officers share these makeups (88 are station commanders: operational ADO)  
Fig 7         
Breakdown of makeups (including Special Services) for financial year 1998-9 for all LFB stations 
Amount of pumps 4 6 8 10 12 15-20 Total 
Station         
A21 PADDINGTON 13 2 . 1 1 . 17 
A22 MANCHESTER SQUARE 4 2 . . . . 6 
A23 EUSTON 2 . . . . . 2 
A24 SOHO 11 . . . . . 11 
A25 WESTMINSTER 4 . . . . . 4 
A26 KNIGHTSBRIDGE 2 . 1 . . . 3 
A27 CLERKENWELL 6 1 . . . . 7 
A28 DOWGATE 2 . . . . . 2 
A28 BARBICAN . . . . . . 0 
A30 ISLINGTON 2 1 . . . . 3 
A31 HOLLOWAY 8 . . . . . 8 
A32 HORNSEY 5 1 1 . . . 7 
A33 TOTTENHAM 10 . . . . . 10 
A34 EDMONTON 6 . . . . . 6 
A35 ENFIELD 5 1 . . . . 6 
A36 SOUTHGATE 6 1 . . . . 7 
A37 BARNET . . . . . . 0 
A38 MILL HILL 8 . . . . . 8 
A39 FINCHLEY 1 . . . . . 1 
A40 HENDON 3 . . . . . 3 
A41 WEST HAMPSTEAD 2 1 1 . . . 4 
A42 BELSIZE 3 . . . . . 3 
A43 KENTISH TOWN 5 1 . . . . 6 
E21 LEWISHAM 1 . . . . . 1 
E22 GREENWICH 1 1 . . . . 2 
E23 EAST GREENWICH 5 2 . . . . 7 
E24 WOOLWICH 2 . . . . . 2 
E25 PLUMSTEAD 1 . . . . . 1 
E26 SHOOTERS HILL . . . . . . 0 
E27 ERITH 6 2 . . . . 8 
E28 BEXLEY 2 2 . . . . 4 
E29 LEE GREEN 1 . . . . . 1 
E30 ELTHAM 6 . . 1 . . 7 
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E31 FOREST HILL 7 . . . . . 7 
E32 DOWNHAM 5 . . . . . 5 
E33 SOUTHWARK 3 . . . . . 3 
E34 DOCKHEAD 3 . . . . . 3 
E35 OLD KENT ROAD 2 . . . . 1 3 
           
E36 DEPTFORD 5 . . . . . 5 
E37 PECKHAM 7 . . 1 . . 8 
E38 NEW CROSS 4 1 . . . . 5 
E39 BROMLEY 1 1 . . . . 2 
E40 SIDCUP 3 . . . . . 3 
E41 ORPINGTON 1 . . . . . 1 
E42 BIGGIN HILL . . . . . . 0 
E43 BECKENHAM 6 . . . . . 6 
F21 STRATFORD 11 . . . 1 . 12 
F22 POPLAR 7 1 . . . . 8 
F23 MILLWALL 2 . . . . . 2 
F24 SHOREDITCH 10 1 . . . 1 12 
F25 SHADWELL 1 . . . . . 1 
F26 BETHNAL GREEN 6 . . . . . 6 
F27 BOW 6 . . . . . 6 
F28 HOMERTON 7 1 . . . . 8 
F29 LEYTON 7 1 . . . . 8 
F30 LEYTONSTONE 4 . . . . . 4 
F31 KINGSLAND 5 1 . . . . 6 
F32 STOKE NEWINGTON 6 1 . . . . 7 
F33 WHITECHAPEL 5 1 . . . . 6 
F34 CHINGFORD 2 . . . . . 2 
F35 WOODFORD 5 1 . . . . 6 
F36 WALTHAMSTOW 8 1 . . . . 9 
F37 HAINAULT 2 . . . . . 2 
F38 ROMFORD 3 2 . . . . 5 
F39 HORNCHURCH 2 . . . . . 2 
F40 WENNINGTON 4 . . . . . 4 
F41 DAGENHAM 10 3 . . . . 13 
F42 ILFORD 10 . . . . . 10 
F43 BARKING 7 1 1 . . . 9 
F44 EAST HAM 7 . . 1 . . 8 
F45 PLAISTOW 9 1 . . . . 10 
F46 SILVERTOWN 5 1 . . . . 6 
G21 HARROW 3 . . . . . 3 
G22 STANMORE 4 1 . . . . 5 
G23 HILLINGDON 2 1 . . . . 3 
G24 SOUTHALL 6 2 1 . . 1 10 
G25 EALING 5 1 . . . . 6 
G26 ACTON 3 1 . . . . 4 
G27 NORTH KENSINGTON 5 1 . . . . 6 
G28 WILLESDEN 3 . . . . . 3 
G29 PARK ROYAL 1 . . . . . 1 
G30 WEMBLEY 5 . . . . . 5 
G31 NORTHOLT 4 . . . . . 4 
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G32 RUISLIP 3 1 . . . . 4 
G33 KENSINGTON 5 2 . . . . 7 
G34 CHELSEA 3 2 . . . . 5 
G35 FULHAM 4 . . . . . 4 
G36 HAMMERSMITH 2 . . . . . 2 
G37 CHISWICK 3 . . . . . 3 
G38 HESTON 9 . 1 . . . 10 
G39 FELTHAM 6 . . . . . 6 
G40 HAYES 3 . . . . . 3 
G56 HEATHROW 2 . . . . . 2 
H21 CLAPHAM 6 . . . . . 6 
H22 LAMBETH 3 1 . . . . 4 
H24 BRIXTON 11 1 . . . . 12 
H25 WEST NORWOOD 7 . . . . . 7 
H26 ADDINGTON 1 1 . . . . 2 
H27 BATTERSEA 4 2 . . . . 6 
H28 WOODSIDE 3 . . 1 . . 4 
H29 PURLEY . . . . . . 0 
H31 CROYDON 10 1 . . . . 11 
H32 NORBURY 7 . . . . . 7 
H33 WANDSWORTH 2 1 1 . . . 4 
H34 WIMBLEDON 4 . . 1 . . 5 
H35 TOOTING 7 . . . . . 7 
H36 MITCHAM 5 . . . . . 5 
H37 WALLINGTON 5 . . . . . 5 
H38 SUTTON 9 . . . . . 9 
H39 SURBITON 2 1 . . . . 3 
H40 NEW MALDEN 3 . . . . . 3 
H41 KINGSTON 2 . . . . . 2 
H42 RICHMOND . . 1 . . . 1 
H43 TWICKENHAM 2 . . . . . 2 
Statistics produced from those provided by London Fire Brigade     
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APPENDIX SEVEN: ARTISTIC IMPRESSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Vigor (1892)                              Millais (1855) 
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12. IMAGES OF FIREFIGHTERS 
 
 
(UK firefighter publications 2001) 
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Gay News, November 1998. 
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APPENDIX NINE: TEBBIT  
 
I HAVE good reason to be grateful to the fire service. Whenever I have needed them, they have 
been there.  Fire officers risked their lives to save mine, and those of my wife and other victims of 
the IRA/Sinn Fein bombing at Brighton. When my car caught fire, when my house caught fire, the 
Fire Brigade was there. They were prompt, they were efficient. They were full of kindness and 
humanity. Sad to say, there are complaints by the- bucket-load about the police, but happily very 
few against our fire services. Indeed a Home Office report stresses its high standards and the 
public's high regard. 
 
But in this lunatic, politically correct world, to do a tough job well and to satisfy the public is not 
enough to avoid a barrage of snide criticism, sneers and jeers and threats from a Government 
department notorious for its failures on crime, immigration, protection of children and the 
management of prisons. The firefighters are condemned, not for failing to put out fires but for a 
failure to 'come to terms with homosexuality and 'sexist’ behaviour. 
 
The men on the fire engine told the Home Office they liked the ‘militaristic’ structure, the 
regimental ethos, the action-man image and the spirit of service.  The creepy, weak-kneed, pen-
pushing, hermaphrodite officials say all that is junk and Mr Mike O'Brien, a Home Office Minister 
who would probably have difficulty in extinguishing the candles on a birthday cake, says: “It is 
time the Fire Service began to understand that society is changing and it is time it began changing, 
too”. 
 
For goodness sake, not many public services are doing their jobs as well as the Fire Service.  
Because society is changing for the worse why should the Fire Service have to follow suit? The 
Minister says it should be representative of the community it serves.  Balderdash - to put it mildly. 
When I was trying to control a fire in my house I did not ask the firemen men why they had not got 
a disabled, lesbian, single mother with them. All I cared about was whether they could put out the 
fire.  Clearly, the Minister thinks I am barmy. His priority is a politically correct fire service. If he is 
ever buried alive in the rubble of a building or his house goes up in flames, he might change his 
mind.  
 
In a rational world the firemen's union would support its members.  Not these days. Andy Gilchrist, 
national officer of the Fire Brigades Union, said: “If there is anyone in the - Fire Service who does 
not want to turn this report into action they should get out of the way now”.  Well chaps, you know 
why you pay this creature's salary - so that when you need help he can kick you in the teeth. 
Tebbit 1999.  
 
 
 
 
Addendum  2005 
Fire Services Act (2004) 
The fire service was involved in a further round of industrial action in 2002 when the FBU lodged a 
pay claim (Seifert and Sibley 2005), which quickly turned to strike action, when the employers 
refused to pay the 40% the FBU were demanding.  At this stage government stepped in to establish 
an ‘independent’ enquiry (Bain 2002).  The FBU did not take part in this enquiry because they 
claimed it was not independent and Professor Burchill, the then independent chair of the National 
Joint Council (NJC) supports this view (Burchill 2004).  Nonetheless almost as bystanders the FBU 
watched as a white paper (ODPM 2003) and a new Fire Services Act (HMG 2004) changed the 
(formal) face of what was now to be called the Fire and Rescue Service.   
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Despite the way that government railroaded through change the FBU negotiated a substantial pay 
rise although there were many conditions attached.  Most of these conditions related to the new role 
of the renamed fire and rescue service to become a modernised organisation that would start to 
focus more on prevention than suppression.  The government had perhaps waited a long time for 
this opportunity to modernise the fire service and their actions indicate that when government 
concentrate on an area it is possible to achieve considerable change.  However many of the 
transformational changes (Burke 2002) that were expected stalled when government’s gaze moved 
to more important issues - something that may well have been predicted given the complex nature 
of fire service cultures and the ability of the FBU to mount resistance.  
 
Nonetheless the change in the fire service is considerable.  There is a new rank structure that 
emphasis the role of those who lead as managers rather than officers.  Each fire authority has to 
provide a Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) for how their fire service will be organised 
taking into account the framework set by government (ODPM 2006).  Fire services then take part in 
a Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) in which they are audited for success (Audit 
Commission 2005; Audit Commission 2007).  Eager to get a high score in their CPA each fire 
service is now subject to an ongoing modernisation programme using performance indicators, 
performance management, Integrated Personal Development Systems (IPDS) (ODPM 2005) and a 
whole lot more.     
 
